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  1. John Aach (1990). Psychologism Reconsidered: A Re-Evaluation of the Arguments of Frege and Husserl. Synthese 85 (2):315 - 338.
  2. David J. Alexander (2012). Inferential Internalism and Reflective Defeat. Philosophia 40 (3):497-521.
    Inferential Internalists accept the Principle of Inferential Justification (PIJ), according to which one has justification for believing P on the basis of E only if one has justification for believing that E makes probable P. Richard Fumerton has defended PIJ by appeal to examples, and recently Adam Leite has argued that this principle is supported by considerations regarding the nature of responsible belief. In this paper, I defend a form of externalism against both arguments. This form of externalism recognizes what (...)
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  3. David J. Alexander (2012). Weak Inferential Internalism. Journal of Philosophical Research 37:357-377.
    Inferential internalism holds that for one to be inferentially justified in believing P on the basis of E one must be justified in believing that E makes probable P. Inferential internalism has long been accused of generating a vicious regress on inferential justification that has drastic skeptical consequences. However, recently Hookway and Rhoda have defended a more modest form of internalism that avoids this problem. They propose a form of weak inferential internalism according to which internalist conditions are restricted to (...)
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  4. David J. Alexander (2012). Weak Inferential Internalism is Indistinguishable From Externalism – A Reply to Rhoda. Journal of Philosophical Research 37:387-394.
    In “Weak Inferential Internalism” I defended the frequently voiced criticism that any internalist account of inferential justification generates a vicious regress. My defense involved criticizing a recent form of internalism, “Weak Inferential Internalism” (WII) defended by Hookway and Rhoda. I argued that while WII does not generate a vicious regress, the position is only distinguishable from externalism insofar as it makes an arbitrary distinction between individuals who believe for the very same reason. Either way, WII is not a defensible internalist (...)
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  5. Keith Allen (2010). Perception and Basic Beliefs: Zombies, Modules, and the Problem of the External World * By JACK C. LYONS. Analysis 70 (2):391-393.
    (No abstract is available for this citation).
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  6. Robert Almeder (1995). Externalism and Justification. Philosophia 24 (3-4):465-469.
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  7. Marc Alspector-kelly (2006). Knowledge Externalism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (3):289–300.
    A popular counterexample directed against externalist epistemological views is that of an agent (Lehrer's "Truetemp" for example) whose beliefs are clearly neither justified nor known but that were generated in the manner that the externalist requires, thereby demonstrating externalism to be insufficient. In this essay I develop and defend an externalist account of knowledge – essentially an elaboration of Fred Dreske's information-theoretic account – that is not susceptible to those criticisms. I then briefly discuss the relationship between knowledge and justification.
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  8. William Alston (1989). Epistemic Justification. Cornell University Press.
    Introduction As the title indicates, the chief focus of this book is epistemic justification. But just what is epistemic justification and what is its place ...
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  9. William P. Alston (1988). An Internalist Externalism. Synthese 74 (3):265 - 283.
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  10. William P. Alston (1986). Internalism and Externalism in Epistemology. Philosophical Topics 14 (1):179-221.
    Internalism restricts justifiers to what is "within" the subject. two main forms of internalism are (1) perspectival internalism (pi), which restricts justifiers to what the subject knows or justifiably believes, and (2) access internalism (ai), which restricts justifiers to what is directly accessible to the subject. the two forms are analyzed and interrelated, and the grounds for each are examined. it is concluded that although pi is both unacceptable and without adequate support, a modest form of ai might be defended.
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  11. D. M. Armstrong (1973). Belief, Truth and Knowledge. London,Cambridge University Press.
    The book as a whole if offered as a contribution to a naturalistic account of man.
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  12. Axel Arturo Barceló Aspeitia (2011). An Insubstantial Externalism. Journal of Philosophy 108 (10):576-582.
    In one of his recent articles published in this JOURNAL, Alvin J. Goldman argues that since one must counts epistemic rules among the factors that help to fix the justificational status of agents (generally called J-factors), not all J-factors are internalist i.e. intrinsic to the agent whose justificational status they help to fix. After all, for an epistemic rule to count as a genuine J-factor, it must be objectively correct, and therefore, “independent of any and all minds” (p.9). Consequently, it (...)
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  13. Robert Audi (1993). The Structure of Justification. Cambridge University Press.
    This collection of papers (including three completely new ones) by one of the foremost philosophers in epistemology transcends two of the most widely misunderstood positions in philosophy--foundationalism and coherentism. Audi proposes a distinctively moderate, internalist foundationalism that incorporates some of the virtues of both coherentism and reliabilism. He develops important distinctions between positive and negative epistemic dependence, substantively and conceptually naturalistic theories, dispositional beliefs and dispositions to believe, episodically and structurally inferential beliefs, first and second order internalism, and rebutting as (...)
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  14. Guy Axtell (2011). From Internalist Evidentialism to Virtue Responsibilism. In Trent Dougherty (ed.), Evidentialism and its Discontents. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Evidentialism as its leading proponents describe it has two distinct senses, these being evidentialism as a conceptual analysis of epistemic justification, and as a prescriptive ethics of belief—an account of what one ‘ought to believe’ under different epistemic circumstances. These two senses of evidentialism are related, but in the work of leading evidentialist philosophers, in ways that I think are deeply problematic. Although focusing on Richard Feldman’s ethics of belief, this chapter is critical of evidentialism in both senses. However, I (...)
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  15. Guy Axtell (2011). Recovering Responsibility. Logos and Episteme (3):429-454..
    This paper defends the epistemological importance of ‘diachronic’ or cross-temporal evaluation of epistemic agents against an interesting dilemma posed for this view in Trent Dougherty’s recent paper “Reducing Responsibility.” This is primarily a debate between evidentialists and character epistemologists, and key issues of contention that the paper treats include the divergent functions of synchronic and diachronic (longitudinal) evaluations of agents and their beliefs, the nature and sources of epistemic normativity, and the advantages versus the costs of the evidentialists’ reductionism about (...)
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  16. Guy Axtell (2008). Expanding Epistemology: A Responsibilist Approach. Philosophical Papers 37 (1):51-87.
    The first part of this paper asks why we need, or what would motivate, ameaningful expansion of epistemology. It answers with three critical arguments found in the recent literature, which each purport to move us some distance beyond the preoccupations of ‘post-Gettier era’ analytic epistemology. These three—the ‘epistemic luck,’ ‘epistemic value’ and ‘epistemic reconciliation’ arguments associated with D. Pritchard, J. Kvanvig, and M. Williams, respectively—each carry this implication of needed expansion by functioning as forceful ‘internal critiques’ of the tradition. The (...)
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  17. Brian Ball & Michael Blome-Tillmann (2013). Indexical Reliabilism and the New Evil Demon. Erkenntnis 78 (6):1317-1336.
    Stewart Cohen’s New Evil Demon argument raises familiar and widely discussed concerns for reliabilist accounts of epistemic justification. A now standard response to this argument, initiated by Alvin Goldman and Ernest Sosa, involves distinguishing different notions of justification. Juan Comesaña has recently and prominently claimed that his Indexical Reliabilism (IR) offers a novel solution in this tradition. We argue, however, that Comesaña’s proposal suffers serious difficulties from the perspective of the philosophy of language. More specifically, we show that the two (...)
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  18. David James Barnett (2013). What's the Matter with Epistemic Circularity? Philosophical Studies:1-29.
    If the reliability of a source of testimony is open to question, it seems epistemically illegitimate to verify the source’s reliability by appealing to that source’s own testimony. Is this because it is illegitimate to trust a questionable source’s testimony on any matter whatsoever? Or is there a distinctive problem with appealing to the source’s testimony on the matter of that source’s own reliability? After distinguishing between two kinds of epistemically illegitimate circularity—bootstrapping and self-verification—I argue for a qualified version of (...)
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  19. Benjamin Bayer (2012). Internalism Empowered: How to Bolster a Theory of Justification with a Direct Realist Theory of Awareness. [REVIEW] Acta Analytica 27 (4):383-408.
    Abstract The debate in the philosophy of perception between direct realists and representationalists should influence the debate in epistemology between internalists and externalists about justification. If direct realists are correct, there are more consciously accessible justifiers for internalists to exploit than externalists think. Internalists can retain their distinctive internalist identity while accepting this widened conception of internalistic justification: even if they welcome the possibility of cognitive access to external facts, their position is still quite distinct from the typical externalist position. (...)
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  20. Michael Bergmann (2013). Externalist Justification and the Role of Seemings. Philosophical Studies 166 (1):163-184.
    It’s not implausible to think that whenever I have a justified noninferential belief that p, it is caused by a seeming that p. It’s also tempting to think that something contributes to the justification of my belief only if I hold my belief because of that thing. Thus, given that many of our noninferential beliefs are justified and that we hold them because of seemings, one might be inclined to hold a view like Phenomenal Conservatism, according to which seemings play (...)
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  21. Michael Bergmann (2006). Justification Without Awareness: A Defense of Epistemic Externalism. Oxford University Press.
    Virtually all philosophers agree that for a belief to be epistemically justified, it must satisfy certain conditions. Perhaps it must be supported by evidence. Or perhaps it must be reliably formed. Or perhaps there are some other "good-making" features it must have. But does a belief's justification also require some sort of awareness of its good-making features? The answer to this question has been hotly contested in contemporary epistemology, creating a deep divide among its practitioners. Internalists, who tend to focus (...)
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  22. Michael Bergmann (1997). Internalism, Externalism and the No-Defeater Condition. Synthese 110 (3):399-417.
    Despite various attempts to rectify matters, the internalism-externalism (I-E) debate in epistemology remains mired in serious confusion. I present a new account of this debate, one which fits well with entrenched views on the I-E distinction and illuminates the fundamental disagreements at the heart of the debate. Roughly speaking, the I-E debate is over whether or not certain of the necessary conditions of positive epistemic status are internal. But what is the sense of internal here? And of which conditions of (...)
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  23. Laurence BonJour (1985). The Structure of Empirical Knowledge. Harvard University Press.
    1 Knowledge and Justification This book is an investigation of one central problem which arises in the attempt to give a philosophical account of empirical ...
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  24. Laurence Bonjour (1980). Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5 (1):53-73.
    One of the many problems that would have t o be solved by a satisfactory theory of empirical knowledge, perhaps the most central is a general structural problem which I shall call the epistemic regress problem: the problem of how to avoid an in- finite and presumably vicious regress of justification in ones account of the justifica- tion of empirical beliefs. Foundationalist theories of empirical knowledge, as we shall see further below, attempt t o avoid the regress by locating a (...)
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  25. Laurence BonJour & Ernest Sosa (2003). Epistemic Justification: Internalism Vs. Externalism, Foundations Vs. Virtues. Blackwell Pub..
    The regress problem and foundationalism -- Externalist accounts of justification -- In search of coherentism -- Back to foundationalism -- The conceptualization of sensory experience and the problem of the external world -- Knowledge and justification -- Does knowledge have foundation -- Skepticism and the internal/external divide -- A virtue epistemology -- Reply to Sosa -- Reply to Bonjour.
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  26. Anthony Robert Booth (2011). The Theory of Epistemic Justification and the Theory of Knowledge: A Divorce. Erkenntnis 75 (1):37-43.
    Richard Foley has suggested that the search for a good theory of epistemic justification and the analysis of knowledge should be conceived of as two distinct projects. However, he has not offered much support for this claim, beyond highlighting certain salutary consequences it might have. In this paper, I offer some further support for Foley’s claim by offering an argument and a way to conceive the claim in a way that makes it as plausible as its denial, and thus levelling (...)
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  27. Jessica Brown (2007). Externalism in Mind and Epistemology. In Sanford Goldberg (ed.), Internalism and Externalism in Semantics and Epistemology. Oxford University Press. 13--34.
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  28. A. Brueckner (2012). Against an Argument Against Justification Internalism. Analysis 72 (4):745-746.
    A novel (and surprising) argument against justification internalism. Analysis 72: 239–43, Sanford Goldberg uses the New Evil Demon thought experiment in an attempt to argue as in the foregoing title. I respond by maintaining that his argument fails when aimed at a prominent version of internalism, viz. evidentialism.
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  29. Anthony Brueckner (2011). Justification, Internalism, and Cream Cheese. Philosophical Papers 38 (1):13-20.
    This paper is a critique of John Gibbons's main example against internalism about justification in 'Access Externalism'. I argue that the underdescription of the example defeats its force against internalism.
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  30. Anthony Brueckner (1996). Deontologism and Internalism in Epistemology. Noûs 30 (4):527-536.
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  31. Evan Butts (2012). Mentalism is Not Epistemic Ur-Internalism. Philosophical Explorations 15 (2):233 - 249.
    Earl Conee and Richard Feldman claim that mentalism identifies the core of internalist epistemology. This is what I call identifying ur-internalism. Their version of ur-internalism differs from the traditional one ? viz., accessibilism ? by not imposing requirements stipulating that subjects must have reflective access to facts which justify their beliefs for these beliefs to be justified. Instead, justification simply supervenes on the mental lives of subjects. I argue that mentalism fails to establish itself as ur-internalism by demonstrating that the (...)
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  32. Stewart Cohen (1984). Justification and Truth. Philosophical Studies 46 (3):279--95.
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  33. Juan Comesaña (2005). We Are (Almost) All Externalists Now. Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):59–76.
    In this paper I argue against Mentalism, the claim that all the factors that contribute to the epistemic justification of a doxastic attitude towards a proposition by a subject S are mental states of S. My objection to mentalism is that there is a special kind of fact (what I call a "support fact") that contributes to the justification of any belief, and that is not mental. My argument against mentalism, then, is the following: Anti-mentalism argument: 1. If mentalism is (...)
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  34. Juan Comesana (2005). We Are (Almost) All Externalists Now. Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):59-76.
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  35. Juan Comesaña (2002). The Diagonal and the Demon. Philosophical Studies 110 (3):249 - 266.
    Reliabilism about epistemic justification – thethesis that what makes a belief epistemicallyjustified is that it was produced by a reliableprocess of belief-formation – must face twoproblems. First, what has been called ``the newevil demon problem'', which arises from the ideathat the beliefs of victims of an evil demonare as justified as our own beliefs, althoughthey are not – the objector claims – reliablyproduced. And second, the problem of diagnosingwhy skepticism is so appealing despite beingfalse. I present a special version ofreliabilism, (...)
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  36. Earl Conee (2004). Externalism, Internalism, and Skepticism. Philosophical Issues 14 (1):78–90.
  37. Earl Conee & Richard Feldman (2004). Evidentialism. Oxford University Press.
    Evidentialism holds that the justified attitudes are determined entirely by the person's evidence. This is the traditional view ofjustification.
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  38. Earl Conee & Richard Feldman (2001). Internalism Defended. In Hilary Kornblith (ed.), Epistemology: Internalism and Externalism. Blackwell. 1 - 18.
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  39. Dan D. Crawford (2002). Ultra-Strong Internalism and the Reliabilist Insight. Journal of Philosophical Research 27:311-328.
    When someone believes something that is justified for her, what part does the subject play in her state of being justified? I will answer this question by developing a strong internalist account of justification according to which the justification of a believing for a subject consists in her having grounds for her belief, and holding the belief in recognition of those grounds. But the internalist theory I defend incorporates key elements of reliabilism into its account. Using perception as a model (...)
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  40. Thomas M. Crisp (2010). A Dilemma for Internalism? Synthese 174 (3):355 - 366.
    Internalism about epistemic justification (henceforth, ‘internalism’) says that a belief B is epistemically justified for S only if S is aware of some good-making feature of B, some feature that makes for B’s having positive epistemic status: e.g., evidence for B. Externalists with respect to epistemic justification (‘externalists’) deny this awareness requirement. Michael Bergmann has recently put this dilemma against internalism: awareness admits of a strong and a weak construal; given the strong construal, internalism is subject to debilitating regress troubles; (...)
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  41. Thomas M. Crisp, Matthew Davidson & David Vander Laan (eds.) (2006). Knowledge and Reality: Essays in Honor of Alvin Plantinga. Springer.
    This volume comprises essays presented to Alvin Plantinga on the occasion of his 70th birthday.
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  42. Joe Cruz & John Pollock (2004). The Chimerical Appeal of Epistemic Externalism. In Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge. De Gruyter. 125--42.
    Internalism in epistemology is the view that all the factors relevant to the justification of a belief are importantly internal to the believer, while externalism is the view that at least some of those factors are external. This extremely modest first approximation cries out for refinement (which we undertake below), but is enough to orient us in the right direction, namely that the debate between internalism and externalism is bound up with the controversy over the correct account of the distinction (...)
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  43. Jonathan Dancy (1992). Externalism for Internalists. Philosophical Issues 2:93-114.
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  44. Terry Dartnall (2005). Does the World Leak Into the Mind? Active Externalism, "Internalism", and Epistemology. Cognitive Science 29 (1):135-43.
  45. Terry Dartnall (2004). Epistemology, Emulators, and Extended Minds. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (3):401-402.
    Grush's framework has epistemological implications and explains how it is possible to acquire offline empirical knowledge. It also complements the extended-mind thesis, which says that mind leaks into the world. Grush's framework suggests that the world leaks into the mind through the offline deployment of emulators that we usually deploy in our experience of the world.
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  46. Marian David (2012). Lehrer on Trustworthiness and Acceptance. Philosophical Studies 161 (1):7-15.
    The paper explores Lehrer's notions of trustworthiness and acceptance and the interplay between them; it adopts a historical approach, looking at how Lehrer's views on these topics have evolved over the years.
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  47. Marian David (1996). Review Essay: Working Without a Net. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (4):943-952.
  48. Matthew Davidson & Gordon Barnes (forthcoming). Internalism and Properly Basic Belief. In David Werther Mark Linville (ed.), Philosophy and the Christian Worldview : Analysis, Assessment and Development. Continuum.
    In this paper we set out a view on which internalist proper basicality is secured by sensory experience.
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  49. Jeroen de Ridder (2014). Why Only Externalists Can Be Steadfast. Erkenntnis 79 (1):185-199.
    What is the rational response to disagreement with an epistemic peer? Some say the steadfast response of holding on to your own belief can be rational; others argue that some degree of conciliation is always rationally required. I argue that only an epistemological externalist about rationality—someone who holds that the rationality of a belief is partly constituted by factors outside a subject’s cognitive perspective—can defend the steadfast view. Or at least that this is so in the kinds of idealized cases (...)
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  50. Michael DePaul (2011). Sosa, Certainty and the Problem of the Criterion. Philosophical Papers 40 (3):287-304.
    Abstract In Reflective Knowledge, Ernest Sosa continues his detailed and intriguing defense of his two level account of knowledge that recognizes both animal and reflective knowledge. The latter more impressive type of knowledge requires a coherent positive epistemic perspective defending the reliability of a source of belief. Viewing Sosa's discussion from the through the lens provided by R.M. Chisholm's treatments of the problem of the criterion, I worry that Sosa's approach is too far in the methodist direction. As a result, (...)
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