About this topic
Summary This category describes works that explore the feeling components of emotions. Questions that such works ask include: Are emotions feelings (but see also the 'Somatic and Feeling Theories of Emotion' subcategory)? Do emotions have feelings as components? What is the nature of the feelings that characterize emotions? For instance, are emotional feelings bodily feelings or are they 'psychic' feelings? Do emotional feelings have intentional properties, can they be about things in the world? Is it possible to have an emotion and not feel anything?  
  Show all references
Related categories
Siblings:
100 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Order:
1 — 50 / 100
  1. Maria Magoula Adamos (2012). Mental Pictures, Imagination and Emotions. In P. Hanna (ed.), Anthology of Philosophical Studies, vol. 6. ATINER 83-91.
    Although cognitivism has lost some ground recently in the philosophical circles, it is still the favorite view of many scholars of emotions. Even though I agree with cognitivism's insight that emotions typically involve some type of evaluative intentional state, I shall argue that in some cases, less epistemically committed, non-propositional evaluative states such as mental pictures can do a better job in identifying the emotion and providing its intentional object. Mental pictures have different logical features from propositions: they are representational, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  2. Santiago Arango-Muñoz & Kourken Michaelian (2014). Epistemic Feelings, Epistemic Emotions: Review and Introduction to the Focus Section. Philosophical Inquiries 2 (1):97-122.
    Philosophers of mind and epistemologists are increasingly making room in their theories for epistemic emotions (E-emotions) and, drawing on metacognition research in psychology, epistemic – or noetic or metacognitive – feelings (E-feelings). Since philoso- phers have only recently begun to draw on empirical research on E-feelings, in particular, we begin by providing a general characterization of E-feelings (section 1) and reviewing some highlights of relevant research (section 2). We then turn to philosophical work on E-feelings and E-emotions, situating the contributions (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  3. Anthony P. Atkinson & Matthew Ratcliffe (2012). Introduction to the Special Section on “Emotions and Feelings in Psychiatric Illness”. Emotion Review 4 (2):119-121.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  4. Bruce Aune (1963). Feelings, Moods, and Introspection. Mind 72 (April):187-208.
  5. Murat Aydede (2000). Emotions or Emotional Feelings? (Commentary on Rolls' The Brain and Emotion). Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (2):192-194.
    It turns out that Rolls’s answer to Nagel’s (1974) question, "What is it like to be a bat?" is brusque: there is nothing it is like to be a bat . . . provided that bats don’t have a linguistically structured internal representational system that enables them to think about their first-order thoughts which are also linguistically structured. For phenomenal consciousness, a properly functioning system of higher-order linguistic thought (HOLT) is necessary (Rolls 1998, p. 262). By this criterion, not only (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  6. Lisa Barrett, Batja Mesquita, Kevin N. Ochsner & ­James J. Gross (2005). The Experience of Emotion. In Lisa Feldman Barrett, Paula M. Niedenthal & Piotr Winkielman (eds.), Emotion and Consciousness. Guilford Press
    Experiences of emotion are content-rich events that emerge at the level of psychological description, but must be causally constituted by neurobiological processes. This chapter outlines an emerging scientific agenda for understanding what these experiences feel like and how they arise. We review the available answers to what is felt (i.e., the content that makes up an experience of emotion) and how neurobiological processes instantiate these properties of experience. These answers are then integrated into a broad framework that describes, in psychological (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  7. Aaron Ben-Ze'ev (2002). Emotions Are Not Feelings: Comment. Consciousness and Emotion 3 (1):81-89.
  8. A. Ben-Ze?ev (2002). Emotions Are Not Feelings. Consciousness and Emotion 3 (1):81-89.
  9. Tim Bloser (2011). Emotional Feelings. Philosophical Papers 40 (2):179 - 205.
    Abstract What role do feelings, and specifically bodily feelings, play in our emotional responses? Many current philosophical theories of the emotions suggest that the role of bodily feelings is at best relatively minor compared to other important features of emotions, such as beliefs, or distinctively ?psychic? feelings. In this paper, I try to show that the most common arguments against the importance of bodily feelings, and specifically those offered by Martha Nussbaum in her influential book Upheavals of Thought, are not (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  10. Richard Brown (2008). Review of 'Feeling and Emotion: The Amsterdam Symposium' by Manstead, Fridja & Fischer (Ed). [REVIEW] Philosophical Psychology 21 (1).
    As its title suggests, this anthology is a collection of papers presented at a conference on feelings and emotions held in Amsterdam in 2001. One of the symposium’s main goals was to draw some of the most prominent researchers in emotion research together and provide a multi-disciplinary ‘snap shot’ of the state of the art at the turn of the century. In that respect it is truly a cognitive science success story. There are articles from a wide range of fields, (...)
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  11. Douglas Browning (1965). The Philosophy of Mind, Part I: The Privacy of Feelings. Southern Journal of Philosophy 3:45-56.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  12. Giovanna Colombetti (forthcoming). Enactive Affectivity, Extended. Topoi:1-11.
    In this paper I advance an enactive view of affectivity that does not imply that affectivity must stop at the boundaries of the organism. I first review the enactive notion of “sense-making”, and argue that it entails that cognition is inherently affective. Then I review the proposal, advanced by Di Paolo, that the enactive approach allows living systems to “extend”. Drawing out the implications of this proposal, I argue that, if enactivism allows living systems to extend, then it must also (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  13. Giovanna Colombetti (2013). The Feeling Body: Affective Science Meets the Enactive Mind. The MIT Press.
    A proposal that extends the enactive approach developed in cognitive science and philosophy of mind to issues in affective science.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   12 citations  
  14. Giovanna Colombetti (2011). Varieties of Pre-Reflective Self-Awareness: Foreground and Background Bodily Feelings in Emotion Experience. Inquiry 54 (3):293 - 313.
    How do we feel our body in emotion experience? In this paper I initially distinguish between foreground and background bodily feelings, and characterize them in some detail. Then I compare this distinction with the one between reflective and pre-reflective bodily self-awareness one finds in some recent philosophical phenomenological works, and conclude that both foreground and background bodily feelings can be understood as pre-reflective modes of bodily self-awareness that nevertheless differ in degree of self-presentation or self-intimation. Finally, I use the distinction (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  15. Giovanna Colombetti (2009). What Language Does to Feelings. Journal of Consciousness Studies 16 (9):4-26.
    This paper distinguishes various ways in which language can act on our affect or emotion experience. From the commonsensical consideration that sometimes we use language merely to report or describe our feelings, I move on to discuss how language can constitute, clarify, and enhance them, as well as induce novel and oft surprising experiences. I also consider the social impact of putting feelings into words, including the reciprocal influences between emotion experience and the public dissemination of emotion labels (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  16. W. D. Commins (1937). The Psychology of Feeling and Emotion. New Scholasticism 11 (3):278-280.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  17. Antonio R. Damasio (1999). The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness. Harcourt Brace and Co.
  18. Ronald de Sousa, Emotion. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  19. Andreas Dorschel (1999). Emotion und Verstand. Philosophisches Jahrbuch 106 (1):18-40.
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  20. Andreas Dorschel (1994). Empfindung, Gefühl und Emotion. In Karl-Otto Apel & Matthias Kettner (eds.), Mythos Wertfreiheit? Neue Beiträge zur Objektivität in den Human- und Kulturwissenschaften. Campus 157-173.
    In book 3 of ‘De anima’, Aristotle distinguishes between sensations and feelings. On the level of sensation, we merely register that something is so and so; feeling, by way of contrast, takes that so and so to be agreeable or disagreeable. Emotion has to be distinguished from both sensation and feeling. One cannot have a sensation or feeling without noticing it. But others may be the first to realize that somebody is jealous or envious. Hence emotions like jealousy or envy (...)
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  21. Andreas Dorschel (1993). Gefühl Als Argument? In Andreas Dorschel, Matthias Kettner, Wolfgang Kuhlmann & Marcel Niquet (eds.), Transzendentalpragmatik. Ein Symposion für Karl-Otto Apel. Suhrkamp 167-186.
    Does having some feeling or other ever count as an argument – and, should it? As a matter of fact, not just do persons sometimes refer to their feelings to make a point in debate. Often, they even treat them as irrefutable arguments; for they are, of course, certain of their own feelings. To make a point in debate by reference to one’s feelings, one has got to articulate them. As language is the core medium of debate (though it can (...)
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  22. Travis Dumsday (2007). Emotional Experience and Religious Understanding: Integrating Perception, Conception and Feeling. Dialogue 46 (4):817-819.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  23. Paul Ekamn & Daniel Cordaro (2011). What is Meant by Calling Emotions Basic. Emotion Review 3 (4): Emotion Review October 2364-370.
    Emotions are discrete, automatic responses to universally shared, culture-specific and individual-specific events. The emotion terms, such as anger, fear, etcetera, denote a family of related states sharing at least 12 characteristics, which distinguish one emotion family from another, as well as from other affective states. These affective responses are preprogrammed and involuntary, but are also shaped by life experiences.
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  24. E. Sonny Elizondo (2014). More Than a Feeling. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44 (3-4):425-442.
    According to rationalist conceptions of moral agency, the constitutive capacities of moral agency are rational capacities. So understood, rationalists are often thought to have a problem with feeling. For example, many believe that rationalists must reject the attractive Aristotelian thought that moral activity is by nature pleasant. I disagree. It is easy to go wrong here because it is easy to assume that pleasure is empirical rather than rational and so extrinsic rather than intrinsic to moral agency, rationalistically conceived. (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  25. Andreas Elpidorou (2014). The Bright Side of Boredom. Frontiers in Psychology 5.
  26. Andreas Elpidorou & Lauren Freeman (2014). The Phenomenology and Science of Emotions: An Introduction. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (4):507-511.
    Phenomenology, perhaps more than any other single movement in philosophy, has been key in bringing emotions to the foreground of philosophical consideration. This is in large part due to the ways in which emotions, according to phenomenological analyses, are revealing of basic structures of human existence. Indeed, it is partly and, according to some phenomenologists, even primarily through our emotions that the world is disclosed to us, that we become present to and make sense of ourselves, and that we relate (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  27. Eva-Maria Engelen & Verena Mayer (2008). Gefuhle. Philosophisches Jahrbuch 115 (2):471.
    Nach Erläuterung der wesentlichen Begriffe wie „Emotion“ und „Gefühl“ stellt Eva-Maria Engelen die wichtigsten theoretischen Ansätze vor. Dabei spielen sowohl Theorien aus der Philosophie, der Psychologie als auch aus den Neurowissenschaften eine wichtige Rolle. Geklärt wird in weiteren Kapiteln das Verhältnis von Gefühlen und Emotionen zum Verstand, zum Bewusstsein und zu Werten.
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  28. Barrie Falk (1996). Feeling and Cognition. In Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. Cambridge University Press 211-222.
    There is a common view that as well as being conscious of the world in virtue of having thoughts about it, forming representations of its various states and processes, we are also conscious of it in virtue of feeling it. What I have in mind is not the fact that we have feelings about the world—indignation at this, pleasure at that—but that we sensorily feel its colours, sounds, textures and so on. And this feeling form of consciousness, it's often thought, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  29. J. Cyril Flower (1929). Emotion, Feeling and Religion. Philosophy 4 (14):192-.
    I do not propose to attempt in this article to make any exact or exhaustive definition of religion, but rather to call attention to one of its outstanding psychological characteristics. At the outset, then, I take it for granted that religion is primarily a feeling experience. We make use of the term ‘religion,’ it is true, for many things in addition to immediate feeling experiences, and it is inevitable that we should do so. But it will be well to bear (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  30. Nico Frijda & Agneta Fischer, Feelings and Emotions: The Amsterdam Symposium.
    As its title suggests, this anthology is a collection of papers presented at a conference on feelings and emotions held in Amsterdam in 2001. One of the symposium’s main goals was to draw some of the most prominent researchers in emotion research together and provide a multi-disciplinary ‘snap shot’ of the state of the art at the turn of the century. In that respect it is truly a cognitive science success story. There are articles from a wide range of fields, (...)
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  31. William D. Gean (1979). Emotion, Emotional Feeling and Passive Body Change. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 9 (1):39–51.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  32. Peter Goldie (2009). Getting Feelings Into Emotional Experiences in the Right Way. Emotion Review 1 (3):232-239.
    I argue that emotional feelings are not just bodily feelings, but also feelings directed towards things in the world beyond the bounds of the body, and that these feelings (feelings towards) are bound up with the way we take in the world in emotional experience.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   10 citations  
  33. Peter Goldie (2006). Emotional Experience and Understanding. In Richard Menary (ed.), Radical Enactivism: Intentionality, Phenomenology and Narrative: Focus on the Philosophy of Daniel D. Hutto.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  34. Peter Goldie (2003). One's Remembered Past: Narrative Thinking, Emotion, and the External Perspective. Philosophical Papers 32 (3):301-319.
    Abstract Narrative thinking has a very important role in our ordinary everyday lives?in our thinking about fiction, about the historical past, about how things might have been, and about our own past and our plans for the future. In this paper, which is part of a larger project, I will be focusing on just one kind of narrative thinking: the kind that we sometimes engage in when we think about, evaluate, and respond emotionally to, our own past lives from a (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   10 citations  
  35. Peter Goldie (2002). Emotions, Feelings and Intentionality. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1 (3):235-254.
    Emotions, I will argue, involve two kinds of feeling: bodily feeling and feeling towards. Both are intentional, in the sense of being directed towards an object. Bodily feelings are directed towards the condition of one's body, although they can reveal truths about the world beyond the bounds of one's body – that, for example, there is something dangerous nearby. Feelings towards are directed towards the object of the emotion – a thing or a person, a state of affairs, an action (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   20 citations  
  36. Peter Goldie (2002). Understanding Emotions: Mind and Morals. Brookfield: Ashgate.
  37. Peter Goldie (2000/2002). The Emotions: A Philosophical Exploration. Oxford University Press.
    Peter Goldie opens the path to a deeper understanding of our emotional lives through a lucid philosophical exploration of this surprisingly neglected topic. Drawing on philosophy, literature and science, Goldie considers the roles of culture and evolution in the development of our emotional capabilities. He examines the links between emotion, mood, and character, and places the emotions in the context of consciousness, thought, feeling, and imagination. He explains how it is that we are able to make sense of our own (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   127 citations  
  38. Irwin Goldstein (2002). Are Emotions Feelings? A Further Look at Hedonic Theories of Emotions. Consciousness and Emotion 3 (1):21-33.
    Many philosophers sharply distinguish emotions from feelings. Emotions are not feelings, and having an emotion does not necessitate having some feeling, they think. In this paper I reply to a set of arguments people use sharply to distinguish emotions from feelings. In response to these people, I endorse and defend a hedonic theory of emotion that avoids various anti-feeling objections. Proponents of this hedonic theory analyze an emotion by reference to forms of cognition (e.g., thought, belief, judgment) and a pleasant (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  39. York H. Gunther (2004). The Phenomenology and Intentionality of Emotion. Philosophical Studies 117 (1-2):43-55.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   7 citations  
  40. Christopher Hamilton (2005). Mark R. Wynn Emotional Experience and Religious Understanding: Integrating Perception, Conception, and Feeling. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). Pp. XIV+202. £40.00 (Hbk); £16.99 (Pbk). ISBN 0521840562 (Hbk); 0521549892 (Pbk). [REVIEW] Religious Studies 41 (4):475-480.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  41. Gary Hatfield (2007). Did Descartes Have a Jamesian Theory of the Emotions? Philosophical Psychology 20 (4):413-440.
    Rene Descartes and William James had "body first" theories of the passions or emotions, according to which sensory stimulation causes a bodily response that then causes an emotion. Both held that this bodily response also causes an initial behavioral response (such as flight from a bear) without any cognitive intervention such as an "appraisal" of the object or situation. From here they differ. Descartes proposed that the initial processes that produce fear and running are entirely mechanical. Even human beings initially (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  42. Anthony E. Hatzimoysis (2003). Emotional Feelings and Intentionalism. In A. Hatimoysis (ed.), Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. Cambridge University Press 105-111.
    Emotions are Janus-faced: their focus may switch from how a person is feeling deep inside her, to the busy world of actions, words, or gestures whose perception currently affects her. The intimate relation between the ‘inside’ and the ‘outside’ seems to call for a redrawing of the traditional distinction of mental states between those that can look out to the world, and those that are, supposedly, irredeemably blind.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  43. Anthony E. Hatzimoysis (ed.) (2003). Philosophy and the Emotions. Cambridge University Press.
  44. Alexander Heinzel & Georg Northoff (2009). Emotional Feeling and the Orbitomedial Prefrontal Cortex: Theoretical and Empirical Considerations. Philosophical Psychology 22 (4):443 – 464.
    Emotional feeling can be defined as the affective constituent of emotions representing a subjective experience such as, for example, feeling love or hate. Several recent neuroimaging studies have focused on this affective component of emotions thereby aiming to characterise the underlying neural correlates. These studies indicate that the orbitomedial prefrontal cortex is crucially involved in the processing of emotional feeling. It is the aim of this paper to analyse the extent to which the present state of the art in neuroscience (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  45. Bennett W. Helm (2009). Emotions as Evaluative Feelings. Emotion Review 1 (3):248--55.
    The phenomenology of emotions has traditionally been understood in terms of bodily sensations they involve. This is a mistake. We should instead understand their phenomenology in terms of their distinctively evaluative intentionality. Emotions are essentially affective modes of response to the ways our circumstances come to matter to us, and so they are ways of being pleased or pained by those circumstances. Making sense of the intentionality and phenomenology of emotions in this way requires rejecting traditional understandings of intentionality and (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  46. Robert Hopkins (2010). Imagination and Affective Response. In Jonathan Webber (ed.), Reading Sartre: On Phenomenology and Existentialism. Routledge 100-117.
    What is the relation between affective states, such as emotions and pleasure, and imagining? Do the latter cause the former, just as perceptual states do? Or are the former merely imagined, along with suitable objects? I consider this issue against the backdrop of Sartre’s theory of imagination, and drawing on his highly illuminating discussion of it. I suggest that, while it is commonly assumed that imaginative states cause affective responses much as do perceptions, the alternatives merit more careful consideration than (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  47. S. A. Howard (2012). Nostalgia. Analysis 72 (4):641-650.
    Next SectionThis article argues against two dominant accounts of the nature of nostalgia. These views assume that nostalgia depends, in some way, on comparing a present situation with a past one. However, neither does justice to the full range of recognizably nostalgic experiences available to us – in particular, ‘Proustian’ nostalgia directed at involuntary autobiographical memories. Therefore, the accounts in question fail. I conclude by considering an evaluative puzzle raised by Proustian nostalgia when it is directed at memories that the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (13 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  48. Scott Alexander Howard (2012). Lyrical Emotions and Sentimentality. Philosophical Quarterly 62 (248):546-568.
    I investigate the normative status of an unexamined category of emotions: ‘lyrical’ emotions about the transience of things. Lyrical emotions are often accused of sentimentality—a charge that expresses the idea that they are unfitting responses to their objects. However, when we test the merits of that charge using the standard model of emotion evaluation, a surprising problem emerges: it turns out that we cannot make normative distinctions between episodes of such feelings. Instead, it seems that lyrical emotions are always fitting. (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  49. Daniel D. Hutto (2006). Unprincipled Engagement: Emotional Experience, Expression and Response. In Richard Menary (ed.), Radical Enactivism: Intentionality, Phenomenology and Narrative: Focus on the Philosophy of Daniel D. Hutto.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  50. William James (1884). What is an Emotion? Mind 9 (34):188-205.
1 — 50 / 100