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  1. Jamin Asay & S. Seth Bordner (forthcoming). A Modest Defense of Manifestationalism. Synthese.
    As the debate between realists and empiricists in the philosophy of science drags on, one point of consensus has emerged: no one wants to be a manifestationalist. The manifestationalist is a kind of radical empiricist who argues that science provides theories that aim neither at a true picture of the entire world, nor even an empirically adequate picture that captures the world in all its observable respects. For manifestationalists, science aims only at providing theories that are true to the observed (...)
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  2. Erik C. Banks (2014). The Realistic Empiricism of Mach, James, and Russell. Cambridge University Press.
    The book revives the neutral monism of Mach, James, and Russell and applies the updated view to the problem of redefining physicalism, explaining the origins of sensation, and the problem of deriving extended physical objects and systems from an ontology of events.
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  3. Erik C. Banks (2012). Sympathy for the Devil: Reconsidering Ernst Mach's Empiricism. [REVIEW] Metascience 21 (2):321-330.
    A 2012 survey article for Metascience which explains Mach's realistic brand of empiricism, contrasting it with the common phenomenalist reading of Mach by John Blackmore in two recent books.
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  4. Erik C. Banks (2012). Sympathy for the Devil: Reconsidering Ernst Mach's Empiricism. [REVIEW] Metascience 21 (2):321-330.
    A 2012 review article for Metascience which explains Mach's realistic brand of empiricism, contrasting it with the common phenomenalist reading of Mach by John Blackmore in two recent books.
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  5. George Bealer (1992). The Incoherence of Empiricism. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 66:99-138.
    Radical empiricism is the view that a person's experiences (sensory and introspective), or a person's observations, constitute the person's evidence. This view leads to epistemic self-defeat. There are three arguments, concerning respectively: (1) epistemic starting points; (2) epistemic norms; (3) terms of epistemic appraisal. The source of self-defeat is traced to the fact that empiricism does not count a priori intuition as evidence (where a priori intuition is not a form of belief but rather a form of seeming, specifically intellectual (...)
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  6. Selim Berker (2011). Gupta's Gambit. Philosophical Studies 152 (1):17-39.
    After summarizing the essential details of Anil Gupta’s account of perceptual justification in his book _Empiricism and Experience_, I argue for three claims: (1) Gupta’s proposal is closer to rationalism than advertised; (2) there is a major lacuna in Gupta’s account of how convergence in light of experience yields absolute entitlements to form beliefs; and (3) Gupta has not adequately explained how ordinary courses of experience can lead to convergence on a commonsense view of the world.
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  7. Richmond Campbell (1994). The Virtues of Feminist Empiricism. Hypatia 9 (1):90 - 115.
    Despite the emergence of new forms of feminist empiricism, there continues to be resistance to the idea that feminist political commitment can be integral to hypothesis testing in science when that process adheres strictly to empiricist norms and is grounded in a realist conception of objectivity. I explore the virtues of such feminist empiricism, arguing that the resistance is, in large part, due to the lingering effects of positivism.
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  8. Rudolf Carnap (1963). Replies and Systematic Expositions. In Paul Arthur Schilpp (ed.), ¸ Iteschilpp:Prc. Open Court. 859--1013.
  9. Ann Garry (1995). A Minimally Decent Philosophical Method: Analytic Philosophy and Feminism. Hypatia 10 (3):7-30. [REVIEW] Hypatia 10 (3):7-30.
    This essay focuses on the extent to which the methods of analytic philosophy can be useful to feminist philosophers. I pose nine general questions feminist philosophers might ask to determine the suitability of a philosophical method. Examples include: Do its typical ways of formulating problems or issues encourage the inclusion of a wide variety of women's points of view? Are its central concepts gender-biased, not merely in their origin, but in very deep, continuing ways? Does it facilitate uncovering roles that (...)
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  10. Jim Hopkins (forthcoming). Kantian Neuroscience and Radical Interpretation. In Festschfrift for Mark Platts.
    This is an unedited version of a paper written in 2012 accepted for publication in a forthcoming Festschrift for Mark Platts. In it I argue that the Helmholtz/Bayes tradition of free energy neuroscience begun by Geoffrey Hinton and his colleagues, and now being carried forward by Karl Friston and his, can be seen as a fulfilment of the Quine/Davidson program of radical interpretation, and also of Quine’s conception of a naturalized epistemology. -/- This program, in turn, is rooted in Helmholtz’s (...)
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  11. Horace Meyer Kallen (1913). Radical Empiricism and the Philosophic Tradition. Philosophical Review 22 (2):151-164.
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  12. Saul Kripke (2014). Yet Another Dogma of Empiricism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (1).
  13. John-Michael Kuczynski (2012). Empiricism and the Foundations of Psychology. John Benjamins Pub. Co.
    Intended for philosophically minded psychologists and psychologically minded philosophers, this book identifies the ways that psychology has hobbled itself by adhering too strictly to empiricism, this being the doctrine that all knowledge is observation-based. In the first part of this two-part work, it is shown that empiricism is false. In the second part, the psychology-relevant consequences of this fact are identified. Five of these are of special importance. First, whereas some psychopathologies (e.g. obsessive-compulsive disorder) corrupt the activity mediated by one’s (...)
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  14. Douglas Kutach (2011). Reductive Identities: An Empirical Fundamentalist Approach. Philosophia Naturalis 47 (1):67-101.
    I sketch a philosophical program called ‘Empirical Fundamentalism,’ whose signature feature is the extensive use of a distinction between fundamental and derivative reality. Within the framework of Empirical Fundamentalism, derivative reality is treated as an abstraction from fundamental reality. I show how one can understand reduction and supervenience in terms of abstraction, and then I apply the introduced machinery to understand the relation between water and H2O, mental states and brain states, and so on. The conclusion is that such relations (...)
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  15. Douglas Kutach (2009). Empirical Analyses of Causation. In Allan Hazlett (ed.), New Waves in Metaphysics. Palgrave Macmillan.
    Conceptual analyses can be subdivided into two classes, good and evil. Em- pirical analysis is the good kind, routinely practiced in the sciences. Orthodox analysis is the malevolent version that plagues philosophical discourse. In this paper, I will clarify the difference between them, provide some reasons to prefer good over evil, and illustrate their consequences for the metaphysics of causation. By conducting an empirical analysis of causation rather than an orthodox analysis, one can segregate the genuine metaphysical problems that need (...)
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  16. Nicholas Maxwell (forthcoming). Popper's Paradoxical Pursuit of Natural Philosophy. In J. Shearmur & G. Stokes (eds.), Cambridge Companion to Popper. Cambridge University Press.
    Philosophy of science is seen by most as a meta-discipline – one that takes science as its subject matter, and seeks to acquire knowledge and understanding about science without in any way affecting, or contributing to, science itself. Karl Popper’s approach is very different. His first love is natural philosophy or, as he would put it, cosmology. This intermingles cosmology and the rest of natural science with epistemology, methodology and metaphysics. Paradoxically, however, one of his best known contributions, his proposed (...)
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  17. Alfred Schramm (2006). Methodological Objectivism and Critical Rationalist ’Induction’. In Ian Jarvie, Karl Milford & David Miller (eds.), Karl Popper: A Centenary Assessment, Volume II. Ashgate.
    This paper constitutes one extended argument, which touches on various topics of Critical Rationalism as it was initiated by Karl Popper and further developed (although into different directions) in his aftermath. The result of the argument will be that critical rationalism either offers no solution to the problem of induction at all , or that it amounts, in the last resort, to a kind of Critical Rationalist Inductivism as it were, a version of what I call Good Old Induction. One (...)
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  18. David Spurrett (2012). Empiricism: Reloaded. [REVIEW] Metascience 21 (2):351-354.
    Empiricism: reloaded Content Type Journal Article Category Book Review Pages 1-4 DOI 10.1007/s11016-012-9652-7 Authors David Spurrett, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Howard College Campus, Durban, 4041 South Africa Journal Metascience Online ISSN 1467-9981 Print ISSN 0815-0796.
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