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  1. Norman Bacrac (2010). Epiphenomenalism Explained. Philosophy Now 81:10-13.
    Epiphenomenalism expressed as a form of materialism in two key axioms; distinguished from Cartesian dualism, physicalism, eliminativism; shown to be compatible with a subjective experience of free choice but not with libertarian free will - the social consequences of this view.
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  2. Andrew R. Bailey (2009). Zombies and Epiphenomenalism. Dialogue 48 (01):129-.
    RÉSUMÉ: Cette étude examine la relation entre la demande que les zombies sont logiquement/métaphysiquement possible et de la position que la conscience phénoménal est epiphenomenal. Il est souvent présumé que la première entraîne ce dernier, et que, par conséquent, toute implausibility dans la notion de conscience epiphenomenalism remet en question la possibilité réelle de zombies. Quatre façons dont les zombist pourrait répondre sont examinées, et je soutiens que les deux les plus fréquemment rencontrés sont insuffisantes, mais les autres—dont l’un est (...)
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  3. Andrew R. Bailey (2006). Zombies, Epiphenomenalism, and Physicalist Theories of Consciousness. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (4):481-509.
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  4. Michael Baumgartner (2010). Interventionism and Epiphenomenalism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 40 (3):359-383.
    In a recent paper, Shapiro and Sober (2007) defend two claims with respect to the master argument for epiphenomenalism, which is designed to rebut non-reductive physicalism: (i) relative to an interventionist account of causation, as most elaborately presented in (Woodward 2003), the master argument turns out to be invalid; and (ii) interventionism provides a means to experimentally uncover micro effects of macro causes. The first part of this paper takes issue with both of these claims by showing that Woodward’s interventionism (...)
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  5. Jason A. Beyer (1999). Epiphenomenalism and the Eliminative Strategy. Kinesis 26 (1):18-36.
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  6. Peter Bieri (1992). Trying Out Epiphenomenalism. Erkenntnis 36 (3):283-309.
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  7. Renée Bilodeau (1993). L'inertie du Mental. Dialogue 32 (03):507-525.
    This paper addresses two objections raised against anomalous monism. Firstly, on the basis of Davidson's assertion that all causal relations fall under strict laws, many critics conclude mental properties are causally inert since they are non-nomic. I argue that this conclusion follows only on the further assumption that all causally efficacious properties are nomic properties. It is perfectly consistent, however, to hold that there is a law covering each causal relation without each causal statement being the instantiation of a law. (...)
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  8. Dieter Birnbacher (1988). Epiphenomenalism as a Solution to the Ontological Mind-Body Problem. Ratio 1 (1):17-32.
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  9. Glenn Braddock (2000). Against Chalmers' Epiphenomenalism. Auslegung 24 (1):45-63.
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  10. Evander Bradley McGilvary (1910). Huxley's Epiphenomenalism: A Criticism and an Appreciation. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 7 (17):449-460.
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  11. Tyler Burge (2003). Epiphenomenalism: Reply to Dretske. In Martin Hahn & B. Ramberg (eds.), Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge. MIT Press
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  12. Keith Campbell (1974). Comments On: Mark Woodhouse, A New Epiphenomenalism?. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 52 (August):170-173.
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  13. Keith Campbell & Nicholas J. J. Smith, Epiphenomenalism. Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Epiphenomenalism is a theory concerning the relation between the mental and physical realms, regarded as radically different in nature. The theory holds that only physical states have causal power, and that mental states are completely dependent on them. The mental realm, for epiphenomenalists, is nothing more than a series of conscious states which signify the occurrence of states of the nervous system, but which play no causal role. For example, my feeling sleepy does not cause my yawning — rather, both (...)
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  14. Neil Campbell (2005). Explanatory Epiphenomenalism. Philosophical Quarterly 55 (220):437-451.
    I propose a new form of epiphenomenalism, 'explanatory epiphenomenalism', the view that the identification of A's mental properties does not provide a causal explanation of A's behaviour. I arrive at this view by showing that although anomalous monism does not entail type epiphenomenalism (despite what many of Davidson's critics have suggested), it does (when coupled with some additional claims) lead to the conclusion that the identification of A's reasons does not causally explain A's behaviour. I then formalize this view and (...)
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  15. Neil Campbell (2001). What Was Huxley's Epiphenomenalism? Biology and Philosophy 16 (3):357-375.
    Thomas Huxley is often identified as the originator of the doctrineknown as ``epiphenomenalism,'' but there appears to be littleappreciation for the details of Huxley's theory. In particular,conflicting interpretations show that there is uncertainty about twoaspects of his position: whether mental states are completelywithout causal powers or simply have no influence on the behavior theyare typically taken to explain, and whether conscious epiphenomena arethemselves physical states of the brain or immaterial items. I clarifythese issues and show that Huxley's brand of epiphenomenalism (...)
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  16. Neil Campbell (1998). Anomalous Monism and the Charge of Epiphenomenalism. Dialectica 52 (1):23-39.
    I begin with the view that the usual property‐based epiphenomenalist challenges to anomalous monism are unconvincing in light of Davidson's reluctance to analyze causation in terms of properties. I argue, however, that the challenges against Davidson do hold in the weaker sense that although mental events have causal efficacy the identification of an agent's reasons does not causally explain behaviour. I then show that in light of Davidson's commitment to psychophysical supervenience this does not constitute a serious problem for anomalous (...)
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  17. Milic Capek (1954). James's Early Criticism of the Automaton Theory. Journal of the History of Ideas 15 (April):260-279.
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  18. Victor Caston (1997). Epiphenomenalisms, Ancient and Modern. Philosophical Review 106 (3):309-363.
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  19. Dan Cavedon-Taylor (2009). Still Epiphenomenal Qualia: Response to Muller. Philosophia 37 (1):105-107.
    Hans Muller has recently attempted to show that Frank Jackson cannot assert the existence of <span class='Hi'>qualia</span> without thereby falsifying himself on the matter of such mental states being epiphenomenal with respect to the physical world. I argue that Muller misunderstands the commitments of <span class='Hi'>qualia</span> epiphenomenalism and that, as a result, his arguments against Jackson do not go through.
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  20. Marc Champagne (2014). Referring to the Qualitative Dimension of Consciousness: Iconicity Instead of Indexicality. Dialogue 53 (1):135-182.
    This paper suggests that reference to phenomenal qualities is best understood as involving iconicity, that is, a passage from sign-vehicle to object that exploits a similarity between the two. This contrasts with a version of the ‘phenomenal concept strategy’ that takes indexicality to be central. However, since it is doubtful that phenomenal qualities are capable of causally interacting with anything, indexical reference seems inappropriate. While a theorist like David Papineau is independently coming to something akin to iconicity, I think some (...)
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  21. Kam-Yuen Cheng (1997). Davidson's Action Theory and Epiphenomenalism. Journal of Philosophical Research 22 (April):81-95.
  22. Richard E. Creel (1980). Radical Epiphenomenalism: B.F. Skinner's Account of Private Events. Behaviorism 8 (1):31-53.
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  23. Anthony Dardis (2008). Mental Causation: The Mind-Body Problem. Columbia University Press.
    Anthony Dardis shows how to unravel the knot. He traces its early appearance in the history of philosophical inquiry, specifically in the work of Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, and T. H. Huxley.
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  24. Francis W. Dauer (2001). McGinn's Materialism and Epiphenomenalism. Analysis 61 (2):136-139.
    Colin McGinn urged that while a brain state P explains consciousness, a conception P is cognitively inaccessible to us. This paper argues that McGinn's argument for his form of materialism is committed to P being epiphenomenal or causally inert relative to such things as the movements of our bodies. As a result, McGinn's materialism creates a duality in the brain and thereby faces the same problem of epiphenomenalism which plagues the Cartesian dualist.
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  25. Liam P. Dempsey & Itay Shani (2009). Dynamical Agents: Consciousness, Causation, and Two Specters of Epiphenomenalism. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (2):225-243.
    The aim of this paper is to defend the causal efficacy of consciousness against two specters of epiphenomenalism. We argue that these challenges are best met, on the one hand, by rejecting all forms of consciousness-body dualism, and on the other, by adopting a dynamical systems approach to understanding the causal efficacy of conscious experience. We argue that this non-reductive identity theory provides the theoretical resources for reconciling the reality and efficacy of consciousness with the neurophysiology of the brain and (...)
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  26. Daniel C. Dennett (1991). Epiphenomenal" Qualia? In Yujin Nagasawa, Peter Ludlow & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Consciousness Explained. Little, Brown 127-136.
  27. John Donaldson (2014). The Super-Overdetermination Problem. Dissertation, University of Glasgow
    I examine the debate between reductive and non-reductive physicalists, and conclude that if we are to be physicalists, then we should be reductive physicalists. I assess how both reductionists and non-reductionists try to solve the mind-body problem and the problem of mental causation. I focus on the problem of mental causation as it is supposed to be faced by non-reductionism: the so-called overdetermination problem. I argue that the traditional articulation of that problem is significantly flawed, and I show how to (...)
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  28. Richard Double (1979). Taylor's Refutation of Epiphenomenalism. Journal of Critical Analysis 8 (1):23-28.
    In "metaphysics" richard taylor argues that epiphenomenalism is implausible because it leaves open the possibility that human behavior occurs without the presence of mental events. in my paper i examine the sort of possibility involved and conclude that the logical possibility of "mind-less behavior" which epiphenomenalism must allow is an equal possibility for all competing theories of mind. thus, epiphenomenalism is seen to be no worse off in this respect than other theories and taylor's objection fails.
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  29. Hoyt Littleton Edge (1970). Epiphenomenalism and Rorty's Theory of Identity. Dissertation, Vanderbilt University
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  30. Naomi M. Eilan (2003). The Explanatory Role of Consciousness in Action. In Sabine Maasen, Wolfgang Prinz & Gerhard Roth (eds.), Voluntary Action: Brains, Minds, and Sociality. Oxford University Press 188-201.
  31. Jeff Engelhardt (forthcoming). Emergent Substances, Physical Properties, Action Explanations. Erkenntnis:1-22.
    This paper proposes that if individual X ‘inherits’ property F from individual Y, we should be leery of explanations that appeal to X’s being F. This bears on what I’ll call “emergent substance dualism”, the view that human persons or selves are metaphysically fundamental or “new kinds of things with new kinds of causal powers” even though they depend in some sense on physical particulars :5–23, 2006; Personal agency. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008). Two of the most prominent advocates of (...)
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  32. James H. Fetzer (ed.) (2002). Consciousness Evolving. John Benjamins.
  33. Owen J. Flanagan & Thomas W. Polger (1998). Consciousness, Adaptation, and Epiphenomenalism. In James H. Fetzer (ed.), Consciousness Evolving. John Benjamins
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  34. Horace S. Fries (1929). Some Attitudes and Considerations and a Biological Argument for Epiphenomenalism. Journal of Philosophy 26 (23):626-634.
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  35. Volker Gadenne (2006). In Defence of Qualia-Epiphenomenalism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (1-2):101-114.
    Epiphenomenalism has been criticized with several objections. It has been argued that epiphenomenalism is incompatible with the alleged causal relevance of mental states, and that it renders knowledge of our own conscious states impossible. In this article, it is demonstrated that qualia-epiphenomenalism follows from some well- founded assumptions, and that it meets the cited objections. Though not free from difficulties, it is at least superior to its main competitors, namely, physicalism and interactionism.
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  36. Shaun Gallagher (2006). Where's the Action? Epiphenomenalism and the Problem of Free Will. In Susan Pockett, William P. Banks & Shaun Gallagher (eds.), Does Consciousness Cause Behavior? MIT Press 109-124.
    Some philosophers argue that Descartes was wrong when he characterized animals as purely physical automata – robots devoid of consciousness. It seems to them obvious that animals (tigers, lions, and bears, as well as chimps, dogs, and dolphins, and so forth) are conscious. There are other philosophers who argue that it is not beyond the realm of possibilities that robots and other artificial agents may someday be conscious – and it is certainly practical to take the intentional stance toward them (...)
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  37. Olav Gjelsvik (1999). Actions, Norms, Values. Hawthorne: De Gruyter.
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  38. Olav Gjelsvik (1999). On Mind and Matter. In Actions, Norms, Values. Hawthorne: De Gruyter
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  39. Robert Gulick (1992). Three Bad Arguments for Intentional Property Epiphenomenalism. Erkenntnis 36 (3):311 - 331.
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  40. John Heil, Mental Causation and Epiphenomenalism.
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  41. John Heil (2002). Mental Causation. In Stephen P. Stich & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger. Blackwell 29--52.
    This volume presents a collection of new, specially written essays by a diverse group of philosophers, including Donald Davidson, Ted Honderich, and Philip Pettit, each of whom is widely known for defending a particular conception of minds and their place in nature.
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  42. John Heil & Alfred Mele (eds.) (1993). Mental Causation. Clarendon Press.
    I argue that the two standard models of mental causation fail to capture the crucial causal relevance of the reason-giving relations involved. Their common error is an exclusively mechanical conception of causation, on which any justification is bound to be independent of the causal process involved, based upon a general rule from which the correctness of the particular case follows only by subsumption. I establish possibility of an alternative model, by sketching an account of the causal dependence of perceptual knowledge (...)
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  43. Michael P. Hodges (1979). Meaning and the Impotence Hypothesis. Review of Metaphysics 32 (March):515-29.
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  44. David Hommen (2013). Mentale Verursachung, innere Erfahrung und handelnde Personen. Eine Verteidigung des Epiphänomenalismus. Mentis.
    Die Annahme, dass mentale Zustände wie Überzeugungen, Wünsche und Gefühle physische Ereignisse bewirken (wie körperliches Verhalten und willentliche Handlungen) ist ebenso verbreitet wie problematisch, weil sie im Widerspruch zu der Überzeugung steht, dass mentale Zustände Phänomene nicht-physischer Natur sind und physische Phänomene ausschließlich physische Ursachen haben. Der Epiphänomenalismus, der diesen als Leib-Seele-Problem bekannten Widerspruch auflöst, indem er die kausale Wirksamkeit des Mentalen bestreitet, stößt unter Laien und Philosophen jedoch auf erheblichen Widerstand. Die vorliegende Studie wendet sich den Intuitionen zu, die (...)
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  45. David Hommen (2013). Mentale Verursachung, innere Erfahrung und handelnde Personen. Eine Verteidigung des Epiphänomenalismus. Mentis.
    Die Annahme, dass mentale Zustände wie Überzeugungen, Wünsche und Gefühle physische Ereignisse bewirken (wie körperliches Verhalten und willentliche Handlungen) ist ebenso verbreitet wie problematisch, weil sie im Widerspruch zu der Überzeugung steht, dass mentale Zustände Phänomene nicht-physischer Natur sind und physische Phänomene ausschließlich physische Ursachen haben. Der Epiphänomenalismus, der diesen als Leib-Seele-Problem bekannten Widerspruch auflöst, indem er die kausale Wirksamkeit des Mentalen bestreitet, stößt unter Laien und Philosophen jedoch auf erheblichen Widerstand. Die vorliegende Studie wendet sich den Intuitionen zu, die (...)
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  46. Amir Horowitz (1999). Is There a Problem in Physicalist Epiphenomenalism? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (2):421-34.
    Physicalist epiphenomenalism is the conjunction of the doctrine that tokens of mental events are tokens of physical events and the doctrine that mental events do not exert causal powers by virtue of falling under mental types. The purpose of the paper is to show that physicalist epiphenomenalism, contrary to what many have thought, is not subject to the objections that have been raised against classic epiphenomenalism. This is argued with respect to five such objections: that introspection shows that our mental (...)
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  47. T. Huxley (1874). On the Hypothesis That Animals Are Automata, and its History. Fortnightly Review 95:555-80.
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  48. Alec Hyslop (2000). Methodological Epiphenomenalism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (1):61-70.
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  49. Frank Jackson (1982). Epiphenomenal Qualia. Philosophical Quarterly 32 (April):127-136.
  50. William James (1879). Are We Automata? Mind 4 (13):1-22.
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