This category needs an editor. We encourage you to help if you are qualified.
Volunteer, or read more about what this involves.
Related categories
Siblings:
62 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Order:
1 — 50 / 62
  1. Robert E. Allinson (2002). Space, Time and the Ethical Foundations. Monograph Collection (Matt - Pseudo).
    In Space, Time and the Ethical Foundations ideas about space and time are developed, unique to the history of philosophy, that match the new physics. A well grounded metaphysics is presented which offers a safe haven between stifling skepticism and wild imagination, and an original philosophical method is demonstrated which sharply demarcates philosophy from the empirical sciences.A new foundation is laid for ethics by grounding ethics on the author's psycho-biological deduction of the emotions that offers a progressive model to replace (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  2. William P. Alston (1989). A "Doxastic Practice" Approach to Epistemology. In Marjorie Clay & Keith Lehrer (eds.), Knowledge and Skepticism. Westview Press 1--29.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  3. Guy Axtell (2003). Review of Lynn Holt, Apprehension: Reason in the Absence of Rules. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2003 (9).
  4. Guy Axtell (1997). ``Recent Work in Virtue Epistemology". American Philosophical Quarterly 34:1--27.
  5. Gordon Barnes, The Problem of Basic Deductive Inference.
    Knowledge can be transmitted by a valid deductive inference. If I know that p, and I know that if p then q, then I can infer that q, and I can thereby come to know that q. What feature of a valid deductive inference enables it to transmit knowledge? In some cases, it is a proof of validity that grounds the transmission of knowledge. If the subject can prove that her inference follows a valid rule, then her inference transmits knowledge. (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  6. Philip De Bary (2000). Thomas Reid's Metaprinciple. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 74 (3):373-383.
  7. P. Baumann (2014). On Reflection. Philosophical Quarterly 64 (256):510-512.
    Review of Kornblith, "On Reflection".
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  8. Kenny Boyce & Andrew Moon (forthcoming). In Defense of Proper Functionalism: Cognitive Science Takes on Swampman. Synthese:1-15.
    According to proper functionalist theories of warrant, a belief is warranted only if it is formed by cognitive faculties that are properly functioning according to a good, truth-aimed design plan, one that is often thought to be specified either by intentional design or by natural selection. A formidable challenge to proper functionalist theories is the Swampman objection, according to which there are scenarios involving creatures who have warranted beliefs but whose cognitive faculties are not properly functioning, or are poorly designed, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  9. Tom Burke (2000). What is a Situation? History and Philosophy of Logic 21 (2):95-113.
    This paper examines the role of ?situations? in John Dewey's philosophy of logic. To do this properly it is necessary to contrast Dewey's conception of experience and mentality with views characteristic of modern epistemology. The primary difference is that, rather than treat experience as peripheral and or external to mental functions (reason, etc.), we should treat experience as a field in and as a part of which thinking takes place. Experience in this broad sense subsumes theory and fact, hypothesis and (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  10. Peter Carruthers (1992). Human Knowledge and Human Nature: A New Introduction to an Ancient Debate. Oxford University Press.
    Contemporary debates in epistemology devote much attention to the nature of knowledge, but neglect the question of its sources. This book focuses on the latter, especially on the question of innateness. Carruthers' aim is to transform and reinvigorate contemporary empiricism, while also providing an introduction to a range of issues in the theory of knowledge. He gives a lively presentation and assessment of the claims of classical empiricism, particularly its denial of substantive a priori knowledge and of innate knowledge. He (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  11. David Christensen (1994). Conservatism in Epistemology. Noûs 28 (1):69-89.
  12. Elijah Chudnoff (2012). Presentational Phenomenology. In Miguens & Preyer (eds.), Consciousness and Subjectivity. Ontos Verlag
    A blindfolded clairvoyant walks into a room and immediately knows how it is arranged. You walk in and immediately see how it is arranged. Though both of you represent the room as being arranged in the same way, you have different experiences. Your experience doesn’t just represent that the room is arranged a certain way; it also visually presents the very items in the room that make that representation true. Call the felt aspect of your experience made salient by this (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  13. Sharyn Clough (2011). Radical Interpretation, Feminism, and Science. Dialogues with Davidson.
  14. Mark Collier (2005). A New Look at Hume's Theory of Probabilistic Inference. Hume Studies 31 (1):21-36.
    We must rethink our assessment of Hume’s theory of probabilistic inference. Hume scholars have traditionally dismissed his naturalistic explanation of how we make inferences under conditions of uncertainty; however, psychological experiments and computer models from cognitive science provide substantial support for Hume’s account. Hume’s theory of probabilistic inference is far from obsolete or outdated; on the contrary, it stands at the leading edge of our contemporary science of the mind.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  15. John Corcoran (2006). An Essay on Knowledge and Belief. International Journal of Decision Ethics (2):125-144.
    This accessible essay treats knowledge and belief in a usable and applicable way. Many of its basic ideas have been developed recently in Corcoran-Hamid 2014: Investigating knowledge and opinion. The Road to Universal Logic. Vol. I. Arthur Buchsbaum and Arnold Koslow, Editors. Springer. Pp. 95-126. http://www.springer.com/birkhauser/mathematics/book/978-3-319-10192-7 .
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  16. David Crossley (2003). Senses of Immediacy in Bradley's Epistemology. Bradley Studies 9 (2):58-92.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  17. Franz Dietrich & Luca Moretti (2005). On Coherent Sets and the Transmission of Confirmation. Philosophy of Science 72 (3):403-424.
    In this paper, we identify a new and mathematically well-defined sense in which the coherence of a set of hypotheses can be truth-conducive. Our focus is not, as usually, on the probability but on the confirmation of a coherent set and its members. We show that, if evidence confirms a hypothesis, confirmation is "transmitted" to any hypotheses that are sufficiently coherent with the former hypothesis, according to some appropriate probabilistic coherence measure such as Olsson’s or Fitelson’s measure. Our findings have (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   14 citations  
  18. Fabian Dorsch (forthcoming). Knowledge by Imagination - How Imaginative Experience Can Ground Knowledge. Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy.
    In this article, I defend the view that we can acquire factual knowledge – that is, contingent propositional knowledge about certain (perceivable) aspects of reality – on the basis of imaginative experience. More specifically, I argue that, under suitable circumstances, imaginative experiences can rationally determine the propositional content of knowledge-constituting beliefs – though not their attitude of belief – in roughly the same way as perceptual experiences do in the case of perceptual knowledge. I also highlight some philosophical consequences of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  19. Fred I. Dretske (1983). The Epistemology of Belief. Synthese 55 (1):3 - 19.
    By examining the general conditions in which a structure could come to represent another state of affairs, it is argued that beliefs, a special class of representations, have their contents limited by the sort of information the system in which they occur can pick up and process. If a system — measuring instrument, animal or human being — cannot process information to the effect that something is Q, it cannot represent something as Q. From this it follows (for simple, ostensively (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   10 citations  
  20. Eva-Maria Engelen (2007). Kann man wissen, dass man liebt? E-Journal Philosophie der Psychologie 9.
    Gefühl und Wissen wurden in der Philosophie meist als Gegensätze gesehen. So ist Wissen traditioneller Weise als begründete oder gerechtfertigte wahre Meinung definiert. Kann man, wenn man eine solche Definition zu Grunde legt, sagen, dass man weiß, dass man liebt? Was sollte als Begründung oder Rechtfertigung gelten können?
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  21. Craig French (2014). Knowledge and Ways of Knowing. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 114 (3pt3):353-364.
    Quassim Cassam offers a conception of ways of knowing which he argues is preferable to rival accounts such as the account we find in Williamson. The correct way to think about ways of knowing matters for philosophers, such as Cassam and Williamson, who want to understand knowledge itself in terms of ways of knowing. So is Cassam right that his conception of ways of knowing is preferable to Williamson's? The discussion to follow is irenic in spirit: I will argue that (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  22. Nathaniel Goldberg (2015). Kantian Conceptual Geography. OUP.
    This is a work in Kantian conceptual geography. It explores issues in analytic epistemology, philosophy of language, and metaphysics by appealing to theses drawn from Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  23. Lisa M. Heldke & Stephen H. Kellert (1995). Objectivity as Responsibility. Metaphilosophy 26 (4):360-378.
    We present a case for defining objectivity as responsibility. We do not attempt to offer new arguments on epistemological issues such as relativism or the fact-value distinction. Instead, we construct a conception of objectivity utilizing analyses from Deweyan pragmatism, feminist theory, and science studies, organizing them around the concept of responsibility. This conception of objectivity can serve as a tool to guide the process of inquiry; by suggesting that participants reflect on the question "how can this inquiry be made more (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  24. Andrea Kern (2006). Quellen des Wissens: Zum Begriff Vernünftiger Erkenntnisfähigkeiten. Suhrkamp.
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  25. Søren Harnow Klausen (2013). Approaching the Abstract: Building Blocks for an Epistemology of Abstract Objects. Semiotica 2013 (194):3-20.
    Abstract objects are widely held to pose a formidable epistemological challenge. It has seemed mysterious to many how we can have access to such strange and intangible entities. The article considers five influential ways to meet the challenge: Transcendental arguments, the indispensability argument, insisting that we just are able to grasp abstract objects and that no further explanation is needed, abstractionist accounts, and ontological reduction. None of these approaches is by itself sufficient or completely convincing, but together they make out (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  26. Uriah Kriegel (2014). L'empirisme introspectif: un coup d’œil sous le voile des phénomènes. Philosophie 124 (1):53-79.
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  27. Christy Mag Uidhir (2013). The Epistemic Misuse & Abuse of Pictorial Caricature. American Philosophical Quarterly 50 (2):137-152.
    I claim that caricature is an epistemically defective depiction. More precisely, when employed in service to some epistemic uptake, I claim that caricature can have a non-negligible epistemic effect only for a less than ideally rational audience with certain cognitive biases. An ideally rational audience, however, would take all caricature to be what I refer to as fairground caricature, i.e., an interesting or entertaining form of depiction that is at best only trivially revelatory. I then argue that any medium (or (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  28. Jonathan Matheson (2012). Epistemic Relativism. In Andrew Cullison (ed.), Continuum Companion to Epistemology. Continuum 161-179.
    In this paper I examine the case for epistemic relativism focusing on an argument for epistemic relativism formulated (though not endorsed) by Paul Boghossian. Before examining Boghossian’s argument, however, I first examine some preliminary considerations for and against epistemic relativism.
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  29. Kevin McCain, Problem of the Criterion. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    The Problem of the Criterion The Problem of the Criterion is considered by many to be a fundamental problem of epistemology. In fact, Chisholm (1973, 1) claims that the Problem of the Criterion is “one of the most important and one of the most difficult of all the problems of philosophy.” A popular form of […].
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  30. Kevin Mccain (2008). The Virtues of Epistemic Conservatism. Synthese 164 (2):185-200.
  31. Aaron Meskin & Jonathan Cohen (2008). Photographs as Evidence. In Scott Walden (ed.), Photography and Philosophy: Essays on the Pencil of Nature. Blackwell
    Photographs furnish evidence. This is true in both formal and informal contexts. The use of photographs as legal evidence goes back to the very earliest days of photography, and they have been used in American trials since around the time of the Civil War. Photographs may also serve as historical evidence (for example, about the Civil War). And they serve in informal contexts as evidence about all sorts of things, such as what we and our loved ones looked like in (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  32. Leticia Minhot & Leon Olivé (eds.) (2008). Representación en la ciencia y en el arte. Brujas.
    El problema epistemológico fundamental ya no es el de la adecuación de las representaciones de los sujetos epitémicos al mundo. el sujeto sólo era el ordenador del mundo objetivo sin ser posible que entre en el discurso del conocimiento científico. Su incorporación en el tratamiento de las representaciones amplía el ámbito de reflexión y lleva al planteo de nuevos interrogantes. Los artículos reunidos en este volumen presentan tensiones y debates sobre cuestiones tales como los vínculos de la representación artística y (...)
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  33. Moti Mizrahi (2016). Why Arguments From Expert Opinion Are Still Weak: A Reply to Seidel. Informal Logic 36 (2):238-252.
    In this paper, I reply to Seidel’s objections against my argument from expert performance to the effect that arguments from expert opinion are weak arguments. I clarify what Seidel takes to be unclear points in my argument and show that it withstands Seidel’s objections.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  34. Luca Moretti, Phenomenal Conservatism and the Problem of Reflective Awareness.
    This paper criticizes phenomenal conservatism––the influential view according to which a subject S’s seeming that P provides S with defeasible justification for believing P. I argue that phenomenal conservatism, if true at all, has a significant limitation: seeming-based justification is elusive because S can easily lose it by just reflecting on her seemings and speculating about their causes––I call this the problem of reflective awareness. Because of this limitation, phenomenal conservatism doesn’t have all the epistemic merits attributed to it by (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  35. Luca Moretti (forthcoming). Problems of Wright's Entitlement Theory. In Peter Graham & Nikolaj Pedersen (eds.), Epistemic Entitlement. OUP
    I am concerned with Crispin Wright (2004, 2008, 2012 and 2014)’s entitlement theory, according to which (1) we have non-evidential justification for accepting propositions of a general type, which Wright calls cornerstones, and (2) this non-evidential justification for cornerstones can secure evidential justification for believing many other propositions––those we take to be true on the grounds of ordinary evidence. I initially focus on Wright’s strategic entitlement, which is one of the types of entitlement that Wright has described in more detail. (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  36. Luca Moretti (2015). Phenomenal Conservatism. Analysis 75 (2):296-309.
    I review recent work on Phenomenal Conservatism, the position introduced by Michael Huemer according to which if it seems that P to a subject S, in absence of defeaters S has thereby some degree of justification for believing P.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  37. Luca Moretti (2014). Chris Tucker (Ed.), Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism, NY: OUP (2013). [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly 64 (255):364-366.
  38. Luca Moretti (2013). Mizrahi’s Argument Against Phenomenal Conservatism. The Reasoner 7 (12):137-139.
    I show that Mizrahi’s argument against Phenomenal Conservatism is fallacious.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  39. Luca Moretti & Tommaso Piazza (2015). Phenomenal Conservatism and Bergmann’s Dilemma. Erkenntnis 80 (6):1271-1290.
    In this paper we argue that Michael Huemer’s phenomenal conservatism—the internalist view according to which our beliefs are prima facie justified if based on how things seems or appears to us to be—doesn’t fall afoul of Michael Bergmann’s dilemma for epistemological internalism. We start by showing that the thought experiment that Bergmann adduces to conclude that is vulnerable to his dilemma misses its target. After that, we distinguish between two ways in which a mental state can contribute to the justification (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  40. Jennifer Nagel (2006). Empiricism. In Sarkar Pfeifer (ed.), The Philosophy of Science. Routledge
    Having assigned experience this exclusive role in justification, empiricists then have a range of views concerning the character of experience, the semantics of our claims about unobservable entities, the nature of empirical confirmation, and the possibility of non-empirical warrant for some further class of claims, such as those accepted on the basis of linguistic or logical rules. Given the definitive principle of their position, empiricists can allow that we have knowledge independent of experience only where what is known is not (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  41. Spyridon Orestis Palermos (2011). Belief-Forming Processes, Extended. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (4):741-765.
    We very often grant that a person can gain knowledge on the basis of epistemic artifacts such as telescopes, microscopes and so on. However, this intuition threatens to undermine virtue reliabilism according to which one knows that p if and only if one’s believing the truth that p is the product of a reliable cognitive belief-forming process; in an obvious sense epistemic artifacts are not parts of one’s overall cognitive system. This is so, unless the extended cognition hypothesis (HEC) is (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   14 citations  
  42. Christopher Peacocke (2008). Truly Understood. Oxford University Press.
    A theory of understanding -- Truth's role in understanding -- Critique of justificationist and evidential accounts -- Do pragmatist views avoid this critique? -- A realistic account -- How evidence and truth are related -- Three grades of involvement of truth in theories of understanding -- Anchoring -- Next steps -- Reference and reasons -- The main thesis and its location -- Exposition and four argument-types -- Significance and consequences of the main thesis -- The first person as a case (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   29 citations  
  43. Christopher Peacocke (2003). The Realm of Reason. Oxford University Press.
    The Realm of Reason develops a new, general theory of what it is for a thinker to be entitled to form a given belief. The theory locates entitlement in the nexus of relations between truth, content, and understanding. Peacocke formulates three principles of rationalism that articulate this conception. The principles imply that all entitlement has a component that is justificationally independent of experience. The resulting position is thus a form of rationalism, generalized to all kinds of content. To show how (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   68 citations  
  44. James Pryor (2005). There is Immediate Justification. In Matthias Steup & Ernest Sosa (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Blackwell 181--202.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   31 citations  
  45. Andrew J. Reck (1973). Epistemology in William James's Principles of Psychology. Tulane Studies in Philosophy 22:79-115.
  46. Andrew E. Reisner (2014). A Short Refutation of Strict Normative Evidentialism. Inquiry (5):1-9.
    This paper shows that strict evidentialism about normative reasons for belief is inconsistent with taking truth to be the source of normative reasons for belief. It does so by showing that there are circumstances in which one can know what truth requires one to believe, yet still lack evidence for the contents of that belief.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (11 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  47. David-Hillel Ruben (1976). Epistemological Empiricism: The Duality of Beliefs and Experiences Reconsidered. The Monist 59 (July):392-403.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  48. Shane Ryan (forthcoming). Trust: A Recipe. Think.
  49. Michael J. Shaffer (2007). Taste, Gastronomic Expertise and Objectivity. In Fritz Allhoff & David Monroe (eds.), Food & Philosophy. Blackwell
    In this paper I argue that the best explanation of expertise about taste is that such alleged experts are simply more eloquent in describing the taste experiences that they have than are ordinary tasters.
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  50. Paul Silva Jr (2013). Epistemically Self-Defeating Arguments and Skepticism About Intuition. Philosophical Studies 164 (3):579-589.
    An argument is epistemically self-defeating when either the truth of an argument’s conclusion or belief in an argument’s conclusion defeats one’s justification to believe at least one of that argument’s premises. Some extant defenses of the evidentiary value of intuition have invoked considerations of epistemic self-defeat in their defense. I argue that there is one kind of argument against intuition, an unreliability argument, which, even if epistemically self-defeating, can still imply that we are not justified in thinking intuition has evidentiary (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
1 — 50 / 62