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Emergence

Edited by Patrick McGivern (University of Wollongong)
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  1. Samuel Alexander (1920/1966). Space, Time, and Deity: The Gifford Lectures at Glasgow 1916-1918. Dover Publications.
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  2. Harald Atmanspacher (2007). Contextual Emergence From Physics to Cognitive Neuroscience. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (1-2):18-36.
    The concept of contextual emergence has been proposed as a non-reductive, yet well- defined relation between different levels of description of physical and other systems. It is illustrated for the transition from statistical mechanics to thermodynamical properties such as temperature. Stability conditions are shown to be crucial for a rigorous implementation of contingent contexts that are required to understand temperature as an emergent property. Are such stability conditions meaningful for contextual emergence beyond physics as well? An affirmative example from cognitive (...)
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  3. Ansgar Beckermann (1992). Supervenience, Emergence, and Reduction. In Ansgar Beckermann, Hans Flohr & Jaegwon Kim (eds.), Emergence or Reduction?: Prospects for Nonreductive Physicalism. De Gruyter.
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  4. Ansgar Beckermann, Hans Flohr & Jaegwon Kim (1992). Emergence or Reduction?: Prospects for Nonreductive Physicalism. De Gruyter.
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  5. Mark A. Bedau (2008). Is Weak Emergence Just in the Mind? Minds and Machines 18 (4).
    Weak emergence is the view that a system’s macro properties can be explained by its micro properties but only in an especially complicated way. This paper explains a version of weak emergence based on the notion of explanatory incompressibility and “crawling the causal web.” Then it examines three reasons why weak emergence might be thought to be just in the mind. The first reason is based on contrasting mere epistemological emergence with a form of ontological emergence that involves irreducible downward (...)
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  6. Mark A. Bedau (2002). Downward Causation and the Autonomy of Weak Emergence. Principia 6 (1):5-50.
    Weak emergence has been offered as an explication of the ubiquitous notion of emergence used in complexity science (Bedau 1997). After outlining the problem of emergence and comparing weak emergence with the two other main objectivist approaches to emergence, this paper explains a version of weak emergence and illustrates it with cellular automata. Then it explains the sort of downward causation and explanatory autonomy involved in weak emergence.
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  7. Carlton W. Berenda (1953). On Emergence and Prediction. Journal of Philosophy 50 (April):269-74.
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  8. Gustav Bergmann (1944). Holism, Historicism, and Emergence. Philosophy of Science 11 (March):209-21.
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  9. Reinaldo J. Bernal Velásquez (2012). E-Physicalism. A Physicalist Theory of Phenomenal Consciousness. Ontos Verlag.
    This work advances a theory in the metaphysics of phenomenal consciousness, which the author labels “e-physicalism”. Firstly, he endorses a realist stance towards consciousness and physicalist metaphysics. Secondly, he criticises Strong AI and functionalist views, and claims that consciousness has an internal character. Thirdly, he discusses HOT theories, the unity of consciousness, and holds that the “explanatory gap” is not ontological but epistemological. Fourthly, he argues that consciousness is not a supervenient but an emergent property, not reducible and endowed with (...)
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  10. Mark H. Bickhard (2004). Process and Emergence: Normative Function and Representation. Axiomathes - An International Journal in Ontology and Cognitive Systems 14:135-169.
    Emergence seems necessary for any naturalistic account of the world — none of our familiar world existed at the time of the Big Bang, and it does now — and normative emergence is necessary for any naturalistic account of biology and mind — mental phenomena, such as representation, learning, rationality, and so on, are normative. But Jaegwon Kim’s argument appears to render causally efficacious emergence impossible, and Hume’s argument appears to render normative emergence impossible, and, in its general form, it (...)
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  11. Mark H. Bickhard (2000). Emergence. In P.B. Andersen, Claus Emmeche, N.O. Finnemann & P.V. Christiansen (eds.), Downward Causation. University of Aarhus Press.
    * This paper was to have been written jointly with Don Campbell. His tragic death on May 6, 1996, occurred before we had been able to do much planning for the paper. As a result, this is undoubtedly a very different paper than if Don and I had written it together, and, undoubtedly, not as good a paper. Nevertheless, I believe it maintains at least the spirit of what we had discussed. Clearly, all errors are mine alone.
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  12. Alexander Bird (2008). Causal Exclusion and Evolved Emergent Properties. In Ruth Groff (ed.), Revitalizing Causality: Realism About Causality in Philosophy and Social Science. Routledge.
    Emergent properties are intended to be genuine, natural higher level causally efficacious properties irreducible to physical ones. At the same time they are somehow dependent on or 'emergent from' complexes of physical properties, so that the doctrine of emergent properties is not supposed to be returned to dualism. The doctrine faces two challenges: (i) to explain precisely how it is that such properties emerge - what is emergence; (ii) to explain how they sidestep the exclusion problem - how it is (...)
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  13. Michel Bitbol (2007). Ontology, Matter and Emergence. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (3).
    “Ontological emergence” of inherent high-level properties with causal powers is witnessed nowhere. A non-substantialist conception of emergence works much better. It allows downward causation, provided our concept of causality is transformed accordingly.
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  14. James Blachowicz (forthcoming). The Constraint Interpretation of Physical Emergence. Journal for General Philosophy of Science:1-20.
    I develop a variant of the constraint interpretation of the emergence of purely physical (non-biological) entities, focusing on the principle of the non-derivability of actual physical states from possible physical states (physical laws) alone. While this is a necessary condition for any account of emergence, it is not sufficient, for it becomes trivial if not extended to types of constraint that specifically constitute physical entities, namely, those that individuate and differentiate them. Because physical organizations with these features are in fact (...)
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  15. Mario Bunge (1977). Emergence and the Mind. Neuroscience 2:501-9.
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  16. John Ross Churchill, Nonreductive Physicalism or Emergent Dualism? The Argument From Mental Causation.
    Throughout the 1990s, Jaegwon Kim developed a line of argument that what purport to be nonreductive forms of physicalism are ultimately untenable, since they cannot accommodate the causal efficacy of mental states. His argument has received a great deal of discussion, much of it critical. We believe that, while the argument needs some tweaking, its basic thrust is sound. In what follows, we will lay out our preferred version of the argument and highlight its essential dependence on a causal-powers metaphysic, (...)
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  17. P. Clayton (ed.) (2006). Oxford Handbook of Religion and Science. Oxford University Press.
    In addition to treatments of questions of methodology and implications for life and practice, the Handbook includes sections devoted to the major scientific ...
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  18. Philip Clayton (2006). Emergence From Physics to Theology: Toward a Panoramic View. Zygon 41 (3):675-687.
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  19. Philip Clayton (2004). Mind and Emergence: From Quantum to Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
    Strong claims have been made for emergence as a new paradigm for understanding science, consciousness, and religion. Tracing the past history and current definitions of the concept, Clayton assesses the case for emergent phenomena in the natural world and their significance for philosophy and theology. Complex emergent phenomena require irreducible levels of explanation in physics, chemistry and biology. This pattern of emergence suggests a new approach to the problem of consciousness, which is neither reducible to brain states nor proof of (...)
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  20. Philip Clayton (2002). Emergence — A Response to My Critics. Tradition and Discovery 29 (3):48-51.
    The author responds to criticisms from the four respondents to his “Emergence, Supervenience, and Personal Knowledge,” acknowledging areas where their points have improved the interpretation of science and the interpretation of Polanyi. The discussion focuses on the extent of the “causal decoupling” between parts and emergent wholes, with special attention to the question of whether (and if so, to what degree) brain activity causes thought.
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  21. Philip Clayton (2002). Emergence, Supervenience, and Personal Knowledge. Tradition and Discovery 29 (3):8-19.
    Michael Polanyi was perhaps the most important emergence theorist of the middle of the 20th century. As the key link between the British Emergentists of the 1920s and the explosion of emergence theory in the 1990s, he played a crucial role in resisting reductionist interpretations of science and keeping the concept of emergence alive. Polanyi’s position on emergence is described and its major strengths and weaknesses are analyzed. Using Polanyi as the foundation, the article surveys the major contemporary options in (...)
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  22. Philip Clayton (1999). Neuroscience and the Person: Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action. Notre Dame: University Notre Dame Press.
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  23. Philip Clayton (1999). Neuroscience, the Person, and God: An Emergentist Account. In Neuroscience and the Person: Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action. Notre Dame: University Notre Dame Press.
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  24. John Collier (2008). A Dynamical Account of Emergence. Cybernetics and Human Knowing 15 (3-4):75-86.
    Emergence has traditionally been described as satisfying specific properties, notably nonreducibility of the emergent object or properties to their substrate, novelty, and unpredictability from the properties of the substrate. Sometimes more mysterious properties such as independence from the substrate, separate substances and teleological properties are invoked. I will argue that the latter are both unnecessary and unwarranted. The descriptive properties can be analyzed in more detail in logical terms, but the logical conditions alone do not tell us how to identify (...)
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  25. John D. Collier, Holism and Emergence: Dynamical Complexity Defeats Laplace's Demon.
    The paradigm of Laplacean determinism combines three regulative principles: determinism, predictability, and the explanatory adequacy of universal laws together with purely local conditions. Historically, it applied to celestial mechanics, but it has been expanded into an ideal for scientific theories whose cogency is often not questioned. Laplace's demon is an idealization of mechanistic scientific method. Its principles together assumes imply reducibility, and rule out holism and emergence. I will argue that Laplacean determinism fails even in the realm of planetary dynamics, (...)
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  26. John D. Collier & Scott J. Muller (1998). The Dynamical Basis of Emergence in Natural Hierarchies. In G. L. Farre & T. Oksala (eds.), Emergence, Complexity, Hierarchy, Organization, Selected and Edited Papers From the Echo Iii Conference. Acta Polytechnica Scandinavica.
    Since the origins of the notion of emergence in attempts to recover the content of vitalistic anti-reductionism without its questionable metaphysics, emergence has been treated in terms of logical properties. This approach was doomed to failure, because logical properties are either sui generis or they are constructions from other logical properties. If the former, they do not explain on their own and are inevitably somewhat arbitrary (the problem with the related concept of supervenience, Collier, 1988a), but if the latter, reducibility (...)
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  27. Terrence Deacon (2006). Emergence: The Hole at the Wheel's Hub. In Philip Clayton & Paul Sheldon Davies (eds.), The Re-Emergence of Emergence. Oxford University Press.
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  28. Charbel Nino El-Hani (2002). On the Reality of Emergents. Principia 6 (1):51-87.
    The controversy over the notion of emergence has recently re-emerged But a rigorous debate concerning how it might be explained or defined is often lacking Emergence is discussed here under two strict conditions (l) emergents can be predictable from the knowledge about a system's parts, (ll) emergents can be regarded as dependent on, and deternuned by, the system's micro-structure O'Connor's definmon of an emergent property is taken as a starting-point for a new definmon, incorporating Emmeche and colleagues' analysis of dounward (...)
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  29. George F. R. Ellis (2006). On the Nature of Emergent Reality. In Philip Clayton & Paul Sheldon Davies (eds.), The Re-Emergence of Emergence. Oxford University Press.
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  30. Claus Emmeche (1999). The Biosemiotics of Emergent Properties in a Pluralist Ontology. In Edwina Taborsky (ed.), Semiosis. Evolution. Energy: Towards a Reconceptualization of the Sign. Shaker Verlag.
    Published in: Edwina Taborsky, ed. (1999): Semiosis. Evolution. Energy: Towards a Reconceptualization of the Sign. Shaker Verlag, Aachen. (pp. 89-108). The book is based on the meeting "Semiosis. Evolution. Energy, Third International Conference on Semiotics", Victoria Collage, University of Toronto, Canada, October 17-19, 1997 (programme and list of papers, see the SEE web page:http://www.library.utoronto.ca/see).
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  31. Claus Emmeche, Defining Life, Explaining Emergence.
    Bibliographical Note Abstract Explaining things - introductory remarks General attitudes and the standard view Requirements for a definition Life as the natural selection of replicators Life as an autopoietic system Life as a semiotic phenomenon Downward causation Implicitly well-defined general objects Emergence as explanatory strategy: the observer reappears Concluding remarks Acknowledgements Notes References Bibliographical note: Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the Princeton History of Science Workshop on "Growing Explanations", Princeton University, February 15, 1997; and at the meeting (...)
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  32. Claus Emmeche, Simo Koppe & Frederick Stjernfelt (2000). Levels, Emergence, and Three Versions of Downward Causation. In P.B. Andersen, Claus Emmeche, N.O. Finnemann & P.V. Christiansen (eds.), Downward Causation. Aarhus, Denmark: University of Aarhus Press.
    The idea of a higher level phenomenon having a downward causal influence on a lower level process or entity has taken a variety of forms. In order to discuss the relation between emergence and downward causation, the specific variety of the thesis of downward causation (DC) must be identified. Based on some ontological theses about inter-level relations, types of causation and the possibility of reduction, three versions of DC are distinguished. Of these, the `Strong' form of DC is held to (...)
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  33. Claus Emmeche, Simo Koppe & Frederick Stjernfelt (1997). Explaining Emergence: Toward an Ontology of Levels. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 28 (1):83-119.
    University of Copenhagen University of Copenhagen University of Copenhagen Blegdamsvej 17 Njalsgade 80 Njalsgade 80 DK-2100 Copenhagen Ø DK 2300 Copenhagen S DK-2300 Copenhagen S Denmark.
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  34. Christina E. Erneling & D. Johnson (eds.) (2005). Mind As a Scientific Object. Oxford University Press.
  35. G. L. Farre & T. Oksala (eds.) (1998). Emergence, Complexity, Hierarchy, Organization, Selected and Edited Papers From the ECHO III Conference. Acta Polytechnica Scandinavica.
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  36. Herbert Feigl & Michael Scriven (eds.) (1956). Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science. , Vol.
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  37. Todd E. Feinberg (2001). Why the Mind is Not a Radically Emergent Feature of the Brain. Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (9-10):123-145.
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  38. J. Ganeri (2011). Emergentisms, Ancient and Modern. Mind 120 (479):671-703.
    Jaegwon Kim has argued (Kim 2006a) that the two key issues for emergentism are to give a positive characterization of the emergence relation and to explain the possibility of downward causation. This paper proposes an account of emergence which provides new answers to these two key issues. It is argued that an appropriate emergence relation is characterized by a notion of ‘transformation’, and that the real key issue for emergentism is located elsewhere than the places Kim identifies. The paper builds (...)
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  39. A. Campbell Garnett (1942). Scientific Method and the Concept of Emergence. Journal of Philosophy 39 (August):477-86.
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  40. Carl Gillett (2010). Strong Emergence as a Defese of Non-Reductive Physicalism. Principia 6 (1):89-120.
    Jaegwon Kim, and others, have recently posed a powerful challenge to both emergentism and non-reductive physicalism by providing arguments that these positons are committed to an untenabie combination of both 'upward' and 'dounward' determination. In section 1, I illuminate how the nature of the realization relation underlies such skeptical arguments However, in section 2, I suggest that such conclusions involve a confusion between the implications of physicalism and those of a related thesis in 'Completeness of Physics' (CoP). I show tht (...)
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  41. Carl Gillett (2009). On the Implications of Scientific Composition and Completeness: Or, the Troubles, and Troubles, of Non-Reductive Physicalism. In T. O'connor & A. Corradini (eds.), Emergence in Science and Philosophy. Routledge.
  42. Carl Gillett (2006). Samuel Alexander's Emergentism. Synthese 153 (2):261-296.
    Samuel Alexander was one of the foremost philosophical figures of his day and has been argued by John Passmore to be one of ‘fathers’ of Australian philosophy as well as a novel kind of physicalist. Yet Alexander is now relatively neglected, his role in the genesis of Australian philosophy if far from widely accepted and the standard interpretation takes him to be an anti-physicalist. In this paper, I carefully examine these issues and show that Alexander has been badly, although understandably, (...)
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  43. Carl Gillett (2006). The Hidden Battles Over Emergence. In P. Clayton (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Religion and Science. Oxford University Press.
    By Carl Gillett, Illinois Wesleyan University. Ontological reductionism has long dominated the sciences and intellectual life more broadly. It holds that a ‘final theory’ in physics would, in principle, suffice to explain all natural phenomena and that, ultimately, the entities of such a theory, like quarks with their properties of spin, charm and charge, are all that actually exists. Recently, however, a mounting challenge to this hegemonic reductionism has been focused around ‘emergent’ entities. On one hand, philosophers and a range (...)
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  44. Carl Gillett (2002). Strong Emergence as a Defense of Non-Reductive Physicalism: A Physicalist Metaphysics for 'Downward' Determination. Principia 6 (1):89-120.
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  45. Carl Gillett (2002). The Varieties of Emergence: Their Purposes, Obligations and Importance. Grazer Philosophische Studien 65 (1):95-121.
    I outline reasons for the recent popularity, and lingering suspicion, about 'emergence' by examining three distinct concepts of property emergence, their purposes and associated obligations. In Part 1, I argue 'Strong' emergence is the grail for many emergentists (and physicalists), since it frames what is needed to block the 'Argument from Realization' (AR) which moves from the truth of physicalism to the inefficacy of special science properties. I then distinguish 'Weak' and 'Ontological' emergence, in Part 2, arguing each is a (...)
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  46. James W. Haag (2006). Between Physicalism and Mentalism: Philip Clayton on Mind and Emergence. Zygon 41 (3):633-647.
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  47. Scott Hagan & Masayuki Hirafuji (2001). Constraints on an Emergent Formulation of Conscious Mental States. Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (9-10):99-121.
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  48. John J. Haldane (1996). The Mystery of Emergence. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 96:261-67.
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  49. Rom Harré (2006). Resolving the Emergence-Reduction Debate. Synthese 151 (3):499-509.
    The debate between emergentists and reductionists rests on the observation that in many situations, in which it seems desirable to work with a coherent and unified discourse, key predicates fall into different groups, such that pairs of members one taken from each group, cannot be co-predicated of some common subject. Must we settle for ‘island’ discourses in science and human affairs or is some route to a unified discourse still open? To make progress towards resolving the issue the conditions under (...)
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  50. William Hasker (1999). The Emergent Self. Cornell University Press.
    In The Emergent Self, William Hasker joins one of the most heated debates in contemporary analytic philosophy, that over the nature of mind.
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  51. William Hasker (1982). Emergentism. Religious Studies 18 (December):473-88.
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  52. D. Heard (2006). A New Problem for Ontological Emergence. Philosophical Quarterly 56 (222):55-62.
    It is becoming increasingly common to find phenomena described as emergent. There are two sorts of philosophical analysis of emergence. Ontological analyses ground emergence in real, distinct, emergent properties. Epistemological analyses deny emergent properties and stress instead facts about our epistemic status. I review a standard worry for ontological analyses of emergence, that they entail a surfeit of metaphysics, and find that it can easily be sidestepped. I go on to present a new worry, that ontological emergentism entails a highly (...)
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  53. Paul Henle (1942). The Status of Emergence. Journal of Philosophy 39 (August):486-93.
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  54. Louis J. Hopkins (1943). Current Thought: Scientific Method and the Concept of Emergence. Personalist 24:77-78.
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  55. Paul Hoyningen-Huene & Simon Lohse, Emergence: Postulates and Candidates.
    In the first part of this article we will formulate postulates, which must be satisfied by a reasonable concept of emergence. The postulates will articulate conditions of adequacy for an appropriate explication of the concept of emergence. These conditions of adequacy are based primarily upon the philosophical and scientific history of the concept of emergence, in which the intended role of the concept is expressed. In the second part we will discuss and evaluate some candidates for the concept of emergence (...)
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  56. Michael Huemer, The Philosophical Complaint Against Emergence.
    In _The Mind and its Place in Nature_ , C.D. Broad tries to show, as he says (p. 59), that "there is no doubt" that the Theory of Emergence is a logically possible view with a good deal in its favor. And in his history of British Emergentism, McLaughlin states that emergentism is perfectly internally coherent, although he doesn't think it has any empirical evidence in its favor at present. I am inclined to agree with the assessment that emergentism is (...)
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  57. Paul Humphreys (2008). Synchronic and Diachronic Emergence. Minds and Machines 18 (4).
    I discuss here a number of different kinds of diachronic emergence, noting that they differ in important ways from synchronic conceptions. I argue that Bedau’s weak emergence has an essentially historical aspect, in that there can be two indistinguishable states, one of which is weakly emergent, the other of which is not. As a consequence, weak emergence is about tokens, not types, of states. I conclude by examining the question of whether the concept of weak emergence is too weak and (...)
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  58. Paul W. Humphreys (1997). How Properties Emerge. Philosophy of Science 64 (1):1-17.
    A framework for representing a specific kind of emergent property instance is given. A solution to a generalized version of the exclusion argument is then provided and it is shown that upwards and downwards causation is unproblematical for that kind of emergence. One real example of this kind of emergence is briefly described and the suggestion made that emergence may be more common than current opinions allow.
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  59. Paul W. Humphreys (1996). Aspects of Emergence. Philosophical Topics 24 (1):53-71.
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  60. David Martel Johnson & Christina E. Erneling (eds.) (2005). The Mind As a Scientific Object. Oup.
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  61. David H. Jones (1972). Emergent Properties, Persons, and the Mind-Body Problem. Southern Journal of Philosophy 10 (4):423-33.
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  62. Jesper Kallestrup (forthcoming). Review of Physicalism, or Something Near Enough, by Jaegwon Kim. [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly.
    The debate between the reductive and emergent materialist is still very much a live one. (Antony and Levine 1997; Auyang 2000; Bechtel and Richardson 1992; Block 1997; Boyd 1999; Crane 2001; David 1997; Fodor 1989; Fodor 1997; Kim 1993b; Kim 1994; Kim 1996; Kim 1999; Le Pore and Loewer 1987; Millikan 1999; Pereboom 2002; Rueger 2000; Van Gulick 2001; Yablo 1992). We argue that the best way to settle this debate is to take a step back and consider the metaphysics (...)
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  63. Stuart Kauffman & Philip Clayton (2006). On Emergence, Agency, and Organization. Biology and Philosophy 21 (4):501-521.
    Ultimately we will only understand biological agency when we have developed a theory of the organization of biological processes, and science is still a long way from attaining that goal. It may be possible nonetheless to develop a list of necessary conditions for the emergence of minimal biological agency. The authors offer a model of molecular autonomous agents which meets the five minimal physical conditions that are necessary (and, we believe, conjointly sufficient) for applying agential language in biology: autocatalytic reproduction; (...)
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  64. John Kekes (1966). Physicalism, the Identity Theory, and the Concept of Emergence. Philosophy of Science 33 (December):360-75.
    I physicalism1 and the weak identity theory deny, while physicalism2 and the radical identity theory assert, that raw feels can be accomodated in a purely physicalistic framework. II A way of interpreting the claim of physicalism1 is that raw feels are emergents. III The doctrine of emergence asserts that: (i) there are different levels of existence, (ii) these levels of existence are distinguishable on the basis of the behaviour of entities of that level, and (iii) an adequate scientific explanation of (...)
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  65. Jaegwon Kim (2006). Being Realistic About Emergence. In Philip Clayton & Paul Sheldon Davies (eds.), The Re-Emergence of Emergence. Oxford University Press.
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  66. Jaegwon Kim (2006). Emergence: Core Ideas and Issues. Synthese 151 (3):547-559.
    This paper explores the fundamental ideas that have motivated the idea of emergence and the movement of emergentism. The concept of reduction, which lies at the heart of the emergence idea is explicated, and it is shown how the thesis that emergent properties are irreducible gives a unified account of emergence. The paper goes on to discuss two fundamental unresolved issues for emergentism. The first is that of giving a “positive” characterization of emergence; the second is to give a coherent (...)
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  67. Michael Kirchhoff (forthcoming). In Search of Ontological Emergence: Diachronic, But Non-Supervenient. Axiomathes:1-28.
    Most philosophical accounts of emergence are based on supervenience, with supervenience being an ontologically synchronic relation of determination. This conception of emergence as a relation of supervenience, I will argue, is unable to make sense of the kinds of emergence that are widespread in self-organizing and nonlinear dynamical systems, including distributed cognitive systems. In these dynamical systems, an emergent property is ontological (i.e., the causal capacities of P, where P is an emergent feature, are not reducible to causal capacities of (...)
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  68. Robert C. Koons (2003). Functionalism Without Physicalism: Outline of an Emergentist Program. Progress in Complexity, Information, and Design 2 (3-3).
    The historical association between functionalism and physicalism is not an unbreakable one. There are reasons for finding some version of a functional account of the mental attractive that are independent of the plausibility of physicalism. I develop a non-physicalist version of func- tionalism and explain how this model is able to secure genuine emergence of the mental, despite Kim’s arguments that such emergence theories are incoherent. The kind of teleological emergence of the mental required by this model is in fact (...)
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  69. C. Lloyd Morgan (1925). Emergent Evolution. Mind 34 (133):70-74.
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  70. Alfred H. Lloyd (1927). Also the Emergence of Matter. Journal of Philosophy 24 (12):309-332.
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  71. Arthur O. Lovejoy (1927). The Meanings of "Emergence" and its Modes. In Edgar S. Brightman (ed.), Proceedings of the Sixth International Congress of Philosophy. Longmans, Green, and Co.
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  72. E. J. Lowe (2000). Causal Closure Principles and Emergentism. Philosophy 75 (294):571-586.
    Causal closure arguments against interactionist dualism are currently popular amongst physicalists. Such an argument appeals to some principles of the causal closure of the physical, together with certain other premises, to conclude that at least some mental events are identical with physical events. However, it is crucial to the success of any such argument that the physical causal closure principle to which it appeals is neither too strong nor too weak by certain standards. In this paper, it is argued that (...)
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  73. A. Lowry (1974). A Note on Emergence. Mind 83 (April):276-77.
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  74. W. L. Mackenzie (1926). The Notion of Emergence. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 6:56-68.
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  75. Maurice Mandelbaum (1951). A Note On Emergence In Freedom And Reason, Salo Baron And Others (Eds). Glencoe Il: Free Press.
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  76. Joseph Margolis (1986). Emergence. Philosophical Forum 17:271-95.
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  77. William Marias Malisoff (1939). Emergence Without Mystery. Philosophy of Science 6 (1):17-24.
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  78. Olga Markič (2004). Causal Emergentism. Acta Analytica 19 (33):65-81.
    In this paper I describe basic features of traditional (British) emergentism and Popper’s emergentist theory of consciousness and compare them to the contemporary versions of emergentism present in connectionist approach in cognitive sciences. I argue that despite their similarities, the traditional form, as well as Popper’s theory belong to strong causal emergentism and yield radically different ontological consequences compared to the weaker, contemporary version present in cognitive science. Strong causal emergentism denies the causal closure of the physical domain and introduces (...)
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  79. R. I. Markus (1950). Alexander's Philosophy: The Emergence of Qualities. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 11 (September):58-74.
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  80. Ausonio Marras (2006). Emergence and Reduction: Reply to Kim. Synthese 151 (3):561-569.
    In this paper I examine Jaegwon Kim’s view that emergent properties are irreducible to the base properties on which they supervene. Kim’s view assumes a model of ‘functional reduction’ which he claims to be substantially different from the traditional Nagelian model. I dispute this claim and argue that the two models are only superficially different, and that on either model, properly understood, it is possible to draw a distinction between a property’s being reductively identifiable with its base property and a (...)
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  81. Olivier Massin (2006). Complementarity Cannot Resolve the Emergence–Reduction Debate: Reply to Harré. Synthese 151 (3):511 - 517.
    Rom Harré thinks that the Emergence–Reduction debate, conceived as a vertical problem, is partly ill posed. Even if he doesn’t wholly reject the traditional definition of an emergent property as a property of a collection but not of its components, his point is that this definition doesn’t exhaust all the dimensions of emergence. According to Harré there is another kind (or dimension) of emergence, which we may call—somewhat paradoxically—“horizontal emergence”: two properties of a substance are horizontally emergent relative to each (...)
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  82. Brian P. McLaughlin (1992). The Rise and Fall of British Emergentism. In Ansgar Beckermann, Hans Flohr & Jaegwon Kim (eds.), Emergence or Reduction?: Prospects for Nonreductive Physicalism. De Gruyter.
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  83. Brian P. McLaughlin & Jonathan D. Cohen (eds.) (2007). Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell Pub..
    Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind showcases the leading contributors to the field, debating the major questions in philosophy of mind today. Comprises 20 newly commissioned essays on hotly debated issues in the philosophy of mind Written by a cast of leading experts in their fields, essays take opposing views on 10 central contemporary debates A thorough introduction provides a comprehensive background to the issues explored Organised into three sections which explore the ontology of the mental, nature of the mental (...)
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  84. Dolores G. Morris (2011). Emergence in Mind. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (1):196 - 198.
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Volume 90, Issue 1, Page 196-198, March 2012.
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  85. C. Ulises Moulines (2006). Ontology, Reduction, Emergence: A General Frame. Synthese 151 (3):313-323.
    In a scientific context, ontological commitments should be considered as supervenient over accepted scientific theories. This implies that the primarily ontological notions of reduction and emergence of entities of different kinds should be reformulated in terms of relations between existing empirical theories. For this, in turn, it is most convenient to employ a model-theoretic view of scientific theories: the identity criterion of a scientific theory is essentially given by a class of models. Accordingly, reduction and emergence are to be seen (...)
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  86. Stephen Mumford & Matthew Tugby (eds.) (forthcoming). Metaphysics and Science. Oxford University Press.
    Metaphysics and Science brings together important new work within an emerging philosophical discipline: the metaphysics of science. In the opening chapter, a definition of the metaphysics of science is offered, one which explains why the topics of laws, causation, natural kinds, and emergence are at the discipline's heart. The book is then divided into four sections, which group together papers from leading academics on each of those four topics. Among the questions discussed are: How are laws and measurement methods related? (...)
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  87. Nancey C. Murphy (2006). Emergence and Mental Causation. In Philip Clayton & Paul Sheldon Davies (eds.), The Re-Emergence of Emergence. Oxford University Press.
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  88. Nancey C. Murphy & William R. Stoeger (eds.) (2007). Evolution and Emergence: Systems, Organisms, Persons. Oxford University Press.
    The collection as a whole will extend the mutual creative interaction among the sciences, philosophy, and theology.
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  89. Paul Needham (2009). Reduction and Emergence: A Critique of Kim. Philosophical Studies 146 (1):93 - 116.
    In a recent critique of the doctrine of emergentism championed by its classic advocates up to C. D. Broad, Jaegwon Kim (Philosophical Studies 63:31–47, 1999) challenges their view about its applicability to the sciences and proposes a new account of how the opposing notion of reduction should be understood. Kim is critical of the classic conception advanced by Nagel and uses his new account in his criticism of emergentism. I question his claims about the successful reduction achieved in the sciences (...)
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  90. Alvin F. Nelson (1969). Emergentism Reconsidered and an Alternative. Southern Journal of Philosophy 7 (2):187-192.
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  91. Martine Nida-Rümelin (2007). Dualist Emergentism. In Brian P. McLaughlin & Jonathan D. Cohen (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell.
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  92. Gregory M. Nixon (2010). Myth and Mind: The Origin of Consciousness in the Discovery of the Sacred. Journal of Consciousness Exploration and Research 1 (3):289-337.
    By accepting that the formal structure of human language is the key to understanding the uniquity of human culture and consciousness and by further accepting the late appearance of such language amongst the Cro-Magnon, I am free to focus on the causes that led to such an unprecedented threshold crossing. In the complex of causes that led to human being, I look to scholarship in linguistics, mythology, anthropology, paleontology, and to creation myths themselves for an answer. I conclude that prehumans (...)
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  93. Timothy O'Connor (2005). The Metaphysics of Emergence. Noûs 39 (4):658-678.
    The objective probability of every physical event is fixed by prior physical events and laws alone. (This thesis is sometimes expressed in terms of explanation: In tracing the causal history of any physical event, one need not advert to any non-physical events or laws. To the extent that there is any explanation available for a physical event, there is a complete explanation available couched entirely in physical vocabulary. We prefer the probability formulation, as it should be acceptable to any physicalist, (...)
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  94. Timothy O'Connor (2003). Groundwork for an Emergentist Account of the Mental. Pcid 2.
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  95. Timothy O'Connor & Jonathan D. Jacobs (2003). Emergent Individuals. Philosophical Quarterly 53 (213):540-555.
    We explain the thesis that human mental states are ontologically emergent aspects of a fundamentally biological organism. We then explore the consequences of this thesis for the identity of a human person over time. As these consequences are not obviously independent of one's general ontology of objects and their properties, we consider four such accounts: transcendent universals, kind-Aristotelianism, immanent universals, and tropes. We suggest there are reasons for emergentists to favor the latter two accounts. We then argue that within such (...)
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  96. G. T. W. Patrick (1922). The Emergent Theory of Mind. Journal of Philosophy 19 (26):701-708.
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  97. S. L. Peters (1995). Emergent Materialism: A Proposed Solution to the Mind-Body Problem. University Press of America.
    This book is particularly appropriate for graduate seminars or upper division courses in philosophy of mind, and for metaphysics or introductory philosophy ...
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  98. Gregory R. Peterson (2002). Emergence and Supervenience. Tradition and Discovery 29 (3):23-27.
    Philip Clayton has put forth a clear and important position regarding the mind-body relationship in terms of supervenient and emergent realities. While I agree with Clayton on many points, I argue that there are important problems with current literature on supervenience and emergence. In particular, I distinguish between closed system emergence and open system emergence, suggesting that Clayton’s position is closer to the latter than the former.
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  99. S. Pihlstrom (1999). What Shall We Do with Emergence? A Survey of a Fundamental Issue in the Metaphysics and Epistemology of Science. South African Journal of Philosophy 18 (2):192-210.
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  100. Sami Pihlström (2010). The Re-Emergence of the Emergence Debate. Principia 6 (1):133-182.
    This essay provides a criticai review of contemporary controversies related to the notion of emergence by discussing, among other recent views, Achim Stephan's defense of the ontological tradition of emergentist thought along the lines of C. D. Broad. Stephan's distinctions between various notions of emergence, different in strength, are useful as they clarify the state of discussion. There are, however, several unsettled problems concerning emergence. Some of these (e. g., downward causation) have been dealt with by Stephan, Kim, and others, (...)
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