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  1. Eoghan Mac Aogáin (2000). Emotion, Cognition, and Free Representation. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (2):210-210.
    The representation of events, in primates at any rate, is a separate process from their emotional evaluation. The same holds for cognitive evaluation. Here too representation and evaluation are separate operations. Acknowledging the symmetry leads to the notion of free representation.
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  2. Aaron Ben-Ze'ev (1997). Appraisal Theories of Emotions. Journal of Philosophical Research 22 (April):129-143.
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  3. Aaron Ben-Ze’Ev (1997). Appraisal Theories of Emotions. Journal of Philosophical Research 22:129-143.
    Today appraisal theories are the foremost approach to emotions in philosophy and psychology. The general assumption underlying these theories is that evaluations (appraisals) are the most crucial factor in emotions. This assumption may imply that: (a) evaluative pattems distinguish one emotion from another; (b) evaluative pattems distinguish emotions from nonemotions; (e) emotional evaluations of the eliciting event determine emotional intensity. These claims are not necessarily related. Accepting one of them does not necessarily imply acceptance of the others. I believe that (...)
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  4. Uri Benzion, Shosh Shahrabani & Tal Shavit (2008). Emotions and Perceived Risks After the 2006 Israel–Lebanon War. Mind and Society 8 (1):21-41.
    The current study aims to examine how the intense emotions experienced by different Israeli groups during the 2006 Second Lebanon War affected their perceptions of risk. Two weeks after the end of the war, a questionnaire was distributed among 205 people. Some were from the north and had been directly affected by the rocket attacks; others were from the center of Israel. The questionnaires, based on Lerner et al. (2003), measured emotions and perceived risk. The results show significant differences between (...)
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  5. Chrystine E. Cassin (1968). Emotions and Evaluations. Personalist 49:563-571.
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  6. Antonio Chella (2005). An Intermediate Level Between the Psychological and the Neurobiological Levels of Descriptions of Appraisal-Emotion Dynamics. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (2):199-200.
    Conceptual space is proposed as an intermediate representation level between the psychological and the neurobiological levels of descriptions of appraisal and emotions. The main advantage of the proposed intermediate representation is that the appraisal and emotions dynamics are described by using the terms of geometry.
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  7. Giovanna Colombetti & Evan Thompson (2005). Enacting Emotional Interpretations with Feeling. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (2):200-201.
    This commentary makes three points: (1) There may be no clear-cut distinction between emotion and appraisal “constituents” at neural and psychological levels. (2) The microdevelopment of an emotional interpretation contains a complex microdevelopment of affect. (3) Neurophenomenology is a promising research program for testing Lewis's hypotheses about the neurodynamics of emotion-appraisal amalgams.
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  8. Anthony Cunningham (2005). Great Anger. The Dalhousie Review 85 (3).
    Anger has an undeniable hand in human suffering and horrific deeds. Various schools of thought call for eliminating or moderating the capacity for anger. I argue that the capacity for anger, like the capacity for grief, is at the heart of our humanity.
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  9. Andreas Elpidorou (2013). Moods and Appraisals: How the Phenomenology and Science of Emotions Can Come Together. Human Studies (4):1-27.
    In this paper, I articulate Heidegger’s notion of Befindlichkeit and show that his phenomenological account of affective existence can be understood in terms of contemporary work on emotions. By examining Heidegger’s account alongside contemporary accounts of emotions, I not only demonstrate the ways in which key aspects of the former are present in the latter; I also explicate in detail the ways in which our understanding of Befindlichkeit and its relationship to moods and emotions can benefit from an empirically-informed study (...)
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  10. Eva-Maria Engelen, Hans J. Markowitsch, Christian Scheve, Birgitt Roettger-Roessler, Achim Stephan, Manfred Holodynski & Marie Vandekerckhove (2009). Emotions as Bio-Cultural Processes: Discipinary Debates and an Interdisciplinary Outlook. In Birgitt Röttger-Rössler & Hans Markowitsch (eds.), Emotions as Bio-cultural Processes.
    The article develops a theoretical framework that is capable of integrating the biological foundations of emotions with their cultural and semantic formation.
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  11. Janet Etzi (2007). True to Our Feelings: What Our Emotions Are Really Telling Us. Journal of Phenomenological Psychology 38 (2):284-287.
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  12. D. Evans & Pierre Cruse (eds.) (2004). Emotion, Evolution, and Rationality. Oxford University Press.
    For thousands of years, many Western thinkers have assumed that emotions are, at best, harmless luxuries, and at worst outright obstacles to intelligent action. In the past decade, however, scientists and philosophers have begun to challenge this 'negative view of emotion'. Neuroscientists, psychologists and researchers in artificial intelligence now agree that emotions are vital to intelligent action. Evolutionary considerations have played a vital role in this shift to a more positive view of emotion. -/- This book brings together some of (...)
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  13. Philip Gerrans (2007). Mental Time Travel, Somatic Markers and "Myopia for the Future". Synthese 159 (3):459 - 474.
    Patients with damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) are often described as having impaired ability for planning and decision making despite retaining intact capacities for explicit reasoning. The somatic marker hypothesis is that the VMPFC associates implicitly represented affective information with explicit representations of actions or outcomes. Consequently, when the VMPFC is damaged explicit reasoning is no longer scaffolded by affective information, leading to characteristic deficits. These deficits are exemplified in performance on the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) in which (...)
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  14. P. S. Greenspan, Emotions, Evaluation, and Ethics: The Role of Emotions in Formulating and Justifying Ethical Judgments.
    The role of emotions in ethics is often taken by philosophers and others as antithetical to rationality. On the most basic level (in undergraduate philosophy exams and elsewhere), stating an opinion in the form "I feel that p" can be a way of sidestepping the demand for reasons. But emotions can sometimes also be seen as supplying reasons for moral judgment to the extent that they involve evaluations--and a way of communicating them across different moral perspectives.
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  15. Paul E. Griffiths (2004). Toward a "Machiavellian" Theory of Emotional Appraisal. In D. Evans & Pierre Cruse (eds.), Emotion, Evolution, and Rationality. Oxford University Press.
    The aim of appraisal theory in the psychology of emotion is to identify the features of the emotion-eliciting situation that lead to the production of one emotion rather than another2. A model of emotional appraisal takes the form of a set of dimensions against which potentially emotion-eliciting situations are assessed. The dimensions of the emotion hyperspace might include, for example, whether the eliciting situation fulfills or frustrates the subject’s goals or whether an actor in the eliciting situation has violated a (...)
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  16. Paul E. Griffiths, Appraisal and Machiavellian Emotion.
    Emotional appraisal happens at more than one level. Low-level appraisals involve representations that are semantically coarse-grained, fuse the functional roles of belief and desire and have impoverished inferential roles, making it best to think of them as sub-conceptual. Multi-level theories of emotional appraisal are thus best conceived, not as theories of the actual conceptual content of emotional appraisals, but as ecological theories that identify the aspects of the environment that appraisal processes are tracking using diverse cognitive means. These aspects of (...)
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  17. Anthony E. Hatzimoysis (2003). Philosophy and the Emotions. Cambridge University Press.
  18. Richard S. Lazarus (1974). The Self-Regulation of Emotion. Philosophical Studies 22:168-179.
  19. Stefan Linquist (2007). Review of Paul Thagard, Hot Thought: Mechanisms and Applications of Emotional Cognition. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2007 (9).
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  20. Thaddeus Metz (2009). Love and Emotional Reactions to Necessary Evils. In Pedro Alexis Tabensky (ed.), The Positive Function of Evil. Palgrave Macmillan. 28-44.
    This chapter supposes that certain bads are necessary for substantial goods, and poses the question of how one ought to react emotionally to such bads. In recent work, Robert Adams is naturally read as contending that one ought to exhibit positive emotions such as gladness towards certain ‘necessary evils’. A rationale he suggests for this view is that love for a person, which involves viewing the beloved as good, requires being glad about what is necessary for her to exist, even (...)
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  21. Agnes Moors & Peter Kuppens (2008). Distinguishing Between Two Types of Musical Emotions and Reconsidering the Role of Appraisal. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (5):588-589.
    The target article inventories mechanisms underlying musical emotions. We argue that the inventory misses important mechanisms and that its structure would benefit from the distinction between two types of musical emotions. We also argue that the authors' claim that appraisal does not play a crucial role in the causation of musical emotions rests on a narrow conception of appraisal.
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  22. Georg Northoff (2008). Is Appraisal 'Embodied' and 'Embedded'? A Neurophilosophical Investigation of Emotions. Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (5):68-99.
    Emotion theories in present philosophical discussion propose different models of relationship between feeling and appraisal. The multicomponent model considers appraisal as separate component and distinguishes it from feeling and physiological body changes thus presupposing what may be called 'disembodied' and 'disembedded' appraisal as representational. The recently emerged concept of enactment, in contrast, argues that appraisal is closely linked to feeling and physiological body changes presupposing what can be called 'embodied' and 'embedded' appraisal as relational. The aim of the paper is (...)
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  23. Elisabeth Pacherie (2002). The Role of Emotions in the Explanation of Action. European Review of Philosophy 5:53-92.
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  24. Carolyn S. Price (2006). Fearing Fluffy: The Content of an Emotional Appraisal. In Graham F. Macdonald & David Papineau (eds.), Teleosemantics. Oxford University Press.
    What is the difference between an emotional appraisal and a dispassionate judgement? It has been suggested that emotional appraisals are states of a special kind that play a distinctive role in our psychology; it has also been suggested that emotional appraisals have a distinctive kind of content. In this paper, I explore the links between the function and content of an emotional appraisal, making use of a teleosemantic account of intentional content that I have developed elsewhere.
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  25. Jesse Prinz (2004). Emotions Embodied. In R. Solomon (ed.), Thinking About Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions. Oxford University Press.
    In one of the most frequently quoted passages in the history of emotion research, William James (1884: 189f) announces that emotions occur when the perception of an exciting fact causes a collection of bodily changes, and “our feeling of the same changes as they occur IS the emotion.” The same idea occurred to Carl Lange (1984) around the same time. These authors were not the first to draw a link between the emotions and the body. Indeed, this had been a (...)
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  26. Jesse J. Prinz (2003). Emotions, Psychosemantics, and Embodied Appraisals. In A. Hatimoysis (ed.), Philosophy and the Emotions. Cambridge University Press. 69-86.
  27. David Sander (2008). Basic Tastes and Basic Emotions: Basic Problems and Perspectives for a Nonbasic Solution. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (1):88-88.
    Contemporary behavioral and brain scientists consider the existence of so-called basic emotions in a similar way to the one described by Erickson for so-called basic tastes. Commenting on this analogy, I argue that similar basic problems are encountered in both perspectives, and I suggest a potential nonbasic solution that is tested in emotion research (i.e., the appraisal model of emotion).
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  28. Robert C. Solomon (2007). True To Our Feelings: What Our Emotions Are Really Telling Us. Oxford University Press.
    We live our lives through our emotions, writes Robert Solomon, and it is our emotions that give our lives meaning. What interests or fascinates us, who we love, what angers us, what moves us, what bores us--all of this defines us, gives us character, constitutes who we are. In True to Our Feelings, Solomon illuminates the rich life of the emotions--why we don't really understand them, what they really are, and how they make us human and give meaning to life. (...)
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  29. Fabrice Teroni & Julien A. Deonna (forthcoming). In What Sense Are Emotions Evaluations? In Cain Todd & Sabine Roeser (eds.), Emotion and Value. Oxford.
    In this chapter, we first introduce the idea that emotions are evaluations. Next, we explore two approaches attempting to account for this idea in terms of attitudes that are alleged to become emotional when taking evaluative contents. According to the first approach, emotions are evaluative judgments. According to the second, emotions are perceptual experiences of evaluative properties. We explain why this theory remains unsatisfactory insofar as it shares with the evaluative judgement theory the idea that emotions are evaluations in virtue (...)
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  30. Fabrice Teroni & Julien A. Deonna (2011). Is Shame a Social Emotion. In Anita Konzelmann Ziv, Keith Lehrer & Hans Bernard Schmid (eds.), Self-Evaluation: Affective and Social Grounds of Intentionality. Springer.
    In this article, we present, assess and give reasons to reject the popular claim that shame is essentially social. We start by presenting several theses which the social claim has motivated in the philosophical literature. All of them, in their own way, regard shame as displaying a structure in which ‘others’ play an essential role. We argue that while all these theses are true of some important families of shame episodes, none of them generalize so as to motivate the conclusion (...)
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