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  1. Linda Martín Alcoff (2010). Epistemic Identities. Episteme 7 (2):128-137.
    This paper explores the significant strengths of Fricker's account, and then develops the following questions. Can volitional epistemic practice correct for non-volitional prejudices? How can we address the structural causes of credibility-deflation? Are the motivations behind identity prejudice mostly other-directed or self-directed? And does Fricker aim for neutrality vis-à-vis identity, in which case her account conflicts with standpoint theory?
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  2. Elizabeth Anderson (2012). Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions. Social Epistemology 26 (2):163-173.
    In Epistemic injustice, Miranda Fricker makes a tremendous contribution to theorizing the intersection of social epistemology with theories of justice. Theories of justice often take as their object of assessment either interpersonal transactions (specific exchanges between persons) or particular institutions. They may also take a more comprehensive perspective in assessing systems of institutions. This systemic perspective may enable control of the cumulative effects of millions of individual transactions that cannot be controlled at the individual or institutional levels. This is true (...)
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  3. Alison Bailey (2014). Navigating Epistemic Pushback in Feminist and Critical Race Philosophy Classes. Apa Newsletter on Feminism and Philosophy 14 (1):3-7.
    My contribution to this conversation sets out to accomplish two things: First, I offer a definition of epistemic pushback. Epistemic pushback is an expression of epistemic resistance that occurs regularly in classroom discussions that touch our core beliefs, sense of self, politics, or worldv iews. Epistemic pushback is structural: It broadly characterizes a family of cognitive, affective, and verbal tactics that are deployed regularly to dodge the challenging and exhausting chore of engaging topics and questions that scare us. It can (...)
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  4. Alison Bailey, The Unlevel Knowing Field: An Engagement with Kristie Dotson's Third-Order Epistemic Oppression. Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 3, No. 10.
    My engagement with Dotson’s essay begins with an overview of first- and second-order epistemic exclusions. I develop the concept of an "unlevel knowing field." I use examples from the epistemic injustice literature, and some of my own, to highlight the important distinction she makes between reducible and irreducible forms of epistemic oppression. Next, I turn my attention to her account of third-order epistemic exclusions. I offer a brief explanation of why her sketch of at this level makes an important contribution (...)
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  5. Laura Beeby (2011). A Critique of Hermeneutical Injustice. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (3pt3):479-486.
    Recent work at the junction of epistemology and political theory focuses on the notion of epistemic injustice, the injustice of being wronged as a knower. Miranda Fricker (2007) identifies two kinds of epistemic injustice. I focus here on hermeneutical injustice in an attempt to identify a difficulty for Fricker's account. In particular, I consider the significance of background social conditions and suggest that an epistemic injustice should not rely on other forms of disadvantage to achieve its status as an injustice. (...)
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  6. Mavis Biss (2013). Radical Moral Imagination: Courage, Hope, and Articulation. Hypatia 28 (4):937-954.
    This paper develops the basis for a new account of radical moral imagination, understood as the transformation of moral understandings through creative response to the sensed inadequacy of one's moral concepts or morally significant appraisals of lived experience. Against Miranda Fricker, I argue that this kind of transition from moral perplexity to increased moral insight is not primarily a matter of the “top-down” use of concepts. Against Susan Babbitt, I argue that it is not primarily a matter of “bottom-up” intuitive (...)
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  7. Matthew Congdon (2015). Epistemic Injustice in the Space of Reasons. Episteme 12 (1):75-93.
    In this paper, I make explicit some implicit commitments to realism and conceptualism in recent work in social epistemology exemplified by Miranda Fricker and Charles Mills. I offer a survey of recent writings at the intersection of social epistemology, feminism, and critical race theory, showing that commitments to realism and conceptualism are at once implied yet undertheorized in the existing literature. I go on to offer an explicit defense of these commitments by drawing from the epistemological framework of John McDowell, (...)
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  8. Andrew Cullison (2010). On the Nature of Testimony. Episteme 7 (2):114-127.
    This paper examines several recent positions on the nature of testimony and argues that all are unsatisfactory. The first section argues against narrow, broad, and moderate views. The second section argues against Jennifer Lackey's recent analysis of testimony. Her position is supposed to avoid the problems of the prior accounts, but still suffers from two problems. After discussing those problems, this paper offers and defends an alternative analysis of testimony.
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  9. Annaleigh Curtis (2013). Review of The Epistemology of Resistance: Gender and Racial Oppression, Epistemic Injustice, and Resistant Imaginations. [REVIEW] Hypatia.
  10. Kristie Dotson (2014). Conceptualizing Epistemic Oppression. Social Epistemology 28 (2):115-138.
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  11. Kristie Dotson (2012). A Cautionary Tale: On Limiting Epistemic Oppression. Frontiers 33 (1):24-47.
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  12. Kristie Dotson (2011). Tracking Epistemic Violence, Tracking Practices of Silencing. Hypatia 26 (2):236-257.
    Too often, identifying practices of silencing is a seemingly impossible exercise. Here I claim that attempting to give a conceptual reading of the epistemic violence present when silencing occurs can help distinguish the different ways members of oppressed groups are silenced with respect to testimony. I offer an account of epistemic violence as the failure, owing to pernicious ignorance, of hearers to meet the vulnerabilities of speakers in linguistic exchanges. Ultimately, I illustrate that by focusing on the ways in which (...)
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  13. Miranda Fricker (2013). Epistemic Justice as a Condition of Political Freedom? Synthese 190 (7):1317-1332.
    I shall first briefly revisit the broad idea of ‘epistemic injustice’, explaining how it can take either distributive or discriminatory form, in order to put the concepts of ‘testimonial injustice’ and ‘hermeneutical injustice’ in place. In previous work I have explored how the wrong of both kinds of epistemic injustice has both an ethical and an epistemic significance—someone is wronged in their capacity as a knower. But my present aim is to show that this wrong can also have a political (...)
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  14. Miranda Fricker (2010). Replies to Alcoff, Goldberg, and Hookway on Epistemic Injustice. Episteme 7 (2):164-178.
    In this paper I respond to three commentaries on Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing. In response to Alcoff, I primarily defend my conception of how an individual hearer might develop virtues of epistemic justice. I do this partly by drawing on empirical social psychological evidence supporting the possibility of reflective self-regulation for prejudice in our judgements. I also emphasize the fact that individual virtue is only part of the solution – structural mechanisms also have an essential role (...)
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  15. Miranda Fricker (2010). 10. Can There Be Institutional Virtues? In T. Szabo Gendler & J. Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology. Oxford University Press 3--235.
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  16. Miranda Fricker (2008). On Miranda Fricker's Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing. Theoria 23 (1):69-71.
    This paper summarizes key themes from my Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing (OUP, 2007); and it gives replies to commentators.
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  17. Miranda Fricker (2008). Replies to Critics. Theoria 23 (1):81-86.
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  18. Miranda Fricker (2007). Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing. Oxford University Press.
    Fricker shows that virtue epistemology provides a general epistemological idiom in which these issues can be forcefully discussed.
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  19. Miranda Fricker (2006). Powerlessness and Social Interpretation. Episteme 3 (1-2):96-108.
    Our understanding of social experiences is central to our social understanding more generally. But this sphere of epistemic practice can be structurally prejudiced by unequal relations of power, so that some groups suffer a distinctive kind of epistemic injustice—hermeneutical injustice. I aim to achieve a clear conception of this epistemicethical phenomenon, so that we have a workable definition and a proper understanding of the wrong that it inflicts.
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  20. Miranda Fricker (2003). Epistemic Injustice and a Role for Virtue in the Politics of Knowing. Metaphilosophy 34 (1/2):154-173.
    The dual aim of this article is to reveal and explain a certain phenomenon of epistemic injustice as manifested in testimonial practice, and to arrive at a characterisation of the anti–prejudicial intellectual virtue that is such as to counteract it. This sort of injustice occurs when prejudice on the part of the hearer leads to the speaker receiving less credibility than he or she deserves. It is suggested that where this phenomenon is systematic it constitutes an important form of oppression. (...)
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  21. Miranda Fricker (1999). Epistemic Oppression and Epistemic Privilege. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 29 (Supplement):191-210.
    (1999). Epistemic Oppression and Epistemic Privilege. Canadian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 29, Supplementary Volume 25: Civilization and Oppression, pp. 191-210.
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  22. Sanford Goldberg (2010). Comments on Miranda Fricker's Epistemic Injustice. Episteme 7 (2):138-150.
    Miranda Fricker's Epistemic Injustice is a wide-ranging and important book on a much-neglected topic: the injustice involved in cases in which distrust arises out of prejudice. Fricker has some important things to say about this sort of injustice: its nature, how it arises, what sustains it, and the unhappy outcomes associated with it for the victim and the society in which it takes place. In the course of developing this account, Fricker also develops an account of the epistemology of testimony. (...)
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  23. Delfín Ignacio Grueso (2012). Teoría Crítica, Justicia y Metafilosofía: La Validación de la Filosofía Política En Nancy Fraser y Axel Honneth / Critical Theory, Justice and Metaphilosophy: Validation of Political Philosophy in Fraser and Honneth [Spanish]. Eidos: Revista de Filosofía de la Universidad Del Norte 16:69-98.
    SPANISH: ¿Puede un filósofo, sin más, tomar el lado de las víctimas, cuando se trata de situaciones de justicia e injusticia? ¿Puede carecer de un punto de vista objetivo acerca de lo que es moralmente bueno o malo? Si el filósofo sostiene que lo que las víctimas demandan, en lugar de redistribución, es reconocimiento, ¿debe proveer una convincente teoría de lo que es el reconocimiento y del modo como él juega un papel en las situaciones de justicia e injusticia? Este (...)
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  24. Sally Haslanger (1999). What Knowledge is and What It Ought to Be: Feminist Values and Normative Epistemology. Philosophical Perspectives 13 (s13):459-480.
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  25. Katherine Hawley (2011). Knowing How and Epistemic Injustice. In John Bengson & Marc A. Moffett (eds.), Philosophical Inquiry. Oxford University Press, Usa 283-91.
    In this chapter I explore how epistemic injustice (as discussed by Miranda Fricker) can arise in connection with knowledge how. I attempt to bypass the question of whether knowledge how is a type of propositional knowledge, and instead focus on some distinctive ways in which knowledge how is sometimes sought, identified or ignored.
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  26. Christopher Hookway (2010). Some Varieties of Epistemic Injustice: Reflections on Fricker. Episteme 2010 (7):151-163.
    Miranda Fricker's important study of epistemic injustice is focussed primarily on testimonial injustice and hermeneutic injustice. It explores how agents' capacities to make assertions and provide testimony can be impaired in ways that can involve forms of distinctively epistemic injustice. My paper identifies a wider range of forms of epistemic injustice that do not all involve the ability to make assertions or offer testimony. The paper considers some examples of some other ways in which injustice can prevent someone from participating (...)
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  27. Polycarp Ikuenobe (1998). A Defense of Epistemic Authoritarianism in Traditional African Cultures. Journal of Philosophical Research 23:417-440.
    In this paper, I take issue with Wiredu’s characterization and criticism of the general problem of epistemic authoritarianism that he identifies in some African cultures. I then defend a plausible view of epistemic authoritarianism as a method of epistemic justification in some African cultures. I argue that both his characterization and criticism implies an affirmation of epistemic individualism and autonomy, doxastic voluntarism, and a denial of epistemic dependence. I argue against epistemic autonomy and individualism, and doxastic voluntarism, because they imply (...)
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  28. Epistemic Injustice (forthcoming). David Coady. Episteme.
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  29. Karen Jones (2012). The Politics of Intellectual Self-Trust. Social Epistemology 26 (2):237-251.
    Just as testimony is affected by unjust social relations, so too is intellectual self-trust. I defend an account of intellectual self-trust that explains both why it is properly thought of as trust and why it is directed at the self, and explore its relationship to social power. Intellectual self-trust is neither a matter of having dispositions to rely on one?s epistemic methods and mechanisms, nor having a set of beliefs about which ones are reliable. Instead, it is a stance that (...)
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  30. Karen Jones (2002). The Politics of Credibility. In Louise Antony & Charlotte Witt (eds.), A Mind of One's Own: Feminist Essays on Reason and Objectivity. Westview Press
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  31. Marianne Winther Jørgensen (2011). The Terms of Debate: The Negotiation of the Legitimacy of a Marginalised Perspective. Social Epistemology 24 (4):313-330.
    A growing body of knowledge within the social sciences is produced from the perspectives of marginalised groups of people, and often, western science is criticised as an accomplice in a male-dominated and/or Eurocentric hegemony where alternative voices are excluded. This article investigates the terms of debate of this kind of knowledge in the social scientific community: who can partake in this discussion, and with which kind of commitment? The empirical material is the reviews of Linda Tuhiwai Smith?s book Decolonizing methodologies. (...)
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  32. Jeff Kochan (2015). Objective Styles in Northern Field Science. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 52:1-12.
    Social studies of science have often treated natural field sites as extensions of the laboratory. But this overlooks the unique specificities of field sites. While lab sites are usually private spaces with carefully controlled borders, field sites are more typically public spaces with fluid boundaries and diverse inhabitants. Field scientists must therefore often adapt their work to the demands and interests of local agents. I propose to address the difference between lab and field in sociological terms, as a difference in (...)
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  33. Catharina Landstroem (1994). The Boundaries of Housework. Social Epistemology 8 (2):133 – 138.
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  34. Rae Langton (2010). Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing. By MIRANDA FRICKER. Hypatia 25 (2):459-464.
  35. Endla Lõhkivi, Katrin Velbaum & Jaana Eigi (2013). Epistemic Injustice in Research Evaluation: A Cultural Analysis of the Humanities and Physics in Estonia. Studia Philosophica Estonica 5 (2):108-132.
    This paper explores the issue of epistemic injustice in research evaluation. Through an analysis of the disciplinary cultures of physics and humanities, we attempt to identify some aims and values specific to the disciplinary areas. We suggest that credibility is at stake when the cultural values and goals of a discipline contradict those presupposed by official evaluation standards. Disciplines that are better aligned with the epistemic assumptions of evaluation standards appear to produce more "scientific" findings. To restore epistemic justice in (...)
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  36. Ishani Maitra (2010). The Nature of Epistemic Injustice. Philosophical Books 51 (4):195-211.
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  37. Gerald Marsh (2011). Trust, Testimony, and Prejudice in the Credibility Economy. Hypatia 26 (2):280-293.
    In this paper I argue for a special kind of injustice I call “trust injustice.” Taking Miranda Fricker's work on epistemic injustice as my starting point, I argue that there are some ethical constraints on trust relationships. If I am right about this, then we sometimes have duties to maintain trust relationships that are independent of the social roles we play.
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  38. S. E. Marshall (2003). Epistemic Injustice The Third Way? Metaphilosophy 34 (1‐2):174-177.
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  39. Nancy McHugh (2015). The Limits of Knowledge: Generating Pragmatist Feminist Cases for Situated Knowing. SUNY Press.
    Argues for a transactionally situated approach to science and medicine in order to meet the needs of marginalized groups. -/- The Limits of Knowledge provides an understanding of what pragmatist feminist theories look like in practice, combining insights from the work of American pragmatist John Dewey concerning experimental inquiry and transaction with arguments for situated knowledge rooted in contemporary feminism. Using case studies to demonstrate some of the particular ways that dominant scientific and medical practices fail to meet the health (...)
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  40. Jen Mcweeny (2010). Liberating Anger, Embodying Knowledge: A Comparative Study of María Lugones and Zen Master Hakuin. Hypatia 25 (2):295 - 315.
    This paper strengthens the theoretical ground of feminist analyses of anger by explaining how the angers of the oppressed are ways of knowing. Relying on insights created through the juxtaposition of Latina feminism and Zen Buddhism, I argue that these angers are special kinds of embodied perceptions that surface when there is a profound lack of fit between a particular bodily orientation and its framing world of sense. As openings to alternative sensibilities, these angers are transformative, liberatory, and deeply epistemohgical.
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  41. José Medina (2013). The Epistemology of Resistance. Oxford University Press.
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  42. Karin Murris (2013). The Epistemic Challenge of Hearing Child's Voice. Studies in Philosophy and Education 32 (3):245-259.
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  43. Alan Saunders & Miranda Fricker, Philosopher's Zone.
    In London in 1993, a black teenager named Stephen Lawrence was fatally stabbed by a small gang of white teenagers. His friend Duwayne Brooks was a witness but the police failed to take his testimony seriously. When someone speaks but is not heard because of accent, sex, or colour, that person is undermined as a knower. This week, we look at was it means to do justice to someone's status as a knower.
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  44. Jeremy Wanderer (2012). Addressing Testimonial Injustice: Being Ignored and Being Rejected. Philosophical Quarterly 62 (246):148-169.
    I examine a distinctive kind of injustice which arises when people are maltreated in their capacity as potential conveyors of knowledge. Extant discussions of testimonial injustice usually assume that the injustice occurs when an audience ignores the claims made by a testifier. This assumption obscures the fact that there are occasions where the best framework for thinking about testimonial injustice is that of inappropriately rejecting, not ignoring, those claims; the injustice differs in these two kinds of case. Light is thrown (...)
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  45. Ian Werkheiser (forthcoming). Community Epistemic Capacity. Social Epistemology:1-20.
    Despite US policy documents which recommend that in areas of environmental risk, interaction between scientific experts and the public move beyond the so-called “Decide, Announce, and Defend model,” many current public involvement policies still do not guarantee meaningful public participation. In response to this problem, various attempts have been made to define what counts as sufficient or meaningful participation and free informed consent from those affected. Though defining “meaningfulness” is a complex task, this paper explores one under-examined dimension that concerns (...)
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  46. Ian Werkheiser (2014). Asking for Reasons as a Weapon: Epistemic Justification and the Loss of Knowledge. Journal of Cognition and Neuroethics 2 (1):173-190.
    In this paper, I will look at what role being able to provide justification plays in several prominent conceptions of epistemology, and argue that taking the ability to provide reasons as necessary for knowledge leads to a biasing toward false negatives. However, I will also argue that asking for reasons is a common practice among the general public, and one that is endorsed by “folk epistemology.” I will then discuss the fact that this asking for reasons is done neither constantly (...)
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