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  1. Samuel Alexander (2013). An Axiomatic Version of Fitch's Paradox. Synthese 190 (12):2015-2020.
    A variation of Fitch’s paradox is given, where no special rules of inference are assumed, only axioms. These axioms follow from the familiar assumptions which involve rules of inference. We show (by constructing a model) that by allowing that possibly the knower doesn’t know his own soundness (while still requiring he be sound), Fitch’s paradox is avoided. Provided one is willing to admit that sound knowers may be ignorant of their own soundness, this might offer a way out of the (...)
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  2. Patrick Bondy (2013). How to Understand and Solve the Lottery Paradox. Logos and Episteme 4 (3).
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  3. Kenneth Boyce & Allan Hazlett, Multi-Peer Disagreement and the Preface Paradox.
    One problem in the epistemology of disagreement (Kelly 2005, Feldman 2006, Christensen 2007) concerns peer disagreement, and the reasonable response to a situation in which you believe p and disagree with an “epistemic peer” of yours (more on which notion in a moment), who believes ~p. Another (Elga 2007, pp. 486-8, Kelly 2010, pp. 160-7) concerns serial peer disagreement, and the reasonable response to a situation in which you believe p1 … pn and disagree with an “epistemic peer” of yours, (...)
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  4. Igor Douven (2002). A New Solution to the Paradoxes of Rational Acceptability. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 53 (3):391-410.
    The Lottery Paradox and the Preface Paradox both involve the thesis that high probability is sufficient for rational acceptability. The standard solution to these paradoxes denies that rational acceptability is deductively closed. This solution has a number of untoward consequences. The present paper suggests that a better solution to the paradoxes is to replace the thesis that high probability suffices for rational acceptability with a somewhat stricter thesis. This avoids the untoward consequences of the standard solution. The new solution will (...)
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  5. Simone Duca & Hannes Leitgeb (2012). How Serious Is the Paradox of Serious Possibility? Mind 121 (481):1-36.
    The so-called Paradox of Serious Possibility is usually regarded as showing that the standard axioms of belief revision do not apply to belief sets that are introspectively closed. In this article we argue to the contrary: we suggest a way of dissolving the Paradox of Serious Possibility so that introspective statements are taken to express propositions in the standard sense, which may thus be proper members of belief sets, and accordingly the normal axioms of belief revision apply to them. Instead (...)
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  6. Joseph S. Fulda (1991). The Paradox of the Surprise Test. The Mathematical Gazette 75 (474):419-421.
    Presents a /simple/ epistemic solution to the paradox of the surprise test, suitable for undergraduates. Given the Gazette's audience, recalcitrant versions, such as Sorenson's, would have been inappropriate to even mention. It is also classified under "logical paradoxes," because it can be argued that given the existence of logical, rather than epistemic, solutions, so also the paradox is logical, rather than epistemic. -/- The author was not sent proofs, because the /Gazette/ was then run on a "shoestring budget"; the 2009 (...)
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  7. Mark Jago (2013). The Problem of Rational Knowledge. Erkenntnis:1-18.
    Real-world agents do not know all consequences of what they know. But we are reluctant to say that a rational agent can fail to know some trivial consequence of what she knows. Since every consequence of what she knows can be reached via chains of trivial cot be dismissed easily, as some have attempted to do. Rather, a solution must give adequate weight to the normative requirements on rational agents’ epistemic states, without treating those agents as mathematically ideal reasoners. I’ll (...)
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  8. Saul A. Kripke (2011). Two Paradoxes of Knowledge. In , Philosophical Troubles. Collected Papers Vol I. Oxford University Press.
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  9. Thomas Kroedel (2013). Why Epistemic Permissions Don't Agglomerate – Another Reply to Littlejohn. Logos and Episteme 4 (4):451–455.
    Clayton Littlejohn claims that the permissibility solution to the lottery paradox requires an implausible principle in order to explain why epistemic permissions don't agglomerate. This paper argues that an uncontentious principle suffices to explain this. It also discusses another objection of Littlejohn's, according to which we’re not permitted to believe lottery propositions because we know that we’re not in a position to know them.
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  10. Clayton Littlejohn (2013). Don't Know, Don't Believe: Reply to Kroedel. Logos and Episteme 4 (2):231-38.
    In recent work, Thomas Kroedel has proposed a novel solution to the lottery paradox. As he sees it, we are permitted/justified in believing some lottery propositions, but we are not permitted/justified in believing them all. I criticize this proposal on two fronts. First, I think that if we had the right to add some lottery beliefs to our belief set, we would not have any decisive reason to stop adding more. Suggestions to the contrary run into the wrong kind of (...)
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  11. Joe Salerno, How to Embed Epistemic Modals Without Violating Modus Tollens.
    Epistemic modals in consequent place of indicative conditionals give rise to apparent counterexamples to Modus Ponens and Modus Tollens. Familiar assumptions of fa- miliar truth conditional theories of modality facilitate a prima facie explanation—viz., that the target cases harbor epistemic modal equivocations. However, these explana- tions go too far. For they foster other predictions of equivocation in places where in fact there are no equivocations. It is argued here that the key to the solution is to drop the assumption that (...)
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  12. Martin Smith (forthcoming). The Arbitrariness of Belief. In Dylan Dodd & Elia Zardini (eds.), Contemporary Perspectives on Scepticism and Perceptual Justification. Oxford University Press.
    In Knowledge and Lotteries, John Hawthorne offers a diagnosis of our unwillingness to believe, of a given lottery ticket, that it will lose a fair lottery – no matter how many tickets are involved. According to Hawthorne, it is natural to employ parity reasoning when thinking about lottery outcomes: Put roughly, to believe that a given ticket will lose, no matter how likely that is, is to make an arbitrary choice between alternatives that are perfectly balanced given one’s evidence. It’s (...)
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  13. P. Roger Turner (2012). Jesus' Return as Lottery Puzzle: A Reply to Donald Smith. Religious Studies 48 (3):305-313.
    In his recent article, ‘Lottery puzzles and Jesus’ return’, Donald Smith says that Christians should accept a very robust scepticism about the future because a Christian ought to think that the probability of Jesus’ return happening at any future moment is inscrutable to her. But I think that Smith’s argument lacks the power rationally to persuade Christians who are antecedently uncommitted as to whether or not we can or do have any substantive knowledge about the future. Moreover, I think that (...)
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  14. Jonathan Weisberg (2012). The Bootstrapping Problem. Philosophy Compass 7 (9):597-610.
    Bootstrapping is a suspicious form of reasoning that verifies a source's reliability by checking it against itself. Theories that endorse such reasoning face the bootstrapping problem. This article considers which theories face the problem, and surveys potential solutions. The initial focus is on theories like reliabilism and dogmatism, which allow one to gain knowledge from a source without knowing that it is reliable. But the discussion quickly turns to a more general version of the problem that does not depend on (...)
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  15. Jan Willem Wieland (2013). What Carroll's Tortoise Actually Proves. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (5):983-997.
    Rationality requires us to have certain propositional attitudes (beliefs, intentions, etc.) given certain other attitudes that we have. Carroll’s Tortoise repeatedly shows up in this discussion. Following up on Brunero (Ethical Theory Moral Pract 8:557–569, 2005), I ask what Carroll-style considerations actually prove. This paper rejects two existing suggestions, and defends a third.
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