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  1. Scott F. Aikin (2011). Epistemology and the Regress Problem. Routledge.
    The regress problem -- Infinitism defended -- Metaepistemic varieties of epistemic infinitism -- Foundationalism, infinitism, and the given -- Argumentation and anti-dogmatism.
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  2. Benjamin F. Armstrong Jr (1984). Stopping the Infinite Regress Without Foundationalism. Southwest Philosophy Review 1:151-160.
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  3. Nathan Ballantyne (2012). Acquaintance and Assurance. Philosophical Studies 161 (3):421-431.
    I criticize Richard Fumerton’s fallibilist acquaintance theory of noninferential justification.
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  4. Selim Berker (2015). Coherentism Via Graphs. Philosophical Issues 25 (1):322-352.
    Once upon a time, coherentism was the dominant response to the regress problem in epistemology, but in recent decades the view has fallen into disrepute: now almost everyone is a foundationalist (with a few infinitists sprinkled here and there). In this paper, I sketch a new way of thinking about coherentism, and show how it avoids many of the problems often thought fatal for the view, including the isolation objection, worries over circularity, and concerns that the concept of coherence is (...)
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  5. Oliver Black (1996). Legal Validity and the Infinite Regress. Law and Philosophy 15 (4):339 - 368.
    The following four theses all have some intuitive appeal: (I) There are valid norms. (II) A norm is valid only if justified by a valid norm. (III) Justification, on the class of norms, has an irreflexive proper ancestral. (IV) There is no infinite sequence of valid norms each of which is justified by its successor. However, at least one must be false, for (I)--(III) together entail the denial of (IV). There is thus a conflict between intuition and logical possibility. This (...)
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  6. Ben Bronner (2013). Assertions Only? Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):44-52.
    It is standardly believed that the only way to justify an assertion in the face of a challenge is by making another assertion. Call this claim ASSERTIONS ONLY. Besides its intrinsic interest, ASSERTIONS ONLY is relevant to deciding between competing views of the norms that govern reasoned discourse. ASSERTIONS ONLY is also a crucial part of the motivation for infinitism and Pyrrhonian skepticism. I suggest that ASSERTIONS ONLY is false: I can justify an assertion by drawing attention to something that (...)
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  7. G. Cator (1929). The Logical Foundations of Our Knowledge and the Infinite Regress of Proof. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 30:127 - 142.
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  8. Andrew D. Cling (2008). The Epistemic Regress Problem. Philosophical Studies 140 (3):401 - 421.
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  9. Andrew D. Cling (2004). The Trouble with Infinitism. Synthese 138 (1):101 - 123.
    One way to solve the epistemic regress problem would be to show that we can acquire justification by means of an infinite regress. This is infinitism. This view has not been popular, but Peter Klein has developed a sophisticated version of infinitism according to which all justified beliefs depend upon an infinite regress of reasons. Klein's argument for infinitism is unpersuasive, but he successfully responds to the most compelling extant objections to the view. A key component of his position is (...)
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  10. Andrew Cortens (2002). Foundationalism and the Regress Argument. Disputatio 12:1 - 16.
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  11. Mylan Engel (2014). Positism: The Unexplored Solution to the Epistemic Regress Problem. Metaphilosophy 45 (2):146-160.
    As we trace a chain of reasoning backward, it must ultimately do one of four things: (i) end in an unjustified belief, (ii) continue infinitely, (iii) form a circle, or (iv) end in an immediately justified basic belief. This article defends positism—the view that, in certain circumstances, type-(i) chains can justify us in holding their target beliefs. One of the assumptions that generates the epistemic regress problem is: (A) Person S is mediately justified in believing p iff (1) S has (...)
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  12. Coos Engelsma (2015). Arbitrary Foundations? On Klein’s Objection to Foundationalism. Acta Analytica 30 (4):389-408.
    This paper evaluates Peter Klein’s objection to foundationalism. According to Klein, foundationalism fails because it allows arbitrariness “at the base.” I first explain that this objection can be interpreted in two ways: either as targeting dialectical foundationalism or as targeting epistemic foundationalism. I then clarify Klein’s concept of arbitrariness. An assertion or belief is assumed to be arbitrary if and only if it lacks a reason that is “objectively and subjectively available.” Drawing on this notion, I evaluate Klein’s objection. I (...)
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  13. Coos Engelsma (2014). On Peter Klein's Concept of Arbitrariness. Metaphilosophy 45 (2):192-200.
    According to Peter Klein, foundationalism fails because it allows a vicious form of arbitrariness. The present article critically discusses his concept of arbitrariness. It argues that the condition Klein takes to be necessary and sufficient for an epistemic item to be arbitrary is neither necessary nor sufficient. It also argues that Klein's concept of arbitrariness is not a concept of something that is obviously vicious. Even if Klein succeeds in establishing that foundationalism allows what he regards as arbitrariness, this (...)
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  14. Ciara Fairley, Foundationalism And The Idea Of The Empirical.
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  15. Jeremy Fantl (2012). Epistemology and the Regress Problem. By Scott Aikin. International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 2 (2):157-160.
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  16. Richard Foley (1978). Inferential Justification and the Infinite Regress. American Philosophical Quarterly 15 (4):311 - 316.
    It is commonly thought that the requirements of inferential justification are such that necessarily the process of inferentially justifying a belief will come to an end. But, If this is so, We should be able to pick out those requirements of justification which necessitate an end to the justification process. Unfortunately, Although there is nearly unanimous agreement as to the need for such an end, It is by no means clear which particular requirements of justification impose this need. I (...)
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  17. Carl Ginet (2005). Infinitism is Not the Answer to the Regress Problem. In Matthias Steup & Ernest Sosa (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Blackwell
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  18. Ali Hasan (2013). Internalist Foundationalism and the Sellarsian Dilemma. Res Philosophica 90 (2):171-184.
    According to foundationalism, some beliefs are justified but do not depend for their justification on any other beliefs. According to access internalism, a subject is justified in believing some proposition only if that subject is aware of or has access to some reason to think that the proposition is true or probable. In this paper I discusses a fundamental challenge to internalist foundationalism often referred to as the Sellarsian dilemma. I consider three attempts to respond to the dilemma – phenomenal (...)
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  19. Stephen Hetherington (2010). Elusive Epistemological Justification. Synthese 174 (3):315 - 330.
    What does it take for some epistemological thinking to be epistemically justified? Indeed, is that outcome even possible? This paper argues that it is not possible: no epistemological thinking can ever be epistemically justified. A vicious infinite regress of epistemological reflection is the price that would have to be paid for having some such justification. Clearly, that price would be too high.
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  20. Daniel Howard-Snyder (2012). Foundationalism. In Andrew Cullison (ed.), The Continuum Companion to Epistemology. Continuum 37.
    Foundationalists distinguish basic from nonbasic beliefs. At a first approximation, to say that a belief of a person is basic is to say that it is epistemically justified and it owes its justification to something other than her other beliefs, where “belief” refers to the mental state that goes by that name. To say that a belief of a person is nonbasic is to say that it is epistemically justified and not basic. Two theses constitute Foundationalism: (a) Minimality: There are (...)
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  21. Daniel Howard-Snyder (2005). Foundationalism and Arbitrariness. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (1):18–24.
    Nonskeptical foundationalists say that there are basic beliefs. But, one might object, either there is a reason why basic beliefs are likely to be true or there is not. If there is, then they are not basic; if there is not, then they are arbitrary. I argue that this dilemma is not nearly as decisive as its author, Peter Klein, would have us believe.
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  22. Daniel Howard-Snyder (2004). Lehrer's Case Against Foundationalism. Erkenntnis 60 (1):51-73.
    In this essay, I assess Keith Lehrer's case against Foundationalism, which consists of variations on three objections: The Independent Information or Belief Objection, The Risk of Error Objection, and the Hidden Argument Objection. I conclude that each objection fails for reasons that can be endorsed – indeed, I would say for reasons that should be endorsed – by antifoundationalists and foundationalists alike.
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  23. Daniel Howard-Snyder (1998). BonJour's 'Basic Antifoundationalist Argument' and the Doctrine of the Given. Southern Journal of Philosophy 36 (2):163-177.
    Laurence BonJour observes that critics of foundationalism tend to argue against it by objecting to "relatively idiosyncratic" versions of it, a strategy which has "proven in the main to be superficial and ultimately ineffective" since answers immune to the objections emerge quickly (1985: 17). He aims to rectify this deficiency. Specifically, he argues that the very soul of foundationalism, "the concept of a basic empirical belief," is incoherent (1985: 30). This is a bold strategy from which we can learn even (...)
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  24. Daniel Howard-Snyder & E. J. Coffman (2006). Three Arguments Against Foundationalism: Arbitrariness, Epistemic Regress, and Existential Support. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (4):535-564.
    Foundationalism is false; after all, foundational beliefs are arbitrary, they do not solve the epistemic regress problem, and they cannot exist withoutother (justified) beliefs. Or so some people say. In this essay, we assess some arguments based on such claims, arguments suggested in recent work by Peter Klein and Ernest Sosa.
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  25. Daniel Howard-Snyder & Christian Lee (2005). On a “Fatal Dilemma” for Moderate Foundationalism. Journal of Philosophical Research 30:251-259.
    Contemporary foundationalists prefer Moderate Foundationalism over Strong Foundationalism. In this paper, we assess two arguments against the former which have been recently defended by Timothy McGrew. Three theses are central to the discussion: that only beliefs can be probabilifying evidence, that justification is internal, in McGrew’s sense of the term, and that only beliefs can be nonarbitrary justifying reasons.
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  26. Noriaki Iwasa (2013). Moral Applicability of Agrippa's Trilemma. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 13 (37):109-128.
    According to Agrippa's trilemma, an attempt to justify something leads to either infinite regress, circularity, or dogmatism. This essay examines whether and to what extent the trilemma applies to ethics. There are various responses to the trilemma, such as foundationalism, coherentism, contextualism, infinitism, and German idealism. Examining those responses, the essay shows that the trilemma applies at least to rational justification of contentful moral beliefs. This means that rationalist ethics based on any contentful moral belief are rationally unjustifiable.
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  27. Timo Kajamies (2009). A Quintet, a Quartet, a Trio, a Duo? The Epistemic Regress Problem, Evidential Support, and Skepticism. Philosophia 37 (3):525-534.
    In his topical article, Andrew Cling claims that the best extant formulation of the so-called epistemic regress problem rests on five assumptions that are too strong. Cling offers an improved version that rests on a different set of three core epistemic assumptions, each of which he argues for. Despite of owing a great deal to Cling’s ideas, I argue that the epistemic regress problem surfaces from more fundamental assumptions than those offered by Cling. There are ultimately two core assumptions—in fact (...)
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  28. Geert Keil (2003). Über den Homunkulus-Fehlschluß. Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 57 (1):1 - 26.
    Ein Homunkulus im philosophischen Sprachgebrauch ist eine postulierte menschenähnliche Instanz, die ausdrücklich oder unausdrücklich zur Erklärung der Arbeitsweise des menschlichen Geistes herangezogen wird. Als Homunkulus-Fehlschluß wird die Praxis bezeichnet, Prädikate, die auf kognitive oder perzeptive Leistungen einer ganzen Person zutreffen, auch auf Teile von Personen oder auf subpersonale Vorgänge anzuwenden, was typischerweise zu einem Regreß führt. Der vorliegende Beitrag erörtert den Homunkulus-Fehlschluß zunächst in argumentationstheoretischer Hinsicht und stellt dabei ein Diagnoseschema auf. Dann werden zwei Anwendungsfelder erörtert: Instanzenmodelle der Psyche (Platon, (...)
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  29. William Kimler (2012). Case Studies, Controversy and the 'Fieldworker's Regress'. Annals of Science 69 (1):127-132.
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  30. Peter Klein (2008). Contemporary Responses to Agrippa's Trilemma. In John Greco (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Skepticism. Oxford University Press
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  31. Peter Klein (2007). Human Knowledge and the Infinite Progress of Reasoning. Philosophical Studies 134 (1):1 - 17.
    The purpose of this paper is to explain how infinitism—the view that reasons are endless and non-repeating—solves the epistemic regress problem and to defend that solution against some objections. The first step is to explain what the epistemic regress problem is and, equally important, what it is not. Second, I will discuss the foundationalist and coherentist responses to the regress problem and offer some reasons for thinking that neither response can solve the problem, no matter how they are tweaked. Then, (...)
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  32. Peter Klein (2007). How to Be an Infinitist About Doxastic Justification. Philosophical Studies 134 (1):25 - 29.
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  33. Peter Klein (2003). When Infinite Regresses Are Not Vicious. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3):718–729.
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  34. Peter Klein (1998). Review: Foundationalism and the Infinite Regress of Reasons. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (4):919 - 925.
    In Metaepistemology and Skepticism (Rowman & Littlefield:\n1995), Richard Fumerton defends foundationalism. As part of\nthe defense he rejects infinitism--the view that holds that\nthe solution to the problem of the regress of justificatory\nreasons is that the reasons are infinitely many and\nnonrepeating. I examine some of those arguments and attempt\nto show that they are not really telling against (at least\nsome versions of) infinitism. Along the way I present some\nobjections to his account of inferential justification.
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  35. Peter D. Klein (2011). Infinitism. In Sven Bernecker & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Routledge Companion to Epistemology. Routledge
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  36. Peter D. Klein (2011). Infinitism and the Epistemic Regress Problem. In Tolksdorf Stephan (ed.), Conceptions of Knowledge. De Gruyter
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  37. Peter D. Klein (2011). Epistemic Justification and the Limits of Pyrrhonism. In Diego Machuca (ed.), Pyrrhonism in Ancient, Modern, and Contemporary Philosophy. Springer
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  38. Peter D. Klein (2005). Infinitism is the Solution to the Epistemic Regress Problem. In Steup Matthias & Sosa Ernest (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Blackwell
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  39. Peter D. Klein (2005). Reply to Ginet. In Steup Matthias & Sosa Ernest (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Blackwell
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  40. Peter D. Klein (2004). There is NO Good Reason to Be an Academic Skeptic. In Luper Steven (ed.), Essential Knowledge. Longman
  41. Peter D. Klein (2004). What IS Wrong with Foundationalism is That It Cannot Solve the Epistemic Regress Problem. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):166–171.
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  42. Peter D. Klein (2003). How a Pyrrhonian Skeptic Might Respond to Academic Skepticism. In Luper Steven (ed.), The Skeptics: Contemporary Essays. Ashgate Press 75--94.
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  43. Peter D. Klein (2000). Why Not Infinitism? Epistemology 5:199-208.
    As the Pyrrhonians made clear, reasons that adequately justify beliefs can have only three possible structures: foundationalism, coherentism, and infinitism. Infinitism—the view that adequate reasons for our beliefs are infinite and non-repeating—has never been developed carefully, much less advocated. In this paper, I will argue that only infinitism can satisfy two intuitively plausible constraints on good reasoning: the avoidance of circular reasoning and the avoidance of arbitrariness. Further, I will argue that infinitism requires serious, but salutary, revisions in our evaluation (...)
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  44. Peter D. Klein (1999). Human Knowledge and the Infinite Regress of Reasons. Philosophical Perspectives 13 (s13):297-325.
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  45. Jonathan Kvanvig, Coherentist Theories of Epistemic Justification. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  46. Robert T. Lehe (1989). Coherence and the Problem of the Criterion. Idealistic Studies 19 (2):112-120.
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  47. Noah Lemos (2004). Epistemic Circularity Again. Philosophical Issues 14 (1):254–270.
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  48. Noah M. Lemos (1982). Coherence and Epistemic Priority. Philosophical Studies 41 (3):299 - 315.
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  49. Lydia McGrew & Timothy McGrew (2008). Foundationalism, Probability, and Mutual Support. Erkenntnis 68 (1):55 - 77.
    The phenomenon of mutual support presents a specific challenge to the foundationalist epistemologist: Is it possible to model mutual support accurately without using circles of evidential support? We argue that the appearance of loops of support arises from a failure to distinguish different synchronic lines of evidential force. The ban on loops should be clarified to exclude loops within any such line, and basing should be understood as taking place within lines of evidence. Uncertain propositions involved in mutual support relations (...)
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  50. Luca Moretti & Tommaso Piazza (2015). Phenomenal Conservatism and Bergmann’s Dilemma. Erkenntnis 80 (6):1271-1290.
    In this paper we argue that Michael Huemer’s phenomenal conservatism—the internalist view according to which our beliefs are prima facie justified if based on how things seems or appears to us to be—doesn’t fall afoul of Michael Bergmann’s dilemma for epistemological internalism. We start by showing that the thought experiment that Bergmann adduces to conclude that is vulnerable to his dilemma misses its target. After that, we distinguish between two ways in which a mental state can contribute to the justification (...)
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