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  1. Maria Magoula Adamos (2012). Mental Pictures, Imagination and Emotions. In P. Hanna (ed.), Anthology of Philosophical Studies, vol. 6. ATINER 83-91.
    Although cognitivism has lost some ground recently in the philosophical circles, it is still the favorite view of many scholars of emotions. Even though I agree with cognitivism's insight that emotions typically involve some type of evaluative intentional state, I shall argue that in some cases, less epistemically committed, non-propositional evaluative states such as mental pictures can do a better job in identifying the emotion and providing its intentional object. Mental pictures have different logical features from propositions: they are representational, (...)
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  2. Eoghan Mac Aogáin (2000). Emotion, Cognition, and Free Representation. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (2):210-210.
    The representation of events, in primates at any rate, is a separate process from their emotional evaluation. The same holds for cognitive evaluation. Here too representation and evaluation are separate operations. Acknowledging the symmetry leads to the notion of free representation.
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  3. Gary Bartlett (2016). Review of "The Feeling Body: Affective Science Meets the Enactive Mind" and "Feeling Extended: Sociality as Extended Body-Becoming-Mind". [REVIEW] Essays in Philosophy 17 (1):164-188.
  4. Jordan Bartol & Stefan Linquist (2015). How Do Somatic Markers Feature in Decision Making? Emotion Review 7 (1):81-89.
    Several recent criticisms of the somatic marker hypothesis (SMH) identify multiple ambiguities in the way it has been formulated by its chief proponents. Here we provide evidence that this hypothesis has also been interpreted in various different ways by the scientific community. Our diagnosis of this problem is that SMH lacks an adequate computational-level account of practical decision making. Such an account is necessary for drawing meaningful links between neurological- and psychological-level data. The paper concludes by providing a simple, five-step (...)
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  5. Monika Bednarek (2009). Dimensions of Evaluation: Cognitive and Linguistic Perspectives. Pragmatics and Cognition 17 (1):146-176.
    In the past two decades or so, a number of researchers from various fields within linguistics have turned their attention to interpersonal phenomena, such as the linguistic expression of speaker opinion or evaluation , or the encoding of subjectivity in language and its diachronic development . Many linguists have offered categorizations of evaluative meaning, based on authentic discourse data, but no connection has been made with cognitive approaches to appraisal processes. This paper offers a first meta-theoretical exploration of such issues. (...)
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  6. Aaron Ben-Ze'ev (1997). Appraisal Theories of Emotions. Journal of Philosophical Research 22 (April):129-143.
    Today appraisal theories are the foremost approach to emotions in philosophy and psychology. The general assumption underlying these theories is that evaluations are the most crucial factor in emotions. This assumption may imply that: evaluative pattems distinguish one emotion from another; evaluative pattems distinguish emotions from nonemotions; emotional evaluations of the eliciting event determine emotional intensity. These claims are not necessarily related. Accepting one of them does not necessarily imply acceptance of the others. I believe that whereas is false, and (...)
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  7. Aaron Ben-Ze’Ev (1997). Appraisal Theories of Emotions. Journal of Philosophical Research 22:129-143.
    Today appraisal theories are the foremost approach to emotions in philosophy and psychology. The general assumption underlying these theories is that evaluations (appraisals) are the most crucial factor in emotions. This assumption may imply that: (a) evaluative pattems distinguish one emotion from another; (b) evaluative pattems distinguish emotions from nonemotions; (e) emotional evaluations of the eliciting event determine emotional intensity. These claims are not necessarily related. Accepting one of them does not necessarily imply acceptance of the others. I believe that (...)
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  8. Uri Benzion, Shosh Shahrabani & Tal Shavit (2009). Emotions and Perceived Risks After the 2006 Israel–Lebanon War. Mind and Society 8 (1):21-41.
    The current study aims to examine how the intense emotions experienced by different Israeli groups during the 2006 Second Lebanon War affected their perceptions of risk. Two weeks after the end of the war, a questionnaire was distributed among 205 people. Some were from the north and had been directly affected by the rocket attacks; others were from the center of Israel. The questionnaires, based on Lerner et al., measured emotions and perceived risk. The results show significant differences between those (...)
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  9. Chrystine E. Cassin (1968). Emotions and Evaluations. Personalist 49 (4):563-571.
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  10. Antonio Chella (2005). An Intermediate Level Between the Psychological and the Neurobiological Levels of Descriptions of Appraisal-Emotion Dynamics. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (2):199-200.
    Conceptual space is proposed as an intermediate representation level between the psychological and the neurobiological levels of descriptions of appraisal and emotions. The main advantage of the proposed intermediate representation is that the appraisal and emotions dynamics are described by using the terms of geometry.
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  11. Tom Cochrane (forthcoming). The Difference Between Emotion and Affect. Physics of Life Reviews.
    In this brief comment on a target article by Koelsch et al., I argue that emotions are more sensitive to context than other affective states.
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  12. Giovanna Colombetti (2013). The Feeling Body: Affective Science Meets the Enactive Mind. The MIT Press.
    A proposal that extends the enactive approach developed in cognitive science and philosophy of mind to issues in affective science.
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  13. Giovanna Colombetti & Evan Thompson (2005). Enacting Emotional Interpretations with Feeling. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (2):200-201.
    This commentary makes three points: (1) There may be no clear-cut distinction between emotion and appraisal “constituents” at neural and psychological levels. (2) The microdevelopment of an emotional interpretation contains a complex microdevelopment of affect. (3) Neurophenomenology is a promising research program for testing Lewis's hypotheses about the neurodynamics of emotion-appraisal amalgams.
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  14. Anthony Cunningham (2005). Great Anger. The Dalhousie Review 85 (3).
    Anger has an undeniable hand in human suffering and horrific deeds. Various schools of thought call for eliminating or moderating the capacity for anger. I argue that the capacity for anger, like the capacity for grief, is at the heart of our humanity.
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  15. Andreas Dorschel (2002). Is Love Intertwined with Hatred? Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 33 (2):273-285.
  16. Andreas Elpidorou (2013). Moods and Appraisals: How the Phenomenology and Science of Emotions Can Come Together. Human Studies (4):1-27.
    In this paper, I articulate Heidegger’s notion of Befindlichkeit and show that his phenomenological account of affective existence can be understood in terms of contemporary work on emotions. By examining Heidegger’s account alongside contemporary accounts of emotions, I not only demonstrate the ways in which key aspects of the former are present in the latter; I also explicate in detail the ways in which our understanding of Befindlichkeit and its relationship to moods and emotions can benefit from an empirically-informed study (...)
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  17. Andreas Elpidorou & Lauren Freeman (2014). The Phenomenology and Science of Emotions: An Introduction. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (4):507-511.
    Phenomenology, perhaps more than any other single movement in philosophy, has been key in bringing emotions to the foreground of philosophical consideration. This is in large part due to the ways in which emotions, according to phenomenological analyses, are revealing of basic structures of human existence. Indeed, it is partly and, according to some phenomenologists, even primarily through our emotions that the world is disclosed to us, that we become present to and make sense of ourselves, and that we relate (...)
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  18. Eva-Maria Engelen, Hans J. Markowitsch, Christian Scheve, Birgitt Roettger-Roessler, Achim Stephan, Manfred Holodynski & Marie Vandekerckhove (2009). Emotions as Bio-Cultural Processes: Discipinary Debates and an Interdisciplinary Outlook. In Birgitt Röttger-Rössler & Hans Markowitsch (eds.), Emotions as Bio-cultural Processes.
    The article develops a theoretical framework that is capable of integrating the biological foundations of emotions with their cultural and semantic formation.
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  19. Janet Etzi (2007). True to Our Feelings: What Our Emotions Are Really Telling Us. Journal of Phenomenological Psychology 38 (2):284-287.
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  20. D. Evans & Pierre Cruse (eds.) (2004). Emotion, Evolution, and Rationality. Oxford University Press.
    For thousands of years, many Western thinkers have assumed that emotions are, at best, harmless luxuries, and at worst outright obstacles to intelligent action. In the past decade, however, scientists and philosophers have begun to challenge this 'negative view of emotion'. Neuroscientists, psychologists and researchers in artificial intelligence now agree that emotions are vital to intelligent action. Evolutionary considerations have played a vital role in this shift to a more positive view of emotion. -/- This book brings together some of (...)
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  21. Philip Gerrans (2007). Mental Time Travel, Somatic Markers and "Myopia for the Future". Synthese 159 (3):459 - 474.
    Patients with damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) are often described as having impaired ability for planning and decision making despite retaining intact capacities for explicit reasoning. The somatic marker hypothesis is that the VMPFC associates implicitly represented affective information with explicit representations of actions or outcomes. Consequently, when the VMPFC is damaged explicit reasoning is no longer scaffolded by affective information, leading to characteristic deficits. These deficits are exemplified in performance on the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) in which (...)
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  22. P. S. Greenspan, Emotions, Evaluation, and Ethics: The Role of Emotions in Formulating and Justifying Ethical Judgments.
    The role of emotions in ethics is often taken by philosophers and others as antithetical to rationality. On the most basic level (in undergraduate philosophy exams and elsewhere), stating an opinion in the form "I feel that p" can be a way of sidestepping the demand for reasons. But emotions can sometimes also be seen as supplying reasons for moral judgment to the extent that they involve evaluations--and a way of communicating them across different moral perspectives.
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  23. Paul E. Griffiths (2004). Toward a "Machiavellian" Theory of Emotional Appraisal. In D. Evans & Pierre Cruse (eds.), Emotion, Evolution, and Rationality. Oxford University Press
    The aim of appraisal theory in the psychology of emotion is to identify the features of the emotion-eliciting situation that lead to the production of one emotion rather than another2. A model of emotional appraisal takes the form of a set of dimensions against which potentially emotion-eliciting situations are assessed. The dimensions of the emotion hyperspace might include, for example, whether the eliciting situation fulfills or frustrates the subject’s goals or whether an actor in the eliciting situation has violated a (...)
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  24. Paul E. Griffiths, Appraisal and Machiavellian Emotion.
    Emotional appraisal happens at more than one level. Low-level appraisals involve representations that are semantically coarse-grained, fuse the functional roles of belief and desire and have impoverished inferential roles, making it best to think of them as sub-conceptual. Multi-level theories of emotional appraisal are thus best conceived, not as theories of the actual conceptual content of emotional appraisals, but as ecological theories that identify the aspects of the environment that appraisal processes are tracking using diverse cognitive means. These aspects of (...)
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  25. Anthony E. Hatzimoysis (ed.) (2003). Philosophy and the Emotions. Cambridge University Press.
  26. Scott Alexander Howard (2015). Metaemotional Intentionality. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2):n/a-n/a.
    This article argues against two theories that obscure our understanding of emotions whose objects are other emotions. The tripartite model of emotional intentionality holds that an emotion's relation to its object is necessarily mediated by an additional representational state; I argue that metaemotions are an exception to this claim. The hierarchical model positions metaemotions as stable, epistemically privileged higher-order appraisals of lower-level emotions; I argue that this clashes with various features of complex metaemotional experiences. The article therefore serves dual purposes, (...)
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  27. Christoph Jäger & Anne Bartsch (2009). Prolegomena zu einer philosophischen Theorie der Meta-Emotionen. In Barbara Merker (ed.), Leben mit Gefühlen. Mentis 113-137.
  28. Richard S. Lazarus (1974). The Self-Regulation of Emotion. Philosophical Studies 22:168-179.
  29. Stefan Linquist (2007). Review of Paul Thagard, Hot Thought: Mechanisms and Applications of Emotional Cognition. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2007 (9).
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  30. Michael McEachrane (2009). Emotion, Meaning, and Appraisal Theory. Theory and Psychology 19 (1):33-53.
    According to psychological emotion theories referred to as appraisal theory, emotions are caused by appraisals (evaluative judgments). Borrowing a term from Jan Smedslund, it is the contention of this article that psychological appraisal theory is “pseudoempirical” (i.e., misleadingly or incorrectly empirical). In the article I outline what makes some scientific psychology “pseudoempirical,” distinguish my view on this from Jan Smedslund’s, and then go on to show why paying heed to the ordinary meanings of emotion terms is relevant to psychology, and (...)
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  31. Thaddeus Metz (2009). Love and Emotional Reactions to Necessary Evils. In Pedro Alexis Tabensky (ed.), The Positive Function of Evil. Palgrave Macmillan 28-44.
    This chapter supposes that certain bads are necessary for substantial goods, and poses the question of how one ought to react emotionally to such bads. In recent work, Robert Adams is naturally read as contending that one ought to exhibit positive emotions such as gladness towards certain ‘necessary evils’. A rationale he suggests for this view is that love for a person, which involves viewing the beloved as good, requires being glad about what is necessary for her to exist, even (...)
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  32. Agnes Moors & Peter Kuppens (2008). Distinguishing Between Two Types of Musical Emotions and Reconsidering the Role of Appraisal. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (5):588-589.
    The target article inventories mechanisms underlying musical emotions. We argue that the inventory misses important mechanisms and that its structure would benefit from the distinction between two types of musical emotions. We also argue that the authors' claim that appraisal does not play a crucial role in the causation of musical emotions rests on a narrow conception of appraisal.
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  33. Adam Morton (2010). Epistemic Emotions. In Peter Goldie (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion. Oxford University Press 385--399.
    I discuss a large number of emotions that are relevant to performance at epistemic tasks. My central concern is the possibility that it is not the emotions that are most relevant to success of these tasks but associated virtues. I present cases in which it does seem to be the emotions rather than the virtues that are doing the work. I end of the paper by mentioning the connections between desirable and undesirable epistemic emotions.
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  34. Jochen Musch & Karl C. Klauer (eds.) (2003). The Psychology of Evaluation: Affective Processes in Cognition and Emotion. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
    Offering a highly integrated and comprehensive coverage of the field, this book is suitable as a core textbook in advanced courses dealing with the role of ...
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  35. Georg Northoff (2008). Is Appraisal 'Embodied' and 'Embedded'? A Neurophilosophical Investigation of Emotions. Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (5):68-99.
    Emotion theories in present philosophical discussion propose different models of relationship between feeling and appraisal. The multicomponent model considers appraisal as separate component and distinguishes it from feeling and physiological body changes thus presupposing what may be called 'disembodied' and 'disembedded' appraisal as representational. The recently emerged concept of enactment, in contrast, argues that appraisal is closely linked to feeling and physiological body changes presupposing what can be called 'embodied' and 'embedded' appraisal as relational. The aim of the paper is (...)
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  36. Elisabeth Pacherie (2002). The Role of Emotions in the Explanation of Action. European Review of Philosophy 5:53-92.
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  37. Carolyn Price (2015). Emotion. Polity.
    Emotion is at the centre of our personal and social lives. To love or to hate, to be frightened or grateful is not just a matter of how we feel on the inside: our emotional responses direct our thoughts and actions, unleash our imaginations, and structure our relationships with others. Yet the role of emotion in human life has long been disputed. Is emotion reason?s friend or its foe? From where do the emotions really arise? Why do we need them (...)
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  38. Carolyn Price (2010). The Rationality of Grief. Inquiry 53 (1):20-40.
    Donald Gustafson has argued that grief centres on a combination of belief and desire: The belief that the subject has suffered an irreparable loss. The desire that this should not be the case. And yet, as Gustafson points out, if the belief is true, the desire cannot be satisfied. Gustafson takes this to show that grief inevitably implies an irrational conflict between belief and desire. I offer a partial defence of grief against Gustafson's charge of irrationality. My defence rests on (...)
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  39. Carolyn Price (2006). Affect Without Object: Moods and Objectless Emotions. European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 2 (1):49-68.
    Should moods be regarded as intentional states, and, if so, what kind of intentional content do they have? I focus on irritability and apprehension, which I examine from the perspective of a teleosemantic theory of content. Eric Lormand has argued that moods are non-intentional states, distinct from emotions; Robert Solomon and Peter Goldie argue that moods are generalised emotions and that they have intentional content of a correspondingly general kind. I present a third model, on which moods are regarded, not (...)
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  40. Carolyn S. Price (2006). Fearing Fluffy: The Content of an Emotional Appraisal. In Graham F. Macdonald & David Papineau (eds.), Teleosemantics. Oxford University Press
    What is the difference between an emotional appraisal and a dispassionate judgement? It has been suggested that emotional appraisals are states of a special kind that play a distinctive role in our psychology; it has also been suggested that emotional appraisals have a distinctive kind of content. In this paper, I explore the links between the function and content of an emotional appraisal, making use of a teleosemantic account of intentional content that I have developed elsewhere.
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  41. Jesse Prinz (2004). Emotions Embodied. In R. Solomon (ed.), Thinking About Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions. Oxford University Press
    In one of the most frequently quoted passages in the history of emotion research, William James (1884: 189f) announces that emotions occur when the perception of an exciting fact causes a collection of bodily changes, and “our feeling of the same changes as they occur IS the emotion.” The same idea occurred to Carl Lange (1984) around the same time. These authors were not the first to draw a link between the emotions and the body. Indeed, this had been a (...)
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  42. Jesse J. Prinz (2003). Emotions, Psychosemantics, and Embodied Appraisals. In A. Hatimoysis (ed.), Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. Cambridge University Press 69-86.
    There seem to be two kinds of emotion the rists in the world. Some work very hard to show that emotions are essentially cognitive states. Others resist this suggestion and insist that emotions are noncognitive. The debate has appeared in many forms in philosophy and psychology. It never seems to go away. The reason for this is simple. Emotions have properties that push in both directions, properties that make them seem quite smart and properties that make them seem quite dumb. (...)
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  43. Rainer Reisenzein (2006). Emotions as Metarepresentational States of Mind. In R. Trappl (ed.), Cybernetics and Systems 2006 (Vol. 2, pp. 649-653). Proceedings of the 18th European Meeting on Cybernetics and Systems Research. Austrian Society for Cybernetic Studies
  44. Rainer Reisenzein (1998). Outlines of a Theory of Emotions as Metarepresentational States of Mind. In A. H. Fischer (ed.), ISRE ' 98, Proceedings of the 10th Conference of the International Society for Research on Emotions (pp. 186-191). ISRE
    This paper summarizes a theory of emotions as metarepresentational states of mind (for more detail, see Reisenzein, 1998). The basic idea of the theory is that at least a core set of human emotions including surprise are nonconceptual products of hardwired, metarepresentational mechanisms whose main function is to subserve the monitoring and updating of the two basic forms of propositional representations, beliefs and desires.
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  45. David Sander (2008). Basic Tastes and Basic Emotions: Basic Problems and Perspectives for a Nonbasic Solution. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (1):88-88.
    Contemporary behavioral and brain scientists consider the existence of so-called basic emotions in a similar way to the one described by Erickson for so-called basic tastes. Commenting on this analogy, I argue that similar basic problems are encountered in both perspectives, and I suggest a potential nonbasic solution that is tested in emotion research (i.e., the appraisal model of emotion).
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  46. Robert C. Solomon (2007). True To Our Feelings: What Our Emotions Are Really Telling Us. Oxford University Press.
    We live our lives through our emotions, writes Robert Solomon, and it is our emotions that give our lives meaning. What interests or fascinates us, who we love, what angers us, what moves us, what bores us--all of this defines us, gives us character, constitutes who we are. In True to Our Feelings, Solomon illuminates the rich life of the emotions--why we don't really understand them, what they really are, and how they make us human and give meaning to life. (...)
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  47. Fabrice Teroni & Julien A. Deonna (2014). In What Sense Are Emotions Evaluations? In Cain Todd & Sabine Roeser (eds.), Emotion and Value. Oxford 15-31.
    In this chapter, we first introduce the idea that emotions are evaluations. Next, we explore two approaches attempting to account for this idea in terms of attitudes that are alleged to become emotional when taking evaluative contents. According to the first approach, emotions are evaluative judgments. According to the second, emotions are perceptual experiences of evaluative properties. We explain why this theory remains unsatisfactory insofar as it shares with the evaluative judgement theory the idea that emotions are evaluations in virtue (...)
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  48. Fabrice Teroni & Julien A. Deonna (2011). Is Shame a Social Emotion? In Anita Konzelmann Ziv, Keith Lehrer & Hans Bernard Schmid (eds.), Self-Evaluation: Affective and Social Grounds of Intentionality. Springer 193-212.
    In this article, we present, assess and give reasons to reject the popular claim that shame is essentially social. We start by presenting several theses which the social claim has motivated in the philosophical literature. All of them, in their own way, regard shame as displaying a structure in which "others" play an essential role. We argue that while all these theses are true of some important families of shame episodes, none of them generalize so as to motivate the conclusion (...)
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