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  1. Roman Altshuler (forthcoming). The Value of Nonhuman Nature: A Constitutive View. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice:1-17.
    A central question of environmental ethics remains one of how best to account for the intuitions generated by the Last Man scenarios; that is, it is a question of how to explain our experience of value in nature and, more importantly, whether that experience is justified. Seeking an alternative to extrinsic views, according to which nonhuman entities possess normative features that obligate us, I turn to constitutive views, which make value or whatever other limits nonhuman nature places on action dependent (...)
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  2. Stephen R. L. Clark (1999). Book Reviews : Environmental Ethics and Process Thinking, by Clare Palmer. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998. 243 Pp. Hb. 35. ISBN 0-19-826952-. [REVIEW] Studies in Christian Ethics 12 (2):89-91.
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  3. Kristian Skagen Ekeli & Espen Gamlund (2011). Reconsidering Approaches to Moral Status. Ethics, Policy and Environment 14 (3):361 - 375.
    Ethics, Policy & Environment, Volume 14, Issue 3, Page 361-375, October 2011.
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  4. Philippe Gagnon (2014). "Diversité et historique des mouvements écologiques en Amérique du Nord" [Diversity and origins of the ecological movements in North America]. Connaître: Cahiers de l'Association Foi Et Culture Scientifique 40:76-89.
    The development of ecological thinking in North America has been conditioned by the imperative aiming at a valuation of the biotic community. Since the end of WWII, the US population was warned against the dangerous and violent alterations of nature. Many then found in theology an unforeseen ally. I review the roots of the tension which led to debates between radical ecologism or its denial, and I aim at analyzing it philosophically.
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  5. Espen Gamlund (2011). Introduction to 'Confronting Environmental Values'. Ethics, Policy and Environment 14 (3):307 - 312.
    Ethics, Policy & Environment, Volume 14, Issue 3, Page 307-312, October 2011.
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  6. Christopher Grau (2010). Moral Status, Speciesism, and Liao’s Genetic Account. Journal of Moral Philosophy 7 (3):387-96.
    This paper offers several criticisms of the account of rightholding laid out in S. Matthew Liao’s recent paper “The Basis of Human Moral Status.” I argue that Liao’s account both does too much and too little: it grants rightholder status to those who may not deserve it, and it does not provide grounds for offering such status to those who arguably do deserve it. Given these troubling aspects of his approach, I encourage Liao to abandon his “physical basis of moral (...)
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  7. Leslie A. Howe (2008). Remote Sport: Risk and Self-Knowledge in Wilder Spaces. Journal of the Philosophy of Sport 35 (1):1-16.
    Previous discussions on the value of sport in remote locations have concentrated on 1) environmental and process concerns, with the rejection of competition and goal-directed or use oriented activity, or 2) the value of risk and dangerous sport for self-affirmation. It is argued that the value of risk in remote sport is in self-knowledge rather than self-affirmation and that risk in remote sport, while enhancing certain kinds of experience, is not necessary. The value of remote sport is in offering the (...)
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  8. Jason Kawall (2008). On Behalf of Biocentric Individualism. Environmental Ethics 30 (1):69-88.
    Victoria Davion in “Itch Scratching, Patio Building, and Pesky Flies: Biocentric Individualism Revisited” takes biocentric individualism to task, focusing in particular on my paper, “Reverence for Life as a Viable Environmental Virtue.” Davion levels a wide-range of criticisms, and concludes that we humans would be better off putting biocentric individualism aside to focus on more important issues and positions. Worries raised by Davion can be defended by elaborating on the position laid out in the original paper, including a background normative (...)
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  9. Karyn L. Lai (2003). Conceptual Foundations for Environmental Ethics: A Daoist Perspective. Environmental Ethics 25 (3):247-266.
    The concepts dao and de in the Daodejing may be evoked to support a distinctive and plausible account of environmental holism. Dao refers to the totality of particulars, including the relations that hold between them, and the respective roles and functions of each within the whole. De refers to the distinctiveness of each particular, realized meaningfully only within the context of its interdependence with others, and its situatedness within the whole. Together, dao and de provide support for an ethical holism (...)
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  10. Jie Liu, Amarbayasgalan Dorjderem, Jinhua Fu, Xiaohui Lei & Darryl Macer (2011). Water Ethics and Water Resource Management. UNESCO.
    This book examines some possible ethical principles to resolve moral dilemmas involving water. Existing problems in current water management practices are discussed in light of these principles. Transformation of human water ethics has the potential to be far more effective, cheaper and acceptable than some existing means of “regulation”, but transformation of personal and societal ethics need time because the changes to ethical values are slow.
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  11. J. Robert Loftis (2003). Three Problems for the Aesthetic Foundations of Environmental Ethics. Philosophy in the Contemporary World 10 (2):41-50.
    This essay takes a critical look at aesthetics as the basis for nature preservation, presenting three reasons why we should not rely on aesthetic foundations to justify the environmentalist program. First, a comparison to other kinds of aesthetic value shows that the aesthetic value of nature can provide weak reasons foraction atbest. Second, not everything environmentalists want to protect has positive aesthetic qualities. Attempts have been made to get around this problem by developing a reformist attitude towards natural aesthetics. I (...)
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  12. Katie McShane (2011). Neosentimentalism and Environmental Ethics. Environmental Ethics 33 (1):5-23.
    Neosentimentalism provides environmental ethics with a theory of value that might be particularly useful for solving many of the problems that have plagued the field since its early days. In particular, a neosentimentalist understanding of value offers us hope for making sense of (1) what intrinsic value might be and how we could know whether parts of the natural world have it; (2) the extent to which value is an essentially anthropocentric concept; and (3) how our understanding of value could (...)
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  13. Katie McShane (2008). Convergence, Noninstrumental Value and the Semantics of 'Love': Reply to Norton. Environmental Values 17 (1):15-21.
    Bryan Norton argues that my recent critique of anthropocentrism presupposes J. Baird Callicott's philosophically problematic distinction between intrinsic and instrumental value and that the problems that it raises for anthropocentrism in general are in fact only problems for strong anthropocentrism. I argue, first, that my own view does not presuppose Callicott's distinction, nor any claims about instrumental value, and second, that the problems it raises for anthropocentrism apply to weak and strong anthropocentrism alike.
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  14. Katie McShane (2007). Rolston's Theory of Value. In Christopher J. Preston and Wayne Ouderkirk (ed.), Nature, Value, Duty: Life on Earth with Holmes Rolston, III. Springer.
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  15. Katie McShane (2007). Anthropocentrism Vs. Nonanthropocentrism: Why Should We Care? Environmental Values 16 (2):169-85.
    Many recent critical discussions of anthropocentrism have focused on Bryan Norton's 'convergence hypothesis': the claim that both anthropocentric and nonanthropocentric ethics will recommend the same environmentally responsible behaviours and policies. I argue that even if we grant the truth of Norton's convergence hypothesis, there are still good reasons to worry about anthropocentric ethics. Ethics legitimately raises questions about how to feel, not just about which actions to take or which policies to adopt. From the point of view of norms for (...)
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  16. Raffaele Rodogno (2010). Sentientism, Wellbeing, and Environmentalism. Journal of Applied Philosophy 27 (1):84-99.
    In this article, I wish to explore a plausible alternative to both sentientist ethics and holistic environmental ethics. In particular, I put forward the claim that creatures other than sentient ones have interests and, in virtue of that, moral standing. This thesis is in disagreement with sentientism insofar as it claims that sentience is not a prerequisite for moral consideration. Radical as it may sound, this view does not take us as far as the holism favoured by some environmentalists. In (...)
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  17. Robert Sparrow (1999). The Ethics of Terraforming. Environmental Ethics 21 (3):227-245.
    I apply an agent-based virtue ethics to issues in environmental philosophy regarding our treatment of complex inorganic systems. I consider the ethics of terraforming: hypothetical planetary engineering on a vast scale which is aimed at producing habitable environments on otherwise “hostile” planets. I argue that the undertaking of such a project demonstrates at least two serious defects of moral character: an aesthetic insensitivity and the sin of hubris. Trying to change whole planets to suit our ends is arrogant vandalism. I (...)
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  18. Toby Svoboda (2014). A Reconsideration of Indirect Duties Regarding Non-Human Organisms. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (2):311-323.
    According to indirect duty views, human beings lack direct moral duties to non-human organisms, but our direct duties to ourselves and other humans give rise to indirect duties regarding non-humans. On the orthodox interpretation of Kant’s account of indirect duties, one should abstain from treating organisms in ways that render one more likely to violate direct duties to humans. This indirect duty view is subject to several damaging objections, such as that it misidentifies the moral reasons we have to treat (...)
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