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  1. Jon Altschul, Epistemic Entitlement. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    In the early 1990s there emerged a growing interest with the concept of epistemic entitlement. Philosophers who acknowledge the existence of entitlements maintain that there are beliefs or judgments unsupported by evidence available to the subject, but which the subject nonetheless has the epistemic right to hold. Some of these may include beliefs non-inferentially sourced in perception, memory, introspection, testimony, and the a priori. Unlike the traditional notion of justification, entitlement is often characterized as an externalist type of epistemic warrant, (...)
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  2. Yuval Avnur (2011). An Old Problem for the New Rationalism. Synthese 183 (2):175-185.
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  3. Paul A. Boghossian (2003). Epistemic Analyticity: A Defense. Grazer Philosophische Studien 66 (1):15-35.
    The paper is a defense of the project of explaining the a priori via the notion of meaning or concept possession. It responds to certain objections that have been made to this project—in particular, that there can be no epistemically analytic sentences that are not also metaphysically analytic, and that the notion of implicit definition cannot explain a priori entitlement. The paper goes on to distinguish between two different ways in which facts about meaning might generate facts about entitlement—inferential and (...)
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  4. Anthony Brueckner (2007). Content Externalism, Entitlement, and Reasons. In Sanford Goldberg (ed.), Internalism and Externalism in Semantics and Epistemology. Oxford University Press. 160.
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  5. Tyler Burge (2003). Perceptual Entitlement. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (3):503-548.
    The paper develops a conception of epistemic warrant as applied to perceptual belief, called entitlement, that does not require the warranted individual to be capable of understanding the warrant. The conception is situated within an account of animal perception and unsophisticated perceptual belief. It characterizes entitlement as fulfillment of an epistemic norm that is apriori associated with a certain representational function that can be known apriori to be a function of perception. The paper connects anti-individualism, a thesis about the nature (...)
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  6. Tyler Burge (2003). Perceptual Entitlement. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (3):503-48.
    The paper develops a conception of epistemic warrant as applied to perceptual belief, called "entitlement", that does not require the warranted individual to be capable of understanding the warrant. The conception is situated within an account of animal perception and unsophisticated perceptual belief. It characterizes entitlement as fulfillment of an epistemic norm that is apriori associated with a certain representational function that can be known apriori to be a function of perception. The paper connects anti-individualism, a thesis about the nature (...)
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  7. Tyler Burge (1996). Our Entitlement to Self-Knowledge. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 96:91-116.
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  8. Tyler Burge (1993). Content Preservation. Philosophical Review 102 (4):457-488.
    The JSTOR Archive is a trusted digital repository providing for long-term preservation and access to leading academic journals and scholarly literature from around the world. The Archive is supported by libraries, scholarly societies, publishers, and foundations. It is an initiative of JSTOR, a not-for-profit organization with a mission to help the scholarly community take advantage of advances in technology. For more information regarding JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
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  9. Albert Casullo (2007). What is Entitlement? Acta Analytica 22 (4):267 - 279.
    In his seminal paper, Content Preservation, Tyler Burge defends an original account of testimonial knowledge. The originality of the account is due, in part, to the fact that it is cast within a novel epistemic framework. The central feature of that framework is the introduction of the concept of entitlement, which is alleged to be a distinctive type of positive epistemic support or warrant. Entitlement and justification, according to Burge, are sub-species of warrant. Justification is the internalist form of warrant, (...)
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  10. Martin Davies (2004). Epistemic Entitlement, Warrant Transmission and Easy Knowledge. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 78 (1):213–245.
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  11. Fred Dretske (2000). Entitlement: Epistemic Rights Without Epistemic Duties? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (3):591-606.
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  12. Mikkel Gerken (2013). Internalism and Externalism in the Epistemology of Testimony. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (3):532-557.
  13. Peter J. Graham (2012). Epistemic Entitlement. Noûs 46 (3):449-482.
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  14. Peter J. Graham (2011). Perceptual Entitlement and Basic Beliefs. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 153 (3):467-475.
    Perceptual entitlement and basic beliefs Content Type Journal Article DOI 10.1007/s11098-010-9603-3 Authors Peter J. Graham, University of California, 900 University Avenue, Riverside, CA USA Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116.
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  15. Peter J. Graham (2010). Testimonial Entitlement and the Function of Comprehension. In Duncan Pritchard, Alan Millar & Adrian Haddock (eds.), Social Epistemology. Oxford University Press. 148--174.
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  16. Gilbert Harman, Review of Christopher Peacocke, the Realm of Reason. [REVIEW]
    Peacocke argues that all epistemic entitlements depend at bottom on a priori entitlements, determined by "constitutive conditions" for the application of concepts. He does not address familiar doubts about the distinction between constitutive and nonconstitutive conditions of application. (These doubts are based on the widely accepted idea that justification begins with all of one's current beliefs and methods and seeks to modify these only to improve their overall coherence with each other, hoping ultimately for "reflective equilibrium.") In addition, Peacocke conflates (...)
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  17. Mikael Janvid (2009). The Value of Lesser Goods: The Epistemic Value of Entitlement. [REVIEW] Acta Analytica 24 (4):263-274.
    The notion of entitlement plays an important role in some influential epistemologies. Often the epistemological motive for introducing the concept is to accommodate certain externalist intuitions within an internalist framework or, conversely, to incorporate internalist traits into an otherwise externalist position. In this paper two prominent philosophers will be used as examples: Tyler Burge as a representative of the first option and Fred Dretske as one of the second. However, even on the assumption that the concept of entitlement is sufficiently (...)
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  18. C. S. Jenkins (2007). Entitlement and Rationality. Synthese 157 (1):25 - 45.
    This paper takes the form of a critical discussion of Crispin Wright’s notion of entitlement of cognitive project. I examine various strategies for defending the claim that entitlement can make acceptance of a proposition epistemically rational, including one which appeals to epistemic consequentialism. Ultimately, I argue, none of these strategies is successful, but the attempt to isolate points of disagreement with Wright issues in some positive proposals as to how an epistemic consequentialist should characterize epistemic rationality.
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  19. Cynthia Macdonald (1998). Externalism and Authoritative Self-Knowledge. In C. Wright, B. Smith & C. Macdonald (eds.), Knowing Our Own Minds. Oxford University Press. 123-155.
    Externalism in the philosophy of mind has been thought by many to pose a serious threat to the claim that subjects are in general authoritative with regard to certain of their own intentional states.<sup>1</sup> In a series of papers, Tyler Burge (1985_a_, 1985_b_, 1988, 1996) has argued that the distinctive entitlement or right that subjects have to self- knowledge in certain cases is compatible with externalism, since that entitlement is environmentally neutral, neutral with respect to the issue of the individuation (...)
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  20. Brad Majors & Sarah Sawyer (2007). Entitlement, Opacity, and Connection. In Sanford Goldberg (ed.), Internalism and Externalism in Semantics and Epistemology. Oxford University Press. 131.
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  21. Ram Neta (2010). Can a Priori Entitlement Be Preserved by Testimony. In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Social Epistemology. Oxford University Press, Usa. 194--215.
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  22. Susana Nuccetelli (2001). Is Self-Knowledge an Entitlement? And Why Should We Care? Southern Journal of Philosophy 39 (1):143-155.
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  23. Christopher Peacocke (2006). Entitlement, Reasons and Externalism. Philosophical Books 47 (2):120-128.
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  24. Christopher Peacocke (2004). The Realm of Reason. Oxford University Press.
    The Realm of Reason develops a new, general theory of what it is for a thinker to be entitled to form a given belief. The theory locates entitlement in the nexus of relations between truth, content, and understanding. Peacocke formulates three principles of rationalism that articulate this conception. The principles imply that all entitlement has a component that is justificationally independent of experience. The resulting position is thus a form of rationalism, generalized to all kinds of content. To show how (...)
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  25. Christopher Peacocke (2004). Explaining Perceptual Entitlement. In Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge. De Gruyter. 441--80.
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  26. Christopher Peacocke (2001). The Past, Necessity, Externalism and Entitlement. Philosophical Books 42:106--117.
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  27. Christopher Peacocke (1996). Entitlement, Self-Knowledge, and Conceptual Redeployment. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Sociey 96:117-58.
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  28. Christopher Peacocke (1996). Our Entitlement to Self-Knowledge: Entitlement, Self-Knowledge, and Conceptual Redeployment. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 96:117-58.
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  29. Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen, Entitlement in Mathematics.
    Crispin Wright has recently introduced a non-evidential notion of warrant – entitlement of cognitive project – as a promising response to certain sceptical arguments, which have been subject to extensive discussion within mainstream epistemology. The central idea is that, for a given class of cognitive projects, there are certain basic propositions – entitlements – which one is warranted in trusting provided there is no sufficient reason to think them false. (See Wrigh [2].) The aim of this paper is to provide (...)
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  30. Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen (forthcoming). Hume's Principle and Entitlement: On the Epistemology of the Neo-Fregean Programme. In Philip Ebert & Marcus Rossberg (eds.), Abstractionism. Oxford University Press.
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  31. Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen (2009). Entitlement, Value and Rationality. Synthese 171 (3):443-457.
    In this paper I discuss two fundamental challenges concerning Crispin Wright's notion of entitlement of cognitive project: firstly, whether entitlement is an epistemic kind of warrant since, seemingly, it is not underwritten by epistemic reasons, and, secondly, whether, in the absence of such reasons, the kind of rationality associated with entitlement is epistemic in nature. The paper investigates three possible lines of response to these challenges. According to the first line of response, entitlement of cognitive project is underwritten by epistemic (...)
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  32. Patrice Philie (2009). Entitlement as a Response to I–Ii–III Scepticism. Synthese 171 (3):459 - 466.
    In this paper, Crispin Wright’s unified strategy against scepticism is put under pressure through an examination of the concept of entitlement. Wright’s characterisation of a generalised form of scepticism is first described, followed by an examination of the concept of entitlement and of the role played by presuppositions in his strategy. This will make manifest the transcendental structure of this response to scepticism. The paper ends with a discussion of the effectiveness of this transcendental strategy in providing a satisfying response (...)
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  33. Stathis Psillos, The a Priori: Between Conventions and Implicit Definitions.
    A thumbnail sketch of the philosophical thinking about the a priori would surely include that it has been dominated by two major approaches: the Kantian absolute conception of it and the Millian-Quinean absolute rejection of it (section 2). Yet, one can find in the literature claims about the existence of a ›functional a priori‹, a ›relative a priori‹, a ›relativised a priori‹ and suchlike. They are all meant to carve a space between the two extremes. An important thought behind the (...)
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  34. Huiming Ren (2009). Entitlement to Self-Knowledge and Brute Error. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 17 (4):543 – 562.
    I discuss Burge's argument that our entitlement to self-knowledge consists in the constitutive relation between the second-order review of thoughts and the thoughts reviewed, and defend it against Peacocke's criticism. I then argue that though our entitlement to self-knowledge is neutral to different environments, as Burge claims, the consideration of Burge's own notion of brute error shows that Burge's effort to reconcile externalism and self-knowledge is not successful.
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  35. Stewart Shapiro (2011). Epistemology of Mathematics: What Are the Questions? What Count as Answers? Philosophical Quarterly 61 (242):130-150.
    A paper in this journal by Fraser MacBride, ‘Can Ante Rem Structuralism Solve the Access Problem?’, raises important issues concerning the epistemological goals and burdens of contemporary philosophy of mathematics, and perhaps philosophy of science and other disciplines as well. I use a response to MacBride's paper as a framework for developing a broadly holistic framework for these issues, and I attempt to steer a middle course between reductive foundationalism and extreme naturalistic quietism. For this purpose the notion of entitlement (...)
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  36. Nicholas Silins (2012). Explaining Perceptual Entitlement. Erkenntnis 76 (2):243-261.
    This paper evaluates the prospects of harnessing “anti-individualism” about the contents of perceptual states to give an account of the epistemology of perception, making special reference to Tyler Burge’s ( 2003 ) paper, “Perceptual Entitlement”. I start by clarifying what kind of warrant is provided by perceptual experience, and I go on to survey different ways one might explain the warrant provided by perceptual experience in terms of anti-individualist views about the individuation of perceptual states. I close by motivating accounts (...)
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  37. Paul Silva (2013). How To Be Conservative: A Partial Defense of Epistemic Conservatism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (3):501-514.
    Conservatism about perceptual justification tells us that we cannot have perceptual justification to believe p unless we also have justification to believe that perceptual experiences are reliable. There are many ways to maintain this thesis, ways that have not been sufficiently appreciated. Most of these ways lead to at least one of two problems. The first is an over-intellectualization problem, whereas the second problem concerns the satisfaction of the epistemic basing requirement on justified belief. I argue that there is at (...)
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  38. Martin Smith (2013). Entitlement and Evidence. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (4):735-753.
    Entitlement is conceived as a kind of positive epistemic status, attaching to certain propositions, that involves no cognitive or intellectual accomplishment on the part of the beneficiary — a status that is in place by default. In this paper I will argue that the notion of entitlement — or something very like it — falls out of an idea that may at first blush seem rather disparate: that the evidential support relation can be understood as a kind of variably strict (...)
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  39. Neil Tennant, §1. Exposition.
    Peacocke argues for a ‘generalized rationalism’, holding that ‘all entitlement has a fundamentally a priori component.’ (2) But his rationalism ‘differs from those of Frege and Gödel, just as theirs differ from that of Leibniz.’ He requires both substantive theories of intentional content and of understanding, and systematic formal theories of referential semantics and truth. We need an externalist theory of content: ‘Only mental states with externally individuated contents can make judgements about the external, mind-independent world rational.’ (123) Purely evidential (...)
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  40. Chris Tucker (2009). Perceptual Justification and Warrant by Default. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87: 445-63 87 (3):445-63.
    As I use the term, ‘entitlement’ is any warrant one has by default—i.e. without acquiring it. Some philosophers not only affirm the existence of entitlement, but also give it a crucial role in the justification of our perceptual beliefs. These philosophers affirm the Entitlement Thesis: An essential part of what makes our perceptual beliefs justified is our entitlement to the proposition that I am not a brain-in-a-vat. Crispin Wright, Stewart Cohen, and Roger White are among those who endorse this controversial (...)
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  41. Hamid Vahid (2011). The Concept of Entitlement and its Epistemic Relevance. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (3):380-399.
    Crispin Wright has recently suggested that, in addition to the notion of justification, we also possess a non-evidential notion of warrant, ‘entitlement’, that can play an important role in responding to various skeptical questions. My concern here is with the question of whether entitlement constitutes an epistemic kind of warrant. I claim Wright's argument for this thesis at most shows that entitlement has a pragmatic character. Having identified the sources of the troubles of this argument in its underlying assumptions, I (...)
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  42. Ralph Wedgwood (2007). Christopher Peacocke's The Realm of Reason. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (3):776-791.
    In this book, Christopher Peacocke proposes a general theory about what it is for a thinker to be entitled to form a given belief. This theory is distinctively rationalist: that is, it gives a large role to the a priori, while insisting that the propositions or contents that can be known a priori are not in any way “true in virtue of meaning” (and without in any other way denigrating these propositions as “trivial”, or as propositions that “tell us nothing (...)
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  43. Ralph Wedgwood (2007). The Realm of Reason by Christopher Peacocke. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (3):776-791.
    This is a critical notice of Christopher Peacocke's book, "The Realm of Reason" (Oxford University Press, 2004).
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  44. Michael Williams (2000). Dretske on Epistemic Entitlement. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (3):607-612.
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  45. Crispin Wright (2004). Intuition, Entitlement and the Epistemology of Logical Laws. Dialectica 58 (1):155–175.
  46. Crispin Wright (2004). Warrant for Nothing (and Foundations for Free)? Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 78 (1):167–212.
  47. Crispin Wright & Martin Davies (2004). On Epistemic Entitlement. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 78:167 - 245.
    [Crispin Wright] Two kinds of epistemological sceptical paradox are reviewed and a shared assumption, that warrant to accept a proposition has to be the same thing as having evidence for its truth, is noted. 'Entitlement', as used here, denotes a kind of rational warrant that counter-exemplifies that identification. The paper pursues the thought that there are various kinds of entitlement and explores the possibility that the sceptical paradoxes might receive a uniform solution if entitlement can be made to reach sufficiently (...)
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