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  1. Norman Bacrac (2010). Epiphenomenalism Explained. Philosophy Now 81:10-13.
    Epiphenomenalism expressed as a form of materialism in two key axioms; distinguished from Cartesian dualism, physicalism, eliminativism; shown to be compatible with a subjective experience of free choice but not with libertarian free will - the social consequences of this view.
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  2. Andrew R. Bailey (2009). Zombies and Epiphenomenalism. Dialogue 48 (01):129-.
    RÉSUMÉ: Cette étude examine la relation entre la demande que les zombies sont logiquement/métaphysiquement possible et de la position que la conscience phénoménal est epiphenomenal. Il est souvent présumé que la première entraîne ce dernier, et que, par conséquent, toute implausibility dans la notion de conscience epiphenomenalism remet en question la possibilité réelle de zombies. Quatre façons dont les zombist pourrait répondre sont examinées, et je soutiens que les deux les plus fréquemment rencontrés sont insuffisantes, mais les autres—dont l’un est (...)
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  3. Andrew R. Bailey (2006). Zombies, Epiphenomenalism, and Physicalist Theories of Consciousness. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (4):481-509.
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  4. Michael Baumgartner (2010). Interventionism and Epiphenomenalism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 40 (3).
    In a recent paper, Shapiro and Sober (2007) defend two claims with respect to the master argument for epiphenomenalism, which is designed to rebut non-reductive physicalism: (i) relative to an interventionist account of causation, as most elaborately presented in (Woodward 2003), the master argument turns out to be invalid; and (ii) interventionism provides a means to experimentally uncover micro effects of macro causes. The first part of this paper takes issue with both of these claims by showing that Woodward’s interventionism (...)
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  5. Jason A. Beyer (1999). Epiphenomenalism and the Eliminative Strategy. Kinesis 26 (1):18-36.
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  6. Peter Bieri (1992). Trying Out Epiphenomenalism. Erkenntnis 36 (3):283-309.
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  7. Renée Bilodeau (1993). L'inertie du Mental. Dialogue 32 (03):507-525.
    This paper addresses two objections raised against anomalous monism. Firstly, on the basis of Davidson's assertion that all causal relations fall under strict laws, many critics conclude mental properties are causally inert since they are non-nomic. I argue that this conclusion follows only on the further assumption that all causally efficacious properties are nomic properties. It is perfectly consistent, however, to hold that there is a law covering each causal relation without each causal statement being the instantiation of a law. (...)
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  8. Dieter Birnbacher (1988). Epiphenomenalism as a Solution to the Ontological Mind-Body Problem. Ratio 1 (1):17-32.
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  9. Glenn Braddock (2000). Against Chalmers' Epiphenomenalism. Auslegung 24 (1):45-63.
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  10. Evander Bradley McGilvary (1910). Huxley's Epiphenomenalism: A Criticism and an Appreciation. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 7 (17):449-460.
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  11. Tyler Burge (2003). Epiphenomenalism: Reply to Dretske. In Martin Hahn & B. Ramberg (eds.), Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge. Mit Press.
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  12. Keith Campbell (1974). Comments On: Mark Woodhouse, A New Epiphenomenalism?. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 52 (August):170-173.
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  13. Neil Campbell (2005). Explanatory Epiphenomenalism. Philosophical Quarterly 55 (220):437-451.
    I propose a new form of epiphenomenalism, 'explanatory epiphenomenalism', the view that the identification of A's mental properties does not provide a causal explanation of A's behaviour. I arrive at this view by showing that although anomalous monism does not entail type epiphenomenalism (despite what many of Davidson's critics have suggested), it does (when coupled with some additional claims) lead to the conclusion that the identification of A's reasons does not causally explain A's behaviour. I then formalize this view and (...)
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  14. Neil Campbell (2001). What Was Huxley's Epiphenomenalism? Biology and Philosophy 16 (3):357-375.
    Thomas Huxley is often identified as the originator of the doctrineknown as ``epiphenomenalism,'' but there appears to be littleappreciation for the details of Huxley's theory. In particular,conflicting interpretations show that there is uncertainty about twoaspects of his position: whether mental states are completelywithout causal powers or simply have no influence on the behavior theyare typically taken to explain, and whether conscious epiphenomena arethemselves physical states of the brain or immaterial items. I clarifythese issues and show that Huxley's brand of epiphenomenalism (...)
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  15. Neil Campbell (1998). Anomalous Monism and the Charge of Epiphenomenalism. Dialectica 52 (1):23-39.
  16. Milic Capek (1954). James's Early Criticism of the Automaton Theory. Journal of the History of Ideas 15 (April):260-279.
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  17. Victor Caston (1997). Epiphenomenalisms, Ancient and Modern. Philosophical Review 106 (3):309-363.
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  18. Dan Cavedon-Taylor (2009). Still Epiphenomenal Qualia: Response to Muller. Philosophia 37 (1):105-107.
    Hans Muller has recently attempted to show that Frank Jackson cannot assert the existence of <span class='Hi'>qualia</span> without thereby falsifying himself on the matter of such mental states being epiphenomenal with respect to the physical world. I argue that Muller misunderstands the commitments of <span class='Hi'>qualia</span> epiphenomenalism and that, as a result, his arguments against Jackson do not go through.
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  19. Kam-Yuen Cheng (1997). Davidson's Action Theory and Epiphenomenalism. Journal of Philosophical Research 22 (April):81-95.
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  20. Richard E. Creel (1980). Radical Epiphenomenalism: B.F. Skinner's Account of Private Events. Behaviorism 8:31-53.
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  21. Francis W. Dauer (2001). McGinn's Materialism and Epiphenomenalism. Analysis 61 (2):136-139.
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  22. Liam Dempsey & Itay Shani (2009). Dynamical Agents: Consciousness, Causation, and Two Specters of Epiphenomenalism. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (2).
    The aim of this paper is to defend the causal efficacy of consciousness against two specters of epiphenomenalism. We argue that these challenges are best met, on the one hand, by rejecting all forms of consciousness-body dualism, and on the other, by adopting a dynamical systems approach to understanding the causal efficacy of conscious experience. We argue that this non-reductive identity theory provides the theoretical resources for reconciling the reality and efficacy of consciousness with the neurophysiology of the brain and (...)
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  23. Daniel C. Dennett (1991). "Epiphenomenal" Qualia? In Consciousness Explained. Little, Brown.
  24. Richard Double (1979). Taylor's Refutation of Epiphenomenalism. Journal of Critical Analysis 8 (1):23-28.
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  25. Naomi M. Eilan (2003). The Explanatory Role of Consciousness in Action. In Sabine Maasen, Wolfgang Prinz & Gerhard Roth (eds.), Voluntary Action: Brains, Minds, and Sociality. Oxford University Press.
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  26. James H. Fetzer (ed.) (2002). Consciousness Evolving. John Benjamins.
  27. Owen J. Flanagan & Thomas W. Polger (1998). Consciousness, Adaptation, and Epiphenomenalism. In James H. Fetzer (ed.), Consciousness Evolving. John Benjamins.
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  28. Horace S. Fries (1929). Some Attitudes and Considerations and a Biological Argument for Epiphenomenalism. Journal of Philosophy 26 (23):626-634.
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  29. Volker Gadenne (2006). In Defence of Qualia-Epiphenomenalism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (1-2):101-114.
    Epiphenomenalism has been criticized with several objections. It has been argued that epiphenomenalism is incompatible with the alleged causal relevance of mental states, and that it renders knowledge of our own conscious states impossible. In this article, it is demonstrated that qualia-epiphenomenalism follows from some well- founded assumptions, and that it meets the cited objections. Though not free from difficulties, it is at least superior to its main competitors, namely, physicalism and interactionism.
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  30. Shaun Gallagher (2006). Where's the Action? Epiphenomenalism and the Problem of Free Will. In Susan Pockett, William P. Banks & Shaun Gallagher (eds.), Does Consciousness Cause Behavior? MIT Press.
    Some philosophers argue that Descartes was wrong when he characterized animals as purely physical automata – robots devoid of consciousness. It seems to them obvious that animals (tigers, lions, and bears, as well as chimps, dogs, and dolphins, and so forth) are conscious. There are other philosophers who argue that it is not beyond the realm of possibilities that robots and other artificial agents may someday be conscious – and it is certainly practical to take the intentional stance toward them (...)
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  31. Olav Gjelsvik (1999). Actions, Norms, Values. Hawthorne: De Gruyter.
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  32. Olav Gjelsvik (1999). On Mind and Matter. In Actions, Norms, Values. Hawthorne: De Gruyter.
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  33. Robert Gulick (1992). Three Bad Arguments for Intentional Property Epiphenomenalism. Erkenntnis 36 (3):311 - 331.
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  34. John Heil (2002). Mental Causation. In Stephen P. Stich & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell.
    This volume presents a collection of new, specially written essays by a diverse group of philosophers, including Donald Davidson, Ted Honderich, and Philip Pettit, each of whom is widely known for defending a particular conception of minds and their place in nature.
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  35. Michael P. Hodges (1979). Meaning and the Impotence Hypothesis. Review of Metaphysics 32 (March):515-29.
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  36. Amir Horowitz (1999). Is There a Problem in Physicalist Epiphenomenalism? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (2):421-34.
    Physicalist epiphenomenalism is the conjunction of the doctrine that tokens of mental events are tokens of physical events and the doctrine that mental events do not exert causal powers by virtue of falling under mental types. The purpose of the paper is to show that physicalist epiphenomenalism, contrary to what many have thought, is not subject to the objections that have been raised against classic epiphenomenalism. This is argued with respect to five such objections: that introspection shows that our mental (...)
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  37. T. Huxley (1874). On the Hypothesis That Animals Are Automata, and its History. Fortnightly Review 95:555-80.
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  38. Alec Hyslop (2000). Methodological Epiphenomenalism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (1):61-70.
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  39. Frank Jackson (1982). Epiphenomenal Qualia. Philosophical Quarterly 32 (April):127-136.
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  40. William James (1879). Are We Automata? Mind 4 (13):1-22.
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  41. Uffe Judl Jensen (1972). Conceptual Epiphenomenalism. The Monist 56 (2):250-275.
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  42. Mark Eli Kalderon (1987). Epiphenomenalism and Content. Philosophical Studies 52 (July):71-90.
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  43. Eric Russert Kraemer (1980). Imitation-Man and the 'New' Epiphenomenalism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 10 (September):479-487.
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  44. John Lachs (1967). Angel, Animal, Machine: Models for Man. Southern Journal of Philosophy 5 (4):221-27.
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  45. John Lachs (1963). Epiphenomenalism and the Notion of Cause. Journal of Philosophy 60 (March):141-45.
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  46. John Lachs (1963). The Impotent Mind. Review of Metaphysics 17 (December):187-99.
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  47. S. S. Laurie (1894). Reflexions Suggested by Psychophysical Materialism. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 3 (9):56-76.
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  48. Stephen Law (2006). Honderich and the Curse of Epiphenomenalism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (7-8):61-70.
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  49. Wilbur Long (1953). Comments on the Alleged Proof of Epiphenomenalism. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 3 (February):355-58.
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  50. M. L. Lonky (2003). Human Consciousness: A Systems Approach to the Mind/Brain Interaction. Journal of Mind and Behavior 24 (1):91-118.
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  51. Jack C. Lyons (2006). In Defense of Epiphenomenalism. Philosophical Psychology 19 (6):76-794.
    Recent worries about possible epiphenomenalist consequences of nonreductive materialism are misplaced, not, as many have argued, because nonreductive materialism does not have epiphenomenalist implications but because the epiphenomenalist implications are actually virtues of the theory, rather than vices. It is only by showing how certain kinds of mental properties are causally impotent that cognitive scientific explanations of mentality as we know them are possible.
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  52. Sabine Maasen, Wolfgang Prinz & Gerhard Roth (eds.) (2003). Voluntary Action: Brains, Minds, and Sociality. Oxford University Press.
    We all know what a voluntary action is - we all think we know when an action is voluntary, and when it is not. Yet, performing and action and defining it are different matters. What counts as an action? When does it begin? Does the conscious desire to perform an action always precede the act? If not, is it really a voluntary action? This is a debate that crosses the boundaries of Philosophy, Neuroscience, Psychology, and Social Science. This book brings (...)
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  53. Steve Matthews (2010). A History of Philosophy of Mind in Australasia. In N. N. Trakakis (ed.), A Companion to Philosophy in Australia and New Zealand. Monash University Publishing.
  54. Evander Bradley McGilvary (1910). Huxley's Epiphenomenalism: A Criticism and an Appreciation. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 7 (17):449-460.
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  55. Brian P. Mclaughlin (2006). Is Role-Functionalism Committed to Epiphenomenalism? Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (1-2):39-66.
    Role-functionalism for mental events attempts to avoid epiphenomenalism without psychophysical identities. The paper addresses the question of whether it can succeed. It is argued that there is considerable reason to believe it cannot avoid epiphenomenalism, and that if it cannot, then it is untenable. It is pointed out, however, that even if role- functionalism is indeed an untenable theory of mental events, a role-functionalism account of mental dispositions has some intuitive plausibility.
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  56. Brian P. McLaughlin (1992). On Davidson's Response to the Charge of Epiphenomenalism. In John Heil & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation. Oxford University Press.
    [Why Davidson's Anomalous Monism Would Lead to Type Epiphenomenalism]: 1. According to Davidson, events can cause other events only in virtue of falling under physical types cited in strict laws; 2. But no mental event-type is a physical event-type cited in a strict law, since the mental is anomalous. 3. Therefore, under Davidson's theory, type epiphenomenalism is true.
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  57. Brian P. McLaughlin (1989). Type Epiphenomenalism, Type Dualism, and the Causal Priority of the Physical. Philosophical Perspectives 3:109-135.
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  58. Jason Megill (2007). Naturalism, Physicalism and Epiphenomenalism. Philosophical Psychology 20 (6):681 – 686.
    I argue that physicalistic naturalism entails the falsity of epiphenomenalism. I conclude by briefly discussing implications of my argument for cognitive science, non-reductive physicalism, and the possibility of formulating a naturalistic form of dualism.
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  59. Paul T. Menzel (1970). Epiphenomenalism and Metaethical Non-Naturalism. Journal of Value Inquiry 4 (1):43-55.
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  60. Dwayne Moore (2011). Role Functionalism and Epiphenomenalism. Philosophia 39 (3):511-525.
    The type-type reductive identity of the mental to the physical was once the dominant position in the mental causation debate. In time this consensus was overturned, largely due to its inability to handle the problem of multiple realizability. In its place a nonreductive position emerged which often included an adherence to functionalism. Functionalism construes mental properties as functional states of an organism, which in turn have specific physical realizers. This nonreductive form of functionalism, henceforth called role functionalism, has faced a (...)
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  61. Hans Muller (2009). More Troubles for Epiphenomenalism. Philosophia 37 (1):109-112.
    I have argued that to say qualia are epiphenomenal is to say a world without qualia would be physically identical to a world with qualia. Dan Cavedon-Taylor has offered an alternative interpretation of the commitments of qualia epiphenomenalism according to which qualia cause beliefs and those beliefs can and do cause changes to the physical world. I argue that neither of these options works for the qualia epiphenomenalist and thus that theory faces far more serious difficulties than has previously been (...)
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  62. Yujin Nagasawa (2010). The Knowledge Argument and Epiphenomenalism. Erkenntnis 72 (1):37 - 56.
    Frank Jackson endorses epiphenomenalism because he thinks that his knowledge argument undermines physicalism. One of the most interesting criticisms of Jackson's position is what I call the 'inconsistency objection'. The inconsistency objection says that Jackson's position is untenable because epiphenomenalism undermines the knowledge argument. The inconsistency objection has been defended by various philosophers independently, including Michael Watkins, Fredrik Stjernberg, and Neil Campbell. Surprisingly enough, while Jackson himself admits explicitly that the inconsistency objection is 'the most powerful reply to the knowledge (...)
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  63. Eddy Nahmias (forthcoming). Is Free Will an Illusion? Confronting Challenges From the Modern Mind Sciences. In Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.), Moral Psychology, vol. 4: Freedom and Responsibility. MIT Press.
    In this chapter I consider various potential challenges to free will from the modern mind sciences. After motivating the importance of considering these challenges, I outline the argument structure for such challenges: they require simultaneously establishing a particular condition for free will and an empirical challenge to that condition. I consider several potential challenges: determinism, naturalism, and epiphenomenalism, and explain why none of these philosophical challenges is bolstered by new discoveries from neuroscience and psychology. I then respond to relevant empirical (...)
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  64. Isaac Nevo (2010). Linguistic Epiphenomenalism ‐ Davidson and Chomsky on the Status of Public Languages. Journal of the Philosophy of History 4 (1):1-22.
  65. Albert Newen & Rimas Cuplinskas (2002). Mental Causation: A Real Phenomenon in a Physicalistic World Without Epiphenomenalism or Overdetermination. Grazer Philosophische Studien 65 (1):139-167.
    The so-called problem of mental causation as discussed in the recent literature raises three central challenges for an adequate solution from a physicalist perspective: the threat of epiphenomenalism, the problem of externalism (or the difficulty in accounting for the causal efficacy of extrinsic mental properties) and the problem of causal exclusion (or the threat of over determination). We wish to account for mental causationas a real phenomenon within a physicalistic framework without accepting epiphenomenalism or overdetermination. The key ideas of our (...)
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  66. Paul Noordhof (2003). Epiphenomenalism and Causal Asymmetry. In Hallvard Lillehammer & Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (eds.), Real Metaphysics: Essays in Honour of D. H. Mellor. New York: Routledge.
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  67. Michael Pauen, Alexander Staudacher & Sven Walter (2006). Epiphenomenalism: Dead End or Way Out? Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (1-2):7-19.
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  68. Michael Pauen, Staudacher & S. Walter (2006). Editors' Introduction -- Epiphenomenalism: Dead End or Way Out? Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (s 1-2):7-19.
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  69. D. Pecnjak (1989). Epiphenomenalism and Machines: A Discussion of Van Rooijen's Critique of Popper. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 40 (September):404-8.
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  70. Davor Pećnjak (1989). Epiphenomenalism and Machines: A Discussion of Van Rooijen's Critique of Popper. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 40 (3):404-408.
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  71. Alvin Plantinga (2004). Evolution, Epiphenomenalism, Reductionism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (3):602-619.
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  72. Susan Pockett (2004). Does Consciousness Cause Behaviour? Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (2):23-40.
  73. Thomas W. Polger & Owen J. Flanagan (2002). Consciousness, Adaptation and Epiphenomenalism. In James H. Fetzer (ed.), Consciousness Evolving. John Benjamins.
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  74. Karl R. Popper (1977). Some Remarks on Panpsychism and Epiphenomenalism. Dialectica 31:177-86.
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  75. Nicholas P. Power (1996). Fodor's Vindication of Folk Psychology and the Charge of Epiphenomenalism. Journal of Philosophical Research 21 (January):183-196.
    Jerry Fodor has long championed the view, recently dubbed “scientific intentional realism” (Loewer and Ray, 1991, p. xiv), that “a scientifically adequate psychology will contain laws that quantify over intentional phenomena in intentional terms.” On such a view our belief/desire psychology will be “vindicated” through empirical investigation; that is, it will be shown to denote the explanatory (or causally salient) states or events in the production of thought and behavior. That intentional properties, states, or events have causal efficacy---are not mere (...)
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  76. Roland Puccetti (1974). Physicalism and the Evolution of Consciousness. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 1:171-83.
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  77. Paul Raymont (2004). On Causal Relevance. Dialogue 43 (2):367-376.
  78. Paul Raymont (1999). An Idle Threat: Epiphenomenalism Exposed. Dissertation, University of Toronto
    In this doctoral dissertation I consider, and reject, the claim that recent varieties of non-reductive physicalism, particularly Donald Davidson's anomalous monism, are committed to a new kind of epiphenomenalism. Non-reductive physicalists identify each mental event with a physical event, and are thus entitled to the belief that mental events are causes, since the physical events with which they are held to be identical are causes. However, Jaegwon Kim, Ernest Sosa and others have argued that if we follow the non-reductive physicalist (...)
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  79. Titus Rivas & Hein van Dongen (2001). Exit Epiphenomenalism: The Demolition of a Refuge. Revista de Filosofia 57.
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  80. Denis Robinson (1993). Epiphenomenalism, Laws, and Properties. Philosophical Studies 69 (1):1-34.
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  81. William Robinson (2007). Evolution and Epiphenomenalism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (11):27-42.
    This paper addresses the question whether evolutionary principles are compatible with epiphenomenalism, and argues for an affirmative answer. A general summary of epiphenomenalism is provided, along with certain specifications relevant to the issues of this paper. The central argument against compatibility is stated and rebutted. A specially powerful version of the argument, due to William James (1890), is stated. The apparent power of this argument is explained as resulting from a problem about our understanding of pleasure and an equivocation on (...)
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  82. William S. Robinson (2006). Knowing Epiphenomena. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (1-2):85-100.
    This paper begins with a summary of an argument for epiphenomenalism and a review of the author's previous work on the self-stultification objection to that view. The heart of the paper considers an objection to this previous work and provides a new response to it. Questions for this new response are considered and a view is developed in which knowledge of our own mentality is seen to differ from our knowledge of external things.
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  83. William S. Robinson (2004). Perception, Affect and Epiphenomenalism: Commentary on Mangan's. Psyche 10 (1).
    This commentary begins by explaining how Mangan's important work leads to a question about the relation between non-sensory experiences and perception. Reflection on affect then suggests an addition to Mangan's view that may be helpful on this and perhaps some other questions. Finally, it is argued that acceptance of non-sensory experiences is fully compatible with epiphenomenalism.
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  84. William S. Robinson, Epiphenomenalism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Epiphenomenalism is the view that mental events are caused by physical events in the brain, but have no effects upon any physical events. Behavior is caused by muscles that contract upon receiving neural impulses, and neural impulses are generated by input from other neurons or from sense organs. On the epiphenomenalist view, mental events play no causal role in this process. Huxley (1874), who held the view, compared mental events to a steam whistle that contributes nothing to the work of (...)
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  85. Anthony J. Rudd (2000). Phenomenal Judgment and Mental Causation. Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (6):53-69.
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  86. Marcelo H. Sabatés (2003). Being Without Doing. Topoi 22 (2):111-125.
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  87. William E. Seager, Generalized Epiphenomenalism.
    I want to show that a common and plausible interpretation of what science tells us about the fundamental structure of the world – the ‘scientific picture of the world’ or SPW for short – leads to what I’ll call ‘generalized epiphenomenalism’, which is the view that the only features of the world that possess causal efficacy are fundamental physical features. I think that generalized epiphenomenalism follows pretty straightforwardly from the SPW as I’ll present it, but it might seem that, once (...)
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  88. William E. Seager (2006). Emergence, Epiphenomenalism and Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (1-2):21-38.
    Causation can be regarded from either an explanatory/epistemic or an ontological viewpoint. From the former, emergent features enter into a host of causal relationships which form a hierarchical structure subject to scientific investigation. From the latter, the paramount issue is whether emergent features provide any novel causal powers, or whether the 'go' of the world is exhausted by the fundamental physical features which underlie emergent phenomena. I argue here that the 'Scientific Picture of the World' (SPW) strongly supports the claim (...)
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  89. Gabriel M. A. Segal (2009). The Causal Inefficacy of Content. Mind and Language 24 (1):80-102.
    Abstract: The paper begins with the assumption that psychological event tokens are identical to or constituted from physical events. It then articulates a familiar apparent problem concerning the causal role of psychological properties. If they do not reduce to physical properties, then either they must be epiphenomenal or any effects they cause must also be caused by physical properties, and hence be overdetermined. It then argues that both epiphenomenalism and over-determinationism are prima facie perfectly reasonable and relatively unproblematic views. The (...)
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  90. James Seth (1894). Are We 'Conscious Automata'? Philosophical Review 3 (3):278-288.
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  91. Lawrence A. Shapiro & Elliott Sober (forthcoming). Epiphenomenalism - the Do's and the Don'ts. In G. Wolters & Peter K. Machamer (eds.), Studies in Causality: Historical and Contemporary. University of Pittsburgh Press.
    When philosophers defend epiphenomenalist doctrines, they often do so by way of a priori arguments. Here we suggest an empirical approach that is modeled on August Weismann.
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  92. Stuart Silvers (2003). Agent Causation, Functional Explanation, and Epiphenomenal Engines: Can Conscious Mental Events Be Causally Efficacious? Journal of Mind and Behavior 24 (2):197-228.
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  93. Jan Sleutels (1998). Phenomenal Consciousness: Epiphenomenalism, Naturalism and Perceptual Plasticity. Communication and Cognition 31 (1):21-55.
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  94. Marc Slors (2003). Epiphenomenalism and Cross-Realization Induction. Grazer Philosophische Studien 65 (1):15-36.
    In the first part of this paper I argue that epiphenomenalism does not pose a threat to nonreductive physicalism, if type-epiphenomenalism does not imply the redundancy of mental (or in general higher-level) typing of events and/or states. Furthermore, if justifiable induction over folk-psychological regularities is possible independently of the ways in which these regularities are realized, type-epiphenomenalism does not imply the redundancy ofmental typing. Inthe second part of this paper I explain how justifiable 'cross-realization induction' can be possible. This explanation (...)
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  95. Nick Smith, EPIPHENOMENALISM Keith Campbell and Nicholas J.J. Smith December 1993.
    Epiphenomenalism is a theory concerning the relation between the mental and physical realms, regarded as radically different in nature. The theory holds that only physical states have causal power, and that mental states are completely dependent on them. The mental realm, for epiphenomenalists, is nothing more than a series of conscious states which signify the occurrence of states of the nervous system, but which play no causal role. For example, my feeling sleepy does not cause my yawning — rather, both (...)
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  96. Peter Smith (1984). Anomalous Monism and Epiphenomenalism: A Reply to Honderich. Analysis 44 (2):83-86.
  97. Alexander Staudacher (2006). Epistemological Challenges to Qualia-Epiphenomenalism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (1-2):153-175.
    One of the strongest objections to epiphenomenalism is that it precludes any kind of knowledge of qualia, since empirical knowledge has to include a causal relationship between the respective belief and the object of knowledge. It is argued that this objection works only if the causal relationship is understood in a very specific sense (as a 'direct' causal relationship). Epiphenomenalism can, however, live well with other kinds of causal relationships ('indirect' causal relationships) or even with a reliability account of knowledge (...)
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  98. Stephen P. Stich & Ted A. Warfield (eds.) (2002). Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell.
  99. Danilo Suster (2001). Semifactuals and Epiphenomenalism. Acta Analytica 16 (26):23-43.
    Semifactuals and Epiphenomenalism -/- Mental properties are said to be epiphenomenal because they do not pass the counterfactual test of causal relevance. Jacob (1996) adopts the defence of causal efficacy of mental properties developed by LePore and Loewer (1987). They claim that those who argue for the epiphenomenalism of the mental place too strong a requirement on causal relevance, which excludes causally efficacious properties. Given a proper analysis of causal relevance, the causal efficacy of mental properties is saved. I defend (...)
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  100. Richard Swinburne (2011). Could Anyone Justifiably Believe Epiphenomenalism? Journal of Consciousness Studies 18:196--216.
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