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  1. María Caamaño Alegre (2013). Pragmatic Norms in Science: Making Them Explicit. Synthese 190 (15):3227-3246.
    The present work constitutes an attempt to make explicit those pragmatic norms successfully operating in empirical science. I will first comment on the initial presuppositions of the discussion, in particular, on those concerning the instrumental character of scientific practice and the nature of scientific goals. Then I will depict the moderately naturalistic frame in which, from this approach, the pragmatic norms make sense. Third, I will focus on the specificity of the pragmatic norms, making special emphasis on what I regard (...)
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  2. G. S. Axtell (1992). Normative Epistemology and the Bootstrap Theory. Philosophical Forum 23 (4):329-343.
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  3. H. Bensusan & M. Pinedo (2004). Truth Matters: Normativity in Thought and Knowledge. Theoria 50:137-154.
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  4. Steffen Borge (2006). Review of Knowledge and Lotteries. [REVIEW] Disputatio 1:361-368.
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  5. Jochen Briesen (forthcoming). Epistemic Consequentialism: Its Relation to Ethical Consequentialism and the Truth-Indication Principle. In P. Schmechtig & M. Grajner (eds.), Epistemic Reasons, Norms, and Goals.
    Consequentialist positions in philosophy spell out normative notions by recourse to final aims. Hedonistic versions of ethical consequentialism spell out what is morally right/justified via recourse to the aim of increasing pleasure and decreasing pain. Veritistic versions of epistemic consequentialism spell out what is epistemically right/justified via recourse to the aim of increasing the number of true beliefs and decreasing the number of false ones. Even though these theories are in many respects structurally analogous, there are also interesting disanalogies. For (...)
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  6. Karen Leigh Brown (2002). Epistemic Possibilities and the Sources of Belief. Dissertation, Indiana University
    I develop Stalnaker's ideas of a causal/pragmatic account of belief, refitting them to function in Situation Theory. Building on the semantics of perception reports, I make the case for the idealizing assumption of the veridicality of belief. I introduce as a requirement on a belief state a soundness condition adapted from information theory. The problem of error leads me to develop epistemic support as part of a revised soundness condition. ;I argue that a psychologically adequate model of belief will include (...)
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  7. Denis Bühler (2009). How is Epistemic Reasoning Possible? Abstracta 5 (4):7-20.
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  8. T. Ryan Byerly (2014). The Special Value of Epistemic Self‐Reliance. Ratio 27 (1):53-67.
    Philosophers have long held that epistemic self-reliance has a special value. But, this view has recently been challenged by prominent epistemologist Linda Zagzebski. Zagzebski argues that potential sources of support for the claim that epistemic self-reliance has a special value fail. Here I provide a novel defense of the special value of epistemic self-reliance. Self-reliance has a special value because it is required for attaining certain valuable cognitive achievements. Further, practicing self-reliance may be all-things-considered worthwhile even when doing so is (...)
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  9. María Caamaño Alegre (2013). Pragmatic Norms in Science: Making Them Explicit. Synthese 190 (15):3227-3246.
    The present work constitutes an attempt to make explicit those pragmatic norms successfully operating in empirical science. I will first comment on the initial presuppositions of the discussion, in particular, on those concerning the instrumental character of scientific practice and the nature of scientific goals. Then I will depict the moderately naturalistic frame in which, from this approach, the pragmatic norms make sense. Third, I will focus on the specificity of the pragmatic norms, making special emphasis on what I regard (...)
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  10. Robert L. Campbell (2008). The Peikovian Doctrine of the Arbitrary Assertion. Journal of Ayn Rand Studies 10 (1):85 - 170.
    The doctrine of the arbitrary assertion is a key part of Objectivist epistemology as elaborated by Leonard Peikoff. For Peikoff, assertions unsupported by evidence are neither true nor false; they have no context or place in the hierarchy of conceptual knowledge; they are meaningless and paralyze rational cognition; their production is proof of irrationality. A thorough examination of the doctrine reveals worrisomely unclear standards of evidence and a jumble of contradictory claims about which assertions are arbitrary, when they are arbitrary, (...)
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  11. Hector-Neri Castaneda (1988). Knowledge and Epistemic Obligation. Philosophical Perspectives 2:211-233.
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  12. Arkadiusz Chrudzimski (2000). Ist das Gettier-Problem wirklich ein Problem? Conceptus 33 (82):45-56.
    Viele Philosophen Glauben, daß die sogenannte „klassische” Definition des Wissens: -/- (W)Das Subjekt S weiß, daß p =Df. (i) S glaubt (ist überzeugt), daß p; (ii) S hat eine Begründung (eine epistemische Rechtferigung) für seine Überzeugung, daß p; und (iii) es ist der Fall, daß p. -/- durch das berühmte Gegenbeispiel Gettiers endgültig demoliert wurde: Gettier hat die folgende Situation konstruiert: -/- (G)(1) Das Subjekt S hat eine gute induktive Begründung für die Überzeugung, daß p. (2) S hat die Überzeugung (...)
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  13. James Van Cleve (1985). Epistemic Supervenience and the Circle of Belief. The Monist 68 (1):90 - 104.
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  14. Lorraine Code (2004). The Power Of Ignorance. Philosophical Papers 33 (3):291-308.
    Abstract Taking my point of entry from George Eliot's reference to ?the power of Ignorance?, I analyse some manifestations of that power as she portrays it in the life of a young woman of affluence, in her novel Daniel Deronda. Comparing and contrasting this kind of ignorance with James Mill's avowed ignorance of local tradition and custom in his History of British India, I consider how ignorance can foster immoral beliefs which, in turn, contribute to social-political arrangements of dominance and (...)
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  15. Lorraine Code (1989). The Theory of Epistemic Rationality. Review of Metaphysics 42 (4):829-831.
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  16. Lorraine Code (1988). Alvin I. Goldman, Epistemology and Cognition. [REVIEW] Philosophy in Review 8:398-401.
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  17. Edward Craig (1986). The Practical Explication of Knowledge. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 87:211 - 226.
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  18. D. Dall'Agnol (2009). Themes From G. E. Moore: New Essays in Epistemology and Ethics, Edited by Susana Nuccetelli and Gary Seay. Mind 118 (471):859-862.
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  19. Marian David (2001). Knowledge, Truth, and Duty. New York: Oxford University Press.
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  20. By Igor Douven (2008). The Lottery Paradox and Our Epistemic Goal. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (2):204–225.
    Many have the intuition that the right response to the Lottery Paradox is to deny that one can justifiably believe of even a single lottery ticket that it will lose. The paper shows that from any theory of justification that solves the paradox in accordance with this intuition, a theory not of that kind can be derived that also solves the paradox but is more conducive to our epistemic goal than the former. It is argued that currently there is no (...)
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  21. Igor Douven (2008). The Lottery Paradox and Our Epistemic Goal. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (2):204-225.
    Many have the intuition that the right response to the Lottery Paradox is to deny that one can justifiably believe of even a single lottery ticket that it will lose. The paper shows that from any theory of justification that solves the paradox in accordance with this intuition, a theory not of that kind can be derived that also solves the paradox but is more conducive to our epistemic goal than the former. It is argued that currently there is no (...)
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  22. Jennifer Duke-Yonge (2013). Ownership, Authorship and External Justification. Acta Analytica 28 (2):237-252.
    Some of the most well-known arguments against epistemic externalism come in the form of thought experiments involving subjects who acquire beliefs through anomolous means such as clairvoyance. These thought experiments purport to provide counterexamples to the reliabilist conception of justification: their subjects are intuitively epistemically unjustified, yet meet reliabilist externalist criteria for justification. In this article, I address a recent defence of externalism due to Daniel Breyer, who argues that externalists need not consider such subjects justified, since they fail to (...)
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  23. Pascal Engel (2007). Belief and Normativity. Disputatio 2 (23):179-203.
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  24. Don Fallis (2011). What Liars Can Tell Us About the Knowledge Norm of Practical Reasoning. Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (4):347-367.
    If knowledge is the norm of practical reasoning, then we should be able to alter people's behavior by affecting their knowledge as well as by affecting their beliefs. Thus, as Roy Sorensen (2010) suggests, we should expect to find people telling lies that target knowledge rather than just lies that target beliefs. In this paper, however, I argue that Sorensen's discovery of “knowledge-lies” does not support the claim that knowledge is the norm of practical reasoning. First, I use a Bayesian (...)
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  25. Richard Feldman (1988). ``Subjective and Objective Justification in Ethics and Epistemology&Quot. The Monist 71 (3):405--419.
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  26. Richard Foley (1992). Working Without a Net: Essays in Egocentric Epistemology. New York: Oxford University Press.
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  27. Peter Forrest (2006). Epistemic Bootstrapping1. In Stephen Hetherington (ed.), Aspects of Knowing. Elsevier Science. 53.
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  28. Richard M. Gale (2006). Comments on the Will to Believe. Social Epistemology 20 (1):35 – 39.
    Kasher and Nishi interpret James as holding an expressivist theory about epistemic duties, as well as other normative sentences. On this interpretation, James's claim that we have a will-to-believe type option to believe an epistemic duty winds up being inconsistent. For one can believe only that which is either true or false; but, for the expressivist, normative claims are neither. It is argued that Feldman's essay is not only a wildly anachronistic account of Clifford and James but also is of (...)
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  29. K. Gluer & A. Wikforss (2010). The Truth Norm and Guidance: A Reply to Steglich-Petersen. Mind 119 (475):757-761.
    We have claimed that truth norms cannot provide genuine guidance for belief formation (Glüer and Wikforss 2009, pp. 43–4). Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen argues that our ‘no guidance argument’ fails because it conflates certain psychological states an agent must have in order to apply the truth norm with the condition under which the norm prescribes forming certain beliefs. We spell out the no guidance argument in more detail and show that there is no such conflation.
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  30. Daniel Greco (2014). A Puzzle About Epistemic Akrasia. Philosophical Studies 167 (2):201-219.
    In this paper I will present a puzzle about epistemic akrasia, and I will use that puzzle to motivate accepting some non-standard views about the nature of epistemological judgment. The puzzle is that while it seems obvious that epistemic akrasia must be irrational, the claim that epistemic akrasia is always irrational amounts to the claim that a certain sort of justified false belief—a justified false belief about what one ought to believe—is impossible. But justified false beliefs seem to be possible (...)
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  31. John Greco (2009). Epistemic Value. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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  32. John Greco & David Henderson (eds.) (Forthcoming). Epistemic Evaluation: Point and Purpose in Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
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  33. Andrew Huddleston (2012). Naughty Beliefs. Philosophical Studies 160 (2):209-222.
    Can a person ever occurrently believe p and yet have the simultaneous, occurrent belief q that this very belief that p is false? Surely not, most would say: that description of a person’s epistemic economy seems to misunderstand the very concept of belief. In this paper I question this orthodox assumption. There are, I suggest, cases where we have a first-order mental state m that involves taking the world to be a certain way, yet although we ourselves acknowledge that we (...)
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  34. Robert Hull, Beyond Epistemology: Nietzsche and the Need for Epistemic Criteria.
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  35. Christoph Kelp Igor Douven (2012). In Defense of the Rational Credibility Account: A Reply to Casalegno. Dialectica 66 (2):289-297.
    A majority of philosophers nowadays hold that the practice of assertion is governed by the rule that one must assert only what one knows. In his last published paper, Paolo Casalegno sides with this view and criticizes rival accounts of assertion on which rational belief or rational credibility will do for warranted assertion. We take issue with Casalegno's criticisms and find them wanting.
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  36. R. J. (1927). The Pragmatic Element in Knowledge. [REVIEW] New Scholasticism 1 (4):362-363.
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  37. M. Janvid (2004). Epistemological Naturalism and the Normativity Objection. Erkenntnis 60 (1):35-49.
    A common objection raised against naturalism is that anaturalized epistemology cannot account for the essential normative character of epistemology. Following an analysis of different ways in which this charge could be understood, it will be argued that either epistemology is not normative in the relevant sense, or if it is, then in a way which a naturalized epistemology can account for with an instrumental and hypothetical model of normativity. Naturalism is here captured by the two doctrines of empiricism and gradualism. (...)
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  38. Mikael Janvid (2004). Epistemological Naturalism and the Normativity Objection or From Normativity to Constitutivity. Erkenntnis 60 (1):35-49.
    A common objection raised against naturalism is that a naturalized epistemology cannot account for the essential normative character of epistemology. Following an analysis of different ways in which this charge could be understood, it will be argued that either epistemology is not normative in the relevant sense, or if it is, then in a way which a naturalized epistemology can account for with an instrumental and hypothetical model of normativity. Naturalism is here captured by the two doctrines of empiricism and (...)
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  39. Pedro D. Karczmarczyk (2010). Las condiciones y la naturaleza del discurso crítico: el debate entre hermenéutica y teoría crítica. Discusiones Filosóficas 11 (16):99-147.
    This paper analyses the question concerning the scope, possibility and legitimation of critical discourse. For this we understand the kind of discourse in which a single individual or a minority group sustain claims against what is considered correct by a majority. We concentrate in a controversy where this problem receives a focal attention: the debate between Habermas and Gadamer. The problem with critical discourse there is its apparent paradoxical status. On the one side, it is questioned whether the conditions of (...)
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  40. Thomas Kelly (2007). Evidence and Normativity: Reply to Leite. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (2):465–474.
    According to one view about the rationality of belief, such rationality is ultimately nothing other than the rationality that one exhibits in taking the means to one’s ends. On this view, epistemic rationality is really a species or special case of instrumental rationality. In particular, epistemic rationality is instrumental rationality in the service of one’s distinctively cognitive or epistemic goals (perhaps: one’s goal of holding true rather than false beliefs). In my (2003), I dubbed this view the instrumentalist conception of (...)
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  41. Andrea Kruse (forthcoming). Nikolaj Nottelmann: Blameworthy Belief. A Study in Epistemic Deontologism. Erkenntnis:1-6.
    The theory of epistemic deontologism is an area of normative epistemology. It is concerned with the application of deontic notions such as obligation, permission, blame and praise in epistemic contexts. Nottelmann’s book “Blameworthy Belief” deals with the applicability of one of the central notions of epistemic deontologism, namely the concept of epistemic blameworthiness.But the study goes beyond the analysis and introduction of this concept. By introducing this notion Nottelmann establishes a theory of epistemic deontologism that is build upon epistemic blame (...)
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  42. Jeanette Landgrebe & Trine Heinemann (2014). Mapping the Epistemic Landscape in Innovation Workshops. Pragmatics and Society 5 (2):191-220.
    This article addresses the epistemic domain of adult make-believe activities in innovation workshops. In particular, we demonstrate how adults initiate imaginary transformations of objects while displaying an orientation to a general order of make-believe in which everyone has equal epistemic rights, and how this can be displayed both verbally and nonverbally. This distribution of equal rights is only overridden by external or locally derived roles, and once invoked they override the general preference for epistemic symmetry, after which interlocutors orient to (...)
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  43. Jon Perez Laraudogoitia (1990). A Doxastic Paradox. Analysis 50 (1):47 - 48.
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  44. Sue Howard Larson (1962). Practical Implication: Some Problems in the Logic of Assertion. Dissertation, Stanford University
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  45. Eric B. Litwack (2011). Epistemic Arguments Against Dictatorship. Human Affairs 21 (1):44-51.
    In this article I examine what I term epistemic arguments against epistocratic dictatorships against the background of Harry Frankfurt’s claim that truth is a fundamental governing notion, and some key reflections of Václav Havel and Leszek Kolakowski. Some of the key epistemic arguments offered by Karl Popper, Robert A. Dahl and Ross Harrison are outlined and endorsed. They underscore the insurmountable problems involved in choosing and maintaining a state of allegedly perfectly wise and efficient rulers. Such rule by virtue of (...)
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  46. Matthew Lockard (2013). Epistemic Instrumentalism. Synthese 190 (9):1701-1718.
    According to epistemic instrumentalism, epistemically rational beliefs are beliefs that are produced in ways that are conducive to certain ends that one wants to attain. In “Epistemic Rationality as Instrumental Rationality: A Critique,” Thomas Kelly advances various objections to epistemic instrumentalism. While I agree with the general thrust of Kelly’s objections, he does not distinguish between two forms of epistemic instrumentalism. Intellectualist forms maintain that epistemically rational beliefs are beliefs arrived at in compliance with rules that are conducive to epistemic (...)
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  47. Epistemic Luck (forthcoming). The Purely Epistemic'. American Philosophical Quarterly.
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  48. Peter MacHamer & Lisa Osbeck (2003). Scientific Normativity as Non-Epistemic: A Hidden Kuhnian Legacy. Social Epistemology 17 (1):3 – 11.
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  49. Doug McConnell & Anke Snoek (2012). Narrating Truths Worth Living: Addiction Narratives. American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 3:77-78.
  50. Mark McEvoy (2007). Should Analytic Epistemology Be Replaced By Ameliorative Psychology? Southwest Philosophy Review 23 (1):163-171.
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