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  1. Kristoffer Ahlstrom (2009). Intuitions in Epistemology: Towards a Naturalistic Alternative. Studia Philosophica Estonica 2 (2):15-34.
    The present paper revisits the main methodological problems with conceptual analysis and considers two attempts to rectify them in terms of prototypes and reflective equilibria, respectively. Finding both wanting for the purposes of epistemological analysis, a naturalistic alternative is then sketched that explores the positive implications of aforementioned problems for the demarcation of the respective roles of intuitions and empirical investigation within three epistemological domains, viz., the evaluation of epistemological hypotheses, the amelioration of epistemic practices, and the construction of a (...)
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  2. Kristoffer Ahlström (2008). Constructive Analysis: A Study in Epistemological Methodology. Dissertation, University of Gothenburg
    The present study is concerned the viability of the primary method in contemporary philosophy, i.e., conceptual analysis. Starting out by tracing the roots of this methodology to Platonic philosophy, the study questions whether such a methodology makes sense when divorced from Platonic philosophy, and develops a framework for a kind of analysis that is more in keeping with recent psychological research on categorization. Finally, it is shown that this kind of analysis can be applied to the concept of justification in (...)
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  3. James Andow (forthcoming). Abduction by Philosophers: Reorienting Philosophical Methodology. Metaphilosophy.
    A reorientation is needed in methodological debate about the role of intuitions in philosophy. Methodological debate has lost sight of the reason why it makes sense to focus on questions about intuitions when thinking about the methods or epistemology of philosophy. The problem is an approach to methodology which gives a near exclusive focus to questions about some evidential role that intuitions may or may not play in philosophers' arguments. A new approach is needed. Approaching methodological questions about the role (...)
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  4. James Andow (forthcoming). Reliable but Not Home Free? What Framing Effects Mean for Moral Intuitions. Philosophical Psychology:1-8.
    Various studies show moral intuitions to be susceptible to framing effects. Many have argued that this susceptibility is a sign of unreliability and that this poses a methodological challenge for moral philosophy. Recently, doubt has been cast on this idea. It has been argued that extant evidence of framing effects does not show that moral intuitions have a unreliability problem. I argue that, even if the extant evidence suggests that moral intuitions are fairly stable with respect to what intuitions we (...)
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  5. James Andow (2016). Intuitions. Analysis 76 (2):232-246.
    This is likely to be published in the Jan 2016 issue of Analysis. The notice can be accessed for free by anyone at the following link -- http://analysis.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/full/anv062?ijkey=BcRDGACTppiH6OT&keytype=ref.
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  6. James Andow (2016). Zebras, Intransigence & Semantic Apocalypse: Problems for Dispositional Metasemantics. Philosophia 44 (1):53-62.
    Complete information dispositional metasemantics says that our expressions get their meaning in virtue of what our dispositions to apply those terms would be given complete information. The view has recently been advanced and argued to have a number of attractive features. I argue that that it threatens to make the meanings of our words indeterminate and doesn’t do what it was that made a dispositional view attractive in the first place.
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  7. James Andow (2015). Expecting Moral Philosophers to Be Reliable. Dialectica 69 (2):205-220.
    Are philosophers’ intuitions more reliable than philosophical novices’? Are we entitled to assume the superiority of philosophers’ intuitions just as we assume that experts in other domains have more reliable intuitions than novices? Ryberg raises some doubts and his arguments promise to undermine the expertise defence of intuition-use in philosophy once and for all. In this paper, I raise a number of objections to these arguments. I argue that philosophers receive sufficient feedback about the quality of their intuitions and that (...)
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  8. James Andow (2015). Thin, Fine and with Sensitivity: A Metamethodology of Intuitions. Review of Philosophy and Psychology (1):1-21.
    Do philosophers use intuitions? Should philosophers use intuitions? Can philosophical methods (where intuitions are concerned) be improved upon? In order to answer these questions we need to have some idea of how we should go about answering them. I defend a way of going about methodology of intuitions: a metamethodology. I claim the following: (i) we should approach methodological questions about intuitions with a thin conception of intuitions in mind; (ii) we should carve intuitions finely; and, (iii) we should carve (...)
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  9. Robert Audi (2008). Intuition, Inference, and Rational Disagreement in Ethics. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 11 (5):475 - 492.
    This paper defends a moderate intuitionism by extending a version of that view previously put forward and responding to some significant objections to it that have been posed in recent years. The notion of intuition is clarified, and various kinds of intuition are distinguished and interconnected. These include doxastic intuitions and intuitive seemings. The concept of inference is also clarified. In that light, the possibility of non-inferential intuitive justification is explained in relation to both singular moral judgments, which intuitionists do (...)
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  10. Renford Bambrough (1978). Intuition and the Inexpressible. In Steven T. Katz (ed.), Mysticism and Philosophical Analysis. Oxford University Press
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  11. Jared Bates (2005). The Old Problem of Induction and the New Reflective Equilibrium. Dialectica 59 (3):347–356.
    In 1955, Goodman set out to 'dissolve' the problem of induction, that is, to argue that the old problem of induction is a mere pseudoproblem not worthy of serious philosophical attention. I will argue that, under naturalistic views of the reflective equilibrium method, it cannot provide a basis for a dissolution of the problem of induction. This is because naturalized reflective equilibrium is -- in a way to be explained -- itself an inductive method, and thus renders Goodman's dissolution viciously (...)
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  12. Jared Bates (2004). Reflective Equilibrium and Underdetermination in Epistemology. Acta Analytica 19 (32):45-64.
    The basic aim of Alvin Goldman’s approach to epistemology, and the tradition it represents, is naturalistic; that is, epistemological theories in this tradition aim to identify the naturalistic, nonnormative criteria on which justified belief supervenes (Goldman, 1986; Markie, 1997). The basic method of Goldman’s epistemology, and the tradition it represents, is the reflective equilibrium test; that is, epistemological theories in this tradition are tested against our intuitions about cases of justified and unjustified belief (Goldman, 1986; Markie, 1997). I will argue (...)
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  13. George Bealer (2004). The Origins of Modal Error. Dialectica 58 (1):11-42.
    Modal intuitions are the primary source of modal knowledge but also of modal error. According to the theory of modal error in this paper, modal intuitions retain their evidential force in spite of their fallibility, and erroneous modal intuitions are in principle identifiable and eliminable by subjecting our intuitions to a priori dialectic. After an inventory of standard sources of modal error, two further sources are examined in detail. The first source - namely, the failure to distinguish between metaphysical possibility (...)
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  14. George Bealer (2002). Modal Epistemology and the Rationalist Renaissance. In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility. Oxford University Press 71-125.
    The paper begins with a clarification of the notions of intuition (and, in particular, modal intuition), modal error, conceivability, metaphysical possibility, and epistemic possibility. It is argued that two-dimensionalism is the wrong framework for modal epistemology and that a certain nonreductionist approach to the theory of concepts and propositions is required instead. Finally, there is an examination of moderate rationalism’s impact on modal arguments in the philosophy of mind -- for example, Yablo’s disembodiment argument and Chalmers’s zombie argument. A less (...)
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  15. George Bealer (2000). A Priori Knowledge. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 5:1-12.
    This paper is a condensed version of the author’s “A Theory of the A Priori” (Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 2000) for the evidential status of intuitions, the incoherence of radical empiricism. the thesis of modal reliabilism, and the Autonomy of Philosophy Thesis (according to which the a priori disciplines are autonomous from empirical science).
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  16. George Bealer (1999). A Theory of the a Priori. Philosophical Perspectives 13 (s13):29-55.
    The topic of a priori knowledge is approached through the theory of evidence. A shortcoming in traditional formulations of moderate rationalism and moderate empiricism is that they fail to explain why rational intuition and phenomenal experience count as basic sources of evidence. This explanatory gap is filled by modal reliabilism -- the theory that there is a qualified modal tie between basic sources of evidence and the truth. This tie to the truth is then explained by the theory of concept (...)
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  17. George Bealer (1998). Intuition and the Autonomy of Philosophy. In Michael DePaul & William Ramsey (eds.), Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and Its Role in Philosophical Inquiry. Rowman & Littlefield 201-240.
    The phenomenology of a priori intuition is explored at length (where a priori intuition is taken to be not a form of belief but rather a form of seeming, specifically intellectual as opposed to sensory seeming). Various reductive accounts of intuition are criticized, and Humean empiricism (which, unlike radical empiricism, does admit analyticity intuitions as evidence) is shown to be epistemically self-defeating. This paper also recapitulates the defense of the thesis of the Autonomy and Authority of Philosophy given in the (...)
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  18. George Bealer (1996). On the Possibility of Philosophical Knowledge. Philosophical Perspectives 10:1-34.
    The paper elaborates upon various points and arguments in the author’s “A Priori Knowledge and the Scope of Philosophy” (Philosophical Studies, 1993), in which the author defends the autonomy of philosophy from the empirical sciences. It provides, for example, an extended defense of the modal reliabilist theory of basic evidence, including a new argument against evolutionary explanations of the reliability of intuitions. It also contains a fuller discussion of how to neutralize the threat of scientific essentialism to the autonomy of (...)
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  19. George Bealer (1996). A Priori Knowledge: Replies to William Lycan and Ernest Sosa. Philosophical Studies 81 (2-3):163-174.
    This paper contains replies to comments on the author's paper "A Priori Knowledge and the Scope of Philosophy." Several points in the argument of that paper are given further clarification: the notion of our standard justificatory procedure, the notion of a basic source of evidence, and the doctrine of modal reliabilism. The reliability of intuition is then defended against Lycan's skepticism and a response is given to Lycan's claim that the scope of a priori knowledge does not include philosophically central (...)
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  20. George Bealer (1996). Intuition. In D. M. Borchert (ed.), Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Supplement. Macmillan 262-264.
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  21. George Bealer (1992). The Incoherence of Empiricism. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 66 (1):99-138.
    Radical empiricism is the view that a person's experiences (sensory and introspective), or a person's observations, constitute the person's evidence. This view leads to epistemic self-defeat. There are three arguments, concerning respectively: (1) epistemic starting points; (2) epistemic norms; (3) terms of epistemic appraisal. The source of self-defeat is traced to the fact that empiricism does not count a priori intuition as evidence (where a priori intuition is not a form of belief but rather a form of seeming, specifically intellectual (...)
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  22. George Bealer (1987). The Philosophical Limits of Scientific Essentialism. Philosophical Perspectives 1:289-365.
    Scientific essentialism is the view that some necessities can be known only with the aid of empirical science. The thesis of the paper is that scientific essentialism does not extend to the central questions of philosophy and that these questions can be answered a priori. The argument is that the evidence required for the defense of scientific essentialism is reliable only if the intuitions required by philosophy to answer its central questions is also reliable. Included is an outline of a (...)
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  23. John Bengson (2014). How Philosophers Use Intuition and 'Intuition'. Philosophical Studies 171 (3):555-576.
    Whither the philosophy of intuition?Herman Cappelen’s Philosophy Without Intuitions (PWI) is a novel study in philosophical sociology—or, as Cappelen at one point suggests, “intellectual anthropology” (96).All undated references are to Cappelen (2012). Its target is the thesis that intuition is central, in the descriptive sense that contemporary analytic philosophers rely on intuitions for evidence—or, more generally, positive epistemic status. Cappelen labels the target thesis Centrality.If Centrality is true, then especially urgent are two questions in the rapidly growing field that is (...)
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  24. John Bengson (2013). Experimental Attacks on Intuitions and Answers. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (3):495-532.
  25. C. Beyer & A. Burri (forthcoming). Intuitions: Their Nature and Epistemic Efficacy. Grazer Philosophische Studien. Philosophical Knowledge-its Possibility and Scope.
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  26. Paul Boghossian (2009). Virtuous Intuitions: Comments on Lecture 3 of Ernest Sosa's a Virtue Epistemology. Philosophical Studies 144 (1):111--119.
    Abstract I agree with Sosa that intuitions are best thought of as attractions to believe a certain proposition merely on the basis of understanding it. However, I don’t think it is constitutive of them that they supply strictly foundational justification for the propositions they justify, though I do believe that it is important that the intuition of a suitable subject be thought of as a prima facie justification for his intuitive judgment, independently of the reliability of his underlying capacities. I (...)
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  27. Patrick Bondy (2015). Elijah Chudnoff , Intuition . Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 35 (2):59-62.
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  28. Laurence BonJour (1998). In Defense of Pure Reason. Cambridge University Press.
    A comprehensive defence of the rationalist view that insight independent of experience is a genuine basis for knowledge.
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  29. Anthony Robert Booth & Darrell P. Rowbottom (eds.) (2014). Intuitions. Oxford University Press.
    Intuitions may seem to play a fundamental role in philosophy: but their role and their value have been challenged recently. This volume offers new essays investigating their epistemological and metaphysical standing, how they are used in philosophy and other disciplines, and how their use stands up to challenges from experimental philosophy.
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  30. Érik Bordeleau (forthcoming). Intuition Première: La Force Étrange du Printemps Québécois. Theory and Event 15 (3).
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  31. K. S. Bowers (1987). Intuition and Discovery. In Robert Stern (ed.), Theories of the Unconscious and Theories of the Self. Analytic Press 71--90.
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  32. Kenneth Boyd & Jennifer Nagel (2014). The Reliability of Epistemic Intuitions. In Edouard Machery & O'Neill Elizabeth (eds.), Current Controversies in Experimental Philosophy. Routledge 109-127.
  33. Jessica Brown (2013). Experimental Philosophy, Contextualism and SSI. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (2):233-261.
    I will ask the conditional question: if folk attributions of "know" are not sensitive to the stakes and/or the salience of error, does this cast doubt on contextualism or subject-sensitive invariantism (SSI)? I argue that if it should turn out that folk attributions of knowledge are insensitive to such factors, then this undermines contextualism, but not SSI. That is not to say that SSI is invulnerable to empirical work of any kind. Rather, I defend the more modest claim that leading (...)
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  34. Jessica Brown (2013). Intuitions, Evidence and Hopefulness. Synthese 190 (12):2021-2046.
    Experimental philosophers have recently conducted surveys of folk judgements about a range of phenomena of interest to philosophy including knowledge, reference, and free will. Some experimental philosophers take these results to undermine the philosophical practice of appealing to intuitions as evidence. I consider several different replies to the suggestion that these results undermine philosophical appeal to intuition, both piecemeal replies which raise concerns about particular surveys, and more general replies. The general replies include the suggestions that the surveys consider the (...)
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  35. Jessica Brown (2013). Immediate Justification, Evidence, and Pragmatics. In C. Tucker (ed.), Seemings and justification. OUP
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  36. Jessica Brown (2013). Immediate Justification, Perception, and Intuition. In Chris Tucker (ed.), Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism. OUP Usa 71.
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  37. Jessica Brown (2011). Thought Experiments, Intuitions and Philosophical Evidence. Dialectica 65 (4):493-516.
    What is the nature of the evidence provided by thought experiments in philosophy? For instance, what evidence is provided by the Gettier thought experiment against the JTB theory of knowledge? According to one view, it provides as evidence only a certain psychological proposition, e.g. that it seems to one that the subject in the Gettier case lacks knowledge. On an alternative, nonpsychological view, the Gettier thought experiment provides as evidence the nonpsychological proposition that the subject in the Gettier case lacks (...)
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  38. Wesley Buckwalter (2012). Surveying Philosophers: A Response to Kuntz & Kuntz. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (4):515-524.
    Experimental philosophers have recently questioned the use of intuitions as evidence in philosophical methods. J. R. Kuntz and J. R.C. Kuntz (2011) conduct an experiment suggesting that these critiques fail to be properly motivated because they fail to capture philosophers' preferred conceptions of intuition‐use. In this response, it is argued that while there are a series of worries about the design of this study, the data generated by Kuntz and Kuntz support, rather than undermine, the motivation for the experimentalist critiques (...)
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  39. Herman Cappelen (2014). Replies to Weatherson, Chalmers, Weinberg, and Bengson. Philosophical Studies 171 (3):577-600.
    Reply to criticsThe replies in this symposium are some of the most insightful contributions to contemporary metaphilosophy I have read. I wish I had seen them before I wrote Philosophy without Intuitions . It would have made it a better book. I also wish I had space to explore all the important issues raised, but unfortunately, the focus here will have to be on points of disagreement. The replies build on each other—I draw on material from the earlier replies in (...)
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  40. Elijah Chudnoff (2013). Intuitive Knowledge. Philosophical Studies 162 (2):359-378.
    In this paper I assume that we have some intuitive knowledge—i.e. beliefs that amount to knowledge because they are based on intuitions. The question I take up is this: given that some intuition makes a belief based on it amount to knowledge, in virtue of what does it do so? We can ask a similar question about perception. That is: given that some perception makes a belief based on it amount to knowledge, in virtue of what does it do so? (...)
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  41. Elijah Chudnoff (2013). Intuition. OUP Oxford.
    Elijah Chudnoff elaborates and defends a view of intuition according to which intuition purports to, and reveals, how matters stand in abstract reality by making us aware of that reality through the intellect. He explores the experience of having an intuition; justification for beliefs that derives from intuition; and contact with abstract reality.
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  42. Elijah Chudnoff (2013). Is Intuition Based On Understanding? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (1):42-67.
    According to the most popular non-skeptical views about intuition, intuitions justify beliefs because they are based on understanding. More precisely: if intuiting that p justifies you in believing that p it does so because your intuition is based on your understanding of the proposition that p. The aim of this paper is to raise some challenges for accounts of intuitive justification along these lines. I pursue this project from a non-skeptical perspective. I argue that there are cases in which intuiting (...)
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  43. Elijah Chudnoff (2011). The Nature of Intuitive Justification. Philosophical Studies 153 (2):313 - 333.
    In this paper I articulate and defend a view that I call phenomenal dogmatism about intuitive justification. It is dogmatic because it includes the thesis: if it intuitively seems to you that p, then you thereby have some prima facie justification for believing that p. It is phenomenalist because it includes the thesis: intuitions justify us in believing their contents in virtue of their phenomenology—and in particular their presentational phenomenology. I explore the nature of presentational phenomenology as it occurs perception, (...)
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  44. Daniel Cohnitz (2012). Philosophy Without Intuitions, by Herman Cappelen. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, 242 Pp. [REVIEW] Disputatio (33):546-553.
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  45. Daniel Cohnitz & Sören Häggqvist (2009). The Role of Intuitions in Philosophical Methodology. Studia Philosophica Estonica 2.
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  46. Daniel Cohnitz & Sören Häggqvist (2009). The Role of Intuitions in Philosophy. Studia Philosophica Estonica 2 (2):1-14.
    As we write this, philosophers all over the world are in a state of temporary, collective self-scrutiny. Tey are poring over the results of the PhilPapers Survey, conducted by David Chalmers and David Bourgeta grand-scale survey of the professions views on 30 major philosophical issues, ranging from aesthetic value to zombies. More than 3000 people have responded, andmanymore are currently absorbing and analyzing the results.
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  47. Daniel Cohnitz & Sören Häggqvist (2007). Gedankenexperimente in der Philosophie. In M. Staschok (ed.), Abstrakt - Exakt - Obskur: Philosophische Gedankenexperimente & Kunst. Logos
    Sie halten gerade ein Buch in Ihren H¨anden. Vielleicht liegt es auch auf dem Tisch vor Ihnen, w¨ahrend Sie diese Worte lesen. Aber woher wissen Sie, dass Sie ein Buch vor sich haben? Nun, Sie sehen es nat¨urlich mit eigenen Augen. Vermutlich f¨uhlen Sie auch das Gewicht des Buches, das gegen Ihre Haut dr¨uckt, w¨ahrend sie es in H¨anden halten, und h¨oren das Rascheln der Seiten, wenn Sie umbl¨attern. Dar¨uber hinaus sind Sie wach und (so vermuten wir mal) einigermaßen n¨uchtern, (...)
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  48. James Collins (1949). Intuition Et Religion. Modern Schoolman 26 (2):187-188.
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  49. S. Alan Corlew (2002). Michael Polanyi's Concept of Tacit Knowledge and its Implications for Christianity. Christianity and Society 12 (3):16-23.
    This article explores the implications of Michael Polanyi's concept of Tacit Knowledge for religious belief in general, and Christianity in particular, by investigating the relationship of tacit knowledge to commitment in scientific investigation, and extrapolating that relationship to commitments in the area of religious belief.
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  50. Simon Cullen (2010). Survey-Driven Romanticism. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (2):275-296.
    Despite well-established results in survey methodology, many experimental philosophers have not asked whether and in what way conclusions about folk intuitions follow from people’s responses to their surveys. Rather, they appear to have proceeded on the assumption that intuitions can be simply read off from survey responses. Survey research, however, is fraught with difficulties. I review some of the relevant literature—particularly focusing on the conversational pragmatic aspects of survey research—and consider its application to common experimental philosophy surveys. I argue for (...)
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