About this topic
Summary This category describes works that explore the feeling components of emotions. Questions that such works ask include: Are emotions feelings (but see also the 'Somatic and Feeling Theories of Emotion' subcategory)? Do emotions have feelings as components? What is the nature of the feelings that characterize emotions? For instance, are emotional feelings bodily feelings or are they 'psychic' feelings? Do emotional feelings have intentional properties, can they be about things in the world? Is it possible to have an emotion and not feel anything?  
  Show all references
Related categories
Siblings:
82 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Sort by:
1 — 50 / 82
  1. Bruce Aune (1963). Feelings, Moods, and Introspection. Mind 72 (April):187-208.
  2. Murat Aydede (2000). Emotions or Emotional Feelings? (Commentary on Rolls' The Brain and Emotion). Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (2):192-194.
    It turns out that Rolls’s answer to Nagel’s (1974) question, "What is it like to be a bat?" is brusque: there is nothing it is like to be a bat . . . provided that bats don’t have a linguistically structured internal representational system that enables them to think about their first-order thoughts which are also linguistically structured. For phenomenal consciousness, a properly functioning system of higher-order linguistic thought (HOLT) is necessary (Rolls 1998, p. 262). By this criterion, not only (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Aaron Ben-Ze'ev (2002). Emotions Are Not Feelings: Comment. Consciousness and Emotion 3 (1):81-89.
  4. A. Ben-Ze?ev (2002). Emotions Are Not Feelings. Consciousness and Emotion 3 (1):81-89.
  5. Tim Bloser (2011). Emotional Feelings. Philosophical Papers 40 (2):179 - 205.
    Abstract What role do feelings, and specifically bodily feelings, play in our emotional responses? Many current philosophical theories of the emotions suggest that the role of bodily feelings is at best relatively minor compared to other important features of emotions, such as beliefs, or distinctively ?psychic? feelings. In this paper, I try to show that the most common arguments against the importance of bodily feelings, and specifically those offered by Martha Nussbaum in her influential book Upheavals of Thought, are not (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Richard Brown (2008). Review of 'Feeling and Emotion: The Amsterdam Symposium' by Manstead, Fridja & Fischer (Ed). [REVIEW] Philosophical Psychology 21 (1).
    As its title suggests, this anthology is a collection of papers presented at a conference on feelings and emotions held in Amsterdam in 2001. One of the symposium’s main goals was to draw some of the most prominent researchers in emotion research together and provide a multi-disciplinary ‘snap shot’ of the state of the art at the turn of the century. In that respect it is truly a cognitive science success story. There are articles from a wide range of fields, (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Douglas Browning (1965). The Philosophy of Mind, Part I: The Privacy of Feelings. Southern Journal of Philosophy 3:45-56.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Georg Brun & Dominique Kuenzle (2008). A New Role for Emotions in Epistemology. In Georg Brun, Ulvi Dogluoglu & Dominique Kuenzle (eds.), Epistemology and Emotions. Ashgate Publishing Company. 1--31.
    This chapter provides an overview of the issues involved in recent debates about the epistemological relevance of emotions. We first survey some key issues in epistemology and the theory of emotions that inform various assessments of emotions’ potential significance in epistemology. We then distinguish five epistemic functions that have been claimed for emotions: motivational force, salience and relevance, access to facts and beliefs, non-propositional contributions to knowledge and understanding, and epistemic efficiency. We identify two core issues in the discussions about (...)
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Giovanna Colombetti (2011). Varieties of Pre-Reflective Self-Awareness: Foreground and Background Bodily Feelings in Emotion Experience. Inquiry 54 (3):293 - 313.
    How do we feel our body in emotion experience? In this paper I initially distinguish between foreground and background bodily feelings, and characterize them in some detail. Then I compare this distinction with the one between reflective and pre-reflective bodily self-awareness one finds in some recent philosophical phenomenological works, and conclude that both foreground and background bodily feelings can be understood as pre-reflective modes of bodily self-awareness that nevertheless differ in degree of self-presentation or self-intimation. Finally, I use the distinction (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. W. D. Commins (1937). The Psychology of Feeling and Emotion. New Scholasticism 11 (3):278-280.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Antonio R. Damasio (1999). The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness. Harcourt Brace and Co.
  12. Ronald de Sousa, Emotion. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  13. Travis Dumsday (2007). Emotional Experience and Religious Understanding: Integrating Perception, Conception and Feeling. Dialogue 46 (4):817-819.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Barrie Falk (1996). Feeling and Cognition. In Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Verstehen and Humane Understanding. Cambridge University Press. 211-222.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. J. Cyril Flower (1929). Emotion, Feeling and Religion. Philosophy 4 (14):192-.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Nico Frijda & Agneta Fischer, Feelings and Emotions: The Amsterdam Symposium.
    As its title suggests, this anthology is a collection of papers presented at a conference on feelings and emotions held in Amsterdam in 2001. One of the symposium’s main goals was to draw some of the most prominent researchers in emotion research together and provide a multi-disciplinary ‘snap shot’ of the state of the art at the turn of the century. In that respect it is truly a cognitive science success story. There are articles from a wide range of fields, (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. William D. Gean (1979). Emotion, Emotional Feeling and Passive Body Change. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 9 (1):39–51.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Peter Goldie (2009). Getting Feelings Into Emotional Experiences in the Right Way. Emotion Review 1 (3):232-239.
    I argue that emotional feelings are not just bodily feelings, but also feelings directed towards things in the world beyond the bounds of the body, and that these feelings (feelings towards) are bound up with the way we take in the world in emotional experience.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Peter Goldie (2006). Emotional Experience and Understanding. In Richard Menary (ed.), Radical Enactivism: Intentionality, Phenomenology and Narrative: Focus on the Philosophy of Daniel D. Hutto.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Peter Goldie (2003). One's Remembered Past: Narrative Thinking, Emotion, and the External Perspective. Philosophical Papers 32 (3):301-319.
    Abstract Narrative thinking has a very important role in our ordinary everyday lives?in our thinking about fiction, about the historical past, about how things might have been, and about our own past and our plans for the future. In this paper, which is part of a larger project, I will be focusing on just one kind of narrative thinking: the kind that we sometimes engage in when we think about, evaluate, and respond emotionally to, our own past lives from a (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Peter Goldie (2002). Understanding Emotions: Mind and Morals. Brookfield: Ashgate.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Peter Goldie (2002). Emotions, Feelings and Intentionality. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1 (3):235-254.
    Emotions, I will argue, involve two kinds of feeling: bodily feeling and feeling towards. Both are intentional, in the sense of being directed towards an object. Bodily feelings are directed towards the condition of one's body, although they can reveal truths about the world beyond the bounds of one's body – that, for example, there is something dangerous nearby. Feelings towards are directed towards the object of the emotion – a thing or a person, a state of affairs, an action (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Peter Goldie (2000/2002). The Emotions: A Philosophical Exploration. Oxford University Press.
    Peter Goldie opens the path to a deeper understanding of our emotional lives through a lucid philosophical exploration of this surprisingly neglected topic. Drawing on philosophy, literature and science, Goldie considers the roles of culture and evolution in the development of our emotional capabilities. He examines the links between emotion, mood, and character, and places the emotions in the context of consciousness, thought, feeling, and imagination. He explains how it is that we are able to make sense of our own (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Irwin Goldstein (2002). Are Emotions Feelings? A Further Look at Hedonic Theories of Emotions. Consciousness and Emotion 3 (1):21-33.
    Many philosophers sharply distinguish emotions from feelings. Emotions are not feelings, and having an emotion does not necessitate having some feeling, they think. In this paper I reply to a set of arguments people use sharply to distinguish emotions from feelings. In response to these people, I endorse and defend a hedonic theory of emotion that avoids various anti-feeling objections. Proponents of this hedonic theory analyze an emotion by reference to forms of cognition (e.g., thought, belief, judgment) and a pleasant (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. York H. Gunther (2004). The Phenomenology and Intentionality of Emotion. Philosophical Studies 117 (1-2):43-55.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. Christopher Hamilton (2005). Mark R. Wynn Emotional Experience and Religious Understanding: Integrating Perception, Conception, and Feeling. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). Pp. XIV+202. £40.00 (Hbk); £16.99 (Pbk). ISBN 0521840562 (Hbk); 0521549892 (Pbk). [REVIEW] Religious Studies 41 (4):475-480.
  27. Gary Hatfield (2007). Did Descartes Have a Jamesian Theory of the Emotions? Philosophical Psychology 20 (4):413-440.
    Philosophical Psychology 20 (2007), 413–40. Key words: Cognitive theories of emotion, Rene Descartes, embodiment, emotions, evolution, historical methodology, instinct, mechanistic theories of behavior, mind–brain relations, passions, William James.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. Anthony E. Hatzimoysis (2003). Emotional Feelings and Intentionalism. In A. Hatimoysis (ed.), Philosophy and the Emotions. Cambridge University Press. 105-111.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. Anthony E. Hatzimoysis (2003). Philosophy and the Emotions. Cambridge University Press.
  30. Alexander Heinzel & Georg Northoff (2009). Emotional Feeling and the Orbitomedial Prefrontal Cortex: Theoretical and Empirical Considerations. Philosophical Psychology 22 (4):443 – 464.
    Emotional feeling can be defined as the affective constituent of emotions representing a subjective experience such as, for example, feeling love or hate. Several recent neuroimaging studies have focused on this affective component of emotions thereby aiming to characterise the underlying neural correlates. These studies indicate that the orbitomedial prefrontal cortex is crucially involved in the processing of emotional feeling. It is the aim of this paper to analyse the extent to which the present state of the art in neuroscience (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. Bennett W. Helm (2009). Emotions as Evaluative Feelings. Emotion Review 1 (3):248--55.
    The phenomenology of emotions has traditionally been understood in terms of bodily sensations they involve. This is a mistake. We should instead understand their phenomenology in terms of their distinctively evaluative intentionality. Emotions are essentially affective modes of response to the ways our circumstances come to matter to us, and so they are ways of being pleased or pained by those circumstances. Making sense of the intentionality and phenomenology of emotions in this way requires rejecting traditional understandings of intentionality and (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. Robert Hopkins (2010). Imagination and Affective Response. In Jonathan Webber (ed.), Reading Sartre: On Phenomenology and Existentialism. Routledge.
    What is the relation between affective states, such as emotions and pleasure, and imagining? Do the latter cause the former, just as perceptual states do? Or are the former merely imagined, along with suitable objects? I consider this issue against the backdrop of Sartre’s theory of imagination, and drawing on his highly illuminating discussion of it. I suggest that, while it is commonly assumed that imaginative states cause affective responses much as do perceptions, the alternatives merit more careful consideration than (...)
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. S. A. Howard (2012). Nostalgia. Analysis 72 (4):641-650.
    Next SectionThis article argues against two dominant accounts of the nature of nostalgia. These views assume that nostalgia depends, in some way, on comparing a present situation with a past one. However, neither does justice to the full range of recognizably nostalgic experiences available to us – in particular, ‘Proustian’ nostalgia directed at involuntary autobiographical memories. Therefore, the accounts in question fail. I conclude by considering an evaluative puzzle raised by Proustian nostalgia when it is directed at memories that the (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (13 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. Scott Alexander Howard (2012). Lyrical Emotions and Sentimentality. Philosophical Quarterly 62 (248):546-568.
    I investigate the normative status of an unexamined category of emotions: ‘lyrical’ emotions about the transience of things. Lyrical emotions are often accused of sentimentality—a charge that expresses the idea that they are unfitting responses to their objects. However, when we test the merits of that charge using the standard model of emotion evaluation, a surprising problem emerges: it turns out that we cannot make normative distinctions between episodes of such feelings. Instead, it seems that lyrical emotions are always fitting. (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. Daniel D. Hutto (2006). Unprincipled Engagement: Emotional Experience, Expression and Response. In Richard Menary (ed.), Radical Enactivism: Intentionality, Phenomenology and Narrative: Focus on the Philosophy of Daniel D. Hutto.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36. William James (1884). What is an Emotion? Mind 9 (34):188-205.
  37. Howard F. Kamler (1973). Emotional Feelings. Philosophia 3 (October):381-411.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. Matthew Kieran (1998). Valuing Emotions by Michael Stocker with Elizabeth Hegeman. Cambridge University Press, 1996, Pp. XXVIII + 353. £45.00 Hb, £15.95 Pb. [REVIEW] Philosophy 73 (2):305-324.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  39. Philip J. Koch (1987). Bodily Feeling in Emotion. Dialogue 26 (01):59-75.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  40. Joel J. Kupperman (1997). Felt and Unfelt Emotions: A Rejoinder to Dalgleish. Philosophical Psychology 10 (1):91.
  41. Joseph LeDoux (2008). Emotional Coloration of Consciousness: How Feelings Come About. In Lawrence Weiskrantz & Martin Davies (eds.), Frontiers of Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  42. Stephen Leighton, Unfelt Feelings in Pain and the Emotions.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43. Stephen R. Leighton (1984). Feelings and Emotion. Review of Metaphysics 38 (December):303-320.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  44. William E. Lyons (1980). Emotion. Cambridge University Press.
  45. William E. Lyons (1977). Emotions and Feelings. Ratio 19 (June):1-12.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  46. Geoffrey C. Madell & Aaron Ridley (1997). Emotion and Feeling. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 71 (71):147-176.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (11 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  47. Henry Rutgers Marshall (1895). Emotions Versus Pleasure-Pain. Mind 4 (14):180-194.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  48. Olivier Massin (2014). Pleasure and Its Contraries. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5 (1):15-40.
    What is the contrary of pleasure? “Pain” is one common answer. This paper argues that pleasure instead has two natural contraries: unpleasure and hedonic indifference. This view is defended by drawing attention to two often-neglected concepts: the formal relation of polar opposition and the psychological state of hedonic indifference. The existence of mixed feelings, it is argued, does not threaten the contrariety of pleasure and unpleasure.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  49. Olivier Massin (2013). The Intentionality of Pleasures. In Denis Fisette & Guillaume Fréchette (eds.), Themes from Brentano. Rodopi.
    This paper defends hedonic intentionalism, the view that all pleasures, including bodily pleasures, are directed towards objects distinct from themselves. Brentano is the leading proponent of this view. My goal here is to disentangle his significant proposals from the more disputable ones so as to arrive at a hopefully promising version of hedonic intentionalism. I mainly focus on bodily pleasures, which constitute the main troublemakers for hedonic intentionalism. Section 1 introduces the problem raised by bodily pleasures for hedonic intentionalism and (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  50. Olivier Massin (2011). Joies Amères Et Douces Peines. In Christine Tappolet, Fabrice Teroni & Anita Konzelmann Ziv (eds.), Les ombres de l'âme, Penser les émotions négatives. Markus Haller.
    This paper argues (i) that the possibility of experiencing at once pleasures and unpleasures does not threaten the contrariety of pleasure and unpleasure. (ii) That the hedonic balance calculated by adding all pleasures and displeasures of a subject at a time yields an abstract result that does not correspond to any new psychological reality. There are no resultant feelings. (iii) That there are nevertheless, in some cases, sentimental fusions: when the co-occurent pleasures and unpleasures do not have any bodily location, (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
1 — 50 / 82