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  1. Fred Adams (2012). Extended Cognition Meets Epistemology. Philosophical Explorations 15 (2):107 - 119.
    This article examines the intersection of the theory of extended mind/cognition and theory of knowledge. In the minds of some, it matters to conditions for knowing whether the mind extends beyond the boundaries of body and brain. I examine these intuitions and find no support for this view from tracking theories of knowledge. I then argue that the apparent difference extended mind is supposed to have for ability or credit theories is also illusory.
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  2. Patrick Allo (2008). Vincent Hendricks, Mainstream and Formal Epistemology. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 69 (3):427-432.
    As Vincent Hendricks remarks early on in this book, the formal and mainstream traditions of epistemic theorising have mostly evolved independently of each other. This initial impression is confirmed by a comparison of the main problems and methods practitioners in each tradition are concerned with. Mainstream epistemol- ogy engages in a dialectical game of proposing and challenging definitions of knowledge. Formal epistemologists proceed differently, as they design a wide variety of axiomatic and model-theoretic methods whose consequences they investigate independently of (...)
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  3. William Alston (1978). ``Meta-Ethics and Meta-Epistemology&Quot. In A. I. Goldman & I. Kim (eds.), Values and Morals. Boston: D. Reidel. 275-97.
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  4. William P. Alston (2001). Doing Epistemology Without Justification. Philosophical Topics 29 (1/2):1-18.
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  5. William P. Alston (1989). A "Doxastic Practice" Approach to Epistemology. In Marjorie Clay & Keith Lehrer (eds.), Knowledge and Skepticism. Westview Press. 1--29.
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  6. Kent Bach (2008). Applying Pragmatics to Epistemology. Philosophical Issues 18 (1):68-88.
    This paper offers a smattering of applications of pragmatics to epistemology. In most cases they concern recent epistemological claims that depend for their plausibility on mistaking something pragmatic for something semantic. After giving my formulation of the semantic/pragmatic distinction and explaining how seemingly semantic intuitions can be responsive to pragmatic factors, I take up the following topics: 1. Classic Examples of Confusing Meaning and Use 2. Pragmatic Implications of Hedging or Intensifying an Assertion 3. Belief Attributions 4. Knowledge-wh 5. The (...)
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  7. Nathan Ballantyne (2011). Anti-Luck Epistemology, Pragmatic Encroachment, and True Belief. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41 (4):485-503.
  8. Pierpaolo Battigalli & Giacomo Bonanno (1997). The Logic of Belief Persistence. Economics and Philosophy 13 (1):39-59.
    The principle of belief persistence, or conservativity principle, states that ’\Nhen changing beliefs in response to new evidence, you should continue to believe as many of the old beliefs as possible' (Harman, 1986, p. 46). In particular, this means that if an individual gets new information, she has to accommodate it in her new belief set (the set of propositions she believes), and, if the new information is not inconsistent with the old belief set, then (1) the individual has to (...)
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  9. John Bengson (2013). Knowledge How Vs. Knowledge That. In B. Kaldis (ed.), Encyclopedia for Philosophy and the Social Sciences. Sage.
    An overview of philosophical work on the distinction between knowledge how and knowledge that, focusing on what it means to say that they are 'distinct', and on what is at stake in the debate between intellectualists and anti-intellectualists about knowledge how.
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  10. Hari Mohan Bhattacharyya (1994). Jaina Logic and Epistemology. K.P. Bagchi & Co..
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  11. Tim Black (2008). Defending a Sensitive Neo-Moorean Invariantism. In Vincent Hendricks & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), New Waves in Epistemology. Palgrave Macmillan. 8--27.
    I defend a sensitive neo-Moorean invariantism, an epistemological account with the following characteristic features: (a) it reserves a place for a sensitivity condition on knowledge, according to which, very roughly, S’s belief that p counts as knowledge only if S wouldn’t believe that p if p were false; (b) it maintains that the standards for knowledge are comparatively low; and (c) it maintains that the standards for knowledge are invariant (i.e., that they vary neither with the linguistic context of the (...)
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  12. Margaret A. Boden (1990). Interdisciplinary Epistemology. Synthese 85 (2):185 - 197.
    In commemorating Piaget we should not remember his psychology alone. He hoped for a biologically grounded epistemology, which would require interdisciplinary effort. This paper mentions some recent research in biology, embryology, and philosophy that is consonant with Piaget's epistemological aims. The authors do not cite Piaget as a prime intellectual influence, there being no distinctive Piagetian methodology outside psychology. But they each mention him as someone whose work is relevant to theirs and whose interdisciplinary aims will be achieved only if (...)
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  13. Lara Buchak (2013). Belief, Credence, and Norms. Philosophical Studies (2):1-27.
    There are currently two robust traditions in philosophy dealing with doxastic attitudes: the tradition that is concerned primarily with all-or-nothing belief, and the tradition that is concerned primarily with degree of belief or credence. This paper concerns the relationship between belief and credence for a rational agent, and is directed at those who may have hoped that the notion of belief can either be reduced to credence or eliminated altogether when characterizing the norms governing ideally rational agents. It presents a (...)
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  14. Andrei A. Buckareff (2008). Strategic Reliabilism and the Replacement Thesis in Epistemology. Dialogue 47 (3-4):425-.
    In their recent book, Epistemology and the Psychology of Human Judgment, Michael Bishop and J.D. Trout have challenged Standard Analytic Epistemology (SAE) in all its guises and have endorsed a version of the "replacement thesis"--proponents of which aim at replacing the standard questions of SAE with psychological questions. In this article I argue that Bishop and Trout offer an incomplete epistemology that, as formulated, cannot address many of the core issues that motivate interest in epistemological questions to begin with, and (...)
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  15. Richmond Campbell (2008). How Ecological Should Epistemology Be? Hypatia 23 (1):161-169.
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  16. Harold King Chadwick (1916). A Suggested Metaphysics to Fit a Functional Epistemology. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 13 (14):365-371.
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  17. Andrew Chignell (2003). Accidentally True Belief and Warrant. Synthese 137 (3):445 - 458.
    The Proper Functionist account of warrant – like many otherexternalist accounts – is vulnerable to certain Gettier-style counterexamples involving accidentally true beliefs. In this paper, I briefly survey the development of the account, noting the way it was altered in response to such counterexamples. I then argue that Alvin Plantinga's latest amendment to the account is flawed insofar as it rules out cases of true beliefs which do intuitively strike us as knowledge, and that a conjecture recently put forward by (...)
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  18. David Christensen (2010). Higher-Order Evidence. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):185-215.
    Sometimes we get evidence of our own epistemic malfunction. This can come from finding out we’re fatigued, or have been drugged, or that other competent and well-informed thinkers disagree with our beliefs. This sort of evidence seems to seems to behave differently from ordinary evidence about the world. In particular, getting such evidence can put agents in a position where the most rational response involves violating some epistemic ideal.
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  19. David Christensen (1994). Conservatism in Epistemology. Noûs 28 (1):69-89.
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  20. John Corcoran (2014). INVESTIGATING KNOWLEDGE AND OPINION. In A. Buchsbaum A. Koslow (ed.), The Road to Universal Logic. Vol. I. SPRINGER. 95-126.
    This work treats the correlative concepts knowledge and opinion, in various senses. In all senses of ‘knowledge’ and ‘opinion’, a belief known to be true is knowledge; a belief not known to be true is opinion. In this sense of ‘belief’, a belief is a proposition thought to be true—perhaps, but not necessarily, known to be true. All knowledge is truth. Some but not all opinion is truth. Every proposition known to be true is believed to be true. Some but (...)
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  21. Igor Douven (2010). The Pragmatics of Belief. Journal of Pragmatics 42 (1):35-47.
    This paper argues that pragmatic considerations similar to the ones that Grice has shown pertain to assertability pertain to acceptability. It further shows how this should affect some widely held epistemic principles. The idea of a pragmatics of belief is defended against some seemingly obvious objections.
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  22. W. Dray (1957). R. G. Collingwood and the Acquaitance Theory of Knowledge. Revue Internationale de Philosophie 11:420-432.
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  23. Robert M. Ellis (2011). Truth on the Edge: A Brief Western Philosophy of the Middle Way. Lulu.com.
    This book is a briefer and updated account of the Middle Way Philosophy developed in 'A Theory of Moral Objectivity'. Its starting point is the argument that we are not justified in making any claims about truth, whether moral or scientific, but the idea of truth is still meaningful. Instead of making or denying metaphysical claims about truth, we need to think in terms of incrementally objective justification within experience. This standpoint is related to an account of objectivity as psychological (...)
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  24. Richard Feldman (2008). Modest Deontologism in Epistemology. Synthese 161 (3):339 - 355.
    Deontologism in epistemology holds that epistemic justification may be understood in terms of “deontological” sentences about what one ought to believe or is permitted to believe, or what one deserves praise for believing, or in some similar way. If deonotologism is true, and people have justified beliefs, then the deontological sentences can be true. However, some say, these deontological sentences can be true only if people have a kind of freedom or control over their beliefs that they do not in (...)
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  25. Hector Ferreiro (2013). La abstracción en la teoría del conocimiento de Hegel. Apuntes Filosóficos 21 (41).
    En la filosofía de Aristóteles y en la filosofía escolástica de cuño aristotélico, la abstracción constituía un acto fundamental del proceso cognitivo: marcaba el salto o ascenso de la sensibilidad a la inteligibilidad, del conocimiento del individuo al conocimiento de su esencia. En la teoría del conocimiento de Hegel, por el contrario, el concepto abstracto o, como Hegel prefiere llamarlo, la “representación abstracta” o “representación universal” es tan sólo un momento intermedio en el proceso fluido que va del conocimiento del (...)
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  26. W. Paul Franks & Richard Brian Davis (2013). Against a Postmodern Pentecostal Epistemology. Philosophia Christi 15:383-399.
    In this paper we explore the idea that Pentecostalism is best supported by conjoining it to a postmodern, narrative epistemology in which everything is a text requiring interpretation. On this view, truth doesn’t consist in a set of uninterpreted facts that make the claims of Christianity true; rather, as James K. A. Smith says, truth emerges when there is a “fit” or proportionality between the Christian story and one’s affective and emotional life. We argue that Pentecostals should reject this account (...)
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  27. Roberto Frega (ed.) (2011). Pragmatist Epistemologies. Lexington books.
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  28. Johannes Haag (ed.) (2007). Erfahrung und Gegenstand. Zum Verhältnis von Sinnlichkeit und Verstand im empirischen Erkennen. Klostermann.
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  29. Alan Hájek & Stephan Hartmann (2010). Bayesian Epistemology. In J. Dancy et al (ed.), A Companion to Epistemology. Blackwell.
    Bayesianism is our leading theory of uncertainty. Epistemology is defined as the theory of knowledge. So “Bayesian Epistemology” may sound like an oxymoron. Bayesianism, after all, studies the properties and dynamics of degrees of belief, understood to be probabilities. Traditional epistemology, on the other hand, places the singularly non-probabilistic notion of knowledge at centre stage, and to the extent that it traffics in belief, that notion does not come in degrees. So how can there be a Bayesian epistemology?
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  30. Michael Hannon (2014). Is Knowledge True Belief Plus Adequate Information? Erkenntnis 79 (5):1069-1076.
    In When is True Belief Knowledge? (2012) Richard Foley proposes an original and strikingly simple theory of knowledge: a subject S knows some proposition p if and only if S truly believes that p and does not lack any important information. If this view is correct, Foley allegedly solves a wide variety of epistemological problems, such as the Gettier problem, the lottery paradox, the so-called ‘value problem’, and the problem of skepticism. However, a central component of his view is that (...)
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  31. Wojciech Hanuszkiewicz (2012). Problem syntetyczności sądów a priori w ujęciu Hermanna Lotzego. ARGUMENT 2 (2):363-375.
    English title: The Problem of the Synthetic a priori Judgements According to Hermann Lotze. The present article compares Kant’s and Lotze’s concepts of synthetic judgements. Lotze’s aim is a renewing of the Kant’s solutions, what he achieves thanks to introduction of the distinction between analytic (identical) content and synthetic form of these judgements which Kant recognised as synthetic. This distinction makes possible to lay down the concept of intentional sense which has influence over Frege and Husserl.
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  32. Gilbert Harman, Epistemology as Methodology.
    What is distinctive about my views in epistemology? One thing is that my concern with epistemology is a concern with methodology. Furthermore, I reject psychologism about logic and reject the idea that deductive rules like modus ponens are in any way rules of inference. I accept a kind of methodological conservatism and reject methodological theories that appeal to special foundations, analytic truth, or a priori justification. Although I believe that there are significant practical aspects of theoretical reasoning, I reject the (...)
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  33. Gilbert Harman (1973). Thought. Princeton University Press.
  34. David Henderson & Terence Horgan (2000). Iceberg Epistemology. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (3):497-535.
    Accounts of what it is for an agent to be justified in holding a belief commonly carry commitments concerning what cognitive processes can and should be like. A concern for the plausibility of such commitments leads to a multi-faceted epistemology in which elements of traditionally conflicting epistemologies are vindicated within a single epistemological account. The accessible and articulable states that have been the exclusive focus of much epistemology must constitute only a proper subset of epistemologically relevant processing. The interaction of (...)
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  35. David Henderson & Terence E. Horgan (2001). Practicing Safe Epistemology. Philosophical Studies 102 (3):227 - 258.
    Reliablists have argued that the important evaluative epistemic concept of being justified in holding a belief, at least to the extent that that concept is associated with knowledge, is best understood as concerned with the objective appropriateness of the processes by which a given belief is generated and sustained. In particular, they hold that a belief is justified only when it is fostered by processes that are reliable (at least minimally so) in the believer’s actual world.[1] Of course, reliablists typically (...)
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  36. Stephen Hetherington (2001). Good Knowledge, Bad Knowledge: On Two Dogmas of Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
    What is knowledge? How hard is it for a person to have knowledge? Good Knowledge, Bad Knowledge confronts contemporary philosophical attempts to answer those classic questions, offering a theory of knowledge that is unique in conceiving of knowledge in a non-absolutist way.
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  37. Keith Hossack (2007). The Metaphysics of Knowledge. Oxford University Press.
    The Metaphysics of Knowledge presents the thesis that knowledge is an absolutely fundamental relation, with an indispensable role to play in metaphysics, philosophical logic, and philosophy of mind and language. Knowledge has been generally assumed to be a propositional attitude like belief. But Keith Hossack argues that knowledge is not a relation to a content; rather, it a relation to a fact. This point of view allows us to explain many of the concepts of philosophical logic in terms of knowledge. (...)
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  38. Moira Howes (2006). On the Very Idea of a Feminist Epistemology for Science: Review Symposium for Sharyn Clough's Beyond Epistemology: A Pragmatist Approach to Feminist Science Studies. Metascience 15 (1):8-15.
  39. Jonathan Ichikawa, Benjamin Jarvis & Katherine Rubin (2012). Pragmatic Encroachment and Belief-Desire Psychology. Analytic Philosophy 53 (4):327-343.
    We develop a novel challenge to pragmatic encroachment. The significance of belief-desire psychology requires treating questions about what to believe as importantly prior to questions about what to do; pragmatic encroachment undermines that priority, and therefore undermines the significance of belief-desire psychology. This, we argue, is a higher cost than has been recognized by epistemologists considering embracing pragmatic encroachment.
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  40. Valeriano Iranzo (1998). Coherencia y justificación. Revista de Filosofía (Madrid) 20 (1):91.
    El articulo analiza dos enfoques coherentistas de lajíístifícación (K. Lehrer y L. Boniour). Ambas versiones se consideran insatisfactorias. En primer lugar, sobrecargan el aparato introspectivo del sujeto cpistémi co, lo cual impide dar cuenta de nuestras intuiciones preanalíticas sobre sujetos "limitados" (niños o animales>. Por otro lado, no consiguen esta blecer un viculo convincente entre justificación ----entendida como cohe í'encia--- y verdad entendida como correspondencia.
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  41. Marianne Janack (1997). Standpoint Epistemology Without the 'Standpoint'. Hypatia 12 (2):125-39.
    In this paper I argue that the distinction between epistemic privilege and epistemic authority is an important one for feminist epistemologists who are sympathetic to feminist standpoint theory. I argue that, while the first concept is elusive, the second is really the important one for a successful feminist standpoint project.
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  42. Miguel Ángel Pérez Jiménez (2012). Critical Notice of 'Interpretar y Argumentar' by María G. Navarro. Ideas Y Valores (150):273-285.
    El libro de María González Navarro se presenta a sí mismo como una “nueva hermenéutica” (23). La novedad involucra dos aspectos: uno que llamaremos metateórico y otro hermenéutico en propiedad. Hablando metateóricamente, el libro presenta una hermenéutica gadameriana vigorizada y robustecida por las teorías pragma-dialécticas de la argumentación. Desde el punto de vista hermenéutico propiamente dicho, la novedad reposa en que se considera que la interpretación correcta está indesligablemente vinculada a la argumentación abductiva.
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  43. Jones (1893). Idealism and Epistemology. Mind 2 (8):457 - 472.
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  44. Prof H. Jones (1893). Idealism and Epistemology. (II.). Mind 2 (8):457 - 472.
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  45. Antti Karjalainen & Adam Morton (2003). Contrastive Knowledge. Philosophical Explorations 6 (2):74 – 89.
    We describe the three place relation of contrastive knowledge, which holds between a person, a target proposition, and a contrasting proposition. The person knows that p rather than that q. We argue for three claims about this relation. (a) Many common sense and philosophical ascriptions of knowledge can be understood in terms of it. (b) Its application is subject to fewer complications than non-contrastive knowledge is. (c) It applies over a wide range of human and nonhuman cases.
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  46. Christoph Kelp (2008). Classical Invariantism and the Puzzle of Fallibilism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 46 (2):221-44.
    This paper revisits a puzzle that arises for theories of knowledge according to which one can know on the basis of merely inductive grounds. No matter how strong such theories require inductive grounds to be if a belief based on them is to qualify as knowledge, there are certain beliefs (namely, about the outcome of fair lotteries) that are based on even stronger inductive grounds, while, intuitively, they do not qualify as knowledge. This paper discusses what is often regarded as (...)
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  47. Peter D. Klein (2004). There is NO Good Reason to Be an Academic Skeptic. In Luper Steven (ed.), Essential Knowledge. Longman.
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  48. Peter D. Klein (2003). Coherence, Knowledge and Skepticism. In Olsson Erik (ed.), The Epistemology of Keith Lehrer. Kluwer. 281--297.
  49. Peter D. Klein (1996). Warrant, Proper Function, Reliabilism and Defeasibility. In Kvanvig Jonathan (ed.), Warrant and Contemporary Epistemology. Rowman & Littlefield.
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  50. Peter D. Klein (1982). Reply to Professor Odegard. Philosophical Books 23 (4):409-19.
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