@unpublished{BachManuscript-BACKIA,
	author = {Kent Bach},
	abstract = {We can be willing in one context to attribute a bit of knowledge that we wouldn\textquoteright{}t attribute and might even deny in another, especially a context in which we\textquoteright{}re stumped by a skeptical argument. Apparently, our standards for knowledge sometimes go up, sometimes way up. How can this be? By claiming that the very contents of knowledge ascribing sentences vary with contexts of use, epistemic contextualism offers one explanation. I will offer another. According to contextualism, variation in standards is built into this claimed variation in contents. According to me, the contents of knowledge attributions are invariant. The variation is in what knowledge attributions we\textquoteright{}re willing to make or accept. Sometimes our standards are too strong, sometimes they\textquoteright{}re too weak, and sometimes they\textquoteright{}re just right.},
	title = {Knowledge in and out of context},
}
@article{Blaauw2008-BLASSI,
	volume = {58},
	number = {231},
	author = {Martijn Blaauw},
	abstract = {Subject sensitive invariantism is the view that whether a subject knows depends on what is at stake for that subject: the truth-value of a knowledge-attribution is sensitive to the subject's practical interests. I argue that subject sensitive invariantism cannot accept a very plausible principle for memory to transmit knowledge. I argue, furthermore, that semantic contextualism and contrastivism can accept this plausible principle for memory to transmit knowledge. I conclude that semantic contextualism and contrastivism are in a dialectical position better than subject sensitive invariantism is.},
	title = {Subject sensitive invariantism: In memoriam},
	journal = {Philosophical Quarterly},
	year = {2008},
	pages = {318--{}325},
}
@article{Blaauw2005-BLACC,
	volume = {69},
	number = {1},
	author = {Martijn Blaauw},
	abstract = {In order to explain such puzzling cases as the Bank Case and the Airport Case, semantic contextualists defend two theses. First, that the truth-conditions of knowledge sentences fluctuate in accordance with features of the conversational context. Second, that this fluctuation can be explained by the fact that 'knows' is an indexical. In this paper, I challenge both theses. In particular, I argue (i) that it isn't obvious that 'knows' is an indexical at all, and (ii) that contrastivism can do the same work as contextualism is supposed to do, without being linguistically implausible.},
	title = {Challenging contextualism},
	journal = {Grazer Philosophische Studien},
	year = {2005},
	pages = {127-146},
}
@article{Blome-Tillmann2009-BLOECS,
	volume = {79},
	number = {2},
	author = {Michael Blome-Tillmann},
	abstract = {Jason Stanley has argued recently that Epistemic Contextualism (EC) and Subject-Sensitive Invariantism (SSI) are explanatorily on a par with regard to certain data arising from modal and temporal embeddings of 'knowledge'-ascriptions. This paper argues against Stanley that EC has a clear advantage over SSI in the discussed field and introduces a new type of linguistic datum strongly suggesting the falsity of SSI.},
	title = {Contextualism, subject-sensitive invariantism, and the interaction of 'knowledge'-ascriptions with modal and temporal operators},
	journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research},
	year = {2009},
	pages = {315-331},
}
@article{Brown2008-BROSIA,
	volume = {42},
	number = {2},
	author = {Jessica Brown},
	abstract = {No Abstract},
	title = {Subject-sensitive invariantism and the knowledge Norm for practical reasoning},
	journal = {No\^u{}s},
	year = {2008},
	pages = {167-189},
}
@article{Brown2008-BROKAP-3,
	volume = {3},
	number = {6},
	author = {Jessica Brown},
	abstract = {It has become recently popular to suggest that knowledge is the epistemic norm of practical reasoning and that this provides an important constraint on the correct account of knowledge, one which favours subject-sensitive invariantism over contextualism and classic invariantism. I argue that there are putative counterexamples to both directions of the knowledge norm. Even if the knowledge norm can be defended against these counterexamples, I argue that it is a delicate issue whether it is true, one which relies on fine distinctions among a variety of relevant notions of propriety which our intuitions may reflect. These notions variously apply to the agent herself, her character traits, her beliefs, her reasoning and any resultant action. Given the delicacy of these issues, I argue that the knowledge norm is not a fixed point from which to defend substantive and controversial views in epistemology. Rather, these views need to be defended on other grounds.},
	title = {Knowledge and practical reason},
	journal = {Philosophy Compass},
	year = {2008},
	pages = {1135-1152},
}
@article{Brown2006-BROCAW,
	volume = {130},
	number = {3},
	author = {Jessica Brown},
	abstract = {Philosophical Studies 2006},
	title = {Contextualism and warranted assertibility manoeuvres},
	journal = {Philosophical Studies},
	year = {2006},
	pages = {407-435},
}
@article{Brown2005-BROCCA-4,
	volume = {69},
	number = {1},
	author = {Jessica Brown},
	abstract = {Contextualism is motivated by cases in which the intuitive correctness of a range of phenomena, including knowledge attributions, assertions and reasoning, depends on the attributor's context. Contextualists offer a charitable understanding of these intuitions, interpreting them as reflecting the truth value of the knowledge attributions and the appropriateness of the relevant assertions and reasoning. Here, I investigate a range of different invariantist accounts and examine the extent to which they too can offer a charitable account of the contextualist data.},
	title = {Comparing contextualism and invariantism on the correctness of contextualist intuitions},
	journal = {Grazer Philosophische Studien},
	year = {2005},
	pages = {71-100},
}
@article{Brown2005-BROAOD,
	volume = {55},
	number = {219},
	author = {Jessica Brown},
	abstract = {Contextualists support their view by appeal to cases which show that whether an attribution of knowledge seems correct depends on attributor factors. Contextualists conclude that the truth-conditions of knowledge attributions depend on the attributor's context. Invariantists respond that these cases show only that the warranted assertability-conditions of knowledge attributions depend on the attributor's context. I examine DeRose's recent argument against the possibility of such an invariantist response, an argument which appeals to the knowledge account of assertion and the context-sensitivity of assertion. I argue that DeRose's new argument does not rule out either of the two forms of invariantism, classic and subject-sensitive invariantism. Further, I argue against DeRose that an invariantist can explain the context-sensitivity of assertion.},
	title = {Adapt or die: The death of invariantism?},
	journal = {Philosophical Quarterly},
	year = {2005},
	pages = {263--{}285},
}
@article{Brueckner2010-BRUSD,
	volume = {60},
	number = {238},
	author = {Anthony Brueckner},
	abstract = {I reply to Martin Blaauw's recent article about subject sensitive invariantism, in which he argues that SSI, unlike its contextualist and contrastivist competitors, cannot give a proper account of memorial knowledge. I argue that these theories are on a par when it comes to such an account.},
	title = {SSSI Disinterred},
	journal = {Philosophical Quarterly},
	year = {2010},
	pages = {160-161},
}
@article{Brueckner2005-BRUCHI,
	volume = {55},
	number = {219},
	author = {Anthony Brueckner},
	abstract = {Keith DeRose discusses 'third-person cases', which appear to raise problems for John Hawthorne's invariantist approach to knowledge-attributions. I argue that there is a prima facie problem for invariantism stemming from third-person cases that is even worse than DeRose's. Then I show that in the end, contrary to appearances, third-person cases do not threaten invariantism.},
	title = {Contextualism, Hawthorne's invariantism and third-person cases},
	journal = {Philosophical Quarterly},
	year = {2005},
	pages = {315--{}318},
}
@article{BuckwalterForthcoming-BUCKIC,
	author = {Wesley Buckwalter},
	abstract = {Recent theories of epistemic contextualism have challenged traditional invariantist positions in epistemology by claiming that the truth conditions of knowledge attributions fluctuate between conversational contexts.  Contextualists often garner support for this view by appealing to folk intuitions regarding ordinary knowledge practices.  Proposed is an experiment designed to test the descriptive conditions upon which these types of contextualist de-fenses rely.  In the cases tested, the folk pattern of knowledge attribution runs contrary to what contextualism predicts.  While preliminary, these data inspire prima facie skepticism for the contextualist hypothesis regarding folk knowl-edge claims, as well as challenge certain predictions made by recent theories of subject-sensitive invariantism.  It is further argued that such results raise meth-odological questions concerning the practice of relying on an assumption of in-tuitions, with respect to ordinary language practices, as evidence for philoso-phical conclusions regarding knowledge.},
	title = {Knowledge Isn't Closed on Saturday: A Study in Ordinary Language},
	journal = {Review of Philosophy and Psychology},
	year = {forthcoming},
}
@unpublished{DeRoseManuscript-DERCCA,
	author = {Keith DeRose},
	abstract = {In Part 1 we will look at the supposed empirical case against standard contextualism, and in Part 2 we will investigate Schaffer \& Knobe's supposed empirical case for the superiority of contrastivism over standard contextualism.},
	title = {Contextualism, Contrastivism, and X-Phi Surveys},
}
@article{DeRose2007-DERROJ,
	volume = {116},
	author = {Keith DeRose},
	title = {Review of J. Stanley,  \_Knowledge and Practical Interests\_},
	journal = {Mind},
	year = {2007},
	pages = {486-489},
}
@article{DeRose2005-DERTOL,
	volume = {55},
	number = {219},
	author = {Keith DeRose},
	abstract = {I present the features of the ordinary use of 'knows' that make a compelling case for the contextualist account of that verb, and I outline and defend the methodology that takes us from the data to a contextualist conclusion. Along the way, the superiority of contextualism over subject-sensitive invariantism is defended, and, in the final section, I answer some objections to contextualism.},
	title = {The ordinary language basis for contextualism, and the new invariantism},
	journal = {Philosophical Quarterly},
	year = {2005},
	pages = {172--{}198},
}
@article{DeRose2004-DERTPW,
	volume = {68},
	number = {2},
	author = {Keith DeRose},
	abstract = {Thomas Blackson does not question that my argument in section 2 of \textquotedblleft{}Assertion, Knowledge and Context\textquotedblright establishes the conclusion that the standards that comprise a truth-condition for \textquotedblleft{}I know that P\textquotedblright vary with context, but does claim that this does not suffice to validly demonstrate the truth of contextualism, because this variance in standards can be handled by what we will here call Subject-Sensitive Invariantism (SSI), and so does not demand a contextualist treatment. According to SSI, the varying standards that comprise a truth-condition of \textquotedblleft{}I know that P\textquotedblright are sensitive to factors that attach to the speaker as the putative subject of knowledge, rather than as the speaker of the knowledge attribution. That is, according to SSI, these factors of the subject\textquoteright{}s context determine a single set of standards that govern when the subject himself, or any other speaker, including those not engaged in conversation with the subject, can truthfully say that the subject \textquotedblleft{}knows.\textquotedblright Thus, we do not get the result that contextualists insist on: that one speaker can truthfully say the subject \textquotedblleft{}knows,\textquotedblright while another speaker, in a different and more demanding context, can say that the subject does \textquotedblleft{}not know\textquotedblright, even though the two speakers are speaking of the same subject knowing (or not knowing) the same proposition at the same time. Given the possibility of SSI, Blackson concludes that I \textquotedblleft{}either assumed without argument that [SSI] is false or failed to distinguish the different ways the standard for knowledge might be determined.\textquotedblright I indeed have long assumed that SSI can\textquoteright{}t be right, and so have taken a different form of invariantism to be the real threat to contextualism. But since SSI, and views like it, now seem to be getting considerable attention, it is worth articulating why I find it unpromising.},
	title = {The problem with subject-sensitive invariantism},
	journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research},
	year = {2004},
	pages = {346--{}350},
}
@incollection{DeRose1999-DERCAE,
	author = {Keith DeRose},
	booktitle = {The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology},
	abstract = {In epistemology, \textquotedblleft{}contextualism\textquotedblright denotes a wide variety of more-or-less closely related positions according to which the issues of knowledge or justification are somehow relative to context. I will proceed by first explicating the position I call contextualism, and distinguishing that position from some closely related positions in epistemology, some of which sometimes also go by the name of \textquotedblleft{}contextualism\textquotedblright. I\textquoteright{}ll then present and answer what seems to many the most pressing of the objections to contextualism as I construe it, and also indicate some of the main positive motivations for accepting the view. Among the epistemologists I\textquoteright{}ve spoken with who have an opinion on the matter, I think it\textquoteright{}s fair to say a majority reject contextualism. However, the resistance has to this point been largely underground, with little by way of sustained arguments against contextualism appearing in the journals,[i] though I have begun to see various papers in manuscript form which are critical of contextualism. Here, I\textquoteright{}ll respond the criticism of contextualism that, in my travels, I have found to be the most pervasive in producing suspicion about the view.},
	title = {Contextualism: An explanation and defense},
	publisher = {Blackwell Publishers},
	year = {1999},
}
@article{FeltzForthcoming-FELDYK,
	author = {Adam Feltz and Chris Zarpentine},
	abstract = {According to intellectualism, what a person knows is solely a function of the evidential features of the person's situation. Anti-intellectualism is the view that what a person knows is more than simply a function of the evidential features of the person's situation. Jason Stanley (2005) argues that, in addition to \textquotedblleft{}traditional factors,\textquotedblright our ordinary practice of knowledge ascription is sensitive to the practical facts of a subject's situation. In this paper, we investigate this question empirically. Our results indicate that Stanley's assumptions about knowledge ascriptions do not reflect our ordinary practices in some paradigmatic cases. If our data generalize, then arguments for anti-intellectualism that rely on ordinary knowledge ascriptions fail: the case for anti-intellectualism cannot depend on our ordinary practices of knowledge ascription.},
	title = {Do You Know More When It Matters Less?},
	journal = {Philosophical Psychology},
	year = {forthcoming},
}
@article{Greco2008-GREWWW,
	volume = {58},
	number = {232},
	author = {John Greco},
	abstract = {This paper addresses two worries that might be raised about contextualism in epistemology and that carry over to its moral analogues: that contextualism robs epistemology (and moral theory) of a proper subject-matter, and that contextualism robs knowledge claims (and moral claims) of their objectivity. Two theses are defended: (1) that these worries are appropriately directed at interest-dependent theories in general rather than at contextualism in particular, and (2) that the two worries are over-stated in any case. Finally, the paper offers some considerations in favour of attributor contextualism over 'subject-sensitive invariantism', both in epistemology and in moral theory. But here we note an interesting result: the very considerations that support contextualism as a semantic thesis, threaten to rob that position of its anti-sceptical force.},
	title = {What's wrong with contextualism?},
	journal = {Philosophical Quarterly},
	year = {2008},
	pages = {416--{}436},
}
@article{Hawthorne2008-HAWKAA,
	volume = {105},
	number = {10},
	author = {John Hawthorne and Jason Stanley},
	abstract = {Judging by our folk appraisals, then, knowledge and action are intimately related. The theories of rational action with which we are familiar leave this unexplained. Moreover, discussions of knowledge are frequently silent about this connection. This is a shame, since if there is such a connection it would seem to constitute one of the most fundamental roles for knowledge. Our purpose in this paper is to rectify this lacuna, by exploring ways in which knowing something is related to rationally acting upon it, defending one particular proposal against anticipated objections.},
	title = {Knowledge and action},
	journal = {Journal of Philosophy},
	year = {2008},
	pages = {571-90},
}
@article{Howell2005-HOWAPF-2,
	volume = {42},
	number = {2},
	author = {Robert J. Howell},
	abstract = {It is an intuitively attractive view that the importance of a proposition affects the amount of evidence a subject needs in order to know that proposition---{}the more important the proposition is to the subject, the more evidence the subject must have in order for her to count as knowing the proposition. This paper argues that because unimportant propositions entail the falsity of very important propositions this position either results in the lack of closure of knowledge under known implication, or it results in standards for evidence being universally high.},
	title = {A Puzzle for Pragmatism},
	journal = {American Philosophical Quarterly},
	year = {2005},
	pages = {131-136},
}
@article{Lawlor2005-LAWEIE,
	volume = {19},
	number = {1},
	author = {Krista Lawlor},
	title = {Enough is enough: Pretense and invariance in the semantics of "knows that"},
	journal = {Philosophical Perspectives},
	year = {2005},
	pages = {211--{}236},
}
@article{Lewis1996-LEWEK,
	volume = {74},
	number = {4},
	author = {David Lewis},
	abstract = {This Article does not have an abstract},
	title = {Elusive knowledge},
	publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
	journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy},
	year = {1996},
	pages = {549 -- 567},
}
@article{Ludlow2008-LUDCC,
	volume = {18},
	number = {1},
	author = {Peter Ludlow},
	abstract = {No Abstract},
	title = {Cheap contextualism},
	journal = {Philosophical Issues},
	year = {2008},
	pages = {104-129},
}
@article{May2010-MAYPIR,
	volume = {1},
	number = {2},
	author = {Joshua May and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Jay G. Hull and Aaron Zimmerman},
	abstract = {In defending his interest-relative account of knowledge in Knowledge and Practical Interests (2005), Jason Stanley relies heavily on intuitions about several bank cases. We experimentally test  the empirical claims that Stanley seems to make concerning our common-sense intuitions about these bank cases. Additionally, we test the empirical claims that Jonathan Schaffer seems to make in his critique of Stanley. We argue that our data impugn what both Stanley and Schaffer claim our intuitions about such cases are. To account for these results, one must develop a better conception of the connection between a subject's interests and her body of knowledge than those offered by Stanley and Schaffer.},
	title = {Practical Interests, Relevant Alternatives, and Knowledge Attributions: An Empirical Study},
	journal = {Review of Philosophy and Psychology},
	year = {2010},
	pages = {265--{}273},
}
@book{McGrathForthcoming-FANKIA,
	author = {Matthew McGrath and Jeremy Fantl},
	abstract = {Knowledge in an Uncertain World is an exploration of the relation between knowledge, reasons, and justification. According to the primary argument of the book, you can rely on what you know in action and belief, because what you know can be a reason you have and you can rely on the reasons you have. If knowledge doesn't allow for a chance of error, then this result is unsurprising. But if knowledge does allow for a chance of error--as seems required if we know much of anything at all--this result entails the denial of a received position in epistemology. Because any chance of error, if the stakes are high enough, can make a difference to what can be relied on, two subjects with the same evidence and generally the same strength of epistemic position for a proposition can differ with respect to whether they are in a position to know. In defending these points, Fantl and McGrath investigate the ramifications for debates about epistemological externalism and contextualism, the value and importance of knowledge, Wittgensteinian hinge propositions, Bayesianism, and the nature of belief. The book is essential reading for epistemologists, philosophers who work on reasons and rationality, philosophers of language and mind, and decision theorists.},
	title = {Knowledge in an Uncertain World},
	publisher = {Oxford University Press},
	year = {forthcoming},
}
@article{NagelForthcoming-NAGTPB,
	author = {Jennifer Nagel},
	abstract = {Harman\textquoteright{}s lottery paradox, generalized by Vogel to a number of other cases, involves a curious pattern of intuitive knowledge ascriptions: certain propositions seem easier to know than various higher-probability propositions that are recognized to follow from them.  For example, it seems easier to judge that someone knows his car is now on Avenue A, where he parked it an hour ago, than to judge that he knows that it is not the case that his car has been stolen and driven away in the last hour.  Contextualists have taken this pattern of intuitions as evidence that \textquotedblleft{}knows\textquotedblright does not always denote the same relationship; subject-sensitive invariantists have taken this pattern of intuitions as evidence that non-traditional factors such as practical interests figure in knowledge; still others have argued that the Harman-Vogel pattern gives us a reason to abandon the principle that knowledge is closed under known entailment.  This paper argues that there is a psychological explanation of the strange pattern of intuitions, grounded in the manner in which we shift between an automatic or heuristic mode of judgment and a controlled or systematic mode.  Understanding the psychology behind the pattern of intuitions enables us to see that the pattern gives us no reason to abandon traditional intellectualist invariantism.  The psychological account of the paradox also yields new resources for clarifying and defending the single premise closure principle for knowledge ascriptions.},
	title = {The Psychological Basis of the Harman-Vogel Paradox},
	journal = {Philosophers' Imprint},
	year = {forthcoming},
}
@article{Nagel2010-NAGKAA-2,
	volume = {60},
	number = {239},
	author = {Jennifer Nagel},
	abstract = {Epistemologists generally agree that the stringency of intuitive ascriptions of knowledge is increased when unrealized possibilities of error are mentioned. Non-sceptical invariantists (Williamson, Hawthorne) think it a mistake to yield in such cases to the temptation to be more stringent, but they do not deny that we feel it. They contend that the temptation is best explained as the product of a psychological bias known as the availability heuristic. I argue against the availability explanation, and sketch a rival account of what happens to us psychologically when possibilities of error are raised.},
	title = {Knowledge ascriptions and the psychological consequences of thinking about error},
	journal = {Philosophical Quarterly},
	year = {2010},
	pages = {286-306},
}
@article{Nagel2008-NAGKAA,
	volume = {86},
	number = {2},
	author = {Jennifer Nagel},
	abstract = {Why do our intuitive knowledge ascriptions shift when a subject's practical interests are mentioned? Many efforts to answer this question have focused on empirical linguistic evidence for context sensitivity in knowledge claims, but the empirical psychology of belief formation and attribution also merits attention. The present paper examines a major psychological factor (called 'need-for-closure') relevant to ascriptions involving practical interests. Need-for-closure plays an important role in determining whether one has a settled belief; it also influences the accuracy of one's cognition. Given these effects, it is a mistake to assume that high- and low-stakes subjects provided with the same initial evidence are perceived to enjoy belief formation that is the same as far as truth-conducive factors are concerned. This mistaken assumption has underpinned contextualist and interest-relative invariantist treatments of cases in which contrasting knowledge ascriptions are elicited by descriptions of subjects with the same initial information and different stakes. The paper argues that intellectualist invariantism can easily accommodate such cases.},
	title = {Knowledge ascriptions and the psychological consequences of changing stakes},
	journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy},
	year = {2008},
	pages = {279 -- 294},
}
@unpublished{NetaManuscript-NETHCC,
	volume = {18},
	number = {1},
	author = {Ram Neta},
	abstract = {According to a contextualist account of knowledge ascriptions, it\textquoteright{}s possible for both Skeptic\textquoteright{}s assertion of \textquotedblleft{}Moore doesn\textquoteright{}t know (at a particular time t0) that he has hands\textquotedblright and Normal\textquoteright{}s simultaneous assertion of \textquotedblleft{}Moore does know (at t0) that he has hands\textquotedblright to be true, so long as these assertions are issued in different contexts. That\textquoteright{}s because the truth-conditions of such knowledge ascriptions (or denials) are fixed partly by features of the context in which those ascriptions (or denials) are issued.},
	title = {How cheap can you get?},
	pages = {130-142},
}
@article{Neta2005-NETACS,
	volume = {69},
	number = {1},
	author = {Ram Neta},
	abstract = {Many philosophers hold some verion of the doctrine of "basic knowledge". According to this doctrine, it's possible for S to know that p, even if S doesn't know the source of her knowledge that p to be reliable or trustworthy. Stewart Cohen has recently argued that this doctrine confronts the problem of easy knowledge. I defend basic knowledge against this criticism, by providing a contextualist solution to the problem of easy knowledge.},
	title = {A contextualist solution to the problem of easy knowledge},
	journal = {Grazer Philosophische Studien},
	year = {2005},
	pages = {183-206},
}
@article{Neta2002-NETSKT,
	volume = {36},
	number = {4},
	author = {Ram Neta},
	abstract = {Rieber 1998 proposes an account of "S knows that p" that generates a contextualist solution to Closure. In this paper, I\textquoteright{}ll argue that Rieber\textquoteright{}s account of "S knows that p" is subject to fatal objections, but we can modify it to achieve an adequate account of "S knows that p" that generates a unified contextualist solution to all four puzzles. This is a feat that should $<$span class='Hi'$>$matter$<$/span$>$ to those philosophers who have proposed contextualist solutions to Closure: all of them have motivated their contextualism by appeal to the fact that they can explain the plausibility of each of the statements in Closure taken individually, and they can do this without having to deny that each of those statements is true, at least in the context in which it is plausible. But notice that this consideration would equally well motivate a contextualist approach to the other puzzles. Nonetheless, no contextualist has yet suggested how a contextualist solution to the other puzzles might go.},
	title = {S knows that P},
	journal = {No\^u{}s},
	year = {2002},
	pages = {663--{}681},
}
@unpublished{PaginManuscript-PAGCAI,
	author = {Peter Pagin},
	abstract = {This paper is concerned with the resources available for insensitive invariantism in epistemology to handle the intuitions that have been appealed to, both for contextualism and for subject-sensitive invariantism. It is argued that proposals by Tim Williamson and Jessica Brown are not adequate, and that subject-sensitive inductive fails to account for some crucial intuitions. It is then argued that the chauvinistic nature of the psychology of insensitive invariantism provides adequate resources for such an account. A subject is chauvinistic simply by taking his own beliefs to be true, and by judging attributions accordingly. This is first illustrated with meaning attributions in the theory of interpretation, and then applied to knowledge attributions.},
	title = {Chauvinism and insensitive invariantism},
}
@unpublished{PinillosManuscript-PINKEA,
	author = {N. \'A{}ngel Pinillos},
	abstract = {Recently, some philosophers have defended the idea that knowledge is an interest-relative notion. According to this thesis, whether an agent knows P may depend on the practical costs of her being wrong about P. This perspective marks a radical departure from traditional accounts that take knowledge to be a purely intellectual concept. I think there is much to say on behalf of the interest-relative notion. In this paper, I report on some new evidence which strongly suggests that ordinary people\textquoteright{}s attributions of knowledge are in fact sensitive to practical interests. This is noteworthy because recent experiments have been interpreted by many to support the opposite conclusion. I also argue that the new results support an invariantist but interest-relativist account of knowledge, a thesis known as Interest Relative Invariantism (IRI). I do not make the case here that IRI gives us the very best explanation of the results presented here. Any such attempt would require an in-depth survey of the last few decades of work in epistemology. I only want to argue here that IRI gives us a simple and elegant explanation of the new data, and that the same cannot be said about traditional contextualism, a leading competitor to IRI},
	title = {Knowledge, Experiments and Practical Interests},
}
@article{Pryor2004-PRYCOS,
	volume = {119},
	number = {1-2},
	author = {James Pryor},
	abstract = {There is much I agree with in Sosa\textquoteright{}s paper. His discussion of Stine and Peirce is quite useful; so too his discussion of Dretske in Appendix II. A further issue he focuses on concerns how Contextualists are to give full endorsement to the knowledge-claims of ordinary subjects. Just saying, metalinguistically, that.},
	title = {Comments on Sosa's \textquotedblleft{}relevant alternatives, contextualism included\textquotedblright},
	journal = {Philosophical Studies},
	year = {2004},
}
@article{Russell2008-RUSKBI,
	volume = {86},
	number = {3},
	author = {Gillian K. Russell and John M. Doris},
	abstract = {Is it harder to acquire knowledge about things that really matter to us than it is to acquire knowledge about things we don't much care about?$<$span class='Hi'$>$$<$/span$>$ Jason Stanley 2005 argues that whether or not the relational predicate $<$span class='Hi'$>$$<$/span$>$'knows that'$<$span class='Hi'$>$$<$/span$>$ holds between an agent and a proposition can depend on the practical interests of the agent:$<$span class='Hi'$>$$<$/span$>$ the more it matters to a person whether p is the case,$<$span class='Hi'$>$$<$/span$>$ the more justification is required before she counts as knowing that p.$<$span class='Hi'$>$$<$/span$>$ The evidence for Stanley's thesis includes a number of intuitive judgments about examples.$<$span class='Hi'$>$$<$/span$>$ In this paper we provide parallel examples for which Stanley's thesis requires unwelcome knowledge-attributions,$<$span class='Hi'$>$$<$/span$>$ and argue that this is possible because his thesis conflicts with familiar and plausible principles about knowledge.},
	title = {Knowledge by indifference},
	journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy},
	year = {2008},
	pages = {429 -- 437},
}
@article{Rysiew2005-RYSCC,
	volume = {69},
	number = {1},
	author = {Patrick Rysiew},
	abstract = {According to Keith DeRose, the invariantist's attempt to account for the data which inspire contextualism fares no better, in the end, than the "desperate and lame" maneuvers of "the crazed theory of 'bachelor'", whereby S's being unmarried is not among the truth conditions of 'S is a bachelor', but merely an implicature generated by an assertion thereof. Here, I outline the invariantist account I have previously proposed. I then argue that the prospects for sophisticated invariantism --- either as a general approach, or in the specific form I have recommended --- are not nearly as dim as DeRose suggests.},
	title = {Contesting contextualism},
	journal = {Grazer Philosophische Studien},
	year = {2005},
	pages = {51-70},
}
@article{Schaffer2008-SCHKIT,
	volume = {18},
	number = {1},
	author = {Jonathan Schaffer},
	abstract = {No Abstract},
	title = {Knowledge in the image of assertion},
	journal = {Philosophical Issues},
	year = {2008},
	pages = {1-19},
}
@article{Schaffer2007-SCHCCA-4,
	volume = {133},
	number = {2},
	author = {Jonathan Schaffer},
	abstract = {How should the contrastivist formulate closure? That is, given that knowledge is a ternary contrastive state Kspq (s knows that p rather than q), how does this state extend under entailment? In what follows, I will identify adequacy conditions for closure, criticize the extant invariantist and contextualist closure schemas, and provide a contrastive schema based on the idea of extending answers. I will conclude that only the contrastivist can adequately formulate closure.},
	title = {Closure, contrast, and answer},
	journal = {Philosophical Studies},
	year = {2007},
	pages = {233--{}255},
}
@article{Schaffer2006-SCHTIO-5,
	volume = {127},
	number = {1},
	author = {Jonathan Schaffer},
	abstract = {\textquoteleft\textquoteleft{}The death of man is nothing to get particularly excited about. It\textquoteright{}s one of the visible forms of a much more general decease, if you like. I don\textquoteright{}t mean by it the death of god but the death of the subject, of the Subject in capital letters, of the subject as origin and foundation of Knowledge, of Liberty, of Language and History.\textquoteright\textquoteright -- Michel Foucault..},
	title = {The irrelevance of the subject: Against subject-sensitive invariantism},
	journal = {Philosophical Studies},
	year = {2006},
	pages = {87-107},
}
@incollection{Schaffer2005-SCHWS,
	author = {Jonathan Schaffer},
	booktitle = {Contextualism in Philosophy: Knowledge, Meaning, and Truth},
	abstract = {Much of the extant discussion focuses on the question of whether contextualism resolves skeptical paradoxes. Understandably. Yet there has been less discussion as to the internal structure of contextualist theories. Regrettably. Here, for instance, are two questions that could stand further discussion: (i) what is the linguistic basis for contextualism and (ii) what is the parameter that shifts with context?},
	title = {What shifts? : Thresholds, standards, or alternatives?},
	publisher = {Oxford University Press},
	year = {2005},
}
@article{Schaffer2004-SCHFCT,
	volume = {119},
	number = {1-2},
	author = {Jonathan Schaffer},
	abstract = {Contextualism treats \textquoteleft{}knows\textquoteright as an indexical that denotes different epistemic properties in different contexts. Contrastivism treats \textquoteleft{}knows\textquoteright as denoting a ternary relation with a slot for a contrast proposition. I will argue that contrastivism resolves the main philosophical problems of contextualism, by employing a better linguistic model. Contextualist insights are best understood by contrastivist theory.},
	title = {From contextualism to contrastivism},
	journal = {Philosophical Studies},
	year = {2004},
	pages = {73-104},
}
@article{Schaffer2001-SCHKRA-2,
	volume = {61},
	number = {3},
	author = {Jonathan Schaffer},
	abstract = {The classic version of the relevant alternatives theory (RAT) identi{}es knowledge with the elimination of relevant alternatives (Dretske 1981, Stine 1976, Lewis 1996, inter alia). I argue that the RAT is trapped by the problem of the missed clue, in which the subject sees but does not appreciate decisive information.},
	title = {Knowledge, relevant alternatives and missed clues},
	journal = {Analysis},
	year = {2001},
	pages = {202--{}208},
}
@article{SchafferForthcoming-SCHCKS,
	author = {Jonathan Schaffer and Joshua Knobe},
	abstract = {Suppose that Ann says, \textquotedblleft{}Keith knows that the bank will be open tomorrow.\textquotedblright Her audience may well agree. Her knowledge ascription may seem true. But now suppose that Ben---{}in a different context---{}also says \textquotedblleft{}Keith knows that the bank will be open tomorrow.\textquotedblright His audience may well disagree. His knowledge ascription may seem false. Indeed, a number of philosophers have claimed that people\textquoteright{}s intuitions about knowledge ascriptions are context sensitive, in the sense that the very same knowledge ascription can seem true in one conversational context but false in another. This purported fact about people\textquoteright{}s intuitions serves as one of the main pieces of evidence for epistemic contextualism, which is the view that the truth conditions of a knowledge attribution can differ from one conversational context to another. Opponents of contextualism have replied by trying to explain these purported intuitions in other ways. For instance, they have proposed that these purported intuitions may be explained via shifts in what is at stake for the subject, pragmatic shifts in what is assertible, or performance shifts in our liability to error. Yet a recent series of empirical studies threatens to undermine this whole debate. These studies presented ordinary people with precisely the sorts of cases that have been discussed in the contextualism literature and examined these people\textquoteright{}s intuitions about the relevant knowledge attributions. Strikingly, the results suggest that people simply do not have the intuitions they were purported to have. Looking at this recent evidence, it is easy to come away with the feeling that the whole contextualism debate was founded on a myth. The various sides offered conflicting explanations for a certain pattern of intuitions, but the empirical evidence suggests that this pattern of intuitions does not exist. Our aim is to defend a form of contextualism in the face of this new threat. We acknowledge that some of the specific claims made by earlier contextualists might be undermined by recent experimental results, but we suggest that a different form of contextualism---{}based on the idea that conversational context provides the relevant contrast---{}can answer this empirical challenge..},
	title = {Contrastivism Surveyed},
	journal = {Nous},
	year = {forthcoming},
}
@article{Schiffer2007-SCHII-3,
	volume = {75},
	number = {1},
	author = {Stephen Schiffer},
	title = {Interest-Relative Invariantism},
	journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research},
	year = {2007},
	pages = {188-195},
}
@book{Stanley2005-STAKAP,
	author = {Jason Stanley},
	abstract = {Jason Stanley presents a startling and provocative claim about knowledge: that whether or not someone knows a proposition at a given time is in part determined by his or her practical interests, i.e. by how much is at stake for that person at that time. In defending this thesis, Stanley introduces readers to a number of strategies for resolving philosophical paradox, making the book essential not just for specialists in epistemology but for all philosophers interested in philosophical methodology. Since a number of his strategies appeal to linguistic evidence, it will be of great interest to linguists as well.},
	title = {Knowledge and Practical Interests},
	publisher = {Oxford University Press},
	year = {2005},
}
@article{Stone2007-STOCAW,
	volume = {88},
	number = {1},
	author = {Jim Stone},
	abstract = {Contextualists offer "high-low standards" practical cases to show that a variety of knowledge standards are in play in different ordinary contexts. These cases show nothing of the sort, I maintain. However Keith DeRose gives an ingenious argument that standards for knowledge do go up in high-stakes cases. According to the knowledge account of assertion (Kn), only knowledge warrants assertion. Kn combined with the context sensitivity of assertability yields contextualism about knowledge. But is Kn correct? I offer a rival account of warranted assertion and argue that it beats Kn as a response to the "knowledge" version of Moore's Paradox.},
	title = {Contextualism and warranted assertion},
	journal = {Pacific Philosophical Quarterly},
	year = {2007},
	pages = {92--{}113},
}
@article{Turri2010-TUREIA,
	volume = {119},
	number = {1},
	author = {John Turri},
	abstract = {This paper shows how to reconcile epistemic invariantism with the knowledge account of assertion. My basic proposal is that we can comfortably combine invariantism with the knowledge account of assertion by endorsing contextualism about speech acts. My demonstration takes place against the backdrop of recent contextualist attempts to usurp the knowledge account of assertion, most notably Keith DeRose\textquoteright{}s influential argument that the knowledge account of assertion spells doom for invariantism and enables contextualism\textquoteright{}s ascendancy. The paper\textquoteright{}s plan: Section 1 explains contextualism and invariantism. Section 2 recounts a common influential objection to contextualism, to wit, that its proponents confuse warranted assertability with truth. Section 3 reviews DeRose\textquoteright{}s response to this objection, wherein he argues that contextualism\textquoteright{}s opponent, in leveling this objection, is hoist with his own petard. Sections 4 -- 6 develop resources for crafting a version of invariantism that escapes DeRose\textquoteright{}s argument. Section 7 introduces us to this freshly equipped version of invariantism, which can be wedded to the knowledge account of assertion. Sections 8 -- 11 entertain and respond to objections. Section 12 concludes our discussion by suggesting how our new invariantist could respond to the radical skeptic, in a way that rivals the anti-skeptical contextualist\textquoteright{}s response.},
	title = {Epistemic invariantism and speech act contextualism},
	journal = {Philosophical Review},
	year = {2010},
}
@unpublished{WeathersonManuscript-WEAQC,
	author = {Brian Weatherson},
	abstract = {I argue that orthodox contextualist theories concerning 'know' make false predictions concerning the proper answers to questions containing 'know'.},
	title = {Questioning contextualism},
}
@article{Wedgwood2008-WEDCAJ,
	volume = {8},
	number = {9},
	author = {Ralph Wedgwood},
	abstract = {This paper presents a new argument for a form of contextualism about \textquoteleft{}justified belief\textquoteright, the argument being based on considerations concerning the nature of belief. It is then argued that this form of contextualism, although it is true, cannot help to answer the threat of scepticism. However, it can explain many other puzzling phenomena: it can give an account of the linguistic mechanisms that determine how the extension of \textquoteleft{}justified belief\textquoteright shifts with context; it can help to defuse some puzzles regarding the closure of justified belief under competent deduction; and it can give a plausible account of the role that practical concerns play in the thinking of a rational believer, allowing for a more plausible kind of "intellectualism" about justified belief.},
	title = {Contextualism about justified belief},
	journal = {Philosophers' Imprint},
	year = {2008},
	pages = {1-20},
}
@article{Williamson2005-WILCSI-2,
	volume = {55},
	number = {219},
	author = {Timothy Williamson},
	abstract = {\S{}I schematises the evidence for an understanding of \textquoteleft{}know\textquoteright and other terms of epistemic appraisal that embodies contextualism or subject-sensitive invariantism, and distinguishes between those two approaches. \S{}II argues that although the cases for contextualism and sensitive invariantism rely on a principle of charity in the interpretation of epistemic claims, neither approach satisfies charity fully, since both attribute metalinguistic errors to speakers. \S{}III provides an equally charitable anti-sceptical insensitive invariantist explanation of much of the same evidence as the result of psychological bias caused by salience effects. \S{}IV suggests that the explanation appears to have implausible consequences about practical reasoning, but also that applications of contextualism or sensitive invariantism to the problem of scepticism have such consequences. \S{}V argues that the inevitable difference between appropriateness and knowledge of appropriateness in practical reasoning, closely related to the difference between knowledge and knowledge of knowledge, explains the apparent implausibility.},
	title = {Contextualism, subject-sensitive invariantism and knowledge of knowledge},
	journal = {Philosophical Quarterly},
	year = {2005},
	pages = {213--{}235},
}