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Epistemological Theories

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  • MichaelBishop & J. D. Trout (2005). The Pathologies of Standard Analytic Epistemology. Noûs 39 (4):696–714.
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  • Christian Beyer (2007). Contextualism and the Background of (Philosophical) Justification. Grazer Philosophische Studien 74 (1):291-305.
    I propose to apply a version of contextualism about knowledge to the special case that represents the topic of this volume. I begin by motivating my preferred version of contextualism, which may be labelled as conventionalist contextualism; here I start from a well-known problem that besets epistemic internalism (section I). Following this, I pose a problem for conventionalist contextualism and argue that it can be solved by invoking, first, the idea of what I shall call the lifewordly background of epistemic (...)
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  • Richard Eldridge (2006). History Vs. (Epistemological) Theory. History and Theory 45 (3):448–454.
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  • James Fieser, David Hume: Metaphysical and Epistemological Theories. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  • Alvin I. Goldman (1967). A Causal Theory of Knowing. Journal of Philosophy 64 (12):357-372.
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  • Pete Mandik, An Epistemological Theory of Consciousness?
    This article tackles problems concerning the reduction of phenomenal consciousness to brain processes that arise in consideration of specifically epistemological properties that have been attributed to conscious experiences. In particular, various defenders of dualism and epiphenomenalism have argued for their positions by assuming special epistemic access to phenomenal consciousness. Many physicalists have reacted to such arguments by denying the epistemological premises. My aim in this paper is to take a different approach in opposing dualism and argue that when we correctly (...)
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  • Domenic Marbaniang (2009). Epistemics of Divine Reality. Google Books.
    Epistemics of Divine Reality is a detailed logical exposition of the epistemological framework of theological and non-theological systems such as Monism, Non-dualism, Polytheism, Pantheism, Panentheism, Skepticism, Positivism, Fideism, etc. The argument proceeds from the hypothesis that rational methodologies eventually lead to monistic theologies while empirical methodologies tend towards a severing from rational foundations. The author highlights various fideistic options like Kierkegaardian existentialism, Barthianism, Foundationalism, and the like before presenting the view of Rational Fideism.
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  • Duncan Pritchard, Epistemic Deflationism.
    It is argued that just as the deflationist programme in the theory of truth has been a fruitful research programme, so a similar deflationist programme should be instituted in the theory of knowledge. Three possible deflationist positions are developed and assessed in this regard—Crispin Sartwell’s view that knowledge is merely true belief, Richard Foley’s contention that knowledge is merely true belief plus other true beliefs, and the radical version of subject contextualism put forward by Michael Williams. It is argued that (...)
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  • Laurence BonJour (1985). The Structure of Empirical Knowledge. Harvard University Press.
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  • Luc Bovens & EJ Olsson (2000). Coherentism, Reliability and Bayesian Networks. Mind 109 (436).
    The coherentist theory of justification provides a response to the sceptical challenge: even though the independent processes by which we gather information about the world may be of dubious quality, the internal coherence of the information provides the justification for our empirical beliefs. This central canon of the coherence theory of justification is tested within the framework of Bayesian networks, which is a theory of probabilistic reasoning in artificial intelligence. We interpret the independence of the information gathering processes (IGPs) in (...)
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  • Anthony L. Brueckner (1988). Problems with Internalist Coherentism. Philosophical Studies 54 (1).
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  • Hannah Ginsborg, Reasons for Belief U.C. Berkeley.
    In his influential article, "A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge," Donald Davidson defends the claim that "nothing can count as a reason for holding a belief except another belief" (1986, 310). The point of this claim is to deny that beliefs can be justified by, or grounded on "the testimony of the senses: sensation, perception, the given, experience, sensedata, the passing show" (ibid.). Davidson's argument focusses on the case of sensation. While a belief can be justified by the awareness (...)
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  • Thomas Grundmann (1999). BonJour's Self-Defeating Argument for Coherentism. Erkenntnis 50 (2-3).
    One of the most influential arguments for the coherence theory of empirical justification is BonJours a priori argument from the internalist regress. According to this argument, foundationalism cannot solve the problem of the internalist regress since internalism is incompatible with basic beliefs. Hence, coherentism seems to be the only option. In my article I contend that this argument is doomed to failure. It is either too strong or too weak. Too strong, since even coherentism cannot stop the internalist regress in (...)
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  • Sven Ove Hansson (2006). Coherence in Epistemology and Belief Revision. Philosophical Studies 128 (1).
    A general theory of coherence is proposed, in which systemic and relational coherence are shown to be interdefinable. When this theory is applied to sets of sentences, it turns out that logical closure obscures the distinctions that are needed for a meaningful analysis of coherence. It is concluded that references to “all beliefs” in coherentist phrases such as “all beliefs support each other” have to be modified so that merely derived beliefs are excluded. Therefore, in order to avoid absurd conclusions, (...)
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  • Sven Ove Hansson & Erik J. Olsson (1999). Providing Foundations for Coherentism. Erkenntnis 51 (2-3).
    We prove that four theses commonly associated with coherentism are incompatible with the representation of a belief state as a logically closed set of sentences. The result is applied to the conventional coherence interpretation of the AGM theory of belief revision, which appears not to be tenable. Our argument also counts against the coherentistic acceptability of a certain form of propositional holism. We argue that the problems arise as an effect of ignoring the distinction between derived and non-derived beliefs, and (...)
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  • David K. Henderson (1994). Epistemic Competence and Contextualist Epistemology: Why Contextualism is Not Just the Poor Person's Coherentism. Journal of Philosophy 91 (12):627-649.
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  • Michael Huemer (2007). Weak Bayesian Coherentism. Synthese 157 (3).
    Recent results in probability theory have cast doubt on coherentism, purportedly showing (a) that coherence among a set of beliefs cannot raise their probability unless individual beliefs have some independent credibility, and (b) that no possible measure of coherence makes coherence generally probability-enhancing. I argue that coherentists can reject assumptions on which these theorems depend, and I derive a general condition under which the concurrence of two information sources lacking individual credibility can raise the probability of what they report.
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  • Christoph Jäger, Is Coherentism Coherent?
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  • Peter Klein & Ted A. Warfield (1996). No Help for the Coherentist. Analysis 56 (2):118–121.
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  • Jonathan Kvanvig, Coherentism and Justified Inconsistent Beliefs: A Solution.
    Here I present a solution to this problem. I will first explain the problem of justified inconsistent beliefs for coherentism, and then show how to avoid it. To anticipate my argument, the key is to note that there are distinct types of justification. There is the ordinary intuitive notion on which justification is roughly synonymous with reasonable or rational belief. Coherentists, however, are interested in the type of justification that is part of a proper account of knowledge, the kind of (...)
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  • Maureen Linker (1999). Review Essay: A Coherentist Epistemology with Integrity. Philosophy and Social Criticism 25 (3).
    Linda Alcoff, Real Knowing (reviewed by Maureen Linker).
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  • William Lycan, Explanation and Epistemology.
    Second, there is a form of ampliative inference that has come to be called ‘inference to the best explanation,’ or more briefly ‘explanatory inference.’ Roughly: From the fact that a certain hypothesis would explain the data at hand better than any other available hypothesis, we infer with some degree of confidence that that leading hypothesis is correct. There is no question but that this inference is often performed. Arguably, every human being performs it many times in a day, perhaps without (...)
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  • D. J. MacDermid (2004). Is Davidson's Epistemology Coherent? Grazer Philosophische Studien 67 (1):101-130.
    My concern in this paper is with a simple question: Does Donald Davidson's case for an anti-foundationalist epistemology cohere well with his stance on conceptual schemes? After rehearsing Davidson's central anti-foundationalist argument in Section 2, I consider the objection that his argument rests on a premise which is defensible only if we invoke the so-called "dualism of scheme and content", Davidson's opposition to which is the subject of Section 3. Then, in Section 4, I explain why, despite appearances to the (...)
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  • G. J. Mattey (1983). Lehrer's Personal Coherentism and the KK Thesis. Philosophical Studies 43 (3).
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  • Peter Murphy, Coherentism. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  • Erik J. Olsson (ed.) (2003). The Epistemology of Keith Lehrer. Kluwer Academic Publishers.
    Keith Lehrer is one of the leading proponents of a coherence theory of knowledge that seeks to explain what it means to know in a characteristically human way. Central to his account are the pivotal role played by a principle of self-trust and his insistence that a sound epistemology must ultimately be ecumenical in nature, combining elements of internalism and externalism. The present book is an extensive, self-contained, up-to-date study of Lehrer's epistemological work. Covering all major aspects, it contains original (...)
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  • William A. Roche (forthcoming). Coherentism, Truth, and Witness Agreement. Acta Analytica.
    Coherentists on epistemic justification claim that all justification is inferential, and that beliefs, when justified, get their justification together (not in isolation) as members of a coherent belief system. Some recent work in formal epistemology shows that “individual credibility” is needed for “witness agreement” to increase the probability of truth and generate a high probability of truth. It can seem that, from this result in formal epistemology, it follows that coherentist justification is not truth-conducive, that it is not the case (...)
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  • James A. Ryan (2001). Conservatism and Coherentism in Aristotle, Confucius, and Mencius. Journal of Chinese Philosophy 28 (3):275–284.
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  • Geoffrey Sayre-McCord, Coherentist Epistemology and Moral Theory.
    matter of knowing that -- that injustice is wrong, courage is valuable, and care is As a result, what I'll be doing is primarily defending in general -- and due. Such knowledge is embodied in a range of capacities, abilities, and skills..
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  • Richard Schantz (1999). The Role of Sensory Experience in Epistemic Justification: A Problem for Coherentism. Erkenntnis 50 (2-3).
    The author argues that coherence views of justification, in spite of their crucial insight into the interpenetration of our beliefs, neglect a key constraint on justification: they are unable to accommodate the epistemic significance of experience. Epistemic justification is not just a function of our beliefs and their interrelations. Both, beliefs and experiences, are relevant to the justification of an empirical belief. Experience is not itself a form of belief or disposition to believe; it cannot be analyzed in doxastic terms. (...)
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  • Thomas D. Senor (1995). Harman, Negative Coherentism, and the Problem of Ongoing Justification. Philosophia 24 (3-4).
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  • Nicholas Shackel (2008). Coherentism and the Symmetry of Epistemic Support. Analysis 68 (299):226–234.
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  • Tom Stoneham (2007). A Reductio of Coherentism. Analysis 67 (295):254–257.
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  • Author unknown, Coherentism. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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Coherentism, Misc
  • Jack Arnold & Stewart Shapiro (2007). Where in the (World Wide) Web of Belief is the Law of Non-Contradiction? Noûs 41 (2):276–297.
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  • Jonathan Kvanvig, Coherentist Theories of Epistemic Justification. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  • Luca Moretti (2007). Ways in Which Coherence is Confirmation Conducive. Synthese 157 (3).
    Recent works in epistemology show that the claim that coherence is truth conducive – in the sense that, given suitable ceteris paribus conditions, more coherent sets of statements are always more probable – is dubious and possibly false. From this, it does not follows that coherence is a useless notion in epistemology and philosophy of science. Dietrich and Moretti (Philosophy of science 72(3): 403–424, 2005) have proposed a formal of account of how coherence is confirmation conducive—that is, of how the (...)
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  • Luca Moretti (2006). The Tacking by Disjunction Paradox: Bayesianism Versus Hypothetico-Deductivism. Erkenntnis 64 (1).
    Hypothetico-deductivists have struggled to develop qualitative confirmation theories not raising the so-called tacking by disjunction paradox. In this paper, I analyze the difficulties yielded by the paradox and argue that the hypothetico-deductivist solutions given by Gemes [1998, Erkenntnis 49, 1–20] and Kuipers [2000, From Instrumentalism to Constructive Realism, Kluwer, Dordrecht] are questionable because they do not fit such analysis. I then show that the paradox yields no difficulty for the Bayesian who appeals to the Total Evidence Condition. I finally argue (...)
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  • Luca Moretti & Ken Akiba (2007). Probabilistic Measures of Coherence and the Problem of Belief Individuation. Synthese 154 (1).
    Coherentism in epistemology has long suffered from lack of formal and quantitative explication of the notion of coherence. One might hope that probabilistic accounts of coherence such as those proposed by Lewis, Shogenji, Olsson, Fitelson, and Bovens and Hartmann will finally help solve this problem. This paper shows, however, that those accounts have a serious common problem: the problem of belief individuation. The coherence degree that each of the accounts assigns to an information set (or the verdict it gives as (...)
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  • Darrell P. Rowbottom (2007). A Refutation of Foundationalism? Analysis 67 (296):345–346.
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Dogmatism
  • James Pryor, Uncertainty and Undermining.
    Dogmatism is a claim about a possible epistemic position, not about the metaphysics of what puts us in that position. So, for example, it leaves it open whether the intrinsic nature of a perceiving subject’s state is the same as that of a hallucinating subject’s state.
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Dogmatism, Misc
  • Peter Kung (forthcoming). On Having No Reason: Dogmatism and Bayesian Confirmation. Synthese.
    Recently in epistemology a number of authors have mounted Bayesian objections to dogmatism. These objections depend on a Bayesian principle of evidential confirmation: Evidence E confirms hypothesis H just in case Pr(H|E) > Pr(H). I argue using Keynes’ and Knight’s distinction between risk and uncertainty that the Bayesian principle fails to accommodate the intuitive notion of having no reason to believe. Consider as an example an unfamiliar card game: at first, since you’re unfamiliar with the game, you assign credences based (...)
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  • Roy A. Sorensen (1988). Dogmatism, Junk Knowledge, and Conditionals. Philosophical Quarterly 38 (153):433-454.
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  • Brian Weatherson, The Bayesian and the Dogmatist.
    There is a lot of philosophically interesting work being done in the borderlands between traditional and formal epistemology. It is easy to think that this would all be one-way traffic. When we try to formalise a traditional theory, we see that its hidden assumptions are inconsistent or otherwise untenable. Or we see that the proponents of the theory had been conflating two concepts that careful formal work lets us distinguish. Either way, the formalist teaches the traditionalist a lesson about what (...)
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Dogmatist and Moorean Replies to Skepticism
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