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  1. Ernest Adams (1965). The Logic of Conditionals. Inquiry 8 (1-4):166 – 197.
    The standard use of the propositional calculus ('P.C.?) in analyzing the validity of inferences involving conditionals leads to fallacies, and the problem is to determine where P.C. may be ?safely? used. An alternative analysis of criteria of reasonableness of inferences in terms of conditions of justification rather than truth of statements is proposed. It is argued, under certain restrictions, that P. C. may be safely used, except in inferences whose conclusions are conditionals whose antecedents are incompatible with the premises in (...)
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  2. Ernest W. Adams (1975). The Logic of Conditionals: An Application of Probability to Deductive Logic. D. Reidel Pub. Co..
    THE INDICATIVE CONDITIONAL. A PROBABILISTIC CRITERION OF SOUNDNESS FOR DEDUCTIVE INFERENCES Our objective in this section is to establish a prima facie case ...
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  3. Horacio Arlo-Costa, Belief Revision Conditionals: Models of Suppositional.
    It is now well known that, on pain of triviality, the probability of a conditional cannot be identified with the corresponding conditional probability [27]. This surprising impossibility result has a qualitative counterpart. In fact, Peter Gardenfors showed in [13] that believing 'If A then B' cannot be equated with the act of believing B on the supposition that A.
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  4. Horacio Arlo-Costa, Belief Revision Conditionals: Basic Iterated.
    Recent work has shown that in spite of these negative results, the question 'how to accept a conditional?' has a clear answer. Even if conditionals are not truth-carriers, they do have precise acceptability conditions. Nevertheless most epistemic models of conditionals do not provide acceptance conditions for iterated conditionals. One of the main goals of this essay is to provide a comprehensive account of the notion of epistemic conditionality covering all forms of iteration.
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  5. Horacio Arlo-Costa, Bayesian Epistemology and Epistemic Conditionals: On the Status of the Export-Import Laws.
    The notion of probability occupies a central role in contemporary epistemology and cognitive science. Nevertheless, the classical notion of probability is hard to reconcile with the central notions postulated by the epistemological tradition.
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  6. Horacio Arló-Costa (2001). Bayesian Epistemology and Epistemic Conditionals: On the Status of the Export-Import Laws. Journal of Philosophy 98 (11):555-593.
    Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/about/terms.html. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.
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  7. Horacio Arlo-Costa, Belief Revision Conditionals: Basic Iterated Systems.
    It is now well known that, on pain of triviality, the probability of a conditional cannot be identified with the corresponding conditional probability [25]. This surprising impossibility result has a qualitative counterpart. In fact, Peter Gärdenfors showed in [13] that believing ‘If A then B’ cannot be equated with the act of believing B on the supposition that A — as long as supposing obeys minimal Bayesian constraints. Recent work has shown that in spite of these negative results, the question (...)
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  8. Horacio Arlo-Costa, Belief Revision Conditionals: Models of Suppositional Reasoning.
  9. Horacio L. Arlo-Costa, Epistemic Conditionals, Snakes and Stars.
    Consider a rational agent X at certain point of time t. X's epistemic state can be represented in different ways.
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  10. Andrew Bacon, In Defence of a Naïve Conditional Epistemology.
    Numerous triviality results have been directed at a collection of views that tie the probability of a conditional sentence to the conditional probability of the consequent on its antecedent. -/- In this paper I argue that this identification makes little sense if conditional sentences are context sensitive. The best alternative, I argue, is a version of the thesis which states that if your total evidence is E then the evidential probability of a conditional evaluated in a context where E is (...)
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  11. Alexandru Baltag & Sonja Smets, A Semantic-Modal View on Ramsey's Test.
    We present a semantic analysis of the Ramsey test, pointing out its deep underlying flaw: the tension between the “static” nature of AGM revision (which was originally tailored for revision of only purely ontic beliefs, and can be applied to higher-order beliefs only if given a “backwards-looking” interpretation) and the fact that, semantically speaking, any Ramsey conditional must be a modal operator (more precisely, a dynamic-epistemic one). Thus, a belief about a Ramsey conditional is in fact a higher-order belief, hence (...)
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  12. David Barnett (2006). Zif is If. Mind 115 (459):519-566.
    A conditional takes the form ‘If A, then C’. On the truth-conditional view of conditionals, conditional statements state things with truth-conditions. On the suppositional view, conditional statements involve the expression of a supposition. I develop and defend a view on which conditional statements both state things with truth-conditions and express suppositions. On this view, something is fundamentally right about standard truth-conditional and standard suppositional views. Considerations in favor of conditional contents lead us to attribute truth-conditional contents to conditional statements; considerations (...)
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  13. Richard Bradley (2007). A Defence of the Ramsey Test. Mind 116 (461):1-21.
    According to the Ramsey Test hypothesis the conditional claim that if A then B is credible just in case it is credible that B, on the supposition that A. If true the hypothesis helps explain the way in which we evaluate and use ordinary language conditionals. But impossibility results for the Ramsey Test hypothesis in its various forms suggest that it is untenable. In this paper, I argue that these results do not in fact have this implication, on (...)
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  14. John Cantwell (2009). Conditionals in Reasoning. Synthese 171 (1):47 - 75.
    The paper presents a non-monotonic inference relation on a language containing a conditional that satisfies the Ramsey Test. The logic is a weakening of classical logic and preserves many of the ‘paradoxes of implication’ associated with the material implication. It is argued, however, that once one makes the proper distinction between supposing that something is the case and accepting that it is the case, these ‘paradoxes’ cease to be counterintuitive. A representation theorem is provided where conditionals are given a non-bivalent (...)
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  15. John Cantwell (2008). Indicative Conditionals:Factual or Epistemic? Studia Logica 88 (1):157 - 194.
    It is argued that indicative conditionals are best viewed as having truth conditions (and so they are in part factual) but that these truth conditions are ‘gappy’ which leaves an explanatory gap that can only be filled by epistemic considerations (and so indicative conditionals are in part epistemic). This dual nature of indicative conditionals gives reason to rethink the relationship between logic viewed as a descriptive discipline (focusing on semantics) and logic viewed as a discipline with a normative import (focusing (...)
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  16. David J. Chalmers & Alan Hájek (2007). Ramsey + Moore = God. Analysis 67 (294):170–172.
    Frank Ramsey (1931) wrote: If two people are arguing 'if p will q?' and both are in doubt as to p, they are adding p hypothetically to their stock of knowledge and arguing on that basis about q. We can say that they are fixing their degrees of belief in q given p. Let us take the first sentence the way it is often taken, as proposing the following test for the acceptability of an indicative conditional: ‘If p then q’ (...)
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  17. Horacio Arló Costa & Rohit Parikh (2005). Conditional Probability and Defeasible Inference. Journal of Philosophical Logic 34 (1):97 - 119.
    We offer a probabilistic model of rational consequence relations (Lehmann and Magidor, 1990) by appealing to the extension of the classical Ramsey-Adams test proposed by Vann McGee in (McGee, 1994). Previous and influential models of nonmonotonic consequence relations have been produced in terms of the dynamics of expectations (Gärdenfors and Makinson, 1994; Gärdenfors, 1993).'Expectation' is a term of art in these models, which should not be confused with the notion of expected utility. The expectations of an agent are some form (...)
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  18. Horacio L. Arlo Costa (1990). Conditionals and Monotonic Belief Revisions: The Success Postulate. Studia Logica 49 (4):557 - 566.
    One of the main applications of the logic of theory change is to the epistemic analysis of conditionals via the so-called Ramsey test. In the first part of the present note this test is studied in the limiting case where the theory being revised is inconsistent, and it is shown that this case manifests an intrinsic incompatibility between the Ramsey test and the AGM postulate of success. The paper then analyses the use of the postulate of success, and a weakening (...)
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  19. Charles B. Cross (2002). Doesn't-Will and Didn't-Did. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (1):101 – 106.
    In "Against the Indicative," AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY 72 (1994): 17-26, and more recently in "Classifying `Conditionals': the Traditional Way is Wrong", ANALYSIS 60 (2000): 147, V.H. Dudman argues that (a) `If Oswald didn't shoot Kennedy then someone else did' and (b) `If Oswald doesn't shoot Kennedy then someone else will' should not be classified together as "indicative conditionals." Dudman relies on the assumption that (a) is entailed by (c) `Someone shot Kennedy', whereas (b) is not entailed by (d) `Someone (...)
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  20. Charles B. Cross (1990). Belief Revision, Non-Monotonic Reasoning, and the Ramsey Test. In Kyburg Henry E., Loui Ronald P. & Carlson Greg N. (eds.), Knowledge Representation and Defeasible Reasoning. Kluwer. 223--244.
    Peter Gärdenfors has proved (Philosophical Review, 1986) that the Ramsey rule and the methodologically conservative Preservation principle are incompatible given innocuous-looking background assumptions about belief revision. Gärdenfors gives up the Ramsey rule; I argue for preserving the Ramsey rule and interpret Gärdenfors's theorem as showing that no rational belief-reviser can avoid reasoning nonmonotonically. I argue against the Preservation principle and show that counterexamples to it always involve nonmonotonic reasoning. I then construct a new formal model of belief revision that does (...)
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  21. Igor Douven (2010). Ramsey's Test, Adams' Thesis, and Left-Nested Conditionals. Review of Symbolic Logic 3 (3):467-484.
    Adams famously suggested that the acceptability of any indicative conditional whose antecedent and consequent are both factive sentences amounts to the subjective conditional probability of the consequent given the antecedent. The received view has it that this thesis offers an adequate partial explication of Ramseys test is extendible to left-nested conditionals, that is, conditionals whose antecedent is itself conditional in form. We argue that this interpretation of van Fraassen thesis for left-nested conditionals.
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  22. Igor Douven (2008). The Evidential Support Theory of Conditionals. Synthese 164 (1):19-44.
    According to so-called epistemic theories of conditionals, the assertability/acceptability/acceptance of a conditional requires the existence of an epistemically significant relation between the conditional’s antecedent and its consequent. This paper points to some linguistic data that our current best theories of the foregoing type appear unable to explain. Further, it presents a new theory of the same type that does not have that shortcoming. The theory is then defended against some seemingly obvious objections.
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  23. Simone Duca (2011). Introduction to the Special Issue: Ramsey Test, Conditionals and Choices. Topoi.
    Test for the rational acceptance of conditionals and it still incites much of the interest in conditional reasoning. For instance, the test has been considered as a good starting point for several formal semantics for conditionals. Furthermore, its ramifications have important implications for several disciplines, from logic and artificial intelligence to decision theory and psychology. This volume presents a small but fine sample of the state of the art of such multifarious area of research.
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  24. Simone Duca (2011). The Suppositional Ramsey Test and Decision-Instability. Topoi (1):53-57.
    Abstract I analyse the relationship between the Ramsey Test (RT) for the acceptance of indicative conditionals and the so-called problem of decision-instability. In particular, I argue that the situations which allegedly bring about this problem are troublesome just in case the relevant conditionals are evaluated by non-suppositional versions, e.g. causal/evidential, of the test. In contrast, a suppositional RT, by highlighting the metacognitive nature of the evaluation of indicative conditionals, allows an agent to run a simulation of such evaluation, without yet (...)
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  25. Dorothy Edgington (2003). What If ? Questions About Conditionals. Mind and Language 18 (4):380–401.
    Section 1 briefly examines three theories of indicative conditionals. The Suppositional Theory is defended, and shown to be incompatible with understanding conditionals in terms of truth conditions. Section 2 discusses the psychological evidence about conditionals reported by Over and Evans (this volume). Section 3 discusses the syntactic grounds offered by Haegeman (this volume) for distinguishing two sorts of conditional.
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  26. Jonathan St B. T. Evans (2005). The Social and Communicative Function of Conditional Statements. Mind and Society 4 (1):97-113.
    In this paper, I discuss conditionals as illocutionary speech acts whose interpretation depends upon the whole of the social context in which they are uttered and whose purpose is to affect the opinions and actions of others. I argue for a suppositional approach to conditional statements based in what philosophers call the Ramsey test and developing the psychological theory that conditionals elicit a process of hypothetical thinking in their listeners. By reference to the experimental psychological literature on conditionals, I show (...)
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  27. André Fuhrmann & Isaac Levi (1994). Undercutting and the Ramsey Test for Conditionals. Synthese 101 (2):157 - 169.
    There is an important class of conditionals whose assertibility conditions are not given by the Ramsey test but by an inductive extension of that test. Such inductive Ramsey conditionals fail to satisfy some of the core properties of plain conditionals. Associated principles of nonmonotonic inference should not be assumed to hold generally if interpretations in terms of induction or appeals to total evidence are not to be ruled out.
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  28. André Fuhrmann & Michael Morreau (eds.) (1991). The Logic of Theory Change. Springer.
    The book presents the results of the joint annual conference of the four Operations Research Societies DGOR, GM\OR, \GOR and SVOR, held in Vienna in 1990.
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  29. D. Gabbay & P. Smets (eds.) (1998). Handbook of Defeasible Reasoning and Uncertainty Management Systems, Vol 3. Kluwer Academic Pub.
    HANDBOOK OF DEFEASIBLE REASONING AND UNCERTAINTY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS EDITORS: DOV M. ... and A. Hunter Volume 3: Belief Change Edited by D. Dubois and H. Prade HANDBOOK OF DEFEASIBLE REASONING AND ...
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  30. Peter Gärdenfors (1987). Variations on the Ramsey Test: More Triviality Results. Studia Logica 46 (4):319-325.
    The purpose of this note is to formulate some weaker versions of the so called Ramsey test that do not entail the following unacceptable consequenceIf A and C are already accepted in K, then if A, then C is also accepted in K. and to show that these versions still lead to the same triviality result when combined with a preservation criterion.
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  31. Peter Gärdenfors (1986). Belief Revisions and the Ramsey Test for Conditionals. Philosophical Review 95 (1):81-93.
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  32. Peter Gärdenfors, Sten Lindström, Michael Morreau & Wlodek Rabinowicz (1991). The Negative Ramsey Test. In André Fuhrmann & Michael Morreau (eds.), The Logic of Theory Change. Springer.
    The so called Ramsey test is a semantic recipe for determining whether a conditional proposition is acceptable in a given state of belief. Informally, it can be formulated as follows: (RT) Accept a proposition of the form "if A, then C" in a state of belief K, if and only if the minimal change of K needed to accept A also requires accepting C. In Gärdenfors (1986) it was shown that the Ramsey test is, in the context of some other (...)
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  33. Anthony S. Gillies (2004). Epistemic Conditionals and Conditional Epistemics. Noûs 38 (4):585–616.
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  34. Matthew Haigh & Andrew J. Stewart (2011). The Influence of Clause Order, Congruency, and Probability on the Processing of Conditionals. Thinking and Reasoning 17 (4):402 - 423.
    Conditional information can be equally asserted in the forms if p, then q (e.g., ?if I am ill, I will miss work tomorrow?) and q, if p (e.g., ?I will miss work tomorrow, if I am ill?). While this type of clause order manipulation has previously been found to have no influence on the ultimate conclusions participants draw from conditional rules, we used self-paced reading to examine how it affects the real time incremental processing of everyday conditional statements. Experiment 1 (...)
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  35. J. Y. Halpern (2000). Probability and Conditionals: Belief Revision and Rational Decision. Philosophical Review 109 (2):277-281.
  36. Sven Ove Hansson (1992). In Defense of the Ramsey Test. Journal of Philosophy 89 (10):522-540.
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  37. Justin Khoo (2011). Operators or Restrictors? A Reply to Gillies. Semantics and Pragmatics 4:1-25.
    According to operator theories, "if" denotes a two-place operator. According to restrictor theories, "if" doesn't contribute an operator of its own but instead merely restricts the domain of some co-occurring quantifier. The standard arguments (Lewis 1975, Kratzer 1986) for restrictor theories have it that operator theories (but not restrictor theories) struggle to predict the truth conditions of quantified conditionals like -/- (1) a. If John didn't work at home, he usually worked in his office. b. If John didn't work at (...)
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  38. Angelika Kratzer (1986). Conditionals. Chicago Linguistics Society 22 (2):1–15.
  39. Hannes Leitgeb (2010). On the Ramsey Test Without Triviality. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 51 (1):21-54.
    We present a way of classifying the logically possible ways out of Gärdenfors' inconsistency or triviality result on belief revision with conditionals. For one of these ways—conditionals which are not descriptive but which only have an inferential role as being given by the Ramsey test—we determine which of the assumptions in three different versions of Gärdenfors' theorem turn out to be false. This is done by constructing ranked models in which such Ramsey-test conditionals are evaluated and which are subject to (...)
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  40. Isaac Levi (1996). For the Sake of the Argument: Ramsey Test Conditionals, Inductive Inference, and Nonmonotonic Reasoning. Cambridge University Press.
    This book by one of the world's foremost philosophers in the fields of epistemology and logic offers an account of suppositional reasoning relevant to practical deliberation, explanation, prediction and hypothesis testing. Suppositions made 'for the sake of argument' sometimes conflict with our beliefs, and when they do, some beliefs are rejected and others retained. Thanks to such belief contravention, adding content to a supposition can undermine conclusions reached without it. Subversion can also arise because suppositional reasoning is ampliative. These two (...)
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  41. Isaac Levi (1988). Iteration of Conditionals and the Ramsey Test. Synthese 76 (1):49 - 81.
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  42. Sten Lindström (1996). The Ramsey Test and the Indexicality of Conditionals: A Proposed Resolution of Gärdenfors' Paradox. In André Fuhrmann & Hans Rott (eds.), Logic, Action and Information. de Gruyter.
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  43. Sten Lindström & Wlodek Rabinowicz (1998). Conditionals and the Ramsey Test. In D. Gabbay & P. Smets (eds.), Handbook of Defeasible Reasoning and Uncertainty Management Systems, Vol 3.
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  44. Sten Lindström & Wlodek Rabinowicz (1995). The Ramsey Test Revisited. In G. Crocco, L. Fariñas del Cerro & A. Herzig (eds.), Conditionals: From Philosophy to Computer Science. Oxford University Press. 131-182.
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  45. Sten Lindström & Wlodzimierz Rabinowicz (1992). Belief Revision, Epistemic Conditionals and the Ramsey Test. Synthese 91 (3):195 - 237.
    Epistemic conditionals have often been thought to satisfy the Ramsey test (RT): If A, then B is acceptable in a belief state G if and only if B should be accepted upon revising G with A. But as Peter Gärdenfors has shown, RT conflicts with the intuitively plausible condition of Preservation on belief revision. We investigate what happens if (a) RT is retained while Preservation is weakened, or (b) vice versa. We also generalize Gärdenfors' approach by treating belief revision (...)
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  46. Vann McGee (2000). To Tell the Truth About Conditionals. Analysis 60 (1):107–111.
  47. Joseph Mendola (1998). Book Review:For the Sake of the Argument: Ramsey Test Conditionals, Inductive Inference, and Nonmonotonic Reasoning Isaac Levi. [REVIEW] Philosophy of Science 65 (4):725-.
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  48. Michael Morreau (1998). Review of Isaac Levi, For the Sake of the Argument: Ramsey Test Conditionals, Inductive Inference and Nonmonotonic Reasoning. [REVIEW] Journal of Philosophy 95 (10):540-546.
  49. Adam Morton (2004). Against the Ramsey Test. Analysis 64 (4):294–299.
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  50. Donald Nute (1983). Book Review:Ifs: Conditionals, Belief, Decision, Chance, and Time William L. Harper, Robert Stalnaker, Glenn Pearce. [REVIEW] Philosophy of Science 50 (3):518-.
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