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  1. C. P. A. (1957). The Problem of Knowledge. [REVIEW] Review of Metaphysics 10 (4):715-715.
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  2. R. I. Aaron (1932). LAIRD, J. - Knowledge, Belief, and Opinion. [REVIEW] Mind 41:113.
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  3. Charles J. Abate, Has Dretske Really Refuted Skepticism?
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  4. W. R. Abbott (1971). What Knowledge Is Not. Analysis 31 (4):143 - 144.
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  5. Raziel Abelson (1968). Knowledge and Belief. Journal of Philosophy 65 (22):733-737.
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  6. Frederick Adams (1986). The Function of Epistemic Justification. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 16 (3):465 - 492.
    Assume that epistemic justification has a cognitive function and that a belief's being justified is not just its being caused by the appropriate information (for this property of the belief may be cognitively impenetrable). What is the function of epistemic justification? it cannot be to actualize knowledge-The belief's being caused by appropriate information alone does that! so what is its function? I suggest it is to cause us to believe and/or take action.
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  7. Robert Merrihew Adams (1989). Reply to Kvanvig. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (2):299-301.
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  8. Kristoffer Ahlstrom‐Vij (2013). Why We Cannot Rely on Ourselves for Epistemic Improvement. Philosophical Issues 23 (1):276-296.
    There is something very appealing about the idea that we are epistemic agents. One reason—if not the main reason—is that, while we are undoubtedly fallible creatures, us being epistemic agents that do things means that it might just be within our power to improve and thereby do better. One important way in which we would want to improve is in relation to our well-established tendency for cognitive bias. Still, the proper role of epistemic agency in us avoiding or correcting for (...)
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  9. Scott F. Aikin (2011). The Ad Hominem Argument against'Knowledge is True Belief': A Reply to Martens. European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 7 (1):5-10.
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  10. Scott F. Aikin (2010). ’KNOWLEDGE IS TRUE BELIEF’ REBUTTED. European Journal of Analytic Philosohy 6 (2):5 - 13.
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  11. Scott F. Aikin (2007). Bar Room Knowledge and Epistemic Pragmatism. Southwest Philosophy Review 23 (2):55-57.
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  12. Timo Airksinen (1982). Contextualism, a New Theory Ofepistemic Justification? Philosophia 12 (1-2):37-50.
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  13. Miri Albahari (2014). Insight Knowledge of No Self in Buddhism: An Epistemic Analysis. Philosophers' Imprint 14 (21).
    Imagine a character, Mary Analogue, who has a complete theoretical knowledge of her subject matter: the illusory nature of self. Suppose that when presenting her paper on no self at a conference she suffers stage-fright – a reaction that implies she is under an illusion of the very self whose existence she denies. Might there be something defective about her knowledge of no self? The Buddhist tradition would claim that Mary Analogue, despite her theoretical omniscience, lacks deep ‘insight knowledge’ into (...)
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  14. B. Allen (2004). What is Knowledge? Common Knowledge 10 (2):365-365.
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  15. Robert Almeder (1985). On Being Justified in Believing False Propositions. Philosophia 15 (3):271-285.
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  16. Brenda Almond (2010). The Value of Knowledge. In Richard Bailey (ed.), The Sage Handbook of Philosophy of Education. Sage Publication. 297.
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  17. William P. Alston (1999). What Is Distinctive About the Epistemology of Religious Belief? The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 1999:91-102.
    In what follows, I discuss the extent to which the epistemology of religious belief differs from the epistemology of other areas of our belief, as well as the extent to which it is similar. There will be important similarities: for example, the standards for the application of terms of epistemic assessment like ‘justified’, ‘warranted’,and ‘rational’. But in this essay, I concentrate on delineating some important differences between religious and non-religious epistemology.
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  18. I. Alvin (1979). Go Ldm An. What is Justified Belief? In George Pappas (ed.), Justification and Knowledge. Boston: D. Reidel. 10--9.
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  19. Catherine L. Bellanca Anderson (1979). The Problem of Misleading Evidence: An Assessment of the Justified-True Belief Approach. Dissertation, Syracuse University
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  20. David James Anderson (2012). Knowledge and Conviction. Synthese 187 (2):377-392.
    Much philosophical effort has been exerted over problems having to do with the correct analysis and application of the concept of epistemic justification. While I do not wish to dispute the central place of this problem in contemporary epistemology, it seems to me that there is a general neglect of the belief condition for knowledge. In this paper I offer an analysis of 'degrees of belief' in terms of a quality I label 'conviction', go on to argue that one requires (...)
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  21. James F. Anderson (1946). Problem: The Metaphysics of Knowledge. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 21:106.
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  22. David B. Annis (1978). A Contextualist Theory of Epistemic Justification. American Philosophical Quarterly 15 (3):213 - 219.
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  23. David B. Annis (1976). Knowledge. Philosophia 6 (1):209-213.
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  24. David Boyden Annis (1969). Knowledge and Belief: The Relation of the Two Concepts. Dissertation, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
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  25. Thomas Aquinas (2000). Why Ascribe Knowledge to God? In Brian Davies (ed.), Philosophy of Religion: A Guide and Anthology. Oup Oxford.
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  26. Leslie Armour (2003). Being and Knowledge. Maritain Studies/Etudes Maritainiennes 19:71-84.
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  27. Benjamin Armstrong (1996). Timothy J. McGrew, The Foundations of Knowledge. [REVIEW] Philosophy in Review 16:421-423.
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  28. Benjamin F. Armstrong (1996). Timothy J. McGrew, The Foundations of Knowledge Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 16 (6):421-423.
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  29. Benjamin Franklin Armstrong (1980). Skepticism and Theories of Justification. Dissertation, University of Pennsylvania
    An equally important part of the discussion concerns the role that doubt must play in inquiries about theories of justification. I argue that Chisholm's efforts to remove such considerations from these inquiries are mistaken. The importance of doubt is a point about which Wittgenstein has much to say in On Certainty. I try to bring to bear some of his insights. ;An important part of my discussion concerns where one is not to start when one is dealing with skeptical arguments. (...)
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  30. David M. Armstrong (2000). The 'Thermometer' View of Knowledge. In Sven Bernecker & Fred I. Dretske (eds.), Knowledge: Readings in Contemporary Epistemology. Oup Oxford.
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  31. J. H. Scobell Armstrong (1953). Knowledge and Belief. Analysis 13 (5):111 - 117.
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  32. Frank Arntzenius (2007). 7. Rationality and Self-Confidence. Oxford Studies in Epistemology: Volume 2 2:165.
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  33. Jay David Atlas, 16-17 April 2005.
    The lecture that we have heard consists of excerpts from Professor Stanley’s forthcoming book Knowledge and Interest, and it consists of two parts, a messy part and a clean part; the messy part is from the book’s introduction, which describes the “central data that is at issue in this debate,” and the clean part is from Chapter 7, which presents an interesting criticism of a semantical theory of knowledge-attribution sentences that makes their truth-conditions relative to non-time-world circumstances of evaluation, e.g. (...)
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  34. Robert Audi (1993). Belief, Justification and Knowledge: An Introduction to Epistemology. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (2):480-484.
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  35. A. J. Ayer & R. G. Collingwood (forthcoming). 1. Evidence as That Which Justifies Belief. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  36. G. H. B. (1973). Problems in the Theory of Knowledge. [REVIEW] Review of Metaphysics 26 (4):771-772.
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  37. J. B. B. (1962). Library Deontology. Review of Metaphysics 16 (2):393-394.
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  38. Murat Baç (2009). Memories of the Fourth Condition and Lessons to Be Learned From Suspicious Externalism. Organon F 16 (2):127-145.
    A significant and interesting part of the post-Gettier literature regarding the analysis of propositional knowledge is the attempt to supplement the traditional tripartite analysis by employing a fourth condition regarding the defeasibility of evidence and thus to preclude the counterexamples displayed in Gettier’s original article. My aim in this paper is to critically examine the sort of externalism that accompanies the most promising of the proposed fourth conditions, due to Pollock, in order to offer some fresh insights on this old (...)
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  39. John Bacon (1983). Knowledge, More or Less. Noûs 17 (4):663-668.
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  40. John Bacon (1975). Belief as Relative Knowledge. In Alan Ross Anderson, Ruth Barcan Marcus, R. M. Martin & Frederic B. Fitch (eds.), The Logical Enterprise. Yale University Press. 189--210.
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  41. Jason Baehr, Unraveling the Value Problem.
    The value problem in epistemology is rooted in a commonsense intuition to the effect that knowledge is more valuable than true belief. Call this the “guiding intuition.” The guiding intuition generates a problem in light of two additional considerations. The first is that knowledge is (roughly) justified or warranted true belief.[1] The second is that on certain popular accounts of justification or warrant (e.g. reliabilism), its value is apparently instrumental to and hence derivative from the value of true belief.[2] But (...)
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  42. Julian Baggini (2007). The Wisdom of Not Knowing. The Philosophers' Magazine 37:36-45.
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  43. B. Ball (2013). Knowledge is Normal Belief. Analysis 73 (1):69-76.
    In this article, I offer a new analysis of knowledge: knowledge, I claim, is normal belief. I begin with what I take to be the conceptual truth that knowledge is epistemically justified, or permissible, belief. I then argue that this in turn is simply doxastically normal belief, first clarifying what is meant by this claim, and then providing reasons to think that normal belief, so understood, must be true and safe from error, making it a good candidate for knowledge.
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  44. Renford Bambrough (1993). Invincible Knowledge. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 35:51-62.
    As there is a condition of mind which is characterized by invincible ignorance, so there is another which may be said to be possessed of invincible knowledge; and it would be paradoxical in me to deny to such a mental state the highest quality of religious faith,—I mean certitude . ‘She's an artist. She keeps saying the same thing without repeating herself. In being initiated into our life as human beings we are subject to causal influences; guiding, teaching, restraint, compulsion, (...)
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  45. Adrian Bardon (1999). Two Problems for the Proper Functionalist Analysis of Epistemic Warrant. Southwest Philosophy Review 15 (2):97-107.
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  46. Earl Barnes (1909). Where Knowledge Fails.
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  47. Gordon Barnes (2002). Belief, Control, and Conclusive Reasons. Southern Journal of Philosophy 40 (2):315-325.
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  48. Marcia Baron, Justifications and Excuses.
    The distinction between justifications and excuses is a familiar one to most of us who work either in moral philosophy or legal philosophy. But exactly how it should be understood is a matter of considerable disagreement. My aim in this paper is, first, to sort out the differences and try to figure out what underlying disagreements account for them. I give particular attention to the following question: Does a person who acts on a reasonable but mistaken belief have a justification, (...)
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  49. Naomi S. Baron (1987). When Seeing's Not Believing. American Journal of Semiotics 5 (3/4):321-339.
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  50. J. D. Bastable (1963). Knowledge. Philosophical Studies 12:286-289.
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