Related categories
Siblings:
80 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Order:
1 — 50 / 80
  1. Jon Altschul (2011). Epistemic Entitlement. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    In the early 1990s there emerged a growing interest with the concept of epistemic entitlement. Philosophers who acknowledge the existence of entitlements maintain that there are beliefs or judgments unsupported by evidence available to the subject, but which the subject nonetheless has the epistemic right to hold. Some of these may include beliefs non-inferentially sourced in perception, memory, introspection, testimony, and the a priori. Unlike the traditional notion of justification, entitlement is often characterized as an externalist type of epistemic warrant, (...)
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  2. Anna-Karin M. Andersson (2007). An Alleged Contradiction in Nozick's Entitlement Theory. Journal of Libertarian Studies 21 (3):43-63.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  3. Nancy Aries (2003). Smith:Entitlement Politics: Medicare and Medicaid 1995–2001. Inquiry 40 (4):416-417.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  4. Yuval Avnur (2011). An Old Problem for the New Rationalism. Synthese 183 (2):175-185.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  5. Agnes Bäker, Werner Güth, Kerstin Pull & Manfred Stadler (2014). Entitlement and the Efficiency-Equality Trade-Off: An Experimental Study. [REVIEW] Theory and Decision 76 (2):225-240.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  6. Claudia Blöser, Mikael Janvid, Hannes Matthiessen & Marcus Willaschek (2013). Preface. Grazer Philosophische Studien 87.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  7. Paul A. Boghossian (2003). Epistemic Analyticity: A Defense. Grazer Philosophische Studien 66 (1):15-35.
    The paper is a defense of the project of explaining the a priori via the notion of meaning or concept possession. It responds to certain objections that have been made to this project—in particular, that there can be no epistemically analytic sentences that are not also metaphysically analytic, and that the notion of implicit definition cannot explain a priori entitlement. The paper goes on to distinguish between two different ways in which facts about meaning might generate facts about entitlement—inferential and (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   10 citations  
  8. Jochen Briesen (2016). Epistemic Consequentialism: Its Relation to Ethical Consequentialism and the Truth-Indication Principle. In Pedro Schmechtig & Martin Grajner (eds.), Epistemic Reasons, Norms and Goals. De Gruyter 277-306.
    Consequentialist positions in philosophy spell out normative notions by recourse to final aims. Hedonistic versions of ETHICAL consequentialism spell out what is MORALLY right/justified via recourse to the aim of increasing pleasure and decreasing pain. Veritistic versions of EPISTEMIC consequentialism spell out what is EPISTEMICALLY right/justified via recourse to the aim of increasing the number of true beliefs and decreasing the number of false ones. Even though these theories are in many respects structurally analogous, there are also interesting disanalogies. For (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  9. Jochen Briesen (2013). Is Kant (W)Right? – On Kant’s Regulative Ideas and Wright’s Entitlements. Kant-Yearbook 5 (1):1-32.
    This paper discusses a structural analogy between Kant’s theory of regulative ideas, as he develops it in the Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic, and Crispin Wright’s theory of epistemic entitlements. First, I argue that certain exegetical difficulties with respect to the Appendix rest on serious systematic problems, which – given other assumptions of the Critique of Pure Reason – Kant is unable to solve. Second, I argue that because of the identified structural analogy between Kant’s and Wright’s views the project (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  10. Anthony Brueckner (2007). Content Externalism, Entitlement, and Reasons. In Sanford Goldberg (ed.), Internalism and Externalism in Semantics and Epistemology. Oxford University Press 160.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  11. Tyler Burge (2003). Perceptual Entitlement. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (3):503-548.
    The paper develops a conception of epistemic warrant as applied to perceptual belief, called entitlement, that does not require the warranted individual to be capable of understanding the warrant. The conception is situated within an account of animal perception and unsophisticated perceptual belief. It characterizes entitlement as fulfillment of an epistemic norm that is apriori associated with a certain representational function that can be known apriori to be a function of perception. The paper connects anti-individualism, a thesis about the nature (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   60 citations  
  12. Tyler Burge (2003). Perceptual Entitlement. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (3):503-48.
    The paper develops a conception of epistemic warrant as applied to perceptual belief, called "entitlement", that does not require the warranted individual to be capable of understanding the warrant. The conception is situated within an account of animal perception and unsophisticated perceptual belief. It characterizes entitlement as fulfillment of an epistemic norm that is apriori associated with a certain representational function that can be known apriori to be a function of perception. The paper connects anti-individualism, a thesis about the nature (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   72 citations  
  13. Tyler Burge (1996). Our Entitlement to Self-Knowledge. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 96 (1):91-116.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   68 citations  
  14. Tyler Burge (1993). Content Preservation. Philosophical Review 102 (4):457-488.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   194 citations  
  15. Tyler Burge & Christopher Peacocke (1996). Our Entitlement to Self-Knowledge: II. Christopher Peacocke: Entitlement, Self-Knowledge and Conceptual Redeployment. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 96:117 - 158.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   28 citations  
  16. Albert Casullo, B o O K R E V I E W S.
    At any given time, an individual has certain beliefs and certain procedures or methods for modifying those beliefs. In The Realm of Reason, as in his previous book, Being Known (1999), Christopher Peacocke is concerned with the elusive question of what it is for someone to be “entitled” to a given belief or procedure.1..
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  17. Albert Casullo (2007). What is Entitlement? Acta Analytica 22 (4):267 - 279.
    In his seminal paper, Content Preservation, Tyler Burge defends an original account of testimonial knowledge. The originality of the account is due, in part, to the fact that it is cast within a novel epistemic framework. The central feature of that framework is the introduction of the concept of entitlement, which is alleged to be a distinctive type of positive epistemic support or warrant. Entitlement and justification, according to Burge, are sub-species of warrant. Justification is the internalist form of warrant, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  18. Martin Davies (2004). Epistemic Entitlement, Warrant Transmission and Easy Knowledge. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 78 (1):213–245.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   71 citations  
  19. Fred Dretske (2000). Entitlement: Epistemic Rights Without Epistemic Duties? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (3):591-606.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   34 citations  
  20. Mikkel Gerken (forthcoming). Against Knowledge-First Epistemology. In Gordon and Jarvis Carter (ed.), Knowledge-First Approaches in Epistemology and Mind. Oxford University Press
    I begin by criticizing reductionist knowledge-first epistemology according to which knowledge can be used to reductively analyze other epistemic phenomena. My central concern is that proponents of such an approach commit a similar mistake to the one that they charge their opponents with. This is the mistake of seeking to reductively analyze basic epistemic phenomena in terms of other allegedly more fundamental phenomena. I then turn to non-reductionist brands of knowledge-first epistemology. Specifically, I consider the knowledge norms of assertion and (...)
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  21. Mikkel Gerken (2013). Internalism and Externalism in the Epistemology of Testimony. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (3):532-557.
    Is the nature of testimonial warrant epistemically internalist or externalist? I will argue that the question should be answered ‘yes!’ The disjunction is not exclusive. Rather, a testimonial belief may possess epistemically internalist warrant—justification—as well as epistemically externalist warrant—entitlement. I use the label ‘pluralism’ to denote the view that there are both internalist and externalist species of genuinely epistemic warrant and argue for pluralism in the epistemology of testimony.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  22. Peter J. Graham (2012). Epistemic Entitlement. Noûs 46 (3):449-482.
    What is the best account of process reliabilism about epistemic justification, especially epistemic entitlement? I argue that entitlement consists in the normal functioning (proper operation) of the belief-forming process when the process has forming true beliefs reliably as an etiological function. Etiological functions involve consequence explanation: a belief-forming process has forming true beliefs reliably as a function just in case forming-true beliefs reliably partly explains the persistence of the process. This account paves the way for avoiding standard objections to process (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   22 citations  
  23. Peter J. Graham (2011). Perceptual Entitlement and Basic Beliefs. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 153 (3):467-475.
    Perceptual entitlement and basic beliefs Content Type Journal Article DOI 10.1007/s11098-010-9603-3 Authors Peter J. Graham, University of California, 900 University Avenue, Riverside, CA USA Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  24. Peter J. Graham (2010). Testimonial Entitlement and the Function of Comprehension. In Duncan Pritchard, Alan Millar & Adrian Haddock (eds.), Social Epistemology. Oxford University Press 148--174.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  25. Patrick Greenough (forthcoming). Knowledge for Nothing. In Peter Graham & Nikolaj Pedersen (eds.), New Essays on Entitlement. Oxford University Press
    Let Entitlement Epistemology be the theory of knowledge which says that entitlement—a special kind of unearned warrant to accept or believe—can help us successfully address a range of sceptical arguments. Prominent versions of this theory urge that epistemology should not be concerned with knowledge (and similar externalist states) but rather with justification, warrant, and entitlement (at least insofar as these are conceived of as internalist states). Knowledge does not come first, half-way, or even last in epistemological theorising—rather, it ought to (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  26. Gilbert Harman, Review of Christopher Peacocke, the Realm of Reason. [REVIEW]
    Peacocke argues that all epistemic entitlements depend at bottom on a priori entitlements, determined by "constitutive conditions" for the application of concepts. He does not address familiar doubts about the distinction between constitutive and nonconstitutive conditions of application. In addition, Peacocke conflates issues about inference with issues about implication and proof and seriously misrepresents David Lewis' view about the content of indicative conditionals.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  27. David Henderson (2013). Entitlement in Gutting's Epistemology of Philosophy: Comments on What Philosophers Know. Southern Journal of Philosophy 51 (1):121-132.
    In What Philosophers Know, Gary Gutting provides an epistemology of philosophical reflection. This paper focuses on the roles that various intuitive inputs are said to play in philosophical thought. Gutting argues that philosophers are defeasibly entitled to believe some of these, prior to the outcome of the philosophical reflection, and that they then rightly serve as significant (again defeasible) anchors on reflection. This paper develops a view of epistemic entitlement and applies it to argue that many prephilosophical convictions of the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  28. Mikael Janvid (2009). The Value of Lesser Goods: The Epistemic Value of Entitlement. Acta Analytica 24 (4):263-274.
    The notion of entitlement plays an important role in some influential epistemologies. Often the epistemological motive for introducing the concept is to accommodate certain externalist intuitions within an internalist framework or, conversely, to incorporate internalist traits into an otherwise externalist position. In this paper two prominent philosophers will be used as examples: Tyler Burge as a representative of the first option and Fred Dretske as one of the second. However, even on the assumption that the concept of entitlement is sufficiently (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  29. C. Jenkins (2007). Entitlement and Rationality. Synthese 157 (1):25-45.
  30. C. S. Jenkins (2007). Entitlement and Rationality. Synthese 157 (1):25 - 45.
    This paper takes the form of a critical discussion of Crispin Wright’s notion of entitlement of cognitive project. I examine various strategies for defending the claim that entitlement can make acceptance of a proposition epistemically rational, including one which appeals to epistemic consequentialism. Ultimately, I argue, none of these strategies is successful, but the attempt to isolate points of disagreement with Wright issues in some positive proposals as to how an epistemic consequentialist should characterize epistemic rationality.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   13 citations  
  31. Anthony Brueckner Jon Altschul (2014). Vahid, Burge, and Perceptual Entitlement. Metaphilosophy 45 (3):325-330.
    Hamid Vahid criticizes Tyler Burge's account of perceptual entitlement. Vahid argues that Burge's account fails to satisfy a criterion of adequacy that any correct account of perceptual warrant must satisfy. According to Vahid, a correct account of perceptual warrant must allow for perceptual beliefs which are produced by a properly functioning perceptual system yet which lack warrant. The present article argues that Vahid's critique of Burge fails. It presents numerous examples of such beliefs that are consistent with Burge's account of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  32. David M. Lederkramer (1979). Quest on the Entitlement Theory. Analysis 39 (4):219 - 222.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  33. Cynthia Macdonald (1998). Externalism and Authoritative Self-Knowledge. In C. Wright, B. Smith & C. Macdonald (eds.), Knowing Our Own Minds. Oxford University Press 123-155.
    Externalism in the philosophy of mind has been thought by many to pose a serious threat to the claim that subjects are in general authoritative with regard to certain of their own intentional states.<sup>1</sup> In a series of papers, Tyler Burge (1985_a_, 1985_b_, 1988, 1996) has argued that the distinctive entitlement or right that subjects have to self- knowledge in certain cases is compatible with externalism, since that entitlement is environmentally neutral, neutral with respect to the issue of the individuation (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  34. Brad Majors (2015). What Entitlement Is. Acta Analytica 30 (4):363-387.
    The paper is an examination of Tyler Burge’s notion of epistemic entitlement. It begins with consideration of a recent attempt to understand entitlement, including the ways in which it differs from the more traditional notion of justification. The paper argues that each of Casullo’s central contentions rests upon confusion. More generally, the paper shows that Casullo’s interpretation tries to force Burge’s work into a framework that is not suited for it; and that the interpretation also suffers from not being even (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  35. Brad Majors & Sarah Sawyer (2007). Entitlement, Opacity, and Connection. In Sanford Goldberg (ed.), Internalism and Externalism in Semantics and Epistemology. Oxford University Press 131.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  36. Hannes Ole Matthiessen (2014). Epistemic Entitlement. The Right to Believe. Palgrave MacMillan.
    In Epistemic Entitlement. The Right to Believe Hannes Ole Matthiessen develops a social externalist account of epistemic entitlement and perceptual knowledge. The basic idea is that positive epistemic status should be understood as a specific kind of epistemic right, that is a right to believe. Since rights have consequences for how others are required to treat the bearer of the right, they have to be publicly accessible. The author therefore suggests that epistemic entitlement can plausibly be conceptualized as a status (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  37. Hannes Ole Matthiessen (2013). Entitlement and Public Accessibility of Epistemic Status. Grazer Philosophische Studien 87:75-97.
    In recent epistemological literature, epistemic entitlement is understood as a personal epistemic status that does not require elaborate justificatory activity on behalf of the entitled individual. It is nevertheless internalist in a weaker sense, since it is said to be grounded in perceptual experiences. It seems, however, that the conditions under which an epistemic right holds should, like in cases of most other rights, be publicly observable, because they have implications for the ways others are required to treat the entitled (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  38. Aidan McGlynn (forthcoming). Epistemic Entitlement and the Leaching Problem. Episteme:1-14.
  39. Aidan McGlynn (2014). On Epistemic Alchemy. In Dylan Dodd Elia Zardini (ed.), Scepticism and Perceptual Justification. Oxford University Press 173-189.
    Crispin Wright has proposed that one has entitlements to accept certain propositions that play a foundational role within one’s body of belief. Such an entitlement is a kind of warrant that does not require the possessor to have acquired evidence speaking in favor of the proposition in question. The proposal allows Wright to concede much of the force of the most powerful arguments for scepticism, while avoiding the truly sceptical conclusion that one lacks warrant for most of one’s beliefs. Here (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  40. Peter E. Millspaugh (1989). Severance Pay: Moving From Managerial Prerogative to Worker Entitlement. Business and Society 28 (1):6-11.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  41. Luca Moretti (forthcoming). Problems of Wright's Entitlement Theory. In Peter Graham & Nikolaj Pedersen (eds.), Epistemic Entitlement. OUP
    I am concerned with Crispin Wright (2004, 2008, 2012 and 2014)’s entitlement theory, according to which (1) we have non-evidential justification for accepting propositions of a general type, which Wright calls cornerstones, and (2) this non-evidential justification for cornerstones can secure evidential justification for believing many other propositions––those we take to be true on the grounds of ordinary evidence. I initially focus on Wright’s strategic entitlement, which is one of the types of entitlement that Wright has described in more detail. (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  42. Ram Neta (2010). Can a Priori Entitlement Be Preserved by Testimony. In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Social Epistemology. Oxford University Press, Usa 194--215.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  43. Robert Nozick (forthcoming). 6 The Entitlement Theory of Justice. Contemporary Political Theory: A Reader.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  44. Susana Nuccetelli (2001). Is Self-Knowledge an Entitlement? And Why Should We Care? Southern Journal of Philosophy 39 (1):143-155.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  45. Alexander C. R. Oldemeier (2013). Entitlement and Epistemic Upgrading. Analytic Philosophy 54 (4):436-446.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  46. D. Pare (1984). On Nozick: A Critique of Entitlement. Gnosis. A Journal of Philosophic Interest Montréal 2 (3):39-63.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  47. Jeffrey Paul (1990). Property, Entitlement, and Remedy. The Monist 73 (4):564-577.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  48. Christopher Peacocke (2006). Entitlement, Reasons and Externalism. Philosophical Books 47 (2):120-128.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  49. Christopher Peacocke (2004). Explaining Perceptual Entitlement. In Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge. De Gruyter 441--80.
    material that was later incorporated into The Realm of Reason (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), and into a paper of the same title in The Challenge of Externalism, ed. R. Schantz (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2004).
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  50. Christopher Peacocke (2003). The Realm of Reason. Oxford University Press.
    The Realm of Reason develops a new, general theory of what it is for a thinker to be entitled to form a given belief. The theory locates entitlement in the nexus of relations between truth, content, and understanding. Peacocke formulates three principles of rationalism that articulate this conception. The principles imply that all entitlement has a component that is justificationally independent of experience. The resulting position is thus a form of rationalism, generalized to all kinds of content. To show how (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   68 citations  
1 — 50 / 80