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  1. Kristin Andrews (2009). Telling Tales. Philosophical Psychology 22 (2):227-235.
    In the twenty-five or so years since Paul Churchland (1981) proposed its elimination, defenders of folk psychology have argued for the ubiquity of propositional attitude attribution in human social cognition. If we didn’t understand others in terms of their beliefs and desires, we would see others as ‘‘baffling ciphers’’ (Dennett, 1991, p. 29) and it would be ‘‘the end of the world’’ (Fodor, 1990, p. 156). Because the world continues, and we seem to predict and explain what others do (...)
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  2. Kristin Andrews (2008). It's in Your Nature: A Pluralistic Folk Psychology. Synthese 165 (1):13 - 29.
    I suggest a pluralistic account of folk psychology according to which not all predictions or explanations rely on the attribution of mental states, and not all intentional actions are explained by mental states. This view of folk psychology is supported by research in developmental and social psychology. It is well known that people use personality traits to predict behavior. I argue that trait attribution is not shorthand for mental state attributions, since traits are not identical to beliefs or desires, and (...)
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  3. Lynne Rudder Baker (1993). Eliminativism and an Argument From Science. Mind and Language 8 (2):180-188.
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  4. Lynne Rudder Baker (1990). A Reply to Johnson's "Review of Saving Belief". Behavior and Philosophy 18 (2):67 - 68.
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  5. Lynne Rudder Baker (1988). Cognitive Suicide. In Robert H. Grimm & D. D. Merrill (eds.), Contents of Thought. University of Arizona Press.
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  6. Lynne Rudder Baker (1987). The Threat of Cognitive Suicide. In , Saving Belief. Princeton University Press.
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  7. Berm (2006). Arguing for Eliminativism. In Brian L. Keeley (ed.), Paul Churchland. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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  8. Rod Bertolet (1994). Saving Eliminativism. Philosophical Psychology 7 (1):87-100.
    This paper contests Lynne Rudder Baker's claim to have shown that eliminative materialism is bound to fail on purely conceptual grounds. It is argued that Baker's position depends on knowing that certain developments in science cannot occur, and that we cannot know that this is so. Consequently, the sort of argument Baker provides is question-begging. For similar reasons, the confidence that the proponents of eliminative materialism have in it is misplaced.
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  9. John Bickle (1992). Revisionary Physicalism. Biology and Philosophy 7 (4):411-30.
    The focus of much recent debate between realists and eliminativists about the propositional attitudes obscures the fact that a spectrum of positions lies between these celebrated extremes. Appealing to an influential theoretical development in cognitive neurobiology, I argue that there is reason to expect such an “intermediate” outcome. The ontology that emerges is a revisionary physicalism. The argument draws lessons about revisionistic reductions from an important historical example, the reduction of equilibrium thermodynamics to statistical mechanics, and applies them to the (...)
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  10. Paul K. Blunt (1992). A Defense of Folk Psychology. International Philosophical Quarterly 32 (4):487-98.
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  11. R. Bogdan (ed.) (1991). Mind and Common Sense. Cambridge University Press.
    The contributors to this volume examine current controversies about the importance of common sense psychology for our understanding of the human mind.
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  12. Radu J. Bogdan (1988). Mental Attitudes and Common Sense Psychology: The Case Against Elimination. Noûs 22 (September):369-398.
    Aside from brute force, there are several philosophically respectable ways of eliminating the mental. In recent years the most popular elimination strategy has been directed against our common sense or folk psychological understanding of the mental. The strategy goes by the name of eliminative materialism (or eliminativism, in short). The motivation behind this strategy seems to be the following. If common sense psychology can be construed as the principled theory of the mental, whose vocabulary and principles implicitly define what counts (...)
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  13. Keith Campbell (1993). What Motivates Eliminativism? Mind and Language 8 (2):206-210.
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  14. Nick Chater & Mike Oaksford (1996). The Falsity of Folk Theories: Implications for Psychology and Philosophy. In W. O'Donahue & Richard F. Kitchener (eds.), The Philosophy of Psychology. Sage Publications. 244--256.
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  15. Colin Cheyne (1993). Reduction, Elimination, and Firewalking. Philosophy of Science 60 (2):349-357.
    Schwartz (1991) argues that the worry that successful reduction would eliminate rather than conserve the mental is a needless worry. He examines cases of reduction from the natural sciences and claims that if reduction of the mental is like any of those cases then it would not be a case of elimination. I discuss other cases of scientific reduction which do involve elimination. Schwartz has not shown that reduction of the mental could not be like such cases, so his argument (...)
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  16. Noam Chomsky (1995). Language and Nature. Mind 104 (413):1-61.
  17. Patricia S. Churchland (1980). Language, Thought, and Information Processing. Noûs 14 (May):147-70.
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  18. Paul M. Churchland (2007). The Evolving Fortunes of Eliminative Materialism. In Brian P. McLaughlin & Jonathan D. Cohen (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell.
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  19. Paul M. Churchland (2006). Eliminative Materialism [Selection From Matter and Consciousness]. In Maureen Eckert (ed.), Theories of Mind: An Introductory Reader. Rowman and Littlefield. 115.
    The identity theory was called into doubt not because the prospects for a materialist account of our mental capacities were thought to be poor, but because it seemed unlikely that the arrival of an adequate materialist theory would bring with it the nice one-to-one match-ups, between the concepts of folk psychology and the concepts of theoretical neuroscience, that intertheoretic reduction requires. The reason for that doubt was the great variety of quite different physical systems that could instantiate the required functional (...)
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  20. Paul M. Churchland (1993). Theory, Taxonomy, and Methodology: A Reply to Haldane's Understanding Folk. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 67:313-19.
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  21. Paul M. Churchland (1993). Evaluating Our Self-Conception. Mind and Language 8 (2):211-22.
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  22. Paul M. Churchland (1989). A Neurocomputational Perspective: The Nature of Mind and the Structure of Science. MIT Press.
    A Neurocomputationial Perspective illustrates the fertility of the concepts and data drawn from the study of the brain and of artificial networks that model the...
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  23. Paul M. Churchland (1985). On the Speculative Nature of Our Self-Conception. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 11:157-173.
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  24. Paul M. Churchland (1981). Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes. Journal of Philosophy 78 (February):67-90.
    This article describes a theory of the computations underlying the selection of coordinated motion patterns, especially in reaching tasks. The central idea is that when a spatial target is selected as an object to be reached, stored postures are evaluated for the contributions they can make to the task. Weights are assigned to the stored postures, and a single target posture is found by taking a weighted sum of the stored postures. Movement is achieved by reducing the distance between the (...)
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  25. Andy Clark (1996). Dealing in Futures: Folk Psychology and the Role of Representations in Cognitive Science. In Robert N. McCauley (ed.), The Churchlands and Their Critics. Blackwell.
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  26. Andy Clark (1993). The Varieties of Eliminativism: Sentential, Intentional and Catastrophic. Mind and Language 8 (2):223-233.
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  27. Andrew Cling (1991). The Empirical Virtues of Belief. Philosophical Psychology 4 (3):303-23.
    Abstract Meeting the eliminativist challenge to folk psychology requires showing that beliefs have explanatory virtues unlikely to be duplicated by non?cognitive accounts of behavior. The explanatory power of beliefs is rooted in their intentionality. That beliefs have a distinctive kind of intentionality is shown by the distinctive intensionality of the sentences which report them. Contrary to Fodor, the fundamental explanatory virtues of beliefs are not to be found in their capacity to make causally inactive properties relevant to the explanation of (...)
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  28. Andrew Cling (1990). Disappearance and Knowledge. Philosophy of Science 57 (2):226-47.
    Paul Churchland argues that the continuity of human intellectual development provides evidence against folk psychology and traditional epistemology, since these latter find purchase only at the later stages of intellectual development. He supports this contention with an analogy from the history of thermodynamics. Careful attention to the thermodynamics analogy shows that the argument from continuity does not provide independent support for eliminative materialism. The argument also rests upon claims about continuity which do not support the claim that the continuity of (...)
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  29. Andrew Cling (1989). Eliminative Materialism and Self-Referential Inconsistency. Philosophical Studies 56 (May):53-75.
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  30. Eric Dietrich (ed.) (1994). Thinking Computers and Virtual Persons. Academic Press.
  31. Christina E. Erneling (ed.) (2004). The Mind As a Scientific Object: Between Brain and Culture. Oxford University Press.
    Clearly the Cartesian ontological commitments that have dominated the scientific study of the mind up to the present have not been helpful. ...
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  32. Christina E. Erneling & D. Johnson (eds.) (2005). Mind As a Scientific Object. Oxford University Press.
  33. J. A. Fodor (1985). Fodor's Guide to Mental Representation: The Intelligent Auntie's Vade-Mecum. Mind 94 (373):76-100.
  34. Jeffrey E. Foss (1985). A Materialist's Misgivings About Eliminative Materialism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 11:105-33.
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  35. Elizabeth Fricker (1993). The Threat of Eliminativism. Mind and Language 8 (2):253-281.
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  36. Francisco Calvo Garzón (2001). Can We Turn a Blind Eye to Eliminativism? International Journal of Philosophical Studies 9 (4):485 – 498.
    In this paper I shall reply to two arguments that Stephen Stich (1990; 1991; 1996) has recently put forward against the thesis of eliminative materialism. In a nutshell, Stich argues that (i) the thesis of eliminative materialism, according to which propositional attitudes don't exist, is neither true nor false, and that (ii) even if it were true, that would be philosophically uninteresting. To support (i) and (ii) Stich relies on two premises: (a) that the job of a theory of reference (...)
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  37. Roger Gibson (1995). Contents. Atascadero: Ridgeview.
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  38. Roger Gibson (1995). A Note on Boghossian's Master Argument. In Contents. Atascadero: Ridgeview. 222-226.
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  39. George Graham & Terence E. Horgan (1994). Southern Fundamentalism and the End of Philosophy. Philosophical Issues 5:219-247.
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  40. John D. Greenwood (1992). Against Eliminative Materialism: From Folk Psychology to Volkerpsychologie. Philosophical Psychology 5 (4):349-68.
    In this paper it is argued that we would not be logically obliged or rationally inclined to reject the ontology of contentful psychological states postulated by folk psychology even if the explanations advanced by folk psychology turned out to be generally inaccurate or inadequate. Moreover, it is argued that eliminativists such as Paul Churchland do not establish that folk psychological explanations are, or are likely to prove, generally inaccurate or inadequate. Most of Churchland's arguments—based upon developments within connectionist neuroscience—only cast (...)
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  41. John D. Greenwood (1991). Reasons to Believe. In , The Future of Folk Psychology. Cambridge University Press. 70.
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  42. John D. Greenwood (ed.) (1991). The Future of Folk Psychology: Intentionality and Cognitive Science. Cambridge University Press.
    The essays in this volume are concerned with our everyday and developed scientific systems of explanation of human behavior in terms of beliefs, attitudes,...
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  43. Robert H. Grimm & D. D. Merrill (eds.) (1988). Contents of Thought. University of Arizona Press.
  44. John J. Haldane (1993). Theory, Realism and Common Sense: A Reply to Paul Churchland. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 93:321-327.
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  45. John J. Haldane (1988). Understanding Folk. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 62:222-46.
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  46. Barbara Hannan (1993). Don't Stop Believing: The Case Against Eliminative Materialism. Mind and Language 8 (2):165-179.
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  47. Barbara Hannan (1990). `Non-Scientific Realism' About Propositional Attitudes as a Response to Eliminativist Arguments. Behavior and Philosophy 18 (2):21-31.
    Two arguments are discussed which have been advanced in support of eliminative materialism: the argument from reductionism and the argument from functionalism. It is contended that neither of these arguments is effective if "non-scientific realism" is adopted with regard to commonsense propositional attitude psychology and its embedded notions. "Non-scientific realism," the position that commonsense propositional attitude psychology is an independently legitimate descriptive/explanatory framework, neither in competition with science nor vulnerable to being shown false by science, is defended.
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  48. David Henderson & Terry Horgan (2004). What Does It Take to Be a True Believer? In Christina E. Erneling & David Martel Johnson (eds.), Mind As a Scientific Object: Between Brain and Culture. Oxford University Press. 211.
    Eliminative materialism, as William Lycan (this volume) tells us, is materialism plus the claim that no creature has ever had a belief, desire, intention, hope, wish, or other “folk-psychological” state. Some contemporary philosophers claim that eliminative materialism is very likely true. They sketch certain potential scenarios, for the way theory might develop in cognitive science and neuroscience, that they claim are fairly likely; and they maintain that if such.
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  49. Charles M. Hermes (2006). The Overdetermination Argument Against Eliminativism. Southwest Philosophy Review 22 (1):113-119.
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  50. Terence E. Horgan (1993). The Austere Ideology of Folk Psychology. Mind and Language 8 (2):282-297.
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