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  1. Elizabeth Anderson (2012). Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions. Social Epistemology 26 (2):163-173.
    In Epistemic injustice, Miranda Fricker makes a tremendous contribution to theorizing the intersection of social epistemology with theories of justice. Theories of justice often take as their object of assessment either interpersonal transactions (specific exchanges between persons) or particular institutions. They may also take a more comprehensive perspective in assessing systems of institutions. This systemic perspective may enable control of the cumulative effects of millions of individual transactions that cannot be controlled at the individual or institutional levels. This is true (...)
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  2. Laura Beeby (2011). A Critique of Hermeneutical Injustice. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (3pt3):479-486.
    Recent work at the junction of epistemology and political theory focuses on the notion of epistemic injustice, the injustice of being wronged as a knower. Miranda Fricker (2007) identifies two kinds of epistemic injustice. I focus here on hermeneutical injustice in an attempt to identify a difficulty for Fricker's account. In particular, I consider the significance of background social conditions and suggest that an epistemic injustice should not rely on other forms of disadvantage to achieve its status as an injustice. (...)
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  3. Annaleigh Curtis (2013). Review of The Epistemology of Resistance: Gender and Racial Oppression, Epistemic Injustice, and Resistant Imaginations. [REVIEW] Hypatia.
  4. Miranda Fricker (2013). Epistemic Justice as a Condition of Political Freedom? Synthese 190 (7):1317-1332.
    I shall first briefly revisit the broad idea of ‘epistemic injustice’, explaining how it can take either distributive or discriminatory form, in order to put the concepts of ‘testimonial injustice’ and ‘hermeneutical injustice’ in place. In previous work I have explored how the wrong of both kinds of epistemic injustice has both an ethical and an epistemic significance—someone is wronged in their capacity as a knower. But my present aim is to show that this wrong can also have a political (...)
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  5. Miranda Fricker (2010). Replies to Alcoff, Goldberg, and Hookway on Epistemic Injustice. Episteme 7 (2):164-178.
    In this paper I respond to three commentaries on Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing. In response to Alcoff, I primarily defend my conception of how an individual hearer might develop virtues of epistemic justice. I do this partly by drawing on empirical social psychological evidence supporting the possibility of reflective self-regulation for prejudice in our judgements. I also emphasize the fact that individual virtue is only part of the solution – structural mechanisms also have an essential role (...)
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  6. Miranda Fricker (2008). On Miranda Fricker's Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing. Theoria 23 (1):69-71.
    This paper summarizes key themes from my Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing (OUP, 2007); and it gives replies to commentators.
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  7. Miranda Fricker (2008). Replies to Critics. Theoria 23 (1):81-86.
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  8. Miranda Fricker (2007). Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing. Oxford University Press.
    Fricker shows that virtue epistemology provides a general epistemological idiom in which these issues can be forcefully discussed.
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  9. Miranda Fricker (2006). Powerlessness and Social Interpretation. Episteme 3 (1-2):96-108.
    Our understanding of social experiences is central to our social understanding more generally. But this sphere of epistemic practice can be structurally prejudiced by unequal relations of power, so that some groups suff er a distinctive kind of epistemic injustice—hermeneutical injustice. I aim to achieve a clear conception of this epistemicethical phenomenon, so that we have a workable definition and a proper understanding of the wrong that it inflicts.
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  10. Miranda Fricker (2003). Epistemic Injustice and a Role for Virtue in the Politics of Knowing. Metaphilosophy 34 (1/2):154-173.
    The dual aim of this article is to reveal and explain a certain phenomenon of epistemic injustice as manifested in testimonial practice, and to arrive at a characterisation of the anti–prejudicial intellectual virtue that is such as to counteract it. This sort of injustice occurs when prejudice on the part of the hearer leads to the speaker receiving less credibility than he or she deserves. It is suggested that where this phenomenon is systematic it constitutes an important form of oppression. (...)
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  11. Miranda Fricker (1999). Epistemic Oppression and Epistemic Privilege. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 29 (Supplement):191-210.
    (1999). Epistemic Oppression and Epistemic Privilege. Canadian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 29, Supplementary Volume 25: Civilization and Oppression, pp. 191-210.
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  12. Sanford Goldberg (2010). Comments on Miranda Fricker's Epistemic Injustice. Episteme 7 (2):138-150.
    Miranda Fricker's Epistemic Injustice is a wide-ranging and important book on a much-neglected topic: the injustice involved in cases in which distrust arises out of prejudice. Fricker has some important things to say about this sort of injustice: its nature, how it arises, what sustains it, and the unhappy outcomes associated with it for the victim and the society in which it takes place. In the course of developing this account, Fricker also develops an account of the epistemology of testimony. (...)
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  13. Polycarp Ikuenobe (1998). A Defense of Epistemic Authoritarianism in Traditional African Cultures. Journal of Philosophical Research 23:417-440.
    In this paper, I take issue with Wiredu’s characterization and criticism of the general problem of epistemic authoritarianism that he identifies in some African cultures. I then defend a plausible view of epistemic authoritarianism as a method of epistemic justification in some African cultures. I argue that both his characterization and criticism implies an affirmation of epistemic individualism and autonomy, doxastic voluntarism, and a denial of epistemic dependence. I argue against epistemic autonomy and individualism, and doxastic voluntarism, because they imply (...)
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  14. Karen Jones (2012). The Politics of Intellectual Self-Trust. Social Epistemology 26 (2):237-251.
    Just as testimony is affected by unjust social relations, so too is intellectual self-trust. I defend an account of intellectual self-trust that explains both why it is properly thought of as trust and why it is directed at the self, and explore its relationship to social power. Intellectual self-trust is neither a matter of having dispositions to rely on one?s epistemic methods and mechanisms, nor having a set of beliefs about which ones are reliable. Instead, it is a stance that (...)
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  15. Marianne Winther Jørgensen (2011). The Terms of Debate: The Negotiation of the Legitimacy of a Marginalised Perspective. Social Epistemology 24 (4):313-330.
    A growing body of knowledge within the social sciences is produced from the perspectives of marginalised groups of people, and often, western science is criticised as an accomplice in a male-dominated and/or Eurocentric hegemony where alternative voices are excluded. This article investigates the terms of debate of this kind of knowledge in the social scientific community: who can partake in this discussion, and with which kind of commitment? The empirical material is the reviews of Linda Tuhiwai Smith?s book Decolonizing methodologies. (...)
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  16. Catharina Landstroem (1994). The Boundaries of Housework. Social Epistemology 8 (2):133 – 138.
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  17. Endla Lõhkivi, Katrin Velbaum & Jaana Eigi (2013). Epistemic Injustice in Research Evaluation: A Cultural Analysis of the Humanities and Physics in Estonia. Studia Philosophica Estonica 5 (2):108-132.
    This paper explores the issue of epistemic injustice in research evaluation. Through an analysis of the disciplinary cultures of physics and humanities, we attempt to identify some aims and values specific to the disciplinary areas. We suggest that credibility is at stake when the cultural values and goals of a discipline contradict those presupposed by official evaluation standards. Disciplines that are better aligned with the epistemic assumptions of evaluation standards appear to produce more "scientific" findings. To restore epistemic justice in (...)
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  18. S. E. Marshall (2003). Epistemic Injustice The Third Way? Metaphilosophy 34 (1‐2):174-177.
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  19. Jen Mcweeny (2010). Liberating Anger, Embodying Knowledge: A Comparative Study of María Lugones and Zen Master Hakuin. Hypatia 25 (2):295 - 315.
    This paper strengthens the theoretical ground of feminist analyses of anger by explaining how the angers of the oppressed are ways of knowing. Relying on insights created through the juxtaposition of Latina feminism and Zen Buddhism, I argue that these angers are special kinds of embodied perceptions that surface when there is a profound lack of fit between a particular bodily orientation and its framing world of sense. As openings to alternative sensibilities, these angers are transformative, liberatory, and deeply epistemohgical.
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  20. Karin Murris (2013). The Epistemic Challenge of Hearing Child's Voice. Studies in Philosophy and Education 32 (3):245-259.
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  21. Alan Saunders & Miranda Fricker, Philosopher's Zone.
    In London in 1993, a black teenager named Stephen Lawrence was fatally stabbed by a small gang of white teenagers. His friend Duwayne Brooks was a witness but the police failed to take his testimony seriously. When someone speaks but is not heard because of accent, sex, or colour, that person is undermined as a knower. This week, we look at was it means to do justice to someone's status as a knower.
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