Related categories
Siblings:
74 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Sort by:
1 — 50 / 74
  1. Guy Axtell (2003). Felix Culpa: Luck in Ethics and Epistemology. Metaphilosophy 34 (3):331--352.
    Luck threatens in similar ways our conceptions of both moral and epistemic evaluation. This essay examines the problem of luck as a metaphilosophical problem spanning the division between subfields in philosophy. I first explore the analogies between ethical and epistemic luck by comparing influential attempts to expunge luck from our conceptions of agency in these two subfields. I then focus upon Duncan Pritchard's challenge to the motivations underlying virtue epistemology, based specifically on its handling of the problem of epistemic luck. (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Guy Axtell (2001). Epistemic Luck in Light of the Virtues. In Abrol Fairweather & Linda Zagzebski (eds.), Virtue Epistemology: Essays on Epistemic Virtue and Responsibility. Oxford University Press. 158--177.
    The presence of luck in our cognitive as in our moral lives shows that the quality of our intellectual character may not be entirely up to us as individuals, and that our motivation and even our ability to desire the truth, like our moral goodness, can be fragile. This paper uses epistemologists'responses to the problem of “epistemic luck” as a sounding board and locates the source of some of their deepest disagreements in divergent, value-charged “interests in explanation,” which epistemologists bring (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Jason Baehr (2006). Epistemic Luck. By Duncan Pritchard. Metaphilosophy 37 (5):728-736.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Nathan Ballantyne (2014). Does Luck Have a Place in Epistemology? Synthese 191 (7):1391-1407.
    Some epistemologists hold that exploration and elaboration of the nature of luck will allow us to better understand knowledge. I argue this is a mistake.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Nathan Ballantyne (2012). Luck and Interests. Synthese 185 (3):319-334.
    Recent work on the nature of luck widely endorses the thesis that an event is good or bad luck for an individual only if it is significant for that individual. In this paper, I explore this thesis, showing that it raises questions about interests, well-being, and the philosophical uses of luck. In Sect. 1, I examine several accounts of significance, due to Pritchard (2005), Coffman (2007), and Rescher (1995). Then in Sect. 2 I consider what some theorists want to ‘do’ (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Nathan Ballantyne (2011). Anti-Luck Epistemology, Pragmatic Encroachment, and True Belief. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41 (4):485-503.
  7. Peter Baumann (2014). No Luck With Knowledge? On a Dogma of Epistemology. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (3):523-551.
    Current epistemological orthodoxy has it that knowledge is incompatible with luck. More precisely: Knowledge is incompatible with epistemic luck . This is often treated as a truism which is not even in need of argumentative support. In this paper, I argue that there is lucky knowledge. In the first part, I use an intuitive and not very developed notion of luck to show that there are cases of knowledge which are “lucky” in that sense. In the second part, I look (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Kelly Becker (2008). Epistemic Luck and the Generality Problem. Philosophical Studies 139 (3):353 - 366.
    Epistemic luck has been the focus of much discussion recently. Perhaps the most general knowledge-precluding type is veritic luck, where a belief is true but might easily have been false. Veritic luck has two sources, and so eliminating it requires two distinct conditions for a theory of knowledge. I argue that, when one sets out those conditions properly, a solution to the generality problem for reliabilism emerges.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Daniel Breyer (2010). Reflective Luck and Belief Ownership. Acta Analytica 25 (2):133-154.
    A belief is reflectively lucky if it is a matter of luck that the belief is true, given what a subject is aware of on reflection alone. Various epistemologists have argued that any adequate theory of knowledge should eliminate reflective luck, but doing so has proven difficult. This article distinguishes between two kinds of reflective luck arguments in the literature: local arguments and global arguments. It argues that local arguments are best interpreted as demanding, not that one be reflectively aware (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Fernando Broncano-Berrocal (2014). Anti-Luck (Too Weak) Virtue Epistemology. Erkenntnis 79 (4):733-754.
    I argue that Duncan Pritchard’s anti-luck virtue epistemology is insufficient for knowledge. I show that Pritchard fails to achieve the aim that motivates his adoption of a virtue-theoretic condition in the first place: to guarantee the appropriate direction of fit that known beliefs have. Finally, I examine whether other virtue-theoretic accounts are able to explain what I call the direction of fit problem.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Anthony Brueckner & Christopher T. Buford (2013). Becker on Epistemic Luck. Philosophical Studies 163 (1):171-175.
    Kelly Becker has argued that in an externalist anti-luck epistemology, we must hold that knowledge requires the satisfaction of both a modalized tracking condition and a process reliability condition. We raise various problems for the examples that are supposed to establish this claim.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. J. Adam Carter (2014). Robust Virtue Epistemology As Anti‐Luck Epistemology: A New Solution. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 95 (2).
    Robust Virtue Epistemology (RVE) maintains that knowledge is achieved just when an agent gets to the truth through, or because of, the manifestation of intellectual virtue or ability. A notorious objection to the view is that the satisfaction of the virtue condition will be insufficient to ensure the safety of the target belief; that is, RVE is no anti-luck epistemology. Some of the most promising recent attempts to get around this problem are considered and shown to ultimately fail. Finally, a (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. J. Adam Carter (2013). Extended Cognition and Epistemic Luck. Synthese 190 (18):4201-4214.
    When extended cognition is extended into mainstream epistemology, an awkward tension arises when considering cases of environmental epistemic luck. Surprisingly, it is not at all clear how the mainstream verdict that agents lack knowledge in cases of environmental luck can be reconciled with principles central to extended cognition.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. J. Adam Carter, Benjamin Jarvis & Katherine Rubin (forthcoming). Varieties of Cognitive Achievement. Philosophical Studies.
    According to robust virtue epistemology (RVE), knowledge is type-identical with a particular species of cognitive achievement. The identification itself is subject to some criticism on the (alleged) grounds that it fails to account for the anti-luck features of knowledge. Although critics have largely focused on environmental luck, the fundamental philosophical problem facing RVE is that it is not clear why it should be a distinctive feature of cognitive abilities that they ordinarily produce beliefs in a way that is safe. We (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. J. Adam Carter, Benjamin Jarvis & Katherine Rubin (2013). Knowledge and the Value of Cognitive Ability. Synthese 190 (17):3715-3729.
    We challenge a line of thinking at the fore of recent work on epistemic value: the line (suggested by Kvanvig in The value of knowledge and the pursuit of understanding, 2003 and others) that if the value of knowledge is “swamped” by the value of mere true belief, then we have good reason to doubt its theoretical importance in epistemology. We offer a value-driven argument for the theoretical importance of knowledge—one that stands even if the value of knowledge is “swamped” (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. J. Adam Carter & Duncan Pritchard (2014). Knowledge‐How and Cognitive Achievement. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (1):n/a-n/a.
    According to reductive intellectualism, knowledge-how just is a kind of propositional knowledge (e.g., Stanley & Williamson 2001; Stanley 2011a, 2011b; Brogaard, 2008a, 2008b, 2009, 2011, 2009, 2011). This proposal has proved controversial because knowledge-how and propositional knowledge do not seem to share the same epistemic properties, particularly with regard to epistemic luck. Here we aim to move the argument forward by offering a positive account of knowledge-how. In particular, we propose a new kind of anti-intellectualism. Unlike neo-Rylean anti-intellectualist views, according (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. J. Adam Carter & Duncan Pritchard (2013). Knowledge‐How and Epistemic Luck. Noûs 47 (4).
    Reductive intellectualists (e.g., Stanley & Williamson ; Stanley ; ; Brogaard ; ; ) hold that knowledge-how is a kind of knowledge-that. For this thesis to hold water, it is obviously important that knowledge-how and knowledge-that have the same epistemic properties. In particular, knowledge-how ought to be compatible with epistemic luck to the same extent as knowledge-that. It is argued, contra reductive intellectualism, that knowledge-how is compatible with a species of epistemic luck which is not compatible with knowledge-that, and thus (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Joseph Adam Carter (2009). Anti-Luck Epistemology and Safety's (Recent) Discontents. Philosophia 38 (3):517-532.
    Anti-luck epistemology is an approach to analyzing knowledge that takes as a starting point the widely-held assumption that knowledge must exclude luck. Call this the anti-luck platitude. As Duncan Pritchard (2005) has suggested, there are three stages constituent of anti-luck epistemology, each which specifies a different philosophical requirement: these stages call for us to first give an account of luck; second, specify the sense in which knowledge is incompatible with luck; and finally, show what conditions must be satisfied in order (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Ian M. Church (2013). Getting 'Lucky' with Gettier. European Journal of Philosophy 21 (1):37-49.
    In this paper I add credence to Linda Zagzebski's (1994) diagnosis of Gettier problems (and the current trend to abandon the standard analysis) by analyzing the nature of luck. It is widely accepted that the lesson to be learned from Gettier problems is that knowledge is incompatible with luck or at least a certain species thereof. As such, understanding the nature of luck is central to understanding the Gettier problem. Thanks by and large to Duncan Pritchard's seminal work, Epistemic Luck, (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. E. J. Coffman (2009). Does Luck Exclude Control? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (3):499-504.
    Many philosophers hold that luck excludes control-more precisely, that an event is lucky for you only if that event lies beyond your control. Call this the Lack of Control Requirement (LCR) on luck. Jennifer Lackey [2008] has recently argued that there is no such requirement on luck. Should such an argument succeed, it would (among other things) disable a main objection to the "libertarian" position in the free will debate. After clarifying the LCR, I defend it against both Lackey's argument (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. E. J. Coffman (2007). Thinking About Luck. Synthese 158 (3):385 - 398.
    Luck looms large in numerous different philosophical subfields. Unfortunately, work focused exclusively on the nature of luck is in short supply on the contemporary analytic scene. In his highly impressive recent book Epistemic Luck, Duncan Pritchard helps rectify this neglect by presenting a partial account of luck that he uses to illuminate various ways luck can figure in cognition. In this paper, I critically evaluate both Pritchard’s account of luck and another account to which Pritchard’s discussion draws our attention—viz., that (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Mylan Engel (1992). Is Epistemic Luck Compatible with Knowledge? Southern Journal of Philosophy 30 (2):59-75.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Richard Foley (1984). ``Epistemic Luck and the Purely Epistemic&Quot. American Philosophical Quarterly 21 (2):113-124.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Wolfgang Freitag (2014). Safety, Sensitivity and “Distant” Epistemic Luck. Theoria 80 (1):44-61.
    Prominent instances of anti-luck epistemology, in particular sensitivity and safety accounts of knowledge, introduce a modal condition on the pertinent belief in terms of closeness or similarity of possible worlds. Very roughly speaking, a belief must continue to be true in close possibilities in order to qualify as knowledge. Such closeness-accounts derive much support from their (alleged) ability to eliminate standard instances of epistemic luck as they appear in prominent Gettier-type examples. The article argues that there are new Gettier-type examples (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Carl Ginet (1988). The Fourth Condition. In D. F. Austin (ed.), Philosophical Analysis. Kluwer. 105--117.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. Preston Greene (2013). When Is A Belief True Because Of Luck? Philosophical Quarterly 63 (252):465-475.
    Many epistemologists are attracted to the claim that knowledge possession excludes luck. Virtue epistemologists attempt to clarify this idea by holding that knowledge requires apt belief: belief that is true because of an agent's epistemic virtues, and not because of luck. Thinking about aptness may have the potential to make progress on important questions in epistemology, but first we must possess an adequate account of when a belief is true because of luck. Existing treatments of aptness assume a simple and (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. Steven D. Hales & Jennifer Adrienne Johnson (2014). Luck Attributions and Cognitive Bias. Metaphilosophy 45 (4-5):509-528.
    Philosophers have developed three theories of luck: the probability theory, the modal theory, and the control theory. To help assess these theories, we conducted an empirical investigation of luck attributions. We created eight putative luck scenarios and framed each in either a positive or a negative light. Furthermore, we placed the critical luck event at the beginning, middle, or end of the scenario to see if the location of the event influenced luck attributions. We found that attributions of luckiness were (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. Barbara J. Hall (1994). On Epistemic Luck. Southern Journal of Philosophy 32 (1):79-84.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. Allan Hazlett, A Gricean Approach to the Gettier Problem.
    David Lewis maintained that epistemological contextualism (on which the truth-conditions for utterances of “S knows p” change in different contexts depending on the salient “alternative possibilities”) could solve the problem of skepticism as well as the Gettier problem. Contextualist approaches to skepticism have become commonplace, if not orthodox, in epistemology. But not so for contextualist approaches to the Gettier problem: the standard approach to this has been to add an “anti-luck” condition to the analysis of knowledge.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. Mark Heller (1999). The Proper Role for Contextualism in an Anti-Luck Epistemology. Philosophical Perspectives 13 (s13):115-129.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. Avram Hiller & Ram Neta (2007). Safety and Epistemic Luck. Synthese 158 (3):303 - 313.
    There is some consensus that for S to know that p, it cannot be merely a matter of luck that S’s belief that p is true. This consideration has led Duncan Pritchard and others to propose a safety condition on knowledge. In this paper, we argue that the safety condition is not a proper formulation of the intuition that knowledge excludes luck. We suggest an alternative proposal in the same spirit as safety, and find it lacking as well.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. Robert Hudson (2013). Saving Pritchard's Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology: The Case of Temp. Synthese:1-15.
    Virtue epistemology is faced with the challenge of establishing the degree to which a knower’s cognitive success is attributable to her cognitive ability. As Duncan Pritchard notes, in some cases one is inclined to a strong version of virtue epistemology, one that requires cognitive success to be because of the exercise of the relevant cognitive abilities. In other cases, a weak version of virtue epistemology seems preferable, where cognitive success need only be the product of cognitive ability. Pritchard’s preference, with (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. Jesper Kallestrup & Duncan Pritchard (2014). Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Twin Earth. European Journal of Philosophy 22 (3):335-357.
    A popular form of virtue epistemology—defended by such figures as Ernest Sosa, Linda Zagzebski and John Greco—holds that knowledge can be exclusively understood in virtue-theoretic terms. In particular, it holds that there isn't any need for an additional epistemic condition to deal with the problem posed by knowledge-undermining epistemic luck. It is argued that the sustainability of such a proposal is called into question by the possibility of epistemic twin earth cases. In particular, it is argued that such cases demonstrate (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. Charlotte Katzoff (1996). When Is Knowledge a Matter of Luck? Grazer Philosophische Studien 51:105-120.
    It is quite common that a claim to knowledge is dismissed as a matter of luck. It is demonstrated that when one cites as the reason for rejecting a true belief that it is merely lucky, this is typically because the belief has not satisfied the requirements of one's theory. So disputes on luck in fact turn out to be disputes on deep epistemological issues. Criterea for epistemological luck suggested by Thomas Nagel, Nicolas Rescher, Alvin Goldman, Mylan Engel and Richard (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. Jonathan Kvanvig (2008). ``Critical Notice of Pritchard's E Pistemic Luck &Quot. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77:272-281.
    Duncan Pritchard’s book (Epistemic Luck, Oxford University Press, 2005) concerns the interplay between two disturbing kinds of epistemic luck, termed “reflective” and “veritic,” and two types of arguments for skepticism, one based on a closure principle for knowledge and the other on an underdetermination thesis about the quality of our evidence for the everyday propositions we believe. Pritchard defends the view that a safety-based account of knowledge can answer the closure argument and provide an account of how veritic epistemic luck (...)
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36. Jonathan Kvanvig (2008). Epistemic Luck. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (1):272-281.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. Brent G. Kyle (2013). Knowledge as a Thick Concept: Explaining Why the Gettier Problem Arises. Philosophical Studies 165 (1):1-27.
    The Gettier problem has stymied epistemologists. But, whether or not this problem is resolvable, we still must face an important question: Why does the Gettier problem arise in the first place? So far, philosophers have seen it as either a problem peculiar to the concept of knowledge, or else an instance of a general problem about conceptual analysis. But I would like to steer a middle course. I argue that the Gettier problem arises because knowledge is a thick concept, and (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. Jennifer Lackey (2008). What Luck is Not. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (2):255 – 267.
    In this paper, I critically examine the two dominant views of the concept of luck in the current literature: lack of control accounts and modal accounts. In particular, I argue that the conditions proposed by such views—that is, a lack of control and the absence of counterfactual robustness—are neither necessary nor sufficient for an event's being lucky. Hence, I conclude that the two main accounts in the current literature both fail to capture what is distinctive of, and central to, the (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  39. Jennifer Lackey (2006). Pritchard's Epistemic Luck. [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly 56 (223):284–289.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (11 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  40. Andrew Latus (2000). Moral and Epistemic Luck. Journal of Philosophical Research 25:149-172.
    The aim of this paper is to offer a diagnosis. It focuses on the problem of moral luck, but, unlike most papers on that topic, offers no solution to the problem. Instead, what I do is discuss a number of attempts to show there is no such thing as moral luck, argue that they fail and, more importantly, that we should not be surprised they fail. I then suggest that the difficulty of the problem posed by moral luck is paralleled (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41. Qilin Li, Quine’s Naturalized Epistemology, Epistemic Normativity and the Gettier Problem.
    In this paper, it is argued that there are (at least) two different kinds of ‘epistemic normativity’ in epistemology, which can be scrutinized and revealed by some comparison with some naturalistic studies of ethics. The first kind of epistemic normativity can be naturalized, but the other not. The doctrines of Quine’s naturalized epistemology is firstly introduced; then Kim’s critique of Quine’s proposal is examined. It is argued that Quine’s naturalized epistemology is able to save some room for the concept of (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  42. Clayton Littlejohn (2012). Justification and the Truth-Connection. Cambridge University Press.
  43. B. J. C. Madison (2011). Combating Anti Anti-Luck Epistemology. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (1):47-58.
    One thing nearly all epistemologists agree upon is that Gettier cases are decisive counterexamples to the tripartite analysis of knowledge; whatever else is true of knowledge, it is not merely belief that is both justified and true. They now agree that knowledge is not justified true belief because this is consistent with there being too much luck present in the cases, and that knowledge excludes such luck. This is to endorse what has become known as the 'anti-luck platitude'. <br /><br (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  44. Rachel McKinnon (2014). You Make Your Own Luck. Metaphilosophy 45 (4-5):558-577.
    This essay takes up two questions. First, what does it mean to say that someone creates her own luck? At least colloquially speaking, luck is conceived as something out of an agent's control. So how could an agent increase or decrease the likelihood that she'll be lucky? Building on some recent work on the metaphysics of luck, the essay argues that there is a sense in which agents can create their own luck because people with more skill tend to have (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  45. Rachel McKinnon (2013). Getting Luck Properly Under Control. Metaphilosophy 44 (4):496-511.
    This article proposes a new account of luck and how luck impacts attributions of credit for agents' actions. It proposes an analogy with the expected value of a series of wagers and argues that luck is the difference between actual outcomes and expected value. The upshot of the argument is that when considering the interplay of intention, chance, outcomes, skill, and actions, we ought to be more parsimonious in our attributions of credit when exercising a skill and obtaining successful outcomes, (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  46. K. Meeker (2007). Review: Epistemic Luck. [REVIEW] Mind 116 (464):1159-1162.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  47. Lisa Miracchi (forthcoming). Competence to Know. Philosophical Studies:1-28.
    I argue against traditional virtue epistemology on which knowledge is a success due to a competence to believe truly, by revealing an in-principle problem with the traditional virtue epistemologist’s explanation of Gettier cases. The argument eliminates one of the last plausible explanation of Gettier cases, and so of knowledge, in terms of non-factive mental states and non-mental conditions. I then I develop and defend a different kind of virtue epistemology, on which knowledge is an exercise of a competence to know. (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  48. Nenad Miščević (2007). Armchair Luck: Apriority, Intellection and Epistemic Luck. [REVIEW] Acta Analytica 22 (1):48-73.
    The paper argues that there is such a thing as luck in acquisition of candidate a priori beliefs and knowledge, and that the possibility of luck in this “armchair” domain shows that definitions of believing by luck that p offered in literature are inadequate, since they mostly rely on the possibility of it being the case that not- p. When p is necessary, such a definition should be supplemented by one pointing to variation in belief, not in the fact believed. (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  49. Carolyn R. Morillo (1984). Epistemic Luck, Naturalistic Epistemology and the Ecology of Knowledge or What the Frog Should Have Told Dretske. Philosophical Studies 46 (1):109-129.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  50. Joshue Orozco (2011). Epistemic Luck. Philosophy Compass 6 (1):11-21.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
1 — 50 / 74