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  1. Darren Abramson (2009). Book Review: "Supersizing the Mind" by Andy Clark. [REVIEW] International Journal of Machine Consciousness 1 (02):299-304.
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  2. Fred Adams (2010). Embodied Cognition. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (4):619-628.
    Embodied cognition is sweeping the planet. On a non-embodied approach, the sensory system informs the cognitive system and the motor system does the cognitive system’s bidding. There are causal relations between the systems but the sensory and motor systems are not constitutive of cognition. For embodied views, the relation to the sensori-motor system to cognition is constitutive, not just causal. This paper examines some recent empirical evidence used to support the view that cognition is embodied and raises questions about some (...)
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  3. Philip E. Agre (1995). Computation and Embodied Agency. Informatica 19:527-35.
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  4. Adrian John Tetteh Alsmith & Frédérique Vignemont (2012). Embodying the Mind and Representing the Body. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (1):1-13.
    Does the existence of body representations undermine the explanatory role of the body? Or do certain types of representation depend so closely upon the body that their involvement in a cognitive task implicates the body itself? In the introduction of this special issue we explore lines of tension and complement that might hold between the notions of embodiment and body representations, which remain too often neglected or obscure. To do so, we distinguish two conceptions of embodiment that either put weight (...)
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  5. Michael Anderson, Reviews. [REVIEW]
    Embodied cognition (EC) is growing up, and How the Body Shapes the Mind is both a sign of, and substantive contributor to, this ongoing development. Born in or about 1991 (the year of publication of seminal works by Brooks, Dreyfus, and Varela, Thompson & Rosch), EC is only now emerging from a tumultuous but exciting childhood marked in particular by the size and breadth of the extended family hoping to have some impact on its early education and upbringing. As family (...)
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  6. Michael L. Anderson, Embodied Cognition: The Teenage Years.
    A review of Gallagher, S. (2005). How the Body Shapes the Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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  7. Michael L. Anderson (2005). Representation, Evolution and Embodiment. Theoria et Historia Scientarum.
    As part of the ongoing attempt to fully naturalize the concept of human being--and, more specifically, to re-center it around the notion of agency--this essay discusses an approach to defining the content of representations in terms ultimately derived from their central, evolved function of providing guidance for action. This 'guidance theory' of representation is discussed in the context of, and evaluated with respect to, two other biologically inspired theories of representation: Dan Lloyd's dialectical theory of representation and Ruth Millikan's biosemantics.
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  8. Michael L. Anderson (2003). Embodied Cognition: A Field Guide. Artificial Intelligence 149 (1):91-130.
    The nature of cognition is being re-considered. Instead of emphasizing formal operations on abstract symbols, the new approach foregrounds the fact that cognition is, rather, a situated activity, and suggests that thinking beings ought therefore be considered first and foremost as acting beings. The essay reviews recent work in Embodied Cognition, provides a concise guide to its principles, attitudes and goals, and identifies the physical grounding project as its central research focus.
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  9. Michael L. Anderson (1997). Content and Comportment: On Embodiment and the Epistemic Availability of the World. Rowman and Littlefield.
    "Content and Comportment argues persuasively that the answer to some long-standing questions in epistemology and metaphysics lies in taking up the neglected question of the role of our bodily activity in establishing connections between representational states?knowledge and belief in particular?and their objects in the world. It takes up these ideas from both current mainstream analytic philosophy?Frege, Dummett, Davidson, Evans?and from mainstream continental work?Heidegger and his commentators and critics?and bings them together successfully in a way that should surprise only those who (...)
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  10. Michael L. Anderson, Michael J. Richardson & Anthony Chemero (forthcoming). Eroding the Boundaries of Cognition: Implications of Embodiment1. Topics in Cognitive Science.
    To accept that cognition is embodied is to question many of the beliefs traditionally held by cognitive scientists. One key question regards the localization of cognitive faculties. Here we argue that for cognition to be embodied and sometimes embedded, means that the cognitive faculty cannot be localized in a brain area alone. We review recent research on neural reuse, the 1/f structure of human activity, tool use, group cognition, and social coordination dynamics that we believe demonstrates how the boundary between (...)
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  11. István Aranyosi (forthcoming). Margins of Me: A Personal Story (Chapter 1 of The Peripheral Mind). In The Peripheral Mind. Philosophy of Mind and the Peripheral Nervous System. OUP.
    The author presents an autobiographical story of serious peripheral motor nerve damage resulting from chemotoxicity induced as a side effect of Hodgkin’s Lymphoma treatment. The first-person, phenomenological account of the condition naturally leads to philosophical questions about consciousness, felt presence of oneself all over and within one’s body, and the felt constitutiveness of peripheral processes to one’s mental life. The first-person data only fit well with a philosophical approach to the mind that takes peripheral, bodily events and states at their (...)
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  12. István Aranyosi (forthcoming). Toward a Well-Innervated Philosophy of Mind (Chapter 4 of The Peripheral Mind). Oxford University Press.
    The “brain in a vat” thought experiment is presented and refuted by appeal to the intuitiveness of what the author informally calls “the eye for an eye principle”, namely: Conscious mental states typically involved in sensory processes can conceivably successfully be brought about by direct stimulation of the brain, and in all such cases the utilized stimulus field will be in the relevant sense equivalent to the actual PNS or part of it thereof. In the second section, four classic problems (...)
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  13. Murat Aydede & P. Robbins (eds.) (2009). The Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition. Cambridge.
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  14. Andrew R. Bailey, Consciousness and the Embodied Self.
    This paper deals with the relationship between the embodied cognition paradigm and two sets of its implications: its implications for the ontology of selves, and its implications for the nature and extent of phenomenal consciousness. There has been a recent wave of interest within cognitive science in the paradigm variously called ‘embodied,’ ‘extended,’ ‘situated’ or ‘distributed’ cognition. Although ideas applied in the embodied cognition research program can be traced back to the work of Heidegger, Piaget, Vygotsky, Merleau-Ponty, and Dewey, the (...)
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  15. J. Mark Baldwin (1909). Motor Processes and Mental Unity. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 6 (7):182-185.
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  16. Dana Ballard (1991). Animate Vision. Artificial Intelligence 48:57-86.
  17. Dana H. Ballard, Mary M. Hayhoe, Polly K. Pook & Rajesh P. N. Rao (1997). Pointing the Way. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (4):758-763.
    The majority of commentators agree that the time to focus on embodiment has arrived and that the disembodied approach that was taken from the birth of artificial intelligence is unlikely to provide a satisfactory account of the special features of human intelligence. In our Response, we begin by addressing the general comments and criticisms directed at the emerging enterprise of deictic and embodied cognition. In subsequent sections we examine the topics that constitute the core of the commentaries: embodiment mechanisms, dorsal (...)
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  18. Amanda Barnier, John Sutton, Celia Harris & Robert A. Wilson (2008). A Conceptual and Empirical Framework for the Social Distribution of Cognition: The Case of Memory. Cognitive Systems Research 9 (1):33-51.
  19. L. Barsalou (2008). Embodied Language and Concepts. In G. R. Semin & Eliot R. Smith (eds.), Embodied Grounding: Social, Cognitive, Affective, and Neuroscientific Approaches. Cambridge University Press.
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  20. R. Beer (1995). A Dynamical Systems Perspective on Agent-Environment Interaction. Artificial Intelligence 72:173-215.
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  21. Jose Luis Bermudez, Anthony J. Marcel & Naomi M. Eilan (eds.) (1995). The Body and the Self. MIT Press.
  22. Donald Borrett, Sean D. Kelly & Hon Kwan (2000). Bridging Embodied Cognition and Brain Function: The Role of Phenomenology. Philosophical Psychology 13 (2):261-266.
    Both cognitive science and phenomenology accept the primacy of the organism-environment system and recognize that cognition should be understood in terms of an embodied agent situated in its environment. How embodiment is seen to shape our world, however, is fundamentally different in these two disciplines. Embodiment, as understood in cognitive science, reduces to a discussion of the consequences of having a body like ours interacting with our environment and the relationship is one of contingent causality. Embodiment, as understood phenomenologically, represents (...)
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  23. Robert Greenleaf Brice (2013). ‘The Whole Hurly-Burly’: Wittgenstein and Embodied Cognition. Journal of Consciousness Studies 20 (1-2):49-58.
    While typically ignored by the cognitive sciences, Wittgenstein’s later work provides those defending embodied cognition (EC) with essential philosophical tools that serve to strengthen the argument against cognitivism. Cognition, as Wittgenstein’s work demonstrates, is not simply a matter of disembodied intellect, but is actional, time-pressured, body-based, and dependent on the larger environment.
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  24. P. Briñol & R. E. Petty (2008). The Embodiment of Power and Communalism in Space and Bodily Contact. In G. R. Semin & Eliot R. Smith (eds.), Embodied Grounding: Social, Cognitive, Affective, and Neuroscientific Approaches. Cambridge University Press.
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  25. Robert Briscoe (2008). Vision, Action, and Make-Perceive. Mind and Language 23 (4):457-497.
    In this paper, I critically assess the enactive account of visual perception recently defended by Alva Noë (2004). I argue inter alia that the enactive account falsely identifies an object’s apparent shape with its 2D perspectival shape; that it mistakenly assimilates visual shape perception and volumetric object recognition; and that it seriously misrepresents the constitutive role of bodily action in visual awareness. I argue further that noticing an object’s perspectival shape involves a hybrid experience combining both perceptual and imaginative elements (...)
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  26. Matthew J. Brown (2011). Science as Socially Distributed Cognition: Bridging Philosophy and Sociology of Science. In Karen François, Benedikt Löwe, Thomas Müller & Bart van Kerkhove (eds.), Foundations of the Formal Sciences VII, Studies in Logic. College Publications.
    I want to make plausible the following claim:Analyzing scientific inquiry as a species of socially distributed cognition has a variety of advantages for science studies, among them the prospects of bringing together philosophy and sociology of science. This is not a particularly novel claim, but one that faces major obstacles. I will retrace some of the major steps that have been made in the pursuit of a distributed cognition approach to science studies, paying special attention to the promise that such (...)
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  27. Joseph A. Buckley & Lisa L. Hall (1999). Self-Knowledge and Embodiment. Southwest Philosophy Review 15 (1):185-196.
  28. Paco Calvo & John Symons, Radical Embodiment and Morphological Computation: Against the Autonomy of (Some) Special Sciences.
    An asymmetry between the demands at the computational and algorithmic levels of description furnishes the illusion that the abstract profile at the computational level can be multiply realized, and that something is actually being shared at the algorithmic one. A disembodied rendering of the situation lays the stress upon the different ways in which an algorithm can be implemented. However, from an embodied approach, things look rather different. The relevant pairing, I shall argue, is not between implementation and algorithm, but (...)
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  29. Matteo Candidi, Salvatore Maria Aglioti & Patrick Haggard (2012). Embodying Bodies and Worlds. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (1):109-123.
    Sensorimotor representations are essential for building up and maintaining corporeal awareness, i.e. the ability to perceive, know and evaluate one's own body as well as the bodies of others. The notion of embodied cognition implies that abstract forms of conceptual knowledge may be ultimately instantiated in such sensorimotor representations. In this sense, conceptual thinking should evoke, via mental simulation, some underlying sensorimotor events. In this review we discuss studies on the relation between embodiment and corporeal awareness. We approach the question (...)
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  30. Antonella Carassa, Francesca Morganit & Giuseppe Riva (eds.) (2009). Enacting Intersubjectivity: Paving the Way for a Dialogue Between Cognitive Science, Social Cognition, and Neuroscience. Università della Svizzera Italiana.
  31. Jaime F. Cárdenas-García (forthcoming). Distributed Cognition: An Ectoderm-Centric Perspective. Biosemiotics:1-14.
    Distributed cognition is widely recognized as an approach to the study of all cognition. It identifies the distribution of cognitive processes between persons and technology, among people, and across time in the development of the social and material contexts for thinking. This paper suggests an ectoderm-centric perspective as the basis for distributed cognition, and in so doing redefines distributed cognition as the ability of an organism to interact with its environment for the purpose of satisfying its most basic physiological (internal (...)
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  32. Quassim Cassam (2002). Representing Bodies. Ratio 15 (4):315-334.
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  33. Quassim Cassam (1995). Introspection and Bodily Self-Ascription. In Jose Luis Bermudez, Anthony J. Marcel & Naomi M. Eilan (eds.), The Body and the Self. Mit Press.
  34. Sue L. Cataldi (1996). Emotion and Embodiment Fragile Ontology. International Studies in Philosophy 28 (4):124-126.
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  35. Dan Cavedon-Taylor (2011). Perceptual Content and Sensorimotor Expectations. Philosophical Quarterly 61 (243):383-391.
    I distinguish between two kinds of sensorimotor expectations: agent- and object-active ones. Alva Noë's answer to the problem of how perception acquires volumetric content illicitly privileges agent-active expectations over object-active expectations, though the two are explanatorily on a par. Considerations which Noë draws upon concerning how organisms may ‘off-load’ internal processes onto the environment do not support his view that volumetric content depends on our embodiment; rather, they support a view of experience which is restrictive of the body's role in (...)
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  36. Antonio Chella & Riccardo Manzotti (2007). Artificial Consciousness. Imprint Academic.
  37. Anthony Chemero, A Stroll Through the Worlds of Animats and Humans:.
    Every few years Andy Clark writes a book designed to help philosophers of mind get up to speed with the most recent developments in cognitive science. In his first two such books, Microcognition (1989) and Associative Engines (1993), Clark introduced the then-cutting-edge field of connectionist networks. In his newest one, Being There: Putting Brain, Body and World Together Again (1997), he once again provides a concise, readable introduction to the state of the art. This time, though, Clark has moved beyond (...)
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  38. Ron Chrisley (2003). The Macmillan Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science.
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  39. Ron Chrisley (2003). Embodiment. In The Macmillan Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science.
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  40. Ronald L. Chrisley (1994). Taking Embodiment Seriously: Nonconceptual Content and Robotics. In Kenneth M. Ford, C. Glymour & Patrick Hayes (eds.), Android Epistemology. MIT Press.
    The development and deployment of the notion of pre-objective or nonconceptual content for the purposes of intentional explanation of requires assistance from a practical and theoretical understanding of computational/robotic systems acting in real-time and real-space. In particular, the usual "that"-clause specification of content will not work for non-conceptual contents; some other means of specification is required, means that make use of the fact that contents are aspects of embodied and embedded systems. That is, the specification of non-conceptual content should use (...)
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  41. Wayne Christensen & John Michael (forthcoming). Ian Apperly, Mindreaders: The Cognitive Basis of Theory of Mind. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences.
  42. Paul Cisek (2001). Embodiment is All in the Head. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (1):36-38.
    I suggest that neurophysiological data, usually interpreted in cognitivist terms, is actually more supportive of dynamic frameworks such as that of Thelen et al. I outline a model of embodied action used to interpret neural data from frontal and parietal cortex, and suggest that it bears strong similarity to the framework described in the target article.
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  43. Andy Clark, Embodiment: From Fish to Fantasy.
    The last ten years have seen an increasing interest, within cognitive science, in issues concerning the physical body, the local environment, and the complex interplay between neural systems and the wider world in which they function. “Physically embodied, environmentally embedded” approaches thus loom large on the contemporary cognitive scientific scene. Yet many unanswered questions remain, and the shape of a genuinely embodied, embedded science of the mind is still unclear. I begin by sketching a few examples of the approach, and (...)
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  44. Andy Clark (2008). Supersizing the Mind: Embodiment, Action, and Cognitive Extension. Oxford University Press.
    Introduction : brainbound versus extended -- From embodiment to cognitive extension -- The active body -- The negotiable body -- Material symbols -- World, Incorporated -- Boundary disputes -- Mind re-bound -- The cure for cognitive hiccups (HEMC, HEC, HEMC ...) -- Rediscovering the brain -- The limits of embodiment -- Painting, planning, and perceiving -- Disentangling embodiment -- Conclusions : mind-sized bites.
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  45. Andy Clark, Language, Embodiment, and the Cognitive Niche.
    Embodied agents use bodily actions and environmental interventions to make the world a better place to think in. Where does language fit into this emerging picture of the embodied, ecologically efficient agent? One useful way to approach this question is to consider language itself as a cognition-enhancing animal-built structure. To take this perspective is to view language as a kind of self-constructed cognitive niche: a persisting though never stationary material scaffolding whose critical role in promoting thought and reason remains surprisingly (...)
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  46. Andy Clark (2005). Beyond the Flesh: Some Lessons From a Mole Cricket. Artificial Life 11 (1-2):233-44.
    What do linguistic symbols do for minds like ours, and how (if at all) can basic embodied, dynamical and situated approaches do justice to high-level human thought and reason? These two questions are best addressed together, since our answers to the first may inform the second. The key move in ‘scaling-up’ simple embodied cognitive science is, I argue, to take very seriously the potent role of human-built structures in transforming the spaces of human learning and reason. In particular, in this (...)
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  47. Andy Clark (2003). Natural-Born Cyborgs: Minds, Technologies and the Future of Human Intelligence. Oxford University Press.
    In Natural-Born Cyborgs, Clark argues that what makes humans so different from other species is our capacity to fully incorporate tools and supporting cultural ...
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  48. Andy Clark (2001). Reasons, Robots and the Extended Mind. Mind and Language 16 (2):121-145.
    A suitable project for the new Millenium is to radically reconfigure our image of human rationality. Such a project is already underway, within the Cognitive Sciences, under the umbrellas of work in Situated Cognition, Distributed and De-centralized Cogition, Real-world Robotics and Artificial Life1. Such approaches, however, are often criticized for giving certain aspects of rationality too wide a berth. They focus their attention on on such superficially poor cousins as.
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  49. Andy Clark (1999). An Embodied Cognitive Science? Trends in Cognitive Sciences 3 (9):345-351.
    The last ten years have seen an increasing interest, within cognitive science, in issues concerning the physical body, the local environment, and the complex interplay between neural systems and the wider world in which they function. --œPhysically embodied, environmentally embedded--� approaches thus loom large on the contemporary cognitive scientific scene. Yet many unanswered questions remain, and the shape of a genuinely embodied, embedded science of the mind is still unclear. I begin by sketching a few examples of the approach, and (...)
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  50. Andy Clark (1999). Where Brain, Body and World Collide. Cognitive Systems Research 1 (1):5-17.
    --œWhere Brain, Body, and World Collide--� reprinted by permission of Daedalus, Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, from the issue entitled, --œThe Brain,--� Spring 1998, Vol. 127, No. 2.
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  51. Andy Clark (1998). Current Issues in Philosophy of Mind. New York: Cambridge University Press.
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  52. Andy Clark (1998). Embodiment and the Philosophy of Mind. In Current Issues in Philosophy of Mind. New York: Cambridge University Press.
    Cambridge University Press:1998) P. 35-52. To be reprinted in Alberto Peruzzi (ed) MIND.
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  53. Andy Clark (1997). Embodiment and the Philosophy of Mind. In Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Contemporary Issues in the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge University Press.
    Cognitive Science is in some sense the science of the mind. But an increasingly influential theme, in recent years, has been the role of the physical body, and of the local environment, in promoting adaptive success. No right-minded Cognitive Scientist, to be sure, ever claimed that body and world were completely irrelevant to the understanding of mind. But there was, nonetheless, an unmistakable tendency to marginalize such factors: to dwell on inner complexity whilst simplifying or ignoring the complex inner-outer interplays (...)
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  54. Andy Clark (1997). Being There: Putting Brain, Body, and World Together Again. MIT Press.
    In treating cognition as problem solving, Andy Clark suggests, we may often abstract too far from the very body and world in which our brains evolved to guide...
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  55. Andy Clark (1995). Moving Minds: Situating Content in the Service of Real-Time Success. Philosophical Perspectives 9:89-104.
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  56. Andy Clark (1987). Being There: Why Implementation Matters to Cognitive Science. AI Review 1:231-44.
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  57. Andy Clark & David J. Chalmers (1998). The Extended Mind. Analysis 58 (1):7-19.
    Where does the mind stop and the rest of the world begin? The question invites two standard replies. Some accept the demarcations of skin and skull, and say that what is outside the body is outside the mind. Others are impressed by arguments suggesting that the meaning of our words "just ain't in the head", and hold that this externalism about meaning carries over into an externalism about mind. We propose to pursue a third position. We advocate a very different (...)
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  58. G. Clore & S. Schnall (2008). Embodiment and Affect. In G. R. Semin & Eliot R. Smith (eds.), Embodied Grounding: Social, Cognitive, Affective, and Neuroscientific Approaches. Cambridge University Press.
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  59. Jonathan Cole (2009). Impaired Embodiment and Intersubjectivity. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (3).
    This paper considers the importance of the body for self-esteem, communication, and emotional expression and experience, through the reflections of those who live with various neurological impairments of movement and sensation; sensory deafferentation, spinal cord injury and Möbius Syndrome (the congenital absence of facial expression). People with severe sensory loss, who require conscious attention and visual feedback for movement, describe the imperative to use the same strategies to reacquire gesture, to appear normal and have embodied expression. Those paralysed after spinal (...)
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  60. Corbin Collins (1988). Body-Intentionality. Inquiry 31 (December):495-518.
    Phenomenologists such as Merleau?Ponty have argued that the ordinary teleological relation between an embodied agent and the world is neither ?subjective? nor ?cognitive?, i.e. that it is not normally mediated by a chain of explicit cognition occurring within a distinct mental subject. Yet, while this seems true from a first?person, phenomenological perspective, I argue that teleological forms of explanation require the ascription of Intentional states. Intentional states, however, are usually regarded as subjective, cognitive states. In order to reconcile the phenomenology (...)
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  61. Giovanna Colombetti (web). Enaction, Sense-Making and Emotion. In S.J. Gapenne & E. Di Paolo (eds.), Enaction: Towards a New Paradigm for Cognitive Science. MIT Press.
    The theory of autopoiesis is central to the enactive approach. Recent works emphasize that the theory of autopoiesis is a theory of sense-making in living systems, i.e. of how living systems produce and consume meaning. In this chapter I first illustrate (some aspects of) these recent works, and interpret their notion of sense-making as a bodily cognitive- emotional form of understanding. Then I turn to modern emotion science, and I illustrate its tendency to over-intellectualize our capacity to evaluate and understand. (...)
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  62. Giovanna Colombetti (forthcoming). Enactive Appraisal. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences.
    Emotion theorists tend to separate “arousal” and other bodily events such as “actions” from the evaluative component of emotion known as “appraisal.” This separation, I argue, implies phenomenologically implausible accounts of emotion elicitation and personhood. As an alternative, I attempt a reconceptualization of the notion of appraisal within the so-called “enactive approach.” I argue that appraisal is constituted by arousal and action, and I show how this view relates to an embodied and affective notion of personhood.
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  63. Diego Cosmelli & Evan Thompson (web). Embodiment or Envatment? Reflections on the Bodily Basis of Consciousness. In J. Stewart, O. Gapenne & E Di Paolo (eds.), Enaction: Towards a New Paradigm for Cognitive Science. MIT Press.
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  64. Joël Cretenet & Vincent Dru (2011). Influence of Bilateral Motor Behaviors on Flexible Functioning: An Embodied Perspective. Cognitive Science 35 (6):1139-1161.
    To examine the influence of bilateral motor behaviors on flexibility performance, two studies were conducted. Previous research has shown that when performing unilateral motor behavior that activates the affective and motivational systems of approach versus avoidance (arm flexion vs. extension), it is the congruence between laterality and motor activation that determines flexibility-rigidity functioning (Cretenet & Dru, 2009). When bilateral motor behaviors were performed, a mechanism of embodiment was revealed. It showed that the flexibility scores were determined by the match between (...)
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  65. Adrian Cussins (1992). Content, Embodiment, and Objectivity: The Theory of Cognitive Trails. Mind 101 (404):651-88.
  66. Leon de Bruin & Lena Kästner (2012). Dynamic Embodied Cognition. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (4):541-563.
    Abstract In this article, we investigate the merits of an enactive view of cognition for the contemporary debate about social cognition. If enactivism is to be a genuine alternative to classic cognitivism, it should be able to bridge the “cognitive gap”, i.e. provide us with a convincing account of those higher forms of cognition that have traditionally been the focus of its cognitivist opponents. We show that, when it comes to social cognition, current articulations of enactivism are—despite their celebrated successes (...)
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  67. Hanne De Jaegher (2009). Social Understanding Through Direct Perception? Yes, by Interacting. Consciousness & Cognition 18 (2):535-542.
    This paper comments on Gallagher’s recently published direct perception proposal about social cognition [Gallagher, S. (2008a). Direct perception in the intersubjective context. Consciousness and Cognition, 17(2), 535–543]. I show that direct perception is in danger of being appropriated by the very cognitivist accounts criticised by Gallagher (theory theory and simulation theory). Then I argue that the experiential directness of perception in social situations can be understood only in the context of the role of the interaction process in social cognition. I (...)
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  68. Hanne De Jaegher (2009). What Made Me Want the Cheese? A Reply to Shaun Gallagher and Dan Hutto. Consciousness & Cognition 18 (2):549-550.
  69. Hanne de Jaegher, Ezequiel di Paolo & Shaun Gallagher (2010). Can Social Interaction Constitute Social Cognition? Trends in Cognitive Sciences 14 (10):441-447.
    An important shift is taking place in social cognition research, away from a focus on the individual mind and toward embodied and participatory aspects of social understanding. Empirical results already imply that social cognition is not reducible to the workings of individual cognitive mechanisms. To galvanize this interactive turn, we provide an operational definition of social interaction and distinguish the different explanatory roles – contextual, enabling and constitutive – it can play in social cognition. We show that interactive processes are (...)
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  70. Hanne De Jaegher & Tom Froese (2009). On the Role of Social Interaction in Individual Agency. Adaptive Behavior 17 (5):444-460.
    Is an individual agent constitutive of or constituted by its social interactions? This question is typically not asked in the cognitive sciences, so strong is the consensus that only individual agents have constitutive efficacy. In this article we challenge this methodological solipsism and argue that interindividual relations and social context do not simply arise from the behavior of individual agents, but themselves enable and shape the individual agents on which they depend. For this, we define the notion of autonomy as (...)
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  71. Helena De Preester & Manos Tsakiris (2009). Body-Extension Versus Body-Incorporation: Is There a Need for a Body-Model? Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (3).
    This paper investigates the role of a pre-existing body-model that is an enabling constraint for the incorporation of objects into the body. This body-model is also a basis for the distinction between body extensions (e.g., in the case of tool-use) and incorporation (e.g., in the case of successful prosthesis use). It is argued that, in the case of incorporation, changes in the sense of body-ownership involve a reorganization of the body-model, whereas extension of the body with tools does not involve (...)
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  72. Manuel de Vega, Arthur M. Glenberg & Arthur C. Graesser (eds.) (2008). Symbols and Embodiment: Debates on Meaning and Cognition. Oxford University Press.
    Cognitive scientists have a variety of approaches to studying cognition: experimental psychology, computer science, robotics, neuroscience, educational psychology, philosophy of mind, and psycholinguistics, to name but a few. In addition, they also differ in their approaches to cognition - some of them consider that the mind works basically like a computer, involving programs composed of abstract, amodal, and arbitrary symbols. Others claim that cognition is embodied - that is, symbols must be grounded on perceptual, motoric, and emotional experience. The existence (...)
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  73. Daniel Dennett (1993). Review of Varela, E. Thompson and E. Rosch, (Eds. )The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience. [REVIEW] .
    Cognitive science, as an interdisciplinary school of thought, may have recently moved beyond the bandwagon stage onto the throne of orthodoxy, but it does not make a favorable first impression on many people. Familiar reactions on first encounters range from revulsion to condescending dismissal--very few faces in the crowd light up with the sense of "Aha! So that's how the mind works! Of course!" Cognitive science leaves something out, it seems; moreover, what it apparently leaves out is important, even precious. (...)
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  74. Daniel C. Dennett, Review of Varela, "Review of F. Varela, E. Thompson and E. Rosch, The Embodied Mind ," American Journal of Psychology, 106, 121-6, 1993. [REVIEW]
    Cognitive science, as an interdisciplinary school of thought, may have recently moved beyond the bandwagon stage onto the throne of orthodoxy, but it does not make a favorable first impression on many people. Familiar reactions on first encounters range from revulsion to condescending dismissal--very few faces in the crowd light up with the sense of "Aha! So that's how the mind works! Of course!" Cognitive science leaves something out , it seems; moreover, what it apparently leaves out is important, even (...)
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  75. Natalie Depraz (2002). Confronting Death Before Death: Between Imminence and Unpredictability. Francisco Varela's Neurophenomenology of Radical Embodiment. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1 (2):83-95.
  76. H. Depreester (2007). The Deep Bodily Origins of the Subjective Perspective: Models and Their Problems. Consciousness and Cognition 16 (3):604-618.
  77. Ezequiel Di Paolo & Hanne De Jaegher (2012). The Interactive Brain Hypothesis. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 6.
    Enactive approaches foreground the role of interpersonal interaction in explanations of social understanding. This motivates, in combination with a recent interest in neuroscientific studies involving actual interactions, the question of how interactive processes relate to neural mechanisms involved in social understanding. We introduce the Interactive Brain Hypothesis (IBH) in order to help map the spectrum of possible relations between social interaction and neural processes. The hypothesis states that interactive experience and skills play enabling roles in both the development and current (...)
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  78. Eric Dietrich (2008). Some Strangeness in the Proportion, or How to Stop Worrying and Learn to Love the Mechanistic Forces of Darkness. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (3):349-352.
    Understanding humans requires viewing them as mechanisms of some sort, since understanding anything requires seeing it as a mechanism. It is science’s job to reveal mechanisms. But science reveals much more than that: it also reveals enduring mystery—strangeness in the proportion. Concentrating just on the scientific side of Selinger’s and Engström’s call for a moratorium on cyborg discourse, I argue that this strangeness prevents cyborg discourse from diminishing us.
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  79. Eric Dietrich (1999). Dynamic Systems and Paradise Regained, or How to Avoid Being a Calculator. [REVIEW] J. Of Experimental and Theoretical AI 11 (4):473-478.
    The new kid on the block in cognitive science these days is dynamic systems. This way of thinking about the mind is, as usual, radically opposed to computationalism - - the hypothesis that thinking is computing. The use of dynamic systems is just the latest in a series of attempts, from Searle's Chinese Room Argument, through the weirdnesses of postmodernism, to overthrown computationalism, which as we all know is a perfectly nice hypothesis about the mind that never hurt anyone.
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  80. Eric Dietrich (1996). AI, Situatedness, Creativity, and Intelligence; or the Evolution of the Little Hearing Bones. J. Of Experimental and Theoretical AI 8 (1):1-6.
    Good sciences have good metaphors. Indeed, good sciences are good because they have good metaphors. AI could use more good metaphors. In this editorial, I would like to propose a new metaphor to help us understand intelligence. Of course, whether the metaphor is any good or not depends on whether it actually does help us. (What I am going to propose is not something opposed to computationalism -- the hypothesis that cognition is computation. Noncomputational metaphors are in vogue these days, (...)
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  81. Chris Dobbyn & Susan A. J. Stuart (2003). The Self as an Embedded Agent. Minds and Machines 13 (2):187-201.
    In this paper we consider the concept of a self-aware agent. In cognitive science agents are seen as embodied and interactively situated in worlds. We analyse the meanings attached to these terms in cognitive science and robotics, proposing a set of conditions for situatedness and embodiment, and examine the claim that internal representational schemas are largely unnecessary for intelligent behaviour in animats. We maintain that current situated and embodied animats cannot be ascribed even minimal self-awareness, and offer a six point (...)
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  82. Jérôme Dokic (2006). From Linguistic Contextualism to Situated Cognition: The Case of Ad Hoc Concepts. Philosophical Psychology 19 (3):309 – 328.
    Our utterances are typically if not always "situated," in the sense that they are true or false relative to unarticulated parameters of the extra-linguistic context. The problem is to explain how these parameters are determined, given that nothing in the uttered sentences indicates them. It is tempting to claim that they must be determined at the level of thought or intention. However, as many philosophers have observed, thoughts themselves are no less situated than utterances. Unarticulated parameters need not be mentally (...)
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  83. Guy Dove (2011). On the Need for Embodied and Dis-Embodied Cognition. Frontiers in Psychology 1 (242):1-13.
    This essay proposes and defends a pluralistic theory of conceptual embodiment. Our concepts are represented in at least two ways: (i) through sensorimotor simulations of our interactions with objects and events and (ii) through sensorimotor simulations of natural language processing. Linguistic representations are “dis-embodied” in the sense that they are dynamic and multimodal but, in contrast to other forms of embodied cognition, do not inherit semantic content from this embodiment. The capacity to store information in the associations and inferential relationships (...)
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  84. Guy Dove (2009). Beyond Perceptual Symbols: A Call for Representational Pluralism. Cognition 110:412-431.
    Recent evidence from cognitive neuroscience suggests that certain cognitive processes employ perceptual representations. Inspired by this evidence, a few researchers have proposed that cognition is inherently perceptual. They have developed an innovative theoretical approach that rests on the notion of perceptual simulation and marshaled several general arguments supporting the centrality of perceptual representations to concepts. In this article, I identify a number of weaknesses in these arguments and defend a multiple semantic code approach that posits both perceptual and non-perceptual representations.
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  85. Zoe Drayson (2009). Embodied Cognitive Science and its Implications for Psychopathology. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 16 (4):329-340.
    The past twenty years have seen an increase in the importance of the body in psychology, neuroscience, and philosophy of mind. This 'embodied' trend challenges the orthodox view in cognitive science in several ways: it downplays the traditional 'mind-as-computer' approach and emphasizes the role of interactions between the brain, body, and environment. In this article, I review recent work in the area of embodied cognitive science and explore the approaches each takes to the ideas of consciousness, computation and representation. Finally, (...)
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  86. Hubert L. Dreyfus (2006). Overcoming the Myth of the Mental. Topoi 25 (1-2):43-49.
    Can we accept John McDowell’s Kantian claim that perception is conceptual “all the way out,” thereby denying the more basic perceptual capacities we seem to share with prelinguistic infants and higher animals? More generally, can philosophers successfully describe the conceptual upper floors of the edifice of knowledge while ignoring the embodied coping going on on the ground floor? I argue that we shouldn’t leave the conceptual component of our lives hanging in midair and suggest how philosophers who want to understand (...)
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  87. Hubert L. Dreyfus (2005). Overcoming the Myth of the Mental: How Philosophers Can Profit From the Phenomenology of Everyday Expertise. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 79 (2):47 - 65.
    Back in 1950, while a physics major at Harvard, I wandered into C.I. Lewis’s epistemology course. There, Lewis was confidently expounding the need for an indubitable Given to ground knowledge, and he was explaining where that ground was to be found. I was so impressed that I immediately switched majors from ungrounded physics to grounded philosophy.
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  88. Hubert L. Dreyfus (1996). The Current Relevance of Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Embodiment. Filozofska Istrazivanja 15 (3).
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  89. Manuel Dries (forthcoming). Freedom, Resistance, Agency. In Peter Kail & Manuel Dries (eds.), Nietzsche on Mind and Nature. Oxford University Press.
    While Nietzsche's rejection of metaphysical free will and moral desert has been widely recognised, the sense in which Nietzsche continues to use the term freedom affirmatively remains largely unnoticed. The aim of this article is to show that freedom and agency are among Nietzsche’s central concerns, that his much-discussed interest in power in fact originates in a first-person account of freedom, and that his understanding of the phenomenology of freedom informs his theory of agency. He develops a non-reductive drive-psychological motivational (...)
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  90. Andreas Elpidorou (forthcoming). Review of Mark Rowlands' The New Science of the Mind. [REVIEW] Philosophical Psychology.
  91. Andreas Elpidorou (forthcoming). Review of Robert D. Rupert's Cognitive Systems and the Extended Mind. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines.
  92. Andreas Elpidorou (2012). The New Science of the Mind: From Extended Mind to Embodied Phenomenology. Philosophical Psychology 25 (5):771-774.
    Philosophical Psychology, Volume 0, Issue 0, Page 1-4, Ahead of Print.
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  93. Andreas Elpidorou (2010). Alva Noë: Out of Our Heads: Why You Are Not Your Brain, and Other Lessons From the Biology of Consciousness. Minds and Machines 20 (1):155-159.
  94. Mirko Farina (2011). Cognitive Systems and the Extended Mind - Review. [REVIEW] Http.
  95. Mirko Farina (2010). Supersizing the Mind: Embodiment, Action and Cognitive Extension. [REVIEW] Http (14).
  96. Jerome A. Feldman (1997). Embodiment is the Foundation, Not a Level. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (4):746-747.
    Embodiment, the explicit dependence of cognition on the properties of the human body, is the foundation of contemporary cognitive science. Ballard et al.'s target article makes an important contribution to the embodiment story by suggesting how limitations on neural binding ability lead to deictic strategies for many tasks. It also exploits the powerful experimental method of instrumented virtual reality. This commentary suggests some ways in which the target article might be misinterpreted and offers other cautions.
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  97. Marco Fenici (2012). Embodied Social Cognition and Embedded Theory of Mind. Biolinguistics 6 (3--47):276--307.
    Embodiment and embeddedness define an attractive framework to the study of cognition. I discuss whether theory of mind, i.e. the ability to attribute mental states to others to predict and explain their behaviour, fits these two principles. In agreement with available evidence, embodied cognitive processes may underlie the earliest manifestations of social cognitive abilities such as infants’ selective behaviour in spontaneous-response false belief tasks. Instead, late theory-of-mind abilities, such as the capacity to pass the (elicited-response) false belief test at age (...)
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  98. Kenneth M. Ford, C. Glymour & Patrick Hayes (eds.) (1994). Android Epistemology. MIT Press.
  99. Anna Petronella Foultier (2013). Language and the Gendered Body: Butler's Early Reading of Merleau‐Ponty. Hypatia 28 (2).
    Through a close reading of Judith Butler's 1989 essay on Merleau-Ponty's “theory” of sexuality as well as the texts her argument hinges on, this paper addresses the debate about the relation between language and the living, gendered body as it is understood by defenders of poststructural theory on the one hand, and different interpretations of Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology on the other. I claim that Butler, in her criticism of the French philosopher's analysis of the famous “Schneider case,” does not take its (...)
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  100. Jan Kyrre Berg Olsen Friis (2012). Perception: Embodiment and Beyond. Foundations of Science 17 (4):363-367.
    In this commentary on Don Ihde’s paper “Stretching the in-between: embodiment and beyond” I argue that perceptions and observations are based on tacit frames and these frames are expressed through pre-reflexive intuitions thus giving meaning to the perceived content of observations. However, if the objective or given information in perception is incomplete or missing our brain and nervous system will intuitively and unconsciously fill in the missing information in order to act—these particular pieces of added information may not be relevant (...)
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