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  1. William P. Alston (1999). What Is Distinctive About the Epistemology of Religious Belief? The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 1999:91-102.
    In what follows, I discuss the extent to which the epistemology of religious belief differs from the epistemology of other areas of our belief, as well as the extent to which it is similar. There will be important similarities: for example, the standards for the application of terms of epistemic assessment like ‘justified’, ‘warranted’,and ‘rational’. But in this essay, I concentrate on delineating some important differences between religious and non-religious epistemology.
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  2. Steve Fuller (1987). Provocation on Belief: Part. Social Epistemology 1 (1):102 – 105.
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  3. David Gorman (1987). Provocation on Belief: Part. Social Epistemology 1 (1):97 – 99.
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  4. Shabnam Mousavi & Jim Garrison (2003). Toward a Transactional Theory of Decision Making: Creative Rationality as Functional Coordination in Context. Journal of Economic Methodology 10 (2):131-156.
    This paper poses a Deweyan challenge to both the neoclassical framework of rational choice and models of bounded rationality and deliberation, especially the procedural theory of rationality advanced by Herbert Simon. We demonstrate how modern theories on procedural or instrumental rationality trace their origin to the tradition of British empiricism, especially the philosophy of David Hume. Most theories of action such as Simon's assume actors may control their bodies 'at will.' For Dewey, habits are will; we control them (...)
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  5. Sylvain Moutier & Olivier Houd (2003). Judgement Under Uncertainty and Conjunction Fallacy Inhibition Training. Thinking and Reasoning 9 (3):185 – 201.
    Intuitive predictions and judgements under uncertainty are often mediated by judgemental heuristics that sometimes lead to biases. Our micro-developmental study suggests that a presumption of rationality is justified for adult subjects, in so far as their systematic judgemental biases appear to be due to a specific executive-inhibition failure in working memory, and not necessarily to a lack of understanding of the fundamental principles of probability. This hypothesis was tested using an experimental procedure in which 60 adult subjects were trained to (...)
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  6. Stephen E. Newstead (2000). What is an Ecologically Rational Heuristic? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (5):759-760.
    The notion of ecological rationality, although plausible, does not readily lead to testable predictions. This is illustrated with respect to heuristics in syllogistic reasoning. Several possible heuristics have been proposed but ecological rationality does not appear to offer a sensible rationale for choosing between these.
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  7. Kai Nielsen (1978). Rationality as Emancipation and Enlightenment. International Studies in Philosophy 10:33-50.
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  8. Ilkka Niiniluoto (2000). Is It Rational To Be Rational? The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 5:115-122.
    For the classical Greek philosophers, the cultivation of human rationality is a central ingredient of education andedification. But notions of reason and rationality have received various interpretations. A plurality of interpretations directs our attention to the general philosophical queries, What is rationality? and Why should we be rational? In this paper, I consider only briefly the first question by distinguishing three aspects of rationality in Section 2. Then I shall use, in Section 3, these three notions to give nine reformulations (...)
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  9. Erik J. Olsson (2008). The Place of Coherence in Epistemology. In Vincent Hendricks (ed.), New Waves in Epistemology. Palgrave Macmillan.
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  10. Erik J. Olsson (1999). Cohering With. Erkenntnis 50 (2-3):273 - 291.
    I argue that the analysis most capable of systematising our intuitions about coherence as a relation is one according to which a set of beliefs, A, coheres with another set, B, if and only if the set-theoretical union of A and B is a coherent set. The second problem I consider is the role of coherence in epistemic justification. I submit that there are severe problems pertaining to the idea, defended most prominently by Keith Lehrer, that justification amounts to coherence (...)
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  11. Spyridon Orestis Palermos (2013). Could Reliability Naturally Imply Safety? European Journal of Philosophy 22 (3).
    The aim of the present paper is to argue that robust virtue epistemology is correct. That is, a complete account of knowledge is not in need for an additional modal criterion in order to account for knowledge-undermining epistemic luck. I begin by presenting the problems facing robust virtue epistemology by examining two prominent counterexamples—the Barney and ‘epistemic twin earth’ cases. After proposing a way in which virtue epistemology can explain away these two problematic cases, thereby, implying that cognitive abilities are (...)
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  12. Paweł Pasieka (2005). Wisdom as Epistemological Utopia and Scepticism. Dialogue and Universalism 15 (5-6):103-110.
    In this essay I wish to discuss the notions of utopia, especially the notion of epistemological utopia as Leszek Kołakowski described it in one of his paper. Epistemological utopia is not tantamount to the conception of perfect and unalterable knowledge. On the contrary, in its realm there is also a place for scepticism, because scepticism is a kind of epistemological utopia but à rebours. Epistemological fundamentalism and scepticism are indeed two opposite attitudes but they finally belong to each other. Nevertheless, (...)
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The Basing Relation
  1. Nathan Ballantyne & Ian Evans (2013). Schaffer's Demon. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (4):552-559.
    Jonathan Schaffer (2010) has summoned a new sort of demon – which he calls the debasing demon – that apparently threatens all of our purported knowledge. We show that any debasing skeptical argument must attack the justification condition and can do so only if a plausible thesis about justification is false.
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  2. N. V. Banerjee (1930). The Problems and Postulates of Epistemology. The Monist 40 (4):552-558.
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  3. Anthony Robert Booth (2014). Two Reasons Why Epistemic Reasons Are Not Object‐Given Reasons. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (1):1-14.
    In this paper I discuss two claims; the first is the claim that state-given reasons for belief are of a radically different kind to object-given reasons for belief. The second is that, where this last claim is true, epistemic reasons are object-given reasons for belief (EOG). I argue that EOG has two implausible consequences: (i) that suspension of judgement can never be epistemically justified, and (ii) that the reason that epistemically justifies a belief that p can never be the reason (...)
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  4. Anthony Robert Booth (2006). Can There Be Epistemic Reasons for Action? Grazer Philosophische Studien 73 (1):133-144.
    In this paper I consider whether there can be such things as epistemic reasons for action. I consider three arguments to the contrary and argue that none are successful, being either somewhat question-begging or too strong by ruling out what most epistemologists think is a necessary feature of epistemic justification, namely the epistemic basing relation. I end by suggesting a "non-cognitivist" model of epistemic reasons that makes room for there being epistemic reasons for action and suggest that this model may (...)
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  5. Juan Comesaña (2006). A Well-Founded Solution to the Generality Problem. Philosophical Studies 129 (1):27 - 47.
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  6. John K. Davis (2009). Subjectivity, Judgment, and the Basing Relationship. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (1):21-40.
    Moral and legal judgments sometimes depend on personal traits in this sense: the subject offers good reasons for her judgment, but if she had a different social or ideological background, her judgment would be different. If you would judge the constitutionality of restrictions on abortion differently if you were not a secular liberal, is your judgment really based on the arguments you find convincing, or do you find them so only because you are a secular liberal? I argue that a (...)
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  7. Ian Evans (2013). The Problem of the Basing Relation. Synthese 190 (14):2943-2957.
    In days past, epistemologists expended a good deal of effort trying to analyze the basing relation—the relation between a belief and its basis. No satisfying account was offered, and the project was largely abandoned. Younger epistemologists, however, have begun to yearn for an adequate theory of basing. I aim to deliver one. After establishing some data and arguing that traditional accounts of basing are unsatisfying, I introduce a novel theory of the basing relation: the dispositional theory. It begins with the (...)
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  8. Carl Ginet (1992). Causal Theories in Epistemology. In Jonathan Dancy & Ernest Sosa (eds.), Blackwell's A Companion to Epistemology. Blackwell.
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  9. Alvin I. Goldman (1978). Epistemology and the Psychology of Belief. The Monist 61 (4):525-535.
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  10. Kenneth Hobson (2008). Foundational Beliefs and the Structure of Justification. Synthese 164 (1):117 - 139.
    I argue that our justification for beliefs about the external physical world need not be constituted by any justified beliefs about perceptual experiences. In this way our justification for beliefs about the physical world may be nondoxastic and this differentiates my proposal from traditional foundationalist theories such as those defended by Laurence BonJour, Richard Fumerton, and Timothy McGrew. On the other hand, it differs from certain non-traditional foundationalist theories such as that defended by James Pryor according to which perceptual experience (...)
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  11. Keith Allen Korcz (2000). The Causal-Doxastic Theory of the Basing Relation. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 30 (4):525-550.
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  12. Jonathan Kvanvig (1995). ``Coherentism: Misconstrual and Misapprehension&Quot. Southwest Philosophy Review 11 (1):159-169.
    Some critics of coherentism have depicted it so that it founders on the distinction between warrant for the content of a belief and warrant for the believing itself. This distinction has to do with the basing relation: one might have warrant for the content of what one believes without basing one's belief properly, without holding the belief because of what warrants it. When the first kind of warrant obtains, I will say that a belief is propositionally warranted.
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  13. Jonathan Kvanvig (1987). On Lemke's Defence of a Causal Basing Requirement. Analysis 47 (3):162 - 167.
    LEMKE has recently taken issue (see ANALYSIS 46.3, June 1986, pp. 138-44) with my claim that no counterfactual causal account of the basing relation is plausible (see ANALYSIS 45.3, June 1985, pp. 153-8). Intuitively, a counterfactual causal account claims that belief is based on evidence if and only if the evidence either causes the belief or would have caused it had the actual cause been absent. This intuitive formulation accounts only for counterfactual causes of level one: events which would have (...)
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  14. Jonathan Kvanvig (1985). Swain on the Basing Relation. Analysis 45 (3):153 - 158.
    Suppose we want to know whether a person justifiably believes a certain claim. Further, suppose that our interest in this question is because we take such justification to be necessary for knowledge. To justifiably believe a claim requires more than there being a justification for that claim. Presumably, there is a justification for accepting all sorts of scientific theories of which I have no awareness; because of my lack of awareness, I do not justifiably believe those theories. Further, even if (...)
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  15. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2003). Justification and Proper Basing. In Erik Olsson (ed.), The Epistemology of Keith Lehrer. Dordrecht: Kluwer Publishing Co.. 43-62.
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  16. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (1987). On Lemke's Defense of a Causal Basing Relation. Analysis 47:162--167.
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  17. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (1985). Swain on the Basing Relation. Analysis 45 (3):153-158.
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  18. Maria Lasonen-Aarnio (2010). Is There a Viable Account of Well-Founded Belief? Erkenntnis 72 (2):205 - 231.
    My starting point is some widely accepted and intuitive ideas about justified, well-founded belief. By drawing on John Pollock’s work, I sketch a formal framework for making these ideas precise. Central to this framework is the notion of an inference graph. An inference graph represents everything that is relevant about a subject for determining which of her beliefs are justified, such as what the subject believes based on what. The strengths of the nodes of the graph represent the degrees of (...)
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  19. Maria Lasonen‐Aarnio (2014). Higher‐Order Evidence and the Limits of Defeat. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):314-345.
  20. Adam Leite, What the Basing Relation Can Teach Us About the Theory of Justification.
    According to a common view, the activity of justifying is epistemologically irrelevant: being justified in believing as one does never requires the ability to justify one’s belief. This view runs into trouble regarding the epistemic basing relation, the relation between a person’s belief and the reasons for which the person holds it. The view must appeal to basing relations as part of its account of what it is for a person to be justified in believing as she does, but the (...)
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  21. Adam Leite (2004). On Justifying and Being Justified. Philosophical Issues 14 (1):219–253.
    We commonly speak of people as being ‘‘justified’’ or ‘‘unjustified’’ in believing as they do. These terms describe a person’s epistemic condition. To be justified in believing as one does is to have a positive epistemic status in virtue of holding one’s belief in a way which fully satisfies the relevant epistemic requirements or norms. This requires something more (or other) than simply believing a proposition whose truth is well-supported by evidence, even by evidence which one possesses oneself, since one (...)
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  22. Lory Lemke (1986). Kvanvig and Swain on the Basing Relation. Analysis 46 (3):138-144.
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  23. Kevin McCain (2012). The Interventionist Account of Causation and the Basing Relation. Philosophical Studies 159 (3):357-382.
    It is commonplace to distinguish between propositional justification (having good reasons for believing p) and doxastic justification (believing p on the basis of those good reasons).One necessary requirement for bridging the gap between S’s merely having propositional justification that p and S’s having doxastic justification that p is that S base her belief that p on her reasons (propositional justification).A plausible suggestion for what it takes for S’s belief to be based on her reasons is that her reasons must contribute (...)
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  24. Daniel M. Mittag (2002). On the Causal-Doxastic Theory of the Basing Relation. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 32 (4):543 - 559.
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  25. Ian Proops (2014). Russellian Acquaintance Revisited. Journal of the History of Philosophy 52 (4):779-811.
    philosophers sometimes claim that in his 1912 work, The Problems of Philosophy (hereafter cited as POP), and possibly as early as “on Denoting” (1905), Russell conceives of acquaintance with sense-data as providing an indubitable or certain foundation for empirical knowledge.1 However, although he does say things suggestive of this view in certain of his 1914 works, Russell also makes remarks in POP that conflict with any Cartesian interpretation of this work.2 He says, for example, that all our knowledge of truths (...)
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  26. Jonathan Schaffer (2010). The Debasing Demon. Analysis 70 (2):228 - 237.
    What knowledge is imperilled by sceptical doubt? That is, what range of beliefs may be called into doubt by sceptical nightmares like the Cartesian demon hypothesis? It is generally thought that demons have limited powers, perhaps only threatening a posteriori knowledge of the external world, but at any rate not threatening principles like the cogito. I will argue that there is a demon – the debasing demon – with unlimited powers, which threatens universal doubt. Rather than deceiving us with falsities, (...)
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  27. Paul Silva Jr (2014). Does Doxastic Justification Have a Basing Requirement? Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-17.
    The distinction between propositional and doxastic justification is the distinction between having justification to believe P (= propositional justification) versus having a justified belief in P (= doxastic justification). The focus of this paper is on doxastic justification and on what conditions are necessary for having it. In particular, I challenge the basing demand on doxastic justification, i.e., the idea that one can have a doxastically justified belief only if one’s belief is based on an epistemically appropriate reason. This demand (...)
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  28. Marshall Swain (1985). Justification, Reasons, and Reliability. Synthese 64 (1):69 - 92.
    Some time ago, F. P. Ramsey (1960) suggested that knowledge is true belief obtained by a reliable process. This suggestion has only recently begun to attract serious attention. In 'Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge', Alvin Goldman (1976) argues that a person has knowl- edge only if that person's belief has been formed as a result of a reliable cognitive mechanism. In Belief, Truth, and Knowledge, David Arm- strong (1973) argues that one has knowledge only if one's belief is a comPletely reliable (...)
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  29. Hannah Tierney & Nicholas D. Smith (2012). Keith Lehrer on the Basing Relation. Philosophical Studies 161 (1):27-36.
    In this paper, we review Keith Lehrer’s account of the basing relation, with particular attention to the two cases he offered in support of his theory, Raco (Lehrer, Theory of knowledge, 1990; Theory of knowledge, (2nd ed.), 2000) and the earlier case of the superstitious lawyer (Lehrer, The Journal of Philosophy, 68, 311–313, 1971). We show that Lehrer’s examples succeed in making his case that beliefs need not be based on the evidence, in order to be justified. These cases show (...)
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  30. Timm Triplett (1987). Rorty's Critique of Foundationalism. Philosophical Studies 52 (1):115 - 129.
    Rorty's critique concentrates on one aspect of foundationalism: the claim that nonpropositional sensory awareness serves as the basis for propositional justification. This claim is an essential component of classical foundationalism, though not necessarily of the more moderate versions of foundationalism that have been proposed. Thus even if it were a successful critique it would tell against only one type of foundationalism. But nothing in Rorty's argument provides any reason to doubt the plausibility of a classical foundationalist explanation of why sensory (...)
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  31. John Turri (2011). Believing For a Reason. Erkenntnis 74 (3):383-397.
    This paper explains what it is to believe something for a reason. My thesis is that you believe something for a reason just in case the reason non-deviantly causes your belief. In the course of arguing for my thesis, I present a new argument that reasons are causes, and offer an informative account of causal non-deviance.
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  32. John Turri (2010). On the Relationship Between Propositional and Doxastic Justification. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (2):312-326.
    I argue against the orthodox view of the relationship between propositional and doxastic justification. The view under criticism is: if p is propositionally justified for S in virtue of S's having reason(s) R, and S believes p on the basis of R, then S's belief that p is doxastically justified. I then propose and evaluate alternative accounts of the relationship between propositional and doxastic justification, and conclude that we should explain propositional justification in terms of doxastic justification. If correct, this (...)
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  33. Hamid Vahid (2009). The Epistemology of Belief. Palgrave Macmillan.
    Truth and the aim of belief -- Belief, interpretation, and Moore's paradox -- Belief, sensitivity, and safety -- Basic beliefs and the problem of non-doxastic justification -- Experience as reason for beliefs -- The problem of the basing relation -- Basic beliefs, easy knowledge, and the problem of warrant transfer -- Belief, justification, and fallibility -- Knowledge of our beliefs and privileged access.
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  34. Han van Wietmarschen (2013). Peer Disagreement, Evidence, and Well-Groundedness. Philosophical Review 122 (3):395-425.
    The central question of the peer disagreement debate is: what should you believe about the disputed proposition if you have good reason to believe that an epistemic peer disagrees with you? This article shows that this question is ambiguous between evidential support (or propositional justification) and well-groundedness (or doxastic justification). The discussion focuses on conciliatory views, according to which peer disagreements require you to significantly revise your view or to suspend judgment. The article argues that for a wide range of (...)
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  35. Ralph Wedgwood (2006). The Normative Force of Reasoning. Noûs 40 (4):660–686.
    What exactly is reasoning? Like many other philosophers, I shall endorse a broadly causal conception of reasoning. Reasoning is a causal process, in which one mental event (say, one’s accepting the conclusion of a certain argument) is caused by an antecedent mental event (say, one’s considering the premises of the argument). Just like causal accounts of action and causal accounts of perception, causal accounts of reasoning have to confront a version of what has come to be known as the problem (...)
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  36. Barbara Winters (1983). Inferring. Philosophical Studies 44 (2):201 - 220.
    It has been a commonplace from the beginnings of philosophical thought that what distinguishes humans from other species is the ability to reason; reason- ing is held to be an essential characteristic of the species and one that is unique to it. The essence condition requires that all humans possess at least the capacity for reasoning and that it be exercised in many of the ordinary cases of acquiring beliefs. And uniqueness entails that non-humans cannot reason, no matter how much (...)
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  37. Crispin Wright (2008). McKinsey One More Time. In Anthony E. Hatzimoysis (ed.), Self-Knowledge. Oxford University Press.
    §1 It is not always true that recognizably valid reasoning from known, or otherwise epistemically warranted premises, can be enlisted to produce knowledge, or other epistemic warrant, for a conclusion. The counterexamples are cases that exhibit what I have elsewhere called warrant transmission-failure. It is nowadays widely accepted that there are indeed such counterexamples, though individual cases remain controversial. One such controversial case is the so-called McKinsey paradox. The paradox presents as a simple collision between three claims that many would (...)
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  38. José L. Zalabardo (2005). Externalism, Skepticism, and the Problem of Easy Knowledge. Philosophical Review 114 (1):33-61.
    of (from Philosophy Papers Online: Browse Papers).
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