Philosophers working on the emotions are interested in answering the following kinds of questions:
What are emotions? Are they thoughts, feelings, perceptual or quasi-perceptual states, or something else? Or perhaps they are combination of all these things? Do emotions form a natural class? Are emotions natural kinds? Are emotions in some sense ‘socially constructed’?
What emotions are there? Is love an emotion? How about Schadenfreude? Are moods emotions? What about so-called moral or aesthetic or religious emotions? Are these emotions proper? Again, how are different emotions to be characterized? What distinguishes them from one another?
What is the relationship between emotion and reason? Can emotions be evaluated for their rationality? Or are emotions non-rational mental states? Do we need emotions in order to be ‘rational’?
Closely related to the last few questions, what is the nature of the relationship between emotion and morality? Are emotions needed to have insight into the evaluate realm? Can a person who lacks certain emotional capacities be a moral agent? How might emotion be important for understanding character, vice and virtue? How might emotion be a hindrance to morality?
Each of the emotion subcategories contains details of work on the emotions that is devoted to answering and shedding light on the above sorts of questions, along with many others.
- Hume: Emotion (1)
Material to categorize
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David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Catarina Dutilh Novaes
Jack Alan Reynolds
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