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  1. John Aach (1990). Psychologism Reconsidered: A Re-Evaluation of the Arguments of Frege and Husserl. Synthese 85 (2):315 - 338.
  2. David J. Alexander (2012). Inferential Internalism and Reflective Defeat. Philosophia 40 (3):497-521.
    Inferential Internalists accept the Principle of Inferential Justification (PIJ), according to which one has justification for believing P on the basis of E only if one has justification for believing that E makes probable P. Richard Fumerton has defended PIJ by appeal to examples, and recently Adam Leite has argued that this principle is supported by considerations regarding the nature of responsible belief. In this paper, I defend a form of externalism against both arguments. This form of externalism recognizes what (...)
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  3. David J. Alexander (2012). Weak Inferential Internalism. Journal of Philosophical Research 37:357-377.
    Inferential internalism holds that for one to be inferentially justified in believing P on the basis of E one must be justified in believing that E makes probable P. Inferential internalism has long been accused of generating a vicious regress on inferential justification that has drastic skeptical consequences. However, recently Hookway and Rhoda have defended a more modest form of internalism that avoids this problem. They propose a form of weak inferential internalism according to which internalist conditions are restricted to (...)
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  4. David J. Alexander (2012). Weak Inferential Internalism is Indistinguishable From Externalism – A Reply to Rhoda. Journal of Philosophical Research 37:387-394.
    In “Weak Inferential Internalism” I defended the frequently voiced criticism that any internalist account of inferential justification generates a vicious regress. My defense involved criticizing a recent form of internalism, “Weak Inferential Internalism” (WII) defended by Hookway and Rhoda. I argued that while WII does not generate a vicious regress, the position is only distinguishable from externalism insofar as it makes an arbitrary distinction between individuals who believe for the very same reason. Either way, WII is not a defensible internalist (...)
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  5. Keith Allen (2010). Perception and Basic Beliefs: Zombies, Modules, and the Problem of the External World * By JACK C. LYONS. Analysis 70 (2):391-393.
    (No abstract is available for this citation).
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  6. Robert Almeder (1995). Externalism and Justification. Philosophia 24 (3-4):465-469.
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  7. Marc Alspector-kelly (2006). Knowledge Externalism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (3):289–300.
    A popular counterexample directed against externalist epistemological views is that of an agent (Lehrer's "Truetemp" for example) whose beliefs are clearly neither justified nor known but that were generated in the manner that the externalist requires, thereby demonstrating externalism to be insufficient. In this essay I develop and defend an externalist account of knowledge – essentially an elaboration of Fred Dreske's information-theoretic account – that is not susceptible to those criticisms. I then briefly discuss the relationship between knowledge and justification.
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  8. William Alston (1989). Epistemic Justification. Cornell University Press.
    Introduction As the title indicates, the chief focus of this book is epistemic justification. But just what is epistemic justification and what is its place ...
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  9. William P. Alston (1988). An Internalist Externalism. Synthese 74 (3):265 - 283.
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  10. William P. Alston (1986). Internalism and Externalism in Epistemology. Philosophical Topics 14 (1):179-221.
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  11. D. M. Armstrong (1973). Belief, Truth and Knowledge. London,Cambridge University Press.
    The book as a whole if offered as a contribution to a naturalistic account of man.
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  12. Axel Arturo Barceló Aspeitia (2011). An Insubstantial Externalism. Journal of Philosophy 108 (10).
    In one of his recent articles published in this JOURNAL, Alvin J. Goldman argues that since one must counts epistemic rules among the factors that help to fix the justificational status of agents (generally called J-factors), not all J-factors are internalist i.e. intrinsic to the agent whose justificational status they help to fix. After all, for an epistemic rule to count as a genuine J-factor, it must be objectively correct, and therefore, “independent of any and all minds” (p.9). Consequently, it (...)
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  13. Robert Audi (1993). The Structure of Justification. Cambridge University Press.
    This collection of papers (including three completely new ones) by one of the foremost philosophers in epistemology transcends two of the most widely misunderstood positions in philosophy--foundationalism and coherentism. Audi proposes a distinctively moderate, internalist foundationalism that incorporates some of the virtues of both coherentism and reliabilism. He develops important distinctions between positive and negative epistemic dependence, substantively and conceptually naturalistic theories, dispositional beliefs and dispositions to believe, episodically and structurally inferential beliefs, first and second order internalism, and rebutting as (...)
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  14. Guy Axtell (2011). From Internalist Evidentialism to Virtue Responsibilism. In T. Dougherty (ed.), Evidentialism and its Discontents. Oxford University Press.
    Evidentialism as its leading proponents describe it has two distinct senses, these being evidentialism as a conceptual analysis of epistemic justification, and as a prescriptive ethics of belief—an account of what one ‘ought to believe’ under different epistemic circumstances. These two senses of evidentialism are related, but in the work of leading evidentialist philosophers, in ways that I think are deeply problematic. Although focusing on Richard Feldman’s ethics of belief, this chapter is critical of evidentialism in both senses. However, I (...)
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  15. Guy Axtell (2011). Recovering Responsibility. Logos and Episteme (3):429-454..
    This paper defends the epistemological importance of ‘diachronic’ or cross-temporal evaluation of epistemic agents against an interesting dilemma posed for this view in Trent Dougherty’s recent paper “Reducing Responsibility.” This is primarily a debate between evidentialists and character epistemologists, and key issues of contention that the paper treats include the divergent functions of synchronic and diachronic (longitudinal) evaluations of agents and their beliefs, the nature and sources of epistemic normativity, and the advantages versus the costs of the evidentialists’ reductionism about (...)
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  16. Guy Axtell (2008). Expanding Epistemology: A Responsibilist Approach. Philosophical Papers 37 (1):51-87.
    The first part of this paper asks why we need, or what would motivate, ameaningful expansion of epistemology. It answers with three critical arguments found in the recent literature, which each purport to move us some distance beyond the preoccupations of ‘post-Gettier era’ analytic epistemology. These three—the ‘epistemic luck,’ ‘epistemic value’ and ‘epistemic reconciliation’ arguments associated with D. Pritchard, J. Kvanvig, and M. Williams, respectively—each carry this implication of needed expansion by functioning as forceful ‘internal critiques’ of the tradition. The (...)
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  17. Brian Ball & Michael Blome-Tillmann (forthcoming). Indexical Reliabilism and the New Evil Demon. Erkenntnis.
    Abstract Stewart Cohen’s (1984) New Evil Demon argument raises familiar and widely discussed concerns for reliabilist accounts of epistemic justification. A now standard response to this argument, initiated by Alvin Goldman (1988) and Ernest Sosa (1993; 2001), involves distinguishing different notions of justification. Juan Comesaña (2002b; 2010) has recently and prominently claimed that his Indexical Reliabilism (IR) offers a novel solution in this tradition. We argue, however, that Comesaña’s proposal, suffers serious difficulties from the perspective of the philosophy of language. (...)
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  18. Benjamin Bayer (2012). Internalism Empowered: How to Bolster a Theory of Justification with a Direct Realist Theory of Awareness. Acta Analytica 27 (4):383-408.
    Abstract The debate in the philosophy of perception between direct realists and representationalists should influence the debate in epistemology between internalists and externalists about justification. If direct realists are correct, there are more consciously accessible justifiers for internalists to exploit than externalists think. Internalists can retain their distinctive internalist identity while accepting this widened conception of internalistic justification: even if they welcome the possibility of cognitive access to external facts, their position is still quite distinct from the typical externalist position. (...)
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  19. Michael Bergmann (1997). Internalism, Externalism and the No-Defeater Condition. Synthese 110 (3):399-417.
    Despite various attempts to rectify matters, the internalism-externalism (I-E) debate in epistemology remains mired in serious confusion. I present a new account of this debate, one which fits well with entrenched views on the I-E distinction and illuminates the fundamental disagreements at the heart of the debate. Roughly speaking, the I-E debate is over whether or not certain of the necessary conditions of positive epistemic status are internal. But what is the sense of internal here? And of which conditions of (...)
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  20. Michael Abram Bergmann (2006). Justification Without Awareness: A Defense of Epistemic Externalism. Oxford University Press.
    Virtually all philosophers agree that for a belief to be epistemically justified, it must satisfy certain conditions. Perhaps it must be supported by evidence. Or perhaps it must be reliably formed. Or perhaps there are some other "good-making" features it must have. But does a belief's justification also require some sort of awareness of its good-making features? The answer to this question has been hotly contested in contemporary epistemology, creating a deep divide among its practitioners. Internalists, who tend to focus (...)
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  21. Laurence BonJour (1985). The Structure of Empirical Knowledge. Harvard University Press.
    1 Knowledge and Justification This book is an investigation of one central problem which arises in the attempt to give a philosophical account of empirical ...
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  22. Laurence Bonjour (1980). Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5 (1):53-73.
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  23. Laurence BonJour & Ernest Sosa (2003). Epistemic Justification: Internalism Vs. Externalism, Foundations Vs. Virtues. Blackwell Pub..
    The regress problem and foundationalism -- Externalist accounts of justification -- In search of coherentism -- Back to foundationalism -- The conceptualization of sensory experience and the problem of the external world -- Knowledge and justification -- Does knowledge have foundation -- Skepticism and the internal/external divide -- A virtue epistemology -- Reply to Sosa -- Reply to Bonjour.
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  24. Anthony Robert Booth (2011). The Theory of Epistemic Justification and the Theory of Knowledge: A Divorce. Erkenntnis 75 (1):37-43.
    Richard Foley has suggested that the search for a good theory of epistemic justification and the analysis of knowledge should be conceived of as two distinct projects. However, he has not offered much support for this claim, beyond highlighting certain salutary consequences it might have. In this paper, I offer some further support for Foley’s claim by offering an argument and a way to conceive the claim in a way that makes it as plausible as its denial, and thus levelling (...)
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  25. Jessica Brown (2007). Externalism in Mind and Epistemology. In Sanford Goldberg (ed.), Internalism and Externalism in Semantics and Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
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  26. Anthony Brueckner (2011). Justification, Internalism, and Cream Cheese. Philosophical Papers 38 (1):13-20.
    This paper is a critique of John Gibbons's main example against internalism about justification in 'Access Externalism'. I argue that the underdescription of the example defeats its force against internalism.
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  27. Anthony Brueckner (1996). Deontologism and Internalism in Epistemology. Noûs 30 (4):527-536.
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  28. Evan Butts (2012). Mentalism is Not Epistemic Ur-Internalism. Philosophical Explorations 15 (2):233 - 249.
    Earl Conee and Richard Feldman claim that mentalism identifies the core of internalist epistemology. This is what I call identifying ur-internalism. Their version of ur-internalism differs from the traditional one ? viz., accessibilism ? by not imposing requirements stipulating that subjects must have reflective access to facts which justify their beliefs for these beliefs to be justified. Instead, justification simply supervenes on the mental lives of subjects. I argue that mentalism fails to establish itself as ur-internalism by demonstrating that the (...)
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  29. Stewart Cohen (1984). Justification and Truth. Philosophical Studies 46 (3):279--95.
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  30. Juan Comesaña (2005). We Are (Almost) All Externalists Now. Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):59–76.
    In this paper I argue against Mentalism, the claim that all the factors that contribute to the epistemic justification of a doxastic attitude towards a proposition by a subject S are mental states of S. My objection to mentalism is that there is a special kind of fact (what I call a "support fact") that contributes to the justification of any belief, and that is not mental. My argument against mentalism, then, is the following: Anti-mentalism argument: 1. If mentalism is (...)
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  31. Juan Comesana (2005). We Are (Almost) All Externalists Now. Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):59-76.
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  32. Juan Comesaña (2002). The Diagonal and the Demon. Philosophical Studies 110 (3):249 - 266.
    Reliabilism about epistemic justification – thethesis that what makes a belief epistemicallyjustified is that it was produced by a reliableprocess of belief-formation – must face twoproblems. First, what has been called ``the newevil demon problem'', which arises from the ideathat the beliefs of victims of an evil demonare as justified as our own beliefs, althoughthey are not – the objector claims – reliablyproduced. And second, the problem of diagnosingwhy skepticism is so appealing despite beingfalse. I present a special version ofreliabilism, (...)
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  33. Earl Conee (2004). Externalism, Internalism, and Skepticism. Philosophical Issues 14 (1):78–90.
  34. Earl Conee & Richard Feldman (2004). Evidentialism. Oxford University Press.
    Evidentialism holds that the justified attitudes are determined entirely by the person's evidence. This is the traditional view ofjustification.
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  35. Earl Conee & Richard Feldman (2001). Internalism Defended. In Hilary Kornblith (ed.), Epistemology: Internalism and Externalism. Blackwell.
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  36. Thomas M. Crisp (2010). A Dilemma for Internalism? Synthese 174 (3).
    Internalism about epistemic justification (henceforth, ‘internalism’) says that a belief B is epistemically justified for S only if S is aware of some good-making feature of B, some feature that makes for B’s having positive epistemic status: e.g., evidence for B. Externalists with respect to epistemic justification (‘externalists’) deny this awareness requirement. Michael Bergmann has recently put this dilemma against internalism: awareness admits of a strong and a weak construal; given the strong construal, internalism is subject to debilitating regress troubles; (...)
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  37. Joe Cruz & John Pollock (2004). The Chimerical Appeal of Epistemic Externalism. In Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge. De Gruyter.
    Internalism in epistemology is the view that all the factors relevant to the justification of a belief are importantly internal to the believer, while externalism is the view that at least some of those factors are external. This extremely modest first approximation cries out for refinement (which we undertake below), but is enough to orient us in the right direction, namely that the debate between internalism and externalism is bound up with the controversy over the correct account of the distinction (...)
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  38. Jonathan Dancy (1992). Externalism for Internalists. Philosophical Issues 2:93-114.
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  39. Terry Dartnall (2005). Does the World Leak Into the Mind? Active Externalism, "Internalism", and Epistemology. Cognitive Science 29:135-43.
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  40. Terry Dartnall (2004). Epistemology, Emulators, and Extended Minds. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (3):401-402.
    Grush's framework has epistemological implications and explains how it is possible to acquire offline empirical knowledge. It also complements the extended-mind thesis, which says that mind leaks into the world. Grush's framework suggests that the world leaks into the mind through the offline deployment of emulators that we usually deploy in our experience of the world.
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  41. Marian David (2012). Lehrer on Trustworthiness and Acceptance. Philosophical Studies 161 (1):7-15.
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  42. Marian David (1996). Review Essay: Working Without a Net. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (4):943-952.
  43. Matthew Davidson & Gordon Barnes (forthcoming). Internalism and Properly Basic Belief. In David Werther Mark Linville (ed.), Philosophy and the Christian Worldview : Analysis, Assessment and Development. Continuum.
    In this paper we set out a view on which internalist proper basicality is secured by sensory experience.
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  44. John M. DePoe (2012). Bergmann's Dilemma and Internalism's Escape. Acta Analytica 27 (4):409-423.
    Abstract Michael Bergmann has argued that internalist accounts of justification face an insoluble dilemma. This paper begins with an explanation of Bergmann’s dilemma. Next, I review some recent attempts to answer the dilemma, which I argue are insufficient to overcome it. The solution I propose presents an internalist account of justification through direct acquaintance. My thesis is that direct acquaintance can provide subjective epistemic assurance without falling prey to the quagmire of difficulties that Bergmann alleges all internalist accounts of justification (...)
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  45. Keith DeRose, Externalism and Skepticism.
    A few years back, I participated in the Spindell Conference in Memphis, and gave a paper, “How Can We Know That We’re Not Brains in Vats?” (available on-line at: http://pantheon.yale.edu/~kd47/Spindell.htm). The bulk of that paper concerned responses to skepticism. I pursued an unusually radical criticism of the often-criticized “Putnam-style” responses to skepticism. To put it rather enigmatically, I argued that such responses don’t work even if they work! And I compared such responses with the type of response I favor – (...)
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  46. Julien Dutant (2012). The Value and Expected Value of Knowledge. Dialogue 51 (1):141-162.
    ABSTRACT: Menothe idea that knowing something is better than merely having a true belief about itswampings Thesis instead, as relying on a confusion between expected value and value proper. The proposed solution relies on an externalist view of rationality, which is presented.
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  47. Antony Eagle, Knowledge: Internalism and Externalism.
    There will be a surprise party for Mark tonight. He loves surprise parties, because he loves the surprise—but he'll feel terrible if the surprise is spoiled, and not want to go. He has a reason to go to the party—the surprise—; but if he knew or even believed what that reason was, he would have a reason not to go. It looks like in this case there can be really good reasons for someone without the person being aware of what (...)
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  48. Evan Fales (2004). Proper Basicality. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (2):373–383.
    Foundationalist epistemologies, whether internalist or externalist, ground noetic structures in beliefs that are said to be foundational, or properly basic. It is essential to such epistemologies that they provide clear criteria for proper basicality. This proves, I argue, to be a thorny task, at least insofar as the goal is to provide a psychologically realistic reconstruction of our actual doxastic practices. I examine some of the difficulties, and suggest some implications, in particular for the externalist epistemology of Alvin Plantinga.
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  49. Richard Feldman (2006). BonJour and Sosa on Internalism, Externalism, and Basic Beliefs. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 131 (3):713 - 728.
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  50. Richard Feldman & Earl Conee (2001). Internalism Defended. American Philosophical Quarterly 38 (1):1 - 18.
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  51. Richard Feldman & Earl Conee (1985). Evidentialism. Philosophical Studies 48 (1):15 - 34.
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  52. Richard Fumerton (2007). What and About What is Internalism? In Sanford Goldberg (ed.), Internalism and Externalism in Semantics and Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
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  53. Richard Fumerton (2007). Review of Michael Bergmann, Justification Without Awareness: A Defense of Epistemic Externalism. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2007 (3).
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  54. Richard Fumerton (1988). The Internalism/Externalism Controversy. Philosophical Perspectives 2:443-459.
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  55. Richard A. Fumerton (1995). Metaepistemology and Skepticism. Rowman & Littlefield.
    ... and Normative Epistemology The Distinction Between Metaepistemology and Normative Epistemology Although this terminology is relatively new, ...
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  56. Mikkel Gerken (forthcoming). Internalism and Externalism in the Epistemology of Testimony. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    Is the nature of testimonial warrant epistemically internalist or externalist? I will argue that the question should be answered ‘yes!’ The disjunction is not exclusive. Rather, a testimonial belief may possess epistemically internalist warrant – justification – as well as epistemically externalist warrant – entitlement. I use the label ‘pluralism’ to denote the view that there are both internalist and externalist species of genuinely epistemic warrant and argue for pluralism in the epistemology of testimony. In doing so, I begin to (...)
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  57. Mikkel Gerken (2012). Critical Study of Goldberg's Relying on Others. [REVIEW] Episteme 9 (1):81-88.
    This critical study of Sanford Goldberg's Relying on Others focuses on the book's central claim, the extendedness hypothesis, according to which the processes relevant for assessing the reliability of a hearer's testimonial belief include the cognitive processes involved in the production of the testimony.
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  58. Mikkel Gerken (2008). Is Internalism About Knowledge Consistent with Content Externalism? Philosophia 36 (1):87-96.
    There is widespread suspicion that there is a principled conflict between epistemic internalism and content externalism (or anti-individualism). Despite the prominence of this suspicion, it has rarely been substantiated by explicit arguments. However, Duncan Pritchard and Jesper Kallestrup have recently provided a prima facie argument concluding that internalism about knowledge and externalism about content are incompatible. I criticize the incompatibilist argument and conclude that the purported incompatibility is, at best, prima facie. This is, in part, because several steps in the (...)
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  59. Sanford Goldberg (ed.) (2007). Internalism and Externalism in Semantics and Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
    Internalism and Externalism in Semantics and Epistemology presents eleven specially written essays exploring these debates in metaphysics and epistemology and ...
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  60. Alvin I. Goldman (2009). Internalism, Externalism, and the Architecture of Justification. Journal of Philosophy 106 (6):309-338.
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  61. Alvin I. Goldman (1999). Internalism Exposed. Journal of Philosophy 96 (6):271-293.
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  62. Alvin I. Goldman (1988). Strong and Weak Justification. Philosophical Perspectives 2:51-69.
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  63. Alvin I. Goldman (1980). The Internalist Conception of Justification. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5 5 (1):27-51.
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  64. Peter J. Graham (forthcoming). Functions, Warrant, History. In Abrol Fairweather & Owen Flanagan (eds.), Naturalizing Epistemic Virtue. Cambridge University Press.
    I hold that epistemic warrant consists in the normal functioning of the belief-forming process when the process has forming true beliefs reliably as an etiological function. Evolution by natural selection is the central source of etiological functions. This leads many to think that on my view warrant requires a history of natural selection. What then about learning? What then about Swampman? Though functions require history, natural selection is not the only source. Self-repair and trial-and-error learning are both sources. Warrant requires (...)
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  65. Peter J. Graham (2011). Does Justification Aim at Truth? Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41 (1):51-72.
    Does epistemic justification aim at truth? The vast majority of epistemologists instinctively answer 'Yes'; it's the textbook response. Joseph Cruz and John Pollock surprisingly say no. In 'The Chimerical Appeal of Epistemic Externalism' they argue that justification bears no interesting connection to truth; justification does not even aim at truth. 'Truth is not a very interesting part of our best understanding' of justification (C&P 2004, 137); it has no 'connection to the truth.' A 'truth-aimed ... epistemology is not entitled to (...)
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  66. John Greco (1990). Internalism and Epistemically Responsible Belief. Synthese 85 (2):245 - 277.
    In section one the deontological (or responsibilist) conception of justification is discussed and explained. In section two, arguments are put forward in order to derive the most plausible version of perspectival internalism, or the position that epistemic justification is a function of factors internal to the believer's cognitive perspective. The two most common considerations put forward in favor of perspectival internalism are discussed. These are the responsibilist conception of justification, and the intuition that two believers with like beliefs and experiences (...)
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  67. Thomas Grundmann (2009). Introspective Self-Knowledge and Reasoning: An Externalist Guide. Erkenntnis 71 (1):89 - 105.
    According to the received view, externalist grounds or reasons need not be introspectively accessible. Roughly speaking, from an externalist point of view, a belief will be epistemically justified, iff it is based upon facts that make its truth objectively highly likely. This condition can be satisfied, even if the epistemic agent does not have actual or potential awareness of the justifying facts. No inner perspective on the belief-forming mechanism and its truth-ratio is needed for a belief to be justified. In (...)
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  68. William Harper (1998). Papier Mâché Problems in Epistemology: A Defense of Strong Internalism. Synthese 116 (1):27-49.
    I attempt to persuade the reader that externalism admits of no plausible interpretation. I argue that reliability is a concept with very different contours from epistemic justification, and that attempts to explicate justification in terms of reliability must fail. I address several other forms of externalism, and also mixed forms of justification. I then argue that externalist theories of justification cannot close the gap between mere true belief and knowledge. I suggest that a fourth condition on knowledge is required, regardless (...)
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  69. Ali Hasan (2013). Phenomenal Conservatism, Classical Foundationalism, and Internalist Justification. Philosophical Studies 162 (2):119-141.
    In “Compassionate Phenomenal Conservatism” (2007), “Phenomenal Conservatism and the Internalist Intuition” (2006), and Skepticism and the Veil of Perception (2001), Michael Huemer endorses the principle of phenomenal conservatism, according to which appearances or seemings constitute a fundamental source of (defeasible) justification for belief. He claims that those who deny phenomenal conservatism, including classical foundationalists, are in a self-defeating position, for their views cannot be both true and justified; that classical foundationalists have difficulty accommodating false introspective beliefs; and that phenomenal conservatism (...)
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  70. Ali Hasan (2011). Classical Foundationalism and Bergmann's Dilemma for Internalism. Journal of Philosophical Research 36:391-410.
    In Justification without Awareness (2006), Michael Bergmann presents a dilemma for internalism from which he claims there is “no escape”: The awareness allegedly required for justification is either strong awareness, which involves conceiving of some justification-contributor as relevant to the truth of a belief, or weak awareness, which does not. Bergmann argues that the former leads to an infinite regress of justifiers, while the latter conflicts with the “clearest and most compelling” motivation for endorsing internalism, namely, that for a belief (...)
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  71. Benj Hellie (2011). There It Is. Philosophical Issues 21 (1):110-164.
    A direct realist theory of perceptual justification. I take a ground-up approach, beginning with a theory of subjective rationality understood in terms of first-person rational explicability of the stream of consciousness. I mathematize this picture via a Tractarian spin on a semantical framework developed by Rayo. Perceptual states justify by being 'receptive': rationally inexplicable intentional states encoded in sentences that are analytic. Direct realists working within this framework should say that when one is taken in by hallucination one's overall picture (...)
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  72. Scott Hendricks (2005). Demons and the Isolation Argument. Philosophical Quarterly 55 (220):403–418.
    Justifying a belief gives reason to think that the belief is true. So our concept of justification contains a ‘truth connection’. I canvass a number of proposals for analysing this. In the end, two competing conceptions of the truth connection remain: the first, that justifying a belief makes the belief objectively probable, the second, that justifying a belief makes the belief probable in a world which would make true our other beliefs. I discuss reasons for embracing and rejecting these two (...)
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  73. S. Hetherington (2007). Review: Justification Without Awareness: A Defense of Epistemic Externalism. [REVIEW] Mind 116 (464):1088-1092.
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  74. Stephen Cade Hetherington (1991). On Being Epistemically Internal. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (4):855-871.
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  75. Stephen Cade Hetherington (1990). Epistemic Internalism's Dilemma. American Philosophical Quarterly 27 (3):245-251.
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  76. Michael Huemer (2007). Compassionate Phenomenal Conservatism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):30-55.
    I defend the principle of Phenomenal Conservatism, on which appearances of all kinds generate at least some justification for belief. I argue that there is no reason for privileging introspection or intuition over perceptual experience as a source of justified belief; that those who deny Phenomenal Conservatism are in a self-defeating position, in that their view cannot be both true and justified; and that thedemand for a metajustification for Phenomenal Conservatism either is an easily met demand, or is an unfair (...)
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  77. Michael Huemer (2006). Phenomenal Conservatism and the Internalist Intuition. American Philosophical Quarterly 43 (2):147-158.
  78. Stephen Jacobson (1992). Internalism in Epistemology and the Internalist Regress. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 70 (4):415 – 424.
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  79. Hilary Kornblith (ed.) (2001). Epistemology: Internalism and Externalism. Blackwell Publishers.
    This book brings together the essays which have defined and advanced this debate.
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  80. Hilary Kornblith (1988). How Internal Can You Get? Synthese 74 (3):313 - 327.
    This paper examines Laurence BonJour''s defense of internalism inThe Structure of Empirical Knowledge with an eye toward better understanding the issues which separate internalists from externalists. It is argued that BonJour''s Doxastic Presumption cannot play the role which is required of it to make his internalism work. It is further argued that BonJour''s internalism, and, indeed, all other internalisms, are motivated by a Cartesian view of an agent''s access to her own mental states. This Caretsian view is argued to be (...)
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  81. Jonathan Kvanvig (2000). Zagzebski on Justification. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (1):191-196.
    The heart of the epistemological interest of Zagzebski’s book is found in the tasks of clarifying the natures of justification and knowledge in terms of the intellectual virtues. It is in virtue of undertaking this task that Zagzebski presents a version of virtue epistemology. Though the book has several interesting features apart from this task, I want to argue that in its fundamental tasks, the book is a failure. In particular, I will argue that Zagzebski’s virtue account of justification is (...)
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  82. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2000). Externalism and Epistemology Worth Doing. Southern Journal of Philosophy 38 (S1):27-42.
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  83. Pierre le Morvan (2005). A Metaphilosophical Dilemma for Epistemic Externalism. Metaphilosophy 36 (5):688-707.
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  84. Keith Lehrer & Stewart Cohen (1983). Justification, Truth, and Coherence. Synthese 55 (2):191 - 207.
    A central issue in epistemology concerns the connection between truth and justification. The burden of our paper is to explain this connection. Reliabilism, defended by Goldman, assumes that the connection is one of reliability. We argue that this assumption is too strong. We argue that foundational theories, such as those articulated by Pollock and Chisholm fail to elucidate the connection. We consider the potentiality of coherence theories to explain the truth connection by means of higher level convictions about probabilities, which (...)
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  85. Adam Leite (2005). Epistemological Externalism and the Project of Traditional Epistemology. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (3):505–533.
    Traditional epistemological reflection on our beliefs about the world attempts to proceed without presupposing or ineliminably depending upon any claims about the world. It has been argued that epistemological externalism fails to engage in the right way with the motivations for this project. I argue, however, that epistemological externalism satisfyingly undermines this project. If we accept the thesis that certain conditions other than the truth of one's belief must obtain in the world outside of one's mind in order for one (...)
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  86. Arnold Levison (1981). 'Epistemology Today: A Perspective in Retrospect' by Ernest Sosa. Philosophical Studies 40 (3):333 - 338.
  87. Clayton Littlejohn (forthcoming). Evidence and Armchair Access. Synthese.
    I want to discuss a problem that arises when you try to combine an attractive account of what constitutes evidence with an independently plausible account of the kind of access we have to our evidence. According to E = K, our evidence consists of what we know. According to the principle of armchair access, if a proposition is part of our evidence we ought to be able to know that this proposition is part of our evidence ‘from the armchair’. Combined, (...)
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  88. Clayton Littlejohn (2012). Justification and the Truth-Connection. Cambridge University Press.
  89. Clayton Littlejohn (2011). Defeating Phenomenal Conservatism. Analytic Philosophy 52 (1):35-48.
    According to the phenomenal conservatives, beliefs are justified by non-doxastic states we might speak of as ‘appearances’ or ‘seemings’. Those who defend the view say that there is something self-defeating about believing that phenomenal conservatism is mistaken. They also claim that the view captures an important internalist insight about justification. I shall argue that phenomenal conservatism is indefensible. The considerations that seem to support the view commit the phenomenal conservatives to condoning morally abhorrent behavior. They can deny that their view (...)
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  90. Clayton Littlejohn (2011). Reasons and Belief's Justification. In Andrew Reisner & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Reasons for Belief. Cambridge University Press.
    There has been a considerable amount of debate about the norms of belief, but little discussion to date about what the reasons associated with these norms demand from us. By working out an account of what reasons demand, we can better understand the nature of justification.
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  91. Clayton Littlejohn (2009). The Externalist's Demon. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (3):pp. 399-434.
  92. Errol Lord (2010). Having Reasons and the Factoring Account. Philosophical Studies 149 (3).
    It’s natural to say that when it’s rational for me to φ, I have reasons to φ. That is, there are reasons for φ-ing, and moreover, I have some of them. Mark Schroeder calls this view The Factoring Account of the having reasons relation. He thinks The Factoring Account is false. In this paper, I defend The Factoring Account. Not only do I provide intuitive support for the view, but I also defend it against Schroeder’s criticisms. Moreover, I show that (...)
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  93. Diego E. Machuca (ed.) (2011). New Essays on Ancient Pyrrhonism. Brill.
    These new essays represent a substantial contribution to the advancement of scholarship on Pyrrhonian skepticism.
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  94. B. J. C. Madison (2010). Epistemic Internalism. Philosophy Compass 5 (10):840-853.
    The internalism/externalism debate is of interest in epistemology since it addresses one of the most fundamental questions in the discipline: what is the basic nature of knowledge and epistemic justification? It is generally held that if a positive epistemic status obtains, this is not a brute fact. Rather if a belief is, for example, justified, it is justified in virtue of some further condition(s) obtaining. What has been called epistemic internalism holds, as the label suggests, is that all the relevant (...)
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  95. B. J. C. Madison (2009). On the Compatibility of Epistemic Internalism and Content Externalism. Acta Analytica 24 (3):173-183.
    In this paper I consider a recent argument of Timothy Williamson’s that epistemic internalism and content externalism are indeed incompatible, and since he takes content externalism to be above reproach, so much the worse for epistemic internalism. However, I argue that epistemic internalism, properly understood, remains substantially unaffected no matter which view of content turns out to be correct. What is key to the New Evil Genius thought experiment is that, given everything of which the inhabitants are consciously aware, the (...)
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  96. B. J. C. Madison (2008). Epistemic Internalism: An Explanation and Defense. Dissertation, University College London
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  97. Peter J. Markie (2008). Justification Without Awareness – Michael Bergmann. Philosophical Quarterly 58 (232):550–555.
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  98. James McBain (2005). Epistemological Practice and the Internalism/Externalism Debate. Facta Philosophica 7 (2):283-291.
    The dialogue between internalists who maintain a belief is a case of knowledge when that which justifies the belief is within the agent's first-person perspective and externalists who maintain epistemic justification can be in part, or entirely, outside the agent's first-person perspective has been part of the epistemological literature for some time with one side usually attempting to show how the other side is mistaken. Edward Craig argues the internalist/externalist debate is flawed from the outset. Specifically, both internalism and externalism (...)
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  99. Timothy McGrew & Lydia McGrew (2007). Internalism and Epistemology : The Architecture of Reason. In Michael Beaney (ed.), The Analytic Turn: Analysis in Early Analytic Philosophy and Phenomenology. Routledge.
    Internalism and Epistemology is a powerful articulation and defense of a classical answer to an enduring question: What is the nature of rational belief? In opposition to prevailing philosophical fashion, the book argues that epistemic externalism leads, not just to skepticism, but to epistemic nihilism - the denial of the very possibility of justification. And it defends a subtle and sophisticated internalism against criticisms that have widely but mistakenly been thought to be decisive. Beginning with an internalist response to the (...)
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  100. Brian P. McLaughlin (2000). Self-Knowledge, Externalism, and Skepticism. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 74 (74):93-118.
    [Brian P. McLaughlin] In recent years, some philosophers have claimed that we can know a priori that certain external world skeptical hypotheses are false on the basis of a priori knowledge that we are in certain kinds of mental states, and a priori knowledge that those mental states are individuated by contingent environmental factors. Appealing to a distinction between weak and strong a priority, I argue that weakly a priori arguments of this sort would beg the question of whether the (...)
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