Related categories
Siblings:
125 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Sort by:
1 — 100 / 125
  1. Kristoffer Ahlstrom (2010). On Epistemic Agency. Dissertation, University of Massachusetts at Amherst
    Every time we act in an effort to attain our epistemic goals, we express our epistemic agency. The present study argues that a proper understanding of the actions and goals relevant to expressions of such agency can be used to make ameliorative recommendations about how the ways in which we actually express our agency can be brought in line with how we should express our agency. More specifically, it is argued that the actions relevant to such expressions should be identified (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij (forthcoming). Moderate Epistemic Expressivism. Philosophical Studies.
    The present paper argues that there are at least two equally plausible yet mutually incompatible answers to the question of what is of non-instrumental epistemic value. The hypothesis invoked to explain how this can be so—moderate epistemic expressivism—holds that (a) claims about epistemic value express nothing but commitments to particular goals of inquiry, and (b) there are at least two viable conceptions of those goals. It is shown that such expressivism survives recent arguments against a more radical form of epistemic (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij (2013). Meno and the Monist. Metaphilosophy 44 (1-2):157-170.
    Recent critiques of veritistic value monism, or the idea that true belief is unique in being of fundamental epistemic value, typically invoke a claim about the surplus value of knowledge over mere true belief, in turn traced back to Plato's Meno. However, to the extent Plato at all defends a surplus claim in the Meno, it differs from that figuring in contemporary discussions with respect to both its scope and the kind of value at issue, and is under closer scrutiny (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij (2012). In Defense of Veritistic Value Monism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (4):19-40.
    Recently, veritistic value monism, i.e. the idea that true belief is unique in being of fundamental epistemic value, has come under attack by pluralist philosophers arguing that it cannot account fully for the domain of epistemic value. However, the relevant arguments fail to establish any such thing. For one thing, there is a presumption of monism due to considerations about axiological parsimony. While such a presumption would be defeated by evidence that the relevant kind of monism cannot account fully for (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij & Stephen R. Grimm (forthcoming). Getting It Right. Philosophical Studies.
    Truth monism is the idea that only true beliefs are of fundamental epistemic value. The present paper considers three objections to truth monism, and argues that, while the truth monist has plausible responses to the first two objections, the third objection suggests that truth monism should be reformulated. On this reformulation, which we refer to as accuracy monism, the fundamental epistemic goal is accuracy, where accuracy is a matter of “getting it right.‘ The idea then developed is that accuracy is (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Guy Axtell (2012). (More) Springs of My Discontent. Logos and Episteme (1):131-137.
    A further reply to Trent Dougherty, author of Evidentialism and its Discontents, on a range of issues regarding a proper understanding of epistemic normativity and doxastic responsibility. The relative importance of synchronic and diachronic concerns with epistemic agency is discussed, both with respect to epistemology proper, as well as in connection to broader concerns with ‘ethics of belief’ and ‘epistemology of disagreement.’.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Guy Axtell (2010). Agency Ascriptions in Ethics and Epistemology: Or, Navigating Intersections, Narrow and Broad. Metaphilosophy 41 (1):73-94.
    Abstract: In this article, the logic and functions of character-trait ascriptions in ethics and epistemology is compared, and two major problems, the "generality problem" for virtue epistemologies and the "global trait problem" for virtue ethics, are shown to be far more similar in structure than is commonly acknowledged. I suggest a way to put the generality problem to work by making full and explicit use of a sliding scale--a "narrow-broad spectrum of trait ascription"-- and by accounting for the various uses (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Guy Axtell (2008). Expanding Epistemology: A Responsibilist Approach. Philosophical Papers 37 (1):51-87.
    The first part of this paper asks why we need, or what would motivate, ameaningful expansion of epistemology. It answers with three critical arguments found in the recent literature, which each purport to move us some distance beyond the preoccupations of ‘post-Gettier era’ analytic epistemology. These three—the ‘epistemic luck,’ ‘epistemic value’ and ‘epistemic reconciliation’ arguments associated with D. Pritchard, J. Kvanvig, and M. Williams, respectively—each carry this implication of needed expansion by functioning as forceful ‘internal critiques’ of the tradition. The (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Guy Axtell (1997). Recent Work on Virtue Epistemology. American Philosophical Quarterly 34 (1):1 - 26.
    This article traces a growing interest among epistemologists in the intellectuals of epistemic virtues. These are cognitive dispositions exercised in the formation of beliefs. Attempts to give intellectual virtues a central normative and/or explanatory role in epistemology occur together with renewed interest in the ethics/epistemology analogy, and in the role of intellectual virtue in Aristotle's epistemology. The central distinction drawn here is between two opposed forms of virtue epistemology, virtue reliabilism and virtue responsibilism. The article develops the shared and distinctive (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Guy Axtell (1996). Epistemic-Virtue Talk: The Reemergence of American Axiology? Journal of Speculative Philosophy 10 (3):172 - 198.
    This was my first paper on virtue epistemology, and already highlights the connections with epistemic value and axiology which I would later develop. Although most accounts were either internalist or externalist in an exclusive sense, I suggest an inquiry-focused version through connections with the American pragmatism.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Guy Axtell & J. Adam Carter (2008). Just the Right Thickness: A Defense of Second-Wave Virtue Epistemology. Philosophical Papers 37 (3):413-434.
    Abstract Do the central aims of epistemology, like those of moral philosophy, require that we designate some important place for those concepts located between the thin-normative and the non-normative? Put another way, does epistemology need ?thick? evaluative concepts? There are inveterate traditions in analytic epistemology which, having legitimized a certain way of viewing the nature and scope of epistemology's subject matter, give this question a negative verdict; further, they have carried with them a tacit commitment to what we argue to (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Jason Baehr, Is There a Value Problem?
    According to the standard conception of the “value problem” in epistemology, the problem originates with a compelling pretheoretical intuition to the effect that knowledge is more valuable than true belief.[i] Call this the “guiding intuition.” The guiding intuition is thought to motivate a constraint on an analysis of knowledge such that any plausible analysis must entail that knowledge is more valuable than true belief. A problem emerges in light of two additional considerations. The first is that knowledge is roughly justified (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Jason Baehr (2012). Credit Theories and the Value of Knowledge. Philosophical Quarterly 62 (246):1-22.
    One alleged advantage of credit theories of knowledge is that they are capable of explaining why knowledge is essentially more valuable than mere true belief. I argue that credit theories in fact provide grounds for denying this claim and therefore are incapable of overcoming the ‘value problem’ in epistemology. Much of the discussion revolves around the question of whether true belief is always epistemically valuable. I also consider to what extent, if any, my main argument should worry credit theorists.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Anne Baril (forthcoming). Pragmatic Encroachment in Accounts of Epistemic Excellence. Synthese.
    Recently a number of philosophers have argued for a kind of encroachment of the practical into the epistemic. Fantl and McGrath, for example, argue that if a subject knows that p, then she is rational to act as if p. (Fantl and McGrath 2007) In this paper I make a preliminary case for what we might call encroachment in, not knowledge or justification, but epistemic excellence, recent accounts of which include those of Roberts and Wood (2007), Bishop and Trout (2005), (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Jared Bates (2013). Damming the Swamping Problem, Reliably. Dialectica 67 (1):103-116.
    The swamping problem is the problem of explaining why reliabilist knowledge (reliable true belief) has greater value than mere true belief. Swamping problem advocates see the lack of a solution to the swamping problem (i.e., the lack of a value-difference between reliabilist knowledge and mere true belief) as grounds for rejecting reliabilism. My aims here are (i) to specify clear requirements for a solution to the swamping problem that are as congenial to reliabilism's critics as possible, (ii) to clear away (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Selim Berker (forthcoming). Epistemic Teleology and the Separateness of Propositions. Philosophical Review.
    When it comes to epistemic normativity, should we take the good to be prior to the right? That is, should we ground facts about what we ought and ought not believe on a given occasion in facts about the value of being in certain cognitive states (such as, for example, the value of having true beliefs)? The overwhelming answer among contemporary epistemologists is: "Yes, we should." In this paper I argue to the contrary. Just as taking the good to be (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Martijn Blaauw (2008). Epistemic Value, Achievements, and Questions. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 82 (1):43-57.
    A central intuition many epistemologists seem to have is that knowledge is distinctively valuable. In his paper 'Radical Scepticism, Epistemic Luck and Epistemic Value', Duncan Pritchard rejects the virtue-theoretic explanation of this intuition. This explanation says that knowledge is distinctively valuable because it is a cognitive achievement. It is maintained, in the first place, that the arguments Pritchard musters against the thesis that knowledge is a cognitive achievement are unconvincing. It is argued, in the second place, that even (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Berit Brogaard, I Know. Therefore, I Understand.
    The so-called Meno problem is one of the recent trendy topics in epistemology.1 In a nutshell, the Meno problem is that of explaining why we value knowledge more than true belief. In his recent book The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding Jon Kvanvig argues quite convincingly that no existing account of knowledge can accommodate the intuition that the value of knowledge exceeds the value of true belief.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Berit Brogaard (2008). The Trivial Argument for Epistemic Value Pluralism. Or How I Learned to Stop Caring About Truth. In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & D. Pritchard (eds.), Epistemic Value. Oxford University Press.
    Relativism offers a nifty way of accommodating most of our intuitions about epistemic modals, predicates of personal taste, color expressions, future contingents, and conditionals. But in spite of its manifest merits relativism is squarely at odds with epistemic value monism: the view that truth is the highest epistemic goal. I will call the argument from relativism to epistemic value pluralism the trivial argument for epistemic value pluralism. After formulating the argument, I will look at three possible ways to refute it. (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Berit Brogaard (2006). Can Virtue Reliabilism Explain the Value of Knowledge? Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (3):335-354.
    Virtue reliabilism appears to have a major advantage over generic reliabilism: only the former has the resources to explain the intuition that knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief. I argue that this appearance is illusory. It is sustained only by the misguided assumption that a principled distinction can be drawn between those belief-forming methods that are grounded in the agent’s intellectual virtues, and those that are not. A further problem for virtue reliabilism is that of explaining why knowledge (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Campbell Brown (2012). The Utility of Knowledge. Erkenntnis 77 (2):155-65.
    Recent epistemology has introduced a new criterion of adequacy for analyses of knowledge: such an analysis, to be adequate, must be compatible with the common view that knowledge is better than true belief. One account which is widely thought to fail this test is reliabilism, according to which, roughly, knowledge is true belief formed by reliable process. Reliabilism fails, so the argument goes, because of the "swamping problem". In brief, provided a belief is true, we do not care whether or (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. J. Adam Carter & Matthew Chrisman (2012). Is Epistemic Expressivism Incompatible with Inquiry? Philosophical Studies 159 (3):323-339.
    Expressivist views of an area of discourse encourage us to ask not about the nature of the relevant kinds of values but rather about the nature of the relevant kind of evaluations. Their answer to the latter question typically claims some interesting disanalogy between those kinds of evaluations and descriptions of the world. It does so in hope of providing traction against naturalism-inspired ontological and epistemological worries threatening more ‘realist’ positions. This is a familiar position regarding ethical discourse; however, some (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. J. Adam Carter & Emma C. Gordon (forthcoming). On Pritchard, Objectual Understanding and the Value Problem. American Philosophical Quarterly.
    Duncan Pritchard (2008, 2009, 2010, forthcoming) has argued for an elegant solution to what have been called the value problems for knowledge at the forefront of recent literature on epistemic value. As Pritchard sees it, these problems dissolve once it is recognized that that it is understanding-why, not knowledge, that bears the distinctive epistemic value often (mistakenly) attributed to knowledge. A key element of Pritchard’s revisionist argument is the claim that understanding-why always involves what he calls strong cognitive achievement—viz., cognitive (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. J. Adam Carter & Benjamin Jarvis (2012). Against Swamping. Analysis 72 (4):690-699.
    The Swamping Argument – highlighted by Kvanvig (2003; 2010) – purports to show that the epistemic value of truth will always swamp the epistemic value of any non-factive epistemic properties (e.g. justification) so that these properties can never add any epistemic value to an already-true belief. Consequently (and counter-intuitively), knowledge is never more epistemically valuable than mere true belief. We show that the Swamping Argument fails. Parity of reasoning yields the disastrous conclusion that nonfactive epistemic properties – mostly saliently justification (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. J. Adam Carter, Benjamin Jarvis & Katherine Rubin (forthcoming). Knowledge and the Value of Cognitive Ability. Synthese.
    Abstract: We challenge a line of thinking at the fore of recent work on epistemic value: the line (suggested by Kvanvig [2003] and others) that if the value of knowledge is “swamped” by the value of mere true belief, then we have good reason to doubt its theoretical importance in epistemology. We offer a value-driven argument for the theoretical importance of knowledge—one that stands even if the value of knowledge is “swamped” by the value of true belief. Specifically, we contend (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. J. Adam Carter, Benjamin Jarvis & Katherine Rubin (forthcoming). Knowledge: Value on the Cheap. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-15.
    ABSTRACT: We argue that the so-called ‘Primary’ and ‘Secondary’ Value Problems for knowledge are more easily solved than is widely appreciated. Pritchard, for instance, has suggested that only virtue-theoretic accounts have any hopes of adequately addressing these problems. By contrast, we argue that accounts of knowledge that are sensitive to the Gettier problem are able to overcome these challenges. To first approximation, the Primary Value Problem is a problem of understanding how the property of being knowledge confers more epistemic value (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. Joseph Adam Carter, "The Epistemic Point of View".
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. Andrew Chignell, The Ethics of Belief. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    The “ethics of belief” refers to a cluster of questions at the intersection of epistemology, philosophy of mind, psychology, and ethics. The central question in the debate is whether there are norms of some sort governing our habits of belief formation, belief maintenance, and belief relinquishment. Is it ever or always morally wrong (or epistemically irrational, or imprudent) to hold a belief on insufficient evidence? Is it ever or always morally right (or epistemically rational, or prudent) to believe on the (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. Allen Coates (2009). Explaining the Value of Truth. American Philosophical Quarterly 46 (2):105-115.
    Truth is a value in that sense that a belief is good (or successful, or correct) just in case it is true. But it does not follow that truth is a good-making property, nor does it follow that the nature of truth explains its value. Instead, this paper argues that the nature of belief explains its value.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. Edward Craig (1990). Knowledge and the State of Nature: An Essay in Conceptual Synthesis. Oxford University Press.
    In this illuminating study Craig argues that the standard practice of analyzing the concept of knowledge has radical defects--arbitrary restriction of the subject matter and risky theoretical presuppositions. He proposes a new approach similar to the "state-of-nature" method found in political theory, building the concept up from a hypothesis about its social function and the needs it fulfills. Shedding light on much that philosophers have written about knowledge, its analysis and the obstacles to its analysis, and the debate over skepticism, (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. Marian David (2012). How To Take Truth As a Goal? In C. Jaeger & W. Loeffler (eds.), Epistemology: Contexts, Values, Disagreements (Proceedings of the 34th International Ludwig Wittgenstein Symposium). Ontos Verlag.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. Marian David (2005). On 'Truth Is Good'. Philosophical Books 46 (4):292-301.
    As to the preference which most people—as long as they are not annoyed by instances—feel in favor of true propositions, this must be based, apparently, upon an ultimate ethical proposition: ‘It is good to believe true propositions, and bad to believe false ones’. This proposition, it is to be hoped, is true; but if it is not, there is no reason to think that we do ill in believing it. Bertrand Russell, “Meinong’s Theory of Complexes and Assumptions” (1904).
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. Marian David (2001). Truth as the Epistemic Goal. In M. Steup (ed.), Knowledge, Truth, and Duty. New York: Oxford University Press.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. Marian David (1996). Review Essay: Working Without a Net. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (4):943-952.
  35. Henk de Regt, Samir Okasha & Stephan Hartmann (eds.) (forthcoming). Proceedings of EPSA09. Springer.
  36. Michael R. Depaul & Stephen R. Grimm (2007). Review Essay on Jonathan Kvanvig's the Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (2):498–514.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. Michael R. DePaul & Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski (eds.) (2003). Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives From Ethics and Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
    The idea of a virtue has traditionally been important in ethics, but only recently has gained attention as an idea that can explain how we ought to form beliefs as well as how we ought to act. Moral philosophers and epistemologists have different approaches to the idea of intellectual virtue; here, Michael DePaul and Linda Zagzebski bring work from both fields together for the first time to address all of the important issues. It will be required reading for anyone working (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. Julien Dutant (2012). The Value and Expected Value of Knowledge. Dialogue 51 (1):141-162.
    ABSTRACT: Menothe idea that knowing something is better than merely having a true belief about itswampings Thesis instead, as relying on a confusion between expected value and value proper. The proposed solution relies on an externalist view of rationality, which is presented.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  39. Brian Ellis (1988). Solving the Problem of Induction Using a Values-Based Epistemology. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 39 (2):141-160.
  40. Don Fallis (2005). Epistemic Value Theory and Social Epistemology. Episteme 2 (3):177-188.
    In order to guide the decisions of real people who want to bring about good epistemic outcomes for themselves and others, we need to understand our epistemic values. In Knowledge in a Social World, Alvin Goldman has proposed an epistemic value theory that allows us to say whether one outcome is epistemically better than another. However, it has been suggested that Goldman's theory is not really an epistemic value theory at all because whether one outcome is epistemically better than another (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41. Don Fallis (2005). Epistemic Value Theory and Judgment Aggregation. Episteme 2 (1):39-55.
    The doctrinal paradox shows that aggregating individual judgments by taking a majority vote does not always yield a consistent set of collective judgments. Philip Pettit, Luc Bovens, and Wlodek Rabinowicz have recently argued for the epistemic superiority of an aggregation procedure that always yields a consistent set of judgments. This paper identifies several additional epistemic advantages of their consistency maintaining procedure. However, this paper also shows that there are some circumstances where the majority vote procedure is epistemically superior. The epistemic (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  42. Simon D. Feldman & Allan Hazlett (forthcoming). Authenticity and Self-Knowledge. Dialectica.
    We argue that the value of authenticity does not explain the value of self-knowledge. There are a plurality of species of authenticity; in this paper we consider four species: avoiding pretense (§2), Frankfurtian wholeheartedness (§3), existential self-knowledge (§4), and spontaneity (§5). Our thesis is that, for each of these species, the value of (that species of) authenticity does not (partially) explain the value of self-knowledge. Moreover, when it comes to spontaneity, the value of (that species of) authenticity conflicts with the (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43. Richard Foley (2008). An Epistemology That Matters. In Philip L. Quinn & Paul J. Weithman (eds.), Liberal Faith: Essays in Honor of Philip Quinn. University of Notre Dame Press.
    The two most fundamental questions for an epistemology are, what is involved in having good reasons to believe a claim, and what is involved in meeting the higher standard of knowing that a claim is true? The theory of justified belief tries to answer the former, whereas the theory of knowledge addresses the latter.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  44. Steve Fuller (2006). Review of Noretta Koertge (Ed.), Scientific Values and Civic Virtues. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2006 (3).
    The movement of epistemic standards closer to moral virtue reflects a worrisome trend in the recent renascence of naturalism in philosophy that links access to truth with a deepening sense of the knower's history. While it is relatively harmless to insist that mastery of a scientific specialty requires training in certain techniques, it is more problematic (pace Kuhn) to insist that all such specialists share the same disciplinary narrative -- and still more problematic to require that they pledge allegiance to (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  45. Axel Gelfert (forthcoming). Hume on Curiosity. British Journal for the History of Philosophy.
    Hume concludes Book II of his Treatise of Human Nature with a section on the passion of curiosity, ‘that love of truth, which was the first source of all our enquiries’. At first sight, this characterisation of curiosity – as the motivating factor in that specifically human activity that is the pursuit of knowledge – may seem unoriginal. However, when Hume speaks of the ‘source of all our enquiries’, he is referring both to the universal human pursuit of knowledge and (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  46. Alvin I. Goldman (1999). Knowledge in a Social World. Oxford University Press.
    Knowledge in a Social World offers a philosophy for the information age. Alvin Goldman explores new frontiers by creating a thoroughgoing social epistemology, moving beyond the traditional focus on solitary knowers. Against the tides of postmodernism and social constructionism Goldman defends the integrity of truth and shows how to promote it by well-designed forms of social interaction. From science to education, from law to democracy, he shows why and how public institutions should seek knowledge-enhancing practices. The result is a bold, (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  47. John Greco (2009). ``The Value Problem". In Epistemic Value. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  48. John Greco (1999). Agent Reliabilism. Philosophical Perspectives 13 (s13):273-296.
    This paper reviews two skeptical arguments and argues that a reliabilist framework is necessary to avoid them. The paper also argues that agent reliabilism, which makes the knower the seat of reliability, is the most plausible version of reliabilism.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  49. Stephen Grimm (2011). On Intellectualism in Epistemology. Mind 120 (479):705-733.
    According to ‘orthodox’ epistemology, it has recently been said, whether or not a true belief amounts to knowledge depends exclusively on truth-related factors: for example, on whether the true belief was formed in a reliable way, or was supported by good evidence, and so on. Jason Stanley refers to this as the ‘intellectualist’ component of orthodox epistemology, and Jeremy Fantl and Matthew McGrath describe it as orthodox epistemology’s commitment to a ‘purely epistemic’ account of knowledge — that is, an account (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  50. Stephen Grimm (2009). ``Epistemic Normativity&Quot. In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Epistemic Value. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    In this article, from the 2009 Oxford University Press collection Epistemic Value, I criticize existing accounts of epistemic normativity by Alston, Goldman, and Sosa, and then offer a new view.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  51. Stephen R. Grimm (2008). Epistemic Goals and Epistemic Values. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (3):725-744.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  52. Stephen R. Grimm (2006). Is Understanding a Species of Knowledge? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (3):515-535.
    Among philosophers of science there seems to be a general consensus that understanding represents a species of knowledge, but virtually every major epistemologist who has thought seriously about understanding has come to deny this claim. Against this prevailing tide in epistemology, I argue that understanding is, in fact, a species of knowledge: just like knowledge, for example, understanding is not transparent and can be Gettiered. I then consider how the psychological act of "grasping" that seems to be characteristic of understanding (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  53. Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.) (2009). Epistemic Value. Oxford University Press.
    Recent epistemology has reflected a growing interest in issues about the value of knowledge and the values informing epistemic appraisal. Is knowledge more valuable that merely true belief or even justified true belief? Is truth the central value informing epistemic appraisal or do other values enter the picture? Epistemic Value is a collection of previously unpublished articles on such issues by leading philosophers in the field. It will stimulate discussion of the nature of knowledge and of directions that might be (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  54. Patrick Hawley (2007). Skepticism and the Value of Knowledge. In Chienkuo Mi Ruey-lin Chen (ed.), Naturalized Epistemology and Philosophy of Science.
    The main claim of this essay is that knowledge is no more
    valuable than lasting true belief.
    This claim is surprising. Doesn't knowledge have a unique
    and special value? If the main claim is correct and if, as it seems,
    knowledge is not lasting true belief, then knowledge does not have a unique value:
    in whatever way knowledge is valuable, lasting true belief is just as valuable.
    However, this result does not show that knowledge is worthless, nor does it undermine
    our knowledge gathering practices. There (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  55. Allan Hazlett, Limning Structure as an Epistemic Goal.
    I define a property of beliefs - that of being structure-limning, or of “carving nature at the joints” - and propose three epistemological applications: (i) that limning structure has pro tanto epistemic value, (ii) that a species of understanding can be defined by appeal to the notion of limning structure, and (iii) that a distinction between important and trivial truths can be articulated by appeal to the notion of limning structure.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  56. Allan Hazlett (forthcoming). A Luxury of the Understanding: On the Value of True Belief. Oxford University Press.
    This is a critical study of the value of true belief: I argue that true belief is at most sometimes eudaimonically valuable (i.e. valuable vis-à-vis the wellbeing of the believer), and criticize realist accounts of the "epistemic" value of true belief that appeal to the thesis that belief "aims at truth.".
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  57. Allan Hazlett (forthcoming). Expressivism and Conventionalism About Epistemic Discourse. In A. Fairweather & O. Flanagan (eds.), Naturalizing Epistemic Virtue. Cambridge University Press.
    Consider the claim that openmindedness is an epistemic virtue, the claim that true belief is epistemically valuable, and the claim that one epistemically ought to cleave to one’s evidence. These are examples of what I’ll call “epistemic discourse.” In this paper I’ll propose and defend a view called “conventionalism about epistemic discourse.” In particular, I’ll argue that conventionalism is superior to its main rival, expressivism about epistemic discourse. Expressivism and conventionalism both jibe with anti-realism about epistemic normativity, which is motivated (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  58. Tim Henning & David P. Schweikard (eds.) (forthcoming). Knowledge, Virtue, and Action: Putting Epistemic Virtues to Work. Routledge.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  59. Paul Horwich (2006). The Value of Truth. Noûs 40 (2):347–360.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  60. Jeff Kasser (2011). How Settled Are Settled Beliefs in “the Fixation of Belief”? Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 47 (2):226-247.
    Despite its prominence in Peirce’s best-known works, the notion of fixed, stable, or settled belief (I will follow Peirce in using these terms more or less interchangeably) has received relatively little explicit attention. Need a belief be permanently stable in order to count as fixed? Or, to take the other extreme, does a belief count as fixed as long as it is currently stable? More fundamentally, what is involved in predicating stability of a belief? Talk of stability suggests a disposition (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  61. Jason Kawall (2010). Autonomy, Agency, and the Value of Enduring Beliefs. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 40 (1):pp. 107-129.
    My central thesis is that philosophers considering questions of epistemic value ought to devote greater attention to the enduring nature of beliefs. I begin by arguing that a commonly drawn analogy between beliefs and actions is flawed in important respects, and that a better, more fruitful analogue for belief would be desire, or a similarly enduring state of an agent. With this in hand, I argue that treating beliefs as enduring, constitutive states of agents allows us to capture the importance (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  62. Jason Kawall (2002). Other–Regarding Epistemic Virtues. Ratio 15 (3):257–275.
    Epistemologists often assume that an agent’s epistemic goal is simply to acquire as much knowledge as possible for herself. Drawing on an analogy with ethics and other practices, I argue that being situated in an epistemic community introduces a range of epistemic virtues (and goals) which fall outside of those typically recognized by both individualistic and social epistemologists. Candidate virtues include such traits as honesty, integrity (including an unwillingness to misuse one’s status as an expert), patience, and creativity. We can (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  63. K. Khalifa (2013). The Role of Explanation in Understanding. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 64 (1):161-187.
    Peter Lipton has argued that understanding can exist in the absence of explanation. We argue that this does not denigrate explanation's importance to understanding. Specifically, we show that all of Lipton's examples are consistent with the idea that explanation is the ideal of understanding, i.e. other modes of understanding ought to be assessed by how well they replicate the understanding provided by a good and correct explanation. We defend this idea by showing that for all of Lipton's examples of non-explanatory (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  64. Jonathan Kvanvig, Responses to Critics.
    I begin by expressing my sincere thanks to my critics for taking time from their own impressive projects in epistemology to consider mine. Often, in reading their criticisms, I had the feeling of having received more help than I really wanted! But the truth of the matter is that we learn best by making mistakes, and I appreciate the conscientious attention to my work that my critics have shown.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  65. Jonathan Kvanvig, Further Thoughts on the Swamping Problem.
    The Swamping Problem is one of the central problems in the new valuedriven approach to epistemology that has arisen recently. Issues concerning epistemic value, however, are not new. We can find them first in Plato’s dialogue Meno, where Socrates and Meno have a discussion about what type of guide one should prefer if one wants to get to Larissa. The first suggestion is that one should want a guide who knows the way, but Socrates notes that a guide with true (...)
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  66. Jonathan Kvanvig (2009). ``Precìs of T He Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding &Quot. In Pritchard, Haddock & MIllar (eds.), Epistemic Value. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Reflection on the issues surrounding the value of knowledge and other cognitive states of interest to epistemologists can be traced to the conversation between Socrates and Meno in Plato’s dialogue named after the latter. The context of discussion concerns the hiring of a guide to get one to Larissa, and the proposal on the table is that one would want a guide who knows the way. Socrates sees a problem, however, for it is not clear why a guide with merely (...)
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  67. Jonathan Kvanvig (2008). Pointless Truth. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 32 (1):199-212.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  68. Jonathan Kvanvig, The Value of Knowledge and Truth.
    The questions concerning the value of knowledge and truth range from complete skepticism about such value to more discriminating concerns about the precise nature of the value in question and the comparative judgment that one of the two is more valuable than the other.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  69. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2012). ``Curiosity and a Response-Dependent Account of the Value of Understanding&Quot. In Timothy Henning & David Schweikard (eds.), Epistemic Virtues.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  70. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2012). ``Truth-Tracking and the Value of Knowledge&Quot. In Kelly Becker (ed.), New Essays on Sensitivity and Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  71. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2009). ``The Value of Understanding&Quot. In Pritchard, Haddock & Millar (eds.), Epistemic Value. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  72. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2009). ``Responses to Critics&Quot. In Pritchard, Haddock & Millar (eds.), Epistemic Value. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  73. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2008). ``Pointless Truth&Quot. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 32:199-212.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  74. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2006). ``The Value of Knowledge and Truth&Quot. In D. M. Borchert (ed.), Encyclopedia of Philosophy. London: Macmillan Reference Books.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  75. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2005). ``Truth and the Epistemic Goal&Quot. In Matthias Steup & Ernest Sosa (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Malden, Ma: Blackwell.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  76. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2004). Nozickian Epistemology and the Value of Knowledge. Philosophical Issues 14 (1):201–218.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  77. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2003). The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding. Cambridge University Press.
    Epistemology has for a long time focused on the concept of knowledge and tried to answer questions such as whether knowledge is possible and how much of it there is. Missing from this inquiry, however, is a discussion on the value of knowledge. In The Pursuit of Knowledge and the Value of Understanding Jonathan Kvanvig argues that epistemology properly conceived cannot ignore the question of the value of knowledge. He also questions one of the most fundamental assumptions in epistemology, namely (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  78. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2003). ``Scientific Naturalism and the Value of Knowledge&Quot. In Thomas F. Crisp (ed.), Knowledge and Reality: Essays in Honor of Alvin Plantinga. Dordrecht: Kluwer Publishing Co..
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  79. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2000). Externalism and Epistemology Worth Doing. Southern Journal of Philosophy 38 (S1):27-42.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  80. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (1998). ``Why Should Inquiring Minds Want to Know?&Quot. The Monist 81 (3):426--451.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  81. Brent G. Kyle (forthcoming). Knowledge as a Thick Concept: Explaining Why the Gettier Problem Arises. Philosophical Studies.
    The Gettier problem has stymied epistemologists. But whether or not this problem is resolvable, we still must face an important question: Why does the Gettier problem arise in the first place? So far, philosophers have seen it as either a problem peculiar to the concept of knowledge, or else an instance of a general problem about conceptual analysis. But I would like to steer a middle course. I argue that the Gettier problem arises because knowledge is a thick concept, and (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  82. Clayton Littlejohn (2012). Justification and the Truth-Connection. Cambridge University Press.
  83. Michael P. Lynch (2012). In Praise of Reason. MIT Press.
    Can we give objective reasons for our most basic standards of reason-- our fundamental epistemic principles? I argue, against several forms of skepticism about reason, that we can, but that the reasons we can give for epistemic principles are ultimately practical, not epistemic.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  84. Michael P. Lynch (2009). Truth, Value and Epistemic Expressivism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (1):76-97.
  85. Michael P. Lynch (2005). Summary. Philosophical Books 46 (4):289-291.
  86. David Papineau (forthcoming). There Are No Norms of Belief. In T. Chan (ed.), The Aim of Belief.
    This paper argues that there is no distinctive species of normativity attaching to the adoption of beliefs.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  87. Fabienne Peter (2013). The Procedural Epistemic Value of Deliberation. Synthese 190 (7):1253-1266.
    Collective deliberation is fuelled by disagreements and its epistemic value depends, inter alia, on how the participants respond to each other in disagreements. I use this accountability thesis to argue that deliberation may be valued not just instrumentally but also for its procedural features. The instrumental epistemic value of deliberation depends on whether it leads to more or less accurate beliefs among the participants. The procedural epistemic value of deliberation hinges on the relationships of mutual accountability that characterize appropriately conducted (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  88. Steve Petersen (2013). Utilitarian Epistemology. Synthese 190 (6):1173-1184.
    Standard epistemology takes it for granted that there is a special kind of value: epistemic value. This claim does not seem to sit well with act utilitarianism, however, since it holds that only welfare is of real value. I first develop a particularly utilitarian sense of “epistemic value”, according to which it is closely analogous to the nature of financial value. I then demonstrate the promise this approach has for two current puzzles in the intersection of epistemology and value theory: (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  89. Steve Petersen (2013). Utilitarian Epistemology. Synthese 190 (6):1173-1184.
    Standard epistemology takes it for granted that there is a special kind of value: epistemic value. This claim does not seem to sit well with act utilitarianism, however, since it holds that only welfare is of real value. I first develop a particularly utilitarian sense of “epistemic value”, according to which it is closely analogous to the nature of financial value. I then demonstrate the promise this approach has for two current puzzles in the intersection of epistemology and value theory: (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  90. Richard Pettigrew (2011). An Improper Introduction to Epistemic Utility Theory. In Henk de Regt, Samir Okasha & Stephan Hartmann (eds.), Proceedings of EPSA: Amsterdam '09. Springer.
    Beliefs come in different strengths. What are the norms that govern these strengths of belief? Let an agent's belief function at a particular time be the function that assigns, to each of the propositions about which she has an opinion, the strength of her belief in that proposition at that time. Traditionally, philosophers have claimed that an agent's belief function at any time ought to be a probability function (Probabilism), and that she ought to update her belief function upon obtaining (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  91. Duncan Pritchard (2009). Knowledge, Understanding and Epistemic Value. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 84 (64):19-.
    It is argued that a popular way of accounting for the distinctive value of knowledge by appeal to the distinctive value of cognitive achievements fails because it is a mistake to identify knowledge with cognitive achievements. Nevertheless, it is claimed that understanding, properly conceived, is a type of cognitive achievement, and thus that the distinctive value of cognitive achievements can explain why understanding is of special value.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  92. Duncan Pritchard (2009). Apt Performance and Epistemic Value. Philosophical Studies 143 (3):407--416.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  93. Duncan Pritchard (2008). Radical Scepticism, Epistemic Luck, and Epistemic Value. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 82 (1):19-41.
    It is argued that it is beneficial to view the debate regarding radical scepticism through the lens of epistemic value. In particular, it is claimed that we should regard radical scepticism as aiming to deprive us of an epistemic standing that is of special value to us, and that this methodological constraint on our dealings with radical scepticism potentially has important ramifications for how we assess the success of an anti-sceptical strategy.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  94. Duncan Pritchard (2008). Knowing the Answer, Understanding and Epistemic Value. Grazer Philosophische Studien 77 (1):325-339.
    This paper principally argues for two controversial theses: that understanding, unlike knowledge, is distinctively valuable, and that understanding is the proper goal of inquiry.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  95. Duncan Pritchard (2007). Recent Work on Epistemic Value. American Philosophical Quarterly 44 (2):85 - 110.
    Recent discussion in epistemology has seen a huge growth in interest in the topic of epistemic value. In this paper I describe the background to this new movement in epistemology and critically survey the contemporary literature on this topic.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  96. Duncan Pritchard (2007). Anti-Luck Epistemology. Synthese 158 (3):277 - 297.
    In this paper, I do three things. First, I offer an overview of an anti-luck epistemology, as set out in my book, Epistemic Luck (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2005). Second, I attempt to meet some of the main criticisms that one might level against the key theses that I propose in this work. And finally, third, I sketch some of the ways in which the strategy of anti-luck epistemology can be developed in new directions.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  97. Duncan Pritchard (2005). Epistemic Luck. Clarendon Press.
    Epistemic Luck is the first book to offer a rigorous philosophical examination of the concept of luck and its relationship to knowledge.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  98. Duncan Pritchard (2004). The Value of Knowledge. The Philosopher's Magazine 16 (26):54-55.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  99. Pritchard, Haddock & MIllar (eds.) (2009). Epistemic Value. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  100. Lubomira Radoilska (2010). An Aristotelian Approach to Cognitive Enhancement. Journal of Value Inquiry 44 (3):365–375.
    In this paper, I argue that cognitive enhancement cannot be epistemically beneficial since getting things right in particular and epistemic agency in general both presuppose a kind of achievement. Drawing on Aristotle’s ethics, I distinguish four categories of actions: caused, attributable, responsible, and creditable. I conclude that to the extent that cognitive enhancement is incompatible with the latter category it undermines rather than strengthens autonomous agency in the realm of cognition.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
1 — 100 / 125