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Summary This category describes works that explore the feeling components of emotions. Questions that such works ask include: Are emotions feelings (but see also the 'Somatic and Feeling Theories of Emotion' subcategory)? Do emotions have feelings as components? What is the nature of the feelings that characterize emotions? For instance, are emotional feelings bodily feelings or are they 'psychic' feelings? Do emotional feelings have intentional properties, can they be about things in the world? Is it possible to have an emotion and not feel anything?  
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  1. Bruce Aune (1963). Feelings, Moods, and Introspection. Mind 72 (April):187-208.
  2. Murat Aydede (2000). Emotions or Emotional Feelings? (Commentary on Rolls' The Brain and Emotion). Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (2):192-194.
    It turns out that Rolls’s answer to Nagel’s (1974) question, "What is it like to be a bat?" is brusque: there is nothing it is like to be a bat . . . provided that bats don’t have a linguistically structured internal representational system that enables them to think about their first-order thoughts which are also linguistically structured. For phenomenal consciousness, a properly functioning system of higher-order linguistic thought (HOLT) is necessary (Rolls 1998, p. 262). By this criterion, not only (...)
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  3. Aaron Ben-Ze'ev (2002). Emotions Are Not Feelings: Comment. Consciousness and Emotion 3 (1):81-89.
  4. A. Ben-Ze?ev (2002). Emotions Are Not Feelings. Consciousness and Emotion 3 (1):81-89.
  5. Tim Bloser (2011). Emotional Feelings. Philosophical Papers 40 (2):179 - 205.
    Abstract What role do feelings, and specifically bodily feelings, play in our emotional responses? Many current philosophical theories of the emotions suggest that the role of bodily feelings is at best relatively minor compared to other important features of emotions, such as beliefs, or distinctively ?psychic? feelings. In this paper, I try to show that the most common arguments against the importance of bodily feelings, and specifically those offered by Martha Nussbaum in her influential book Upheavals of Thought, are not (...)
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  6. Richard Brown (2008). Review of 'Feeling and Emotion: The Amsterdam Symposium' by Manstead, Fridja & Fischer (Ed). [REVIEW] Philosophical Psychology 21 (1).
    As its title suggests, this anthology is a collection of papers presented at a conference on feelings and emotions held in Amsterdam in 2001. One of the symposium’s main goals was to draw some of the most prominent researchers in emotion research together and provide a multi-disciplinary ‘snap shot’ of the state of the art at the turn of the century. In that respect it is truly a cognitive science success story. There are articles from a wide range of fields, (...)
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  7. Douglas Browning (1965). The Philosophy of Mind, Part I: The Privacy of Feelings. Southern Journal of Philosophy 3:45-56.
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  8. Georg Brun & Dominique Kuenzle (2008). A New Role for Emotions in Epistemology. In Georg Brun, Ulvi Dogluoglu & Dominique Kuenzle (eds.), Epistemology and Emotions. Ashgate Publishing Company. 1--31.
    This chapter provides an overview of the issues involved in recent debates about the epistemological relevance of emotions. We first survey some key issues in epistemology and the theory of emotions that inform various assessments of emotions’ potential significance in epistemology. We then distinguish five epistemic functions that have been claimed for emotions: motivational force, salience and relevance, access to facts and beliefs, non-propositional contributions to knowledge and understanding, and epistemic efficiency. We identify two core issues in the discussions about (...)
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  9. Giovanna Colombetti (2011). Varieties of Pre-Reflective Self-Awareness: Foreground and Background Bodily Feelings in Emotion Experience. Inquiry 54 (3):293 - 313.
    How do we feel our body in emotion experience? In this paper I initially distinguish between foreground and background bodily feelings, and characterize them in some detail. Then I compare this distinction with the one between reflective and pre-reflective bodily self-awareness one finds in some recent philosophical phenomenological works, and conclude that both foreground and background bodily feelings can be understood as pre-reflective modes of bodily self-awareness that nevertheless differ in degree of self-presentation or self-intimation. Finally, I use the distinction (...)
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  10. W. D. Commins (1937). The Psychology of Feeling and Emotion. New Scholasticism 11 (3):278-280.
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  11. Antonio R. Damasio (1999). The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness. Harcourt Brace and Co.
  12. Ronald de Sousa, Emotion. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  13. Travis Dumsday (2007). Emotional Experience and Religious Understanding: Integrating Perception, Conception and Feeling. Dialogue 46 (4):817-819.
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  14. Paul Ekamn & Daniel Cordaro (2011). What is Meant by Calling Emotions Basic. Emotion Review 3 (4): Emotion Review October 2364-370.
    Emotions are discrete, automatic responses to universally shared, culture-specific and individual-specific events. The emotion terms, such as anger, fear, etcetera, denote a family of related states sharing at least 12 characteristics, which distinguish one emotion family from another, as well as from other affective states. These affective responses are preprogrammed and involuntary, but are also shaped by life experiences.
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  15. E. Sonny Elizondo (forthcoming). More Than a Feeling. Canadian Journal of Philosophy:1-18.
    According to rationalist conceptions of moral agency, the constitutive capacities of moral agency are rational capacities. So understood, rationalists are often thought to have a problem with feeling. For example, many believe that rationalists must reject the attractive Aristotelian thought that moral activity is by nature pleasant. I disagree. It is easy to go wrong here because it is easy to assume that pleasure is empirical rather than rational and so extrinsic rather than intrinsic to moral agency, rationalistically conceived. Drawing (...)
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  16. Andreas Elpidorou & Lauren Freeman (forthcoming). The Phenomenology and Science of Emotions: An Introduction. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-5.
    Phenomenology, perhaps more than any other single movement in philosophy, has been key in bringing emotions to the foreground of philosophical consideration. This is in large part due to the ways in which emotions, according to phenomenological analyses, are revealing of basic structures of human existence. Indeed, it is partly and, according to some phenomenologists, even primarily through our emotions that the world is disclosed to us, that we become present to and make sense of ourselves, and that we relate (...)
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  17. Barrie Falk (1996). Feeling and Cognition. In Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Verstehen and Humane Understanding. Cambridge University Press. 211-222.
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  18. J. Cyril Flower (1929). Emotion, Feeling and Religion. Philosophy 4 (14):192-.
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  19. Nico Frijda & Agneta Fischer, Feelings and Emotions: The Amsterdam Symposium.
    As its title suggests, this anthology is a collection of papers presented at a conference on feelings and emotions held in Amsterdam in 2001. One of the symposium’s main goals was to draw some of the most prominent researchers in emotion research together and provide a multi-disciplinary ‘snap shot’ of the state of the art at the turn of the century. In that respect it is truly a cognitive science success story. There are articles from a wide range of fields, (...)
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  20. William D. Gean (1979). Emotion, Emotional Feeling and Passive Body Change. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 9 (1):39–51.
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  21. Peter Goldie (2009). Getting Feelings Into Emotional Experiences in the Right Way. Emotion Review 1 (3):232-239.
    I argue that emotional feelings are not just bodily feelings, but also feelings directed towards things in the world beyond the bounds of the body, and that these feelings (feelings towards) are bound up with the way we take in the world in emotional experience.
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  22. Peter Goldie (2006). Emotional Experience and Understanding. In Richard Menary (ed.), Radical Enactivism: Intentionality, Phenomenology and Narrative: Focus on the Philosophy of Daniel D. Hutto.
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  23. Peter Goldie (2003). One's Remembered Past: Narrative Thinking, Emotion, and the External Perspective. Philosophical Papers 32 (3):301-319.
    Abstract Narrative thinking has a very important role in our ordinary everyday lives?in our thinking about fiction, about the historical past, about how things might have been, and about our own past and our plans for the future. In this paper, which is part of a larger project, I will be focusing on just one kind of narrative thinking: the kind that we sometimes engage in when we think about, evaluate, and respond emotionally to, our own past lives from a (...)
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  24. Peter Goldie (2002). Understanding Emotions: Mind and Morals. Brookfield: Ashgate.
  25. Peter Goldie (2002). Emotions, Feelings and Intentionality. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1 (3):235-254.
    Emotions, I will argue, involve two kinds of feeling: bodily feeling and feeling towards. Both are intentional, in the sense of being directed towards an object. Bodily feelings are directed towards the condition of one's body, although they can reveal truths about the world beyond the bounds of one's body – that, for example, there is something dangerous nearby. Feelings towards are directed towards the object of the emotion – a thing or a person, a state of affairs, an action (...)
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  26. Peter Goldie (2000/2002). The Emotions: A Philosophical Exploration. Oxford University Press.
    Peter Goldie opens the path to a deeper understanding of our emotional lives through a lucid philosophical exploration of this surprisingly neglected topic. Drawing on philosophy, literature and science, Goldie considers the roles of culture and evolution in the development of our emotional capabilities. He examines the links between emotion, mood, and character, and places the emotions in the context of consciousness, thought, feeling, and imagination. He explains how it is that we are able to make sense of our own (...)
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  27. Irwin Goldstein (2002). Are Emotions Feelings? A Further Look at Hedonic Theories of Emotions. Consciousness and Emotion 3 (1):21-33.
    Many philosophers sharply distinguish emotions from feelings. Emotions are not feelings, and having an emotion does not necessitate having some feeling, they think. In this paper I reply to a set of arguments people use sharply to distinguish emotions from feelings. In response to these people, I endorse and defend a hedonic theory of emotion that avoids various anti-feeling objections. Proponents of this hedonic theory analyze an emotion by reference to forms of cognition (e.g., thought, belief, judgment) and a pleasant (...)
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  28. York H. Gunther (2004). The Phenomenology and Intentionality of Emotion. Philosophical Studies 117 (1-2):43-55.
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  29. Christopher Hamilton (2005). Mark R. Wynn Emotional Experience and Religious Understanding: Integrating Perception, Conception, and Feeling. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). Pp. XIV+202. £40.00 (Hbk); £16.99 (Pbk). ISBN 0521840562 (Hbk); 0521549892 (Pbk). [REVIEW] Religious Studies 41 (4):475-480.
  30. Janna Hastings, Werner Ceusters, Barry Smith & Kevin Mulligan (2011). The Emotion Ontology: Enabling Interdisciplinary Research in the Affective Sciences. In CONTEXT ’11, The Seventh International and Interdisciplinary Conference on Modeling and Using Context. Springer.
    Affective science conducts interdisciplinary research into the emotions and other affective phenomena. Currently, such research is hampered by the lack of common definitions of terms used to describe, categorise and report both individual emotional experiences and the results of scientific investigations of such experiences. High quality ontologies provide formal definitions for types of entities in reality and for the relationships between such entities, definitions which can be used to disambiguate and unify data across different disciplines. Heretofore, there has been little (...)
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  31. Gary Hatfield (2007). Did Descartes Have a Jamesian Theory of the Emotions? Philosophical Psychology 20 (4):413-440.
    Philosophical Psychology 20 (2007), 413–40. Key words: Cognitive theories of emotion, Rene Descartes, embodiment, emotions, evolution, historical methodology, instinct, mechanistic theories of behavior, mind–brain relations, passions, William James.
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  32. Anthony E. Hatzimoysis (2003). Emotional Feelings and Intentionalism. In A. Hatimoysis (ed.), Philosophy and the Emotions. Cambridge University Press. 105-111.
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  33. Anthony E. Hatzimoysis (2003). Philosophy and the Emotions. Cambridge University Press.
  34. Alexander Heinzel & Georg Northoff (2009). Emotional Feeling and the Orbitomedial Prefrontal Cortex: Theoretical and Empirical Considerations. Philosophical Psychology 22 (4):443 – 464.
    Emotional feeling can be defined as the affective constituent of emotions representing a subjective experience such as, for example, feeling love or hate. Several recent neuroimaging studies have focused on this affective component of emotions thereby aiming to characterise the underlying neural correlates. These studies indicate that the orbitomedial prefrontal cortex is crucially involved in the processing of emotional feeling. It is the aim of this paper to analyse the extent to which the present state of the art in neuroscience (...)
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  35. Bennett W. Helm (2009). Emotions as Evaluative Feelings. Emotion Review 1 (3):248--55.
    The phenomenology of emotions has traditionally been understood in terms of bodily sensations they involve. This is a mistake. We should instead understand their phenomenology in terms of their distinctively evaluative intentionality. Emotions are essentially affective modes of response to the ways our circumstances come to matter to us, and so they are ways of being pleased or pained by those circumstances. Making sense of the intentionality and phenomenology of emotions in this way requires rejecting traditional understandings of intentionality and (...)
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  36. Robert Hopkins (2010). Imagination and Affective Response. In Jonathan Webber (ed.), Reading Sartre: On Phenomenology and Existentialism. Routledge.
    What is the relation between affective states, such as emotions and pleasure, and imagining? Do the latter cause the former, just as perceptual states do? Or are the former merely imagined, along with suitable objects? I consider this issue against the backdrop of Sartre’s theory of imagination, and drawing on his highly illuminating discussion of it. I suggest that, while it is commonly assumed that imaginative states cause affective responses much as do perceptions, the alternatives merit more careful consideration than (...)
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  37. S. A. Howard (2012). Nostalgia. Analysis 72 (4):641-650.
    Next SectionThis article argues against two dominant accounts of the nature of nostalgia. These views assume that nostalgia depends, in some way, on comparing a present situation with a past one. However, neither does justice to the full range of recognizably nostalgic experiences available to us – in particular, ‘Proustian’ nostalgia directed at involuntary autobiographical memories. Therefore, the accounts in question fail. I conclude by considering an evaluative puzzle raised by Proustian nostalgia when it is directed at memories that the (...)
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  38. Scott Alexander Howard (2012). Lyrical Emotions and Sentimentality. Philosophical Quarterly 62 (248):546-568.
    I investigate the normative status of an unexamined category of emotions: ‘lyrical’ emotions about the transience of things. Lyrical emotions are often accused of sentimentality—a charge that expresses the idea that they are unfitting responses to their objects. However, when we test the merits of that charge using the standard model of emotion evaluation, a surprising problem emerges: it turns out that we cannot make normative distinctions between episodes of such feelings. Instead, it seems that lyrical emotions are always fitting. (...)
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  39. Daniel D. Hutto (2006). Unprincipled Engagement: Emotional Experience, Expression and Response. In Richard Menary (ed.), Radical Enactivism: Intentionality, Phenomenology and Narrative: Focus on the Philosophy of Daniel D. Hutto.
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  40. William James (1884). What is an Emotion? Mind 9 (34):188-205.
  41. Howard F. Kamler (1973). Emotional Feelings. Philosophia 3 (October):381-411.
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  42. Matthew Kieran (1998). Valuing Emotions by Michael Stocker with Elizabeth Hegeman. Cambridge University Press, 1996, Pp. XXVIII + 353. £45.00 Hb, £15.95 Pb. [REVIEW] Philosophy 73 (2):305-324.
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  43. Philip J. Koch (1987). Bodily Feeling in Emotion. Dialogue 26 (01):59-75.
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  44. Joel J. Kupperman (1997). Felt and Unfelt Emotions: A Rejoinder to Dalgleish. Philosophical Psychology 10 (1):91.
  45. Joseph LeDoux (2008). Emotional Coloration of Consciousness: How Feelings Come About. In Lawrence Weiskrantz & Martin Davies (eds.), Frontiers of Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
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  46. Stephen Leighton, Unfelt Feelings in Pain and the Emotions.
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  47. Stephen R. Leighton (1984). Feelings and Emotion. Review of Metaphysics 38 (December):303-320.
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  48. William E. Lyons (1980). Emotion. Cambridge University Press.
  49. William E. Lyons (1977). Emotions and Feelings. Ratio 19 (June):1-12.
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  50. Geoffrey C. Madell & Aaron Ridley (1997). Emotion and Feeling. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 71 (71):147-176.
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