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  1. Eric H. Ash (2001). Queen V. Northumberland, and the Control of Technical Expertise. History of Science 39 (124):215-240.
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  2. Eoundationalism Strikes Back (2005). In Search of Epistemically Basic. In Rene van Woudenberg, Sabine Roeser & Ron Rood (eds.), Basic Belief and Basic Knowledge. Ontos-Verlag. 41.
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  3. Anita Benisławska (2009). Intuition and Introspection Problems in Henryk Elzenberg's Philosophy. Dialogue and Universalism 19 (8-9):83-92.
    Intuition and introspection are very interesting terms in Elzenberg’s thought. The intuition is connected with the earlier phase of Elzenberg’s philosophy. Intuition is a form of world cognition. It is tool of selection of the contents. In Elzenberg’s philosophy introspection is a later term than intuition. It may lead intuition but is not a necessity. Process of cognition can finish with introspection which is a phase of information collection. In this meaning introspection creates circumstances for intuition. Introspection is a form (...)
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  4. Gustav Bergmann (1949). On Non-Perceptual Intuition. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 10 (2):263-264.
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  5. Christian Beyer & Alex Burri (eds.) (2007). Philosophical Knowledge: Its Possibility and Scope. Rodopi.
    The former "Queen of Science" seems to be lacking both a specific subject and a particular method. Thus the need arises for intra- and metaphilosophical orientation – especially since the way philosophy sees itself stems from various influential schools and traditions whose mutual exchange is not as lively as one might have hoped.
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  6. Alexander Bird (2004). Is Knowledge Non-Inferential? Philosophical Quarterly:252-65.
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  7. Anthony Bryson & David Alexander (2012). The View From the Armchair: Responding to Kornblith's Alternative to Armchair Philosophy. Essays in Philosophy 13 (1):10.
    In the last two decades, the greatest threat to armchair philosophy has been the natural kinds approach. On this view, philosophic theorizing should not be obsessed with the ideas of justice, goodness, and truth but should look outward to the world of objects to find these things. And if these things happen to be natural kinds, like kinds of rock or fish for instance, then clearly we should reject the armchair for the lab. The philosopher should leave the office and (...)
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  8. T. Ryan Byerly & Kraig Martin (forthcoming). Problems for Explanationism on Both Sides. Erkenntnis:1-19.
    This paper continues a recent exchange in this journal concerning explanationist accounts of epistemic justification. In the first paper in this exchange, Byerly (2013a, b) argues that explanationist views judge that certain beliefs about the future are unjustified when in fact they are justified. In the second paper, McCain (2014b) defends a version of explanationism which he argues escapes Byerly’s criticism. Here we contribute to this exchange in two ways. In the first section, we argue that McCain’s defense of explanationism (...)
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  9. John Carriero (2013). Epistemology Past and Present. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 113 (2pt2):175-200.
    I draw attention to certain differences between how seventeenth-century philosophers thought about knowledge and how contemporary philosophers think about it. These differences do not strike me as particularly subtle; they are gross enough that we might wonder about the extent to which seventeenthth-century philosophers and modern philosophers are interested in the same thing. We might also wonder about the extent to which it is helpful to apply the same label—say, ‘epistemology’—to both sets of interests. I think, for example, one might (...)
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  10. Quassim Cassam (2009). The Possibility of Knowledge: Reply to Denis Bühler, Daniel Dohrn, David Lüthi, Bernhard Ritter and Simon Sauter. Abstracta 5 (4):100-113.
    How is knowledge of the external world possible? How is knowledge of other minds possible? How is a priori knowledge possible? These are all examples of how-possible questions in epistemology. In this highly original book Quassim Cassam explains how such questions arise and how they should be answered.
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  11. Amita Chatterjee (2003). Mohanty, J. N. Explorations in Philosophy: Indian Philosophy, Essays by J. N. Mohanty. Review of Metaphysics 57 (1):160-162.
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  12. Roderick M. Chisholm (1999). On the Nature of Acquaintance. In A. D. Irvine (ed.), Bertrand Russell: Critical Assessments. Routledge. 211.
  13. L. Jonathan Cohen (1982). What is Necessary for Testimonial Corroboration? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 33 (2):161-164.
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  14. Thomus Cronlar (1997). Intuition as Authoritative Knowledge in Midwifery and Homebirth. In R. Davis-Floyd & P. Sven Arvidson (eds.), Intuition: The Inside Story. Routledge. 145.
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  15. D. Davidson (1995). The Problem of Objectivity. Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 57 (2):203 - 220.
    Since Descartes, epistemology has been based on first person knowledge. We must begin, according to the usual story, with what is most certain: knowledge of our own sensations and thoughts. In one way or another we then progress, if we can, to knowledge of an objective external world. There is then the final, tenuous, step to knowledge of other minds. I shall argue for a total revision of this picture. All propositional thought, whether positive or skeptical, whether of the inner (...)
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  16. Donald Davidson (1991). Three Varieties of Knowledge. In A. Phillips Griffiths (ed.), A. J. Ayer Memorial Essays. New York: Cambridge University Press. 153-166.
    I know, for the most part, what I think, want, and intend, and what my sensations are. In addition, I know a great deal about the world around me. I also sometimes know what goes on in other people's minds. Each of these three kinds of empirical knowledge has its distinctive characteristics. What I know about the contents of my own mind I generally know without investigation or appeal to evidence. There are exceptions, but the primacy of unmediated self-knowledge is (...)
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  17. Donald H. Deane, Kenneth R. Hammond & David A. Summers (1972). Acquisition and Application of Knowledge in Complex Inference Tasks. Journal of Experimental Psychology 92 (1):20.
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  18. Steve Deery (2012). New Essays on the a Priori, Eds. Paul Boghossian & Christopher Peacocke (Oxford University Press)£ 16.99/$24.95. The Philosophers' Magazine 16:57.
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  19. Daniel C. Dennett (1995). Overworking the Hippocampus. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (4):677-678.
    Gray mistakenly thinks I have rejected the sort of theoretical enterprise he is undertaking, because, according to him, I think that "more data" is all that is needed to resolve all the issues. Not at all. My stalking horse was the bizarre (often pathetic) claim that no amount of empirical, "third-person point-of-view" science (data plus theory) could ever reduce the residue of mystery about consciousness to zero. This "New Mysterianism" (Flanagan, 1991) is one that he should want to combat as (...)
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  20. Daniel Dohrn (2008). Epistemic Immediacy and Reflection. In Georg Brun, Ulvi Dogluoglu & Dominique Kuenzle (eds.), Epistemology and Emotions. Ashgate Publishing Company. 105--24.
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  21. An Ecofeminist & Karen J. Warren (1997). Taking Empirical Data Seriously. In Karen Warren (ed.), Ecofeminism: Women, Culture, Nature. Indiana Univ Pr. 3.
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  22. Martin Edman (1994). Innate Knowledge and Scientific Rationality. In Dag Prawitz & Dag Westerståhl (eds.), Logic and Philosophy of Science in Uppsala. Kluwer. 99--115.
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  23. Ian Evans & Nicholas D. Smith (2013). Knowledge. Polity.
    Introductions to the theory of knowledge are plentiful, but none introduce students to the most recent debates that exercise contemporary philosophers. Ian Evans and Nicholas D. Smith aim to change that.
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  24. Surrendra Gangadean (2008). Philosophical Foundation: A Critical Analysis of Basic Beliefs. University Press of America.
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  25. Maryanne Garry, Lauren French & Loftus & Elizabeth (2009). False Memories: A Kind of Confabulation in Non-Clinical Subjects. In William Hirstein (ed.), Confabulation: Views From Neuroscience, Psychiatry, Psychology and Philosophy. Oup Oxford.
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  26. Arthur N. Geddis, Barry Onslow, Carol Beynon & John Oesch (1993). Transforming Content Knowledge: Learning to Teach About Isotopes. Science Education 77 (6):575-591.
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  27. Carmen Carretero Gómez (2000). " Epistemology: A Contemporary Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge", de Robert Audi. Teorema: Revista Internacional de Filosofía 19 (1):132-137.
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  28. A. D. H. (1973). Facts, Words and Beliefs. Review of Metaphysics 27 (2):413-414.
  29. Gilbert Harman (1968). Knowledge, Inference, and Explanation. American Philosophical Quarterly 5 (3):164 - 173.
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  30. S. Hetherington (1999). Lawrence BonJour, In Defense of Pure Reason. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (1):111-112.
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  31. Alison Hills, Christopher Mcmahon & Once More Friends (2003). Knowledge and Psychological Explanation 37–52 Sanford C. Goldberg/Anti-Individualism, Conceptual Omniscience, and Skepticism 53–78 Steven Wall/Just Savings and the Difference Principle 79–102. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 116:325-326.
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  32. Frank Hofmann (2014). Non‐Conceptual Knowledge. Philosophical Issues 24 (1):184-208.
    The paper is an investigation into the prospects of an epistemology of non-conceptual knowledge. According to the orthodox view, knowledge requires concepts and belief. I present several arguments to the effect that there is non-conceptual, non-doxastic knowledge, the obvious candidate for such knowledge being non-conceptual perception. Non-conceptual perception seems to be allowed for by cognitive scientists and it exhibits the central role features of knowledge—it plays the knowledge role: it respects an anti-luck condition, it is an achievement, it enables one (...)
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  33. Frank Jackson (2000). Representation, Scepticism, and the A Priori. In Paul Boghossian & Christopher Peacocke (eds.), New Essays on the a Priori. Oxford University Press. 320--332.
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  34. Kevin Kimble (2013). BonJour's Defense of Induction: An A Priorist Way Out? Dialogue 52 (3):449-476.
    Laurence BonJour has proposed a novel defense of the inductive principle in response to a skeptical challenge posed by Hume. In this paper, I elaborate and criticize BonJour’s strategy. Along the way, I draw attention to Anthony Brueckner’s criticisms of BonJour’s approach, detailing why they fall short of providing an effective rebuttal of BonJour’s argument. By distinguishing and applying two different kinds of probability assessment to BonJour’s premises, I argue that BonJour’s a priori strategy fails to provide a cogent defense (...)
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  35. Søren Harnow Klausen (2006). Access to the Abstract: Intuition as Mental Modelling. SATS: Northern European Journal of Philosophy 7 (2):86-105.
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  36. Robert Levy (1999). Lawrence BonJour's in Defense of Pure Reason. Southwest Philosophy Review 15 (2):123-126.
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  37. Guy Longworth (2013). Epistemic Authority. Analysis 74 (1):ant115.
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  38. Penelope Maddy (2000). Naturalism and the A Priori. In Paul Boghossian & Christopher Peacocke (eds.), New Essays on the a Priori. Oxford University Press. 92--116.
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  39. Marie McGinn (2012). Non-Inferential Knowledge. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 112 (1pt1):1-28.
    This paper looks at statements I am in a position to make ‘straight off’: observational judgements, perceptual and memory statements, statements about my posture, my intentions, and so on. These kinds of statement pose a problem: what is the nature of my entitlement to them? I focus on observational judgements and on two contrasting approaches to them. The first, which I reject, provides an account of my warrant for them; the second, which I defend, disconnects my entitlement from possession of (...)
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  40. Marie McGinn (2012). The Presidential Address: Non-Inferential Knowledge. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 112:1 - 28.
    This paper looks at statements I am in a position to make 'straight off': observational judgements, perceptual and memory statements, statements about my posture, my intentions, and so on. These kinds of statement pose a problem: what is the nature of my entitlement to them? I focus on observational judgements and on two contrasting approaches to them. The first, which I reject, provides an account of my warrant for them; the second, which I defend, disconnects my entitlement from possession of (...)
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  41. Stephen McLeod (2009). Quassim Cassam, The Possibility of Knowledge. Philosophy in Review 29 (3):166.
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  42. Donald Mcqueen (1961). Ways of Knowledge and Experience. Philosophical Books 2 (4):22-23.
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  43. P. B. Medawar (2008). Induction and Intuition in Scientific Thought. Routledge.
    Originally published in 1969. This book explains what is wrong with the traditional methodology of "inductive" reasoning and shows that the alternative scheme of reasoning associated with Whewell, Pierce and Popper can give the scientist a useful insight into the way he thinks.
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  44. Maria Paula Meneses (2007). Subjects or Objects of Knowledge? In Boaventura de Sousa Santos (ed.), Cognitive Justice in a Global World: Prudent Knowledges for a Decent Life. Lexington Books.
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  45. Nikolaj Nottelmann (2012). A Critique of Laurence BonJour's Central Arguments for a Priori Fallibilism. Danish Yearbook of Philosophy 45:89-105.
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  46. Erik J. Olsson (1998). Review of In Defense of Pure Reason (Laurence Bonjour, Cambridge UP). [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 49:243-249.
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  47. R. P. (1957). An Essay on the Foundations of Our Knowledge. Review of Metaphysics 10 (4):717-717.
  48. Allen Parducci & Louise M. Marshall (1962). Assimilation Vs. Contrast in the Anchoring of Perceptual Judgments of Weight. Journal of Experimental Psychology 63 (5):426.
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  49. Patrizia Pedrini (2012). What Does the Self-Deceiver Want? Humana. Mente, Journal of Philosophical Studies 20:141 - 157.
  50. G. W. R. (1982). One World and Our Knowledge of It. Review of Metaphysics 35 (3):629-630.
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