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- Kristoffer Ahlstrom (2009). Intuitions in Epistemology: Towards a Naturalistic Alternative. Studia Philosophica Estonica 2:15-34.
- Kristoffer Ahlström (2008). Constructive Analysis: A Study in Epistemological Methodology. Dissertation, University of Gothenburg
- Robert Audi (2008). Intuition, Inference, and Rational Disagreement in Ethics. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 11 (5):475 - 492.
- Jared Bates (2005). The Old Problem of Induction and the New Reflective Equilibrium. Dialectica 59 (3):347–356.
- Jared Bates (2004). Reflective Equilibrium and Underdetermination in Epistemology. Acta Analytica 19 (32):45-64.
- George Bealer, A Priori Knowledge: Replies to Lycan and Sosa.
- George Bealer (2004). The Origins of Modal Error. Dialectica 58 (1):11-42.
- George Bealer (2002). Modal Epistemology and the Rationalist Renaissance. In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility. Oxford University Press.
- George Bealer (2000). A Theory of the a Priori. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 81 (1):1–30.
- George Bealer (1998). Intuition and the Autonomy of Philosophy. In Michael DePaul & William Ramsey (eds.), Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and Its Role in Philosophical Inquiry. Rowman & Littlefield.
- George Bealer (1998). Intuition and the Autonomy of Philosophy. In Rethinking Intuition.
- George Bealer (1996). A Priori Knowledge: Replies to William Lycan and Ernest Sosa. Philosophical Studies 81 (2-3):163-174.
- George Bealer (1996). On the Possibility of Philosophical Knowledge. Philosophical Perspectives 10:1-34.
- George Bealer (1992). The Incoherence of Empiricism. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 66:99-138.
- George Bealer (1987). The Philosophical Limits of Scientific Essentialism. Philosophical Perspectives 1:289-365.
- John Bengson (2013). Experimental Attacks on Intuitions and Answers. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (3):495-532.
- Paul Boghossian (2009). Virtuous Intuitions: Comments on Lecture 3 of Ernest Sosa's a Virtue Epistemology. Philosophical Studies 144 (1):111--119.
- Laurence BonJour (1998). In Defense of Pure Reason. Cambridge University Press.
- Anthony Booth & Darrell P. Rowbottom (eds.) (forthcoming). Intuitions. Oxford University Press.
- Kenneth Boyd & Jennifer Nagel (forthcoming). The Reliability of Epistemic Intuitions. In Edouard Machery (ed.), Current Controversies in Experimental Philosophy. Routledge.
- Jessica Brown (2013). Experimental Philosophy, Contextualism and SSI. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (2):233-261.
- Jessica Brown (2011). Intuitions, Evidence and Hopefulness. Synthese.
- Jessica Brown (2011). Thought Experiments, Intuitions and Philosophical Evidence. Dialectica 65 (4):493-516.
- Wesley Buckwalter (2012). Surveying Philosophers: A Response to Kuntz & Kuntz. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (4):515-524.
- Elijah Chudnoff (2013). Is Intuition Based On Understanding? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (1).
- Elijah Chudnoff (2013). Intuitive Knowledge. Philosophical Studies 162 (2):359-378.
- Elijah Chudnoff (2011). The Nature of Intuitive Justification. Philosophical Studies 153 (2):313 - 333.
- Daniel Cohnitz & Sören Häggqvist (2009). The Role of Intuitions in Philosophy. Studia Philosophica Estonica 2:1-14.
- Daniel Cohnitz & Sören Häggqvist (2007). Gedankenexperimente in der Philosophie. In M. Staschok (ed.), Abstrakt - Exakt - Obskur: Philosophische Gedankenexperimente & Kunst. Logos.
- Simon Cullen (2010). Survey-Driven Romanticism. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (2):275-296.
- Robert C. Cummins (1998). Reflection on Reflective Equilibrium. In Michael DePaul & William Ramsey (eds.), Rethinking Intuition. Rowman & Littlefield.
- John K. Davis (2007). Intuition and the Junctures of Judgment in Decision Procedures for Clinical Ethics. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 28 (1):1-30.
- Helen de Cruz, Maarten Boudry, Johan de Smedt & Stefaan Blancke (2011). Evolutionary Approaches to Epistemic Justification. Dialectica 65 (4):517-535.
- M. R. DePaul & William Ramsey (eds.) (1998). Rethinking Intuition. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield.
- Michael R. DePaul & William Ramsey (eds.) (1998). Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and Its Role in Philosophical Inquiry. Rowman & Littlefield.
- Michael Devitt (2006). Intuitions in Linguistics. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (3):481-513.
- Billy Dunaway, Anna Edmonds & David Manley (forthcoming). The Folk Probably Do Think What You Think They Think. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-21.
- Joshua Earlenbaugh & Bernard Molyneux (2009). Intuitions Are Inclinations to Believe. Philosophical Studies 145 (1):89 - 109.
- Mark Fedyk (2009). Philosophical Intuitions. Studia Philosophica Estonica 2:54-80.
- Yiftach J. H. Fehige (2011). Gedankenexperimente in der Offenbarungstheologie? Eine Erste Annäherung/ Thought Experiments in Revealed Theology? A First Approach. Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 59 (1):209-229.
- Yiftach J. H. Fehige & James R. Brown (2010). Thought Experiments. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 25 (1):135-142.
- Adam Feltz (2008). Problems with the Appeal to Intuition in Epistemology. Philosophical Explorations 11 (2):131 – 141.
- Eugen Fischer (forthcoming). Philosophical Intuitions, Heuristics, and Metaphors. Synthese.
- Tamar Szabó Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.) (2002). Conceivability and Possibility. Oxford University Press.
- Mikkel Gerken (2013). Epistemic Focal Bias. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (1):41 - 61.
- Alvin I. Goldman (2007). Philosophical Intuitions: Their Target, Their Source, and Their Epistemic Status. Grazer Philosophische Studien 74 (1):1-26.
- Alvin I. Goldman & Joel Pust (1998). Philosophical Theory and Intuitional Evidence. In Michael Depaul & William Ramsey (eds.), Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and its Role in Philosophical Inquiry. Rowman and Littlefield.
- Thomas Grundmann (2007). The Nature of Rational Intuitions and a Fresh Look at the Explanationist Objection. Grazer Philosophische Studien 74 (1):69-87.
- Steven D. Hales (2012). The Faculty of Intuition. Analytic Philosophy 53 (2):180-207.
- Steven D. Hales (2004). Intuition, Revelation, and Relativism. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 12 (3):271 – 295.
- Steven D. Hales (2000). The Problem of Intuition. American Philosophical Quarterly 37 (2):135-147.
- Stephen Cade Hetherington (ed.) (2006). Epistemology Futures. Oxford University Press.
- Joachim Horvath (2010). How (Not) to React to Experimental Philosophy. Philosophical Psychology 23 (4):447-480.
- Joachim Horvath & Thomas Grundmann (eds.) (2012). Experimental Philosophy and its Critics. Routledge.
- Jonathan Ichikawa, Intuitions and Begging the Question.
- Jonathan Ichikawa, Sosa on Virtues, Perception, and Intuition.
- Jonathan Ichikawa, Who Needs Intuitions?
- Jonathan Ichikawa & Benjamin Jarvis (2009). Thought-Experiment Intuitions and Truth in Fiction. Philosophical Studies 142 (2):221 - 246.
- Henry Jackman (2005). Intuitions and Semantic Theory. Metaphilosophy 36 (3):363-380.
- Hilary Kornblith (2007). Naturalism and Intuitions. Grazer Philosophische Studien 74 (1):27-49.
- J. R. Kuntz & J. R. C. Kuntz (2011). Surveying Philosophers About Philosophical Intuition. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (4):643-665.
- Janet Levin (2007). Can Modal Intuitions Be Evidence for Essentialist Claims? Inquiry 50 (3):253 – 269.
- Janet Levin (2004). The Evidential Status of Philosophical Intuition. Philosophical Studies 121 (3):193-224.
- S. Matthew Liao, Alex Weigmann, Joshua Alexander & Gerard Vong (2011). Putting the Trolley in Order: Experimental Philosophy and the Loop Case. Philosophical Psychology 25 (5):661 - 671.
- Clayton Littlejohn (2011). Ethical Intuitionism and Moral Skepticism. In Jill Graper Hernandez (ed.), The New Intuitionism.
- Kirk Ludwig (2007). The Epistemology of Thought Experiments : First Person Versus Third Person Approaches. In Peter A. French & Howard K. Wettstein (eds.), Philosophy and the Empirical. Blackwell Pub. Inc..
- Anna-Sara Malmgren (2013). Review of "Philosophy Without Intuitions" by Herman Cappelen. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
- Anna-Sara Malmgren (2011). Rationalism and the Content of Intuitive Judgements. Mind 120 (478):263-327.
- James McBain (1999). The Role of Theory Contamination in Intuitions. Southwest Philosophy Review 15 (1):197-204.
- Mark McEvoy (2007). Kitcher, Mathematical Intuition, and Experience. Philosophia Mathematica 15 (2):227-237.
- Yitzhak Y. Melamed (forthcoming). “ ’Scientia Intuitiva’: Spinoza’s Third Kind of Cognition”. In Johannes Haag (ed.), Übergänge - diskursiv oder intuitiv? Essays zu Eckart Förster die 25 Jahre der Philosophie. Klostermann.
- Nenad Miščević (2004). The Explainability of Intuitions. Dialectica 58 (1):43–70.
- Nenad Miščević (2003). Explaining Modal Intuition. Acta Analytica 18 (1-2):5-41.
- Moti Mizrahi (2013). More Intuition Mongering. The Reasoner 7 (1):5-6.
- Moti Mizrahi (2012). Intuition Mongering. The Reasoner 6 (11):169-170.
- Thomas Nadelhoffer & Adam Feltz (2008). The Actor–Observer Bias and Moral Intuitions: Adding Fuel to Sinnott-Armstrong's Fire. Neuroethics 1 (2):133-144.
- Jennifer Nagel (2012). Intuitions and Experiments: A Defense of the Case Method in Epistemology. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (3):495-527.
- Jennifer Nagel (2012). Mindreading in Gettier Cases and Skeptical Pressure Cases. In Jessica Brown & Mikkel Gerken (eds.), Knowledge Ascriptions. Oxford University Press.
- Jennifer Nagel (2007). Epistemic Intuitions. Philosophy Compass 2 (6):792–819.
- Jennifer Nagel, Valerie San Juan & Raymond A. Mar (forthcoming). Lay Denial of Knowledge for Justified True Beliefs. Cognition.
- Shaun Nichols & Joseph Ulatowski (2007). Intuitions and Individual Differences: The Knobe Effect Revisited. Mind and Language 22 (4):346–365.
- Joel Pust (forthcoming). Skepticism, Reason and Reidianism. In Albert Casullo & Joshua Thurow (eds.), The A Priori in Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
- Joel Pust, Intuition. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
- Joel Pust (2004). On Explaining Knowledge of Necessity. Dialectica 58 (1):71–87.
- Joel Pust (2001). Against Explanationist Skepticism Regarding Philosophical Intuitions. Philosophical Studies 106 (3):227 - 258.
- Joel Pust (2000). Intuitions as Evidence. Routledge.
- Darrell P. Rowbottom (forthcoming). Intuitions in Science: Thought Experiments as Argument Pumps. In Anthony R. Booth & Darrell P. Rowbottom (eds.), Intuitions.
- Alexander Sarch (2010). Bealer and the Autonomy of Philosophy. Synthese 172 (3).
- Paul Schollmeier (1991). Practical Intuition and Rhetorical Example. Philosophy and Rhetoric 24 (2):95 - 104.
- Max Seeger, The Critique From Experimental Philosophy: Can Philosophical Intuitions Be Externally Corroborated? XXII. Deutscher Kongress für Philosophie.
- Max Seeger (2010). Experimental Philosophy and the Twin Earth Intuition. Grazer Philosophische Studien 80:237-244.
- Joseph Shieber (2010). On the Nature of Thought Experiments and a Core Motivation of Experimental Philosophy. Philosophical Psychology 23 (4):547-564.
- Paul Silva (forthcoming). Epistemically Self-Defeating Arguments and Skepticism About Intuition. Philosophical Studies.
- Desh Raj Sirswal (2005). Hume’s Discussion on the Personal Identity. Bihar Jounal of Philosophical Research.
- David Sosa (2006). Scepticism About Intuition. Philosophy 81 (4):633-648.
- Ernest Sosa (2007/2009). A Virtue Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
- Ernest Sosa (2007). Experimental Philosophy and Philosophical Intuition. Philosophical Studies 132 (1):99-107.
- Ernest Sosa (2007). Intuitions: Their Nature and Epistemic Efficacy. Grazer Philosophische Studien 74 (1):51-67.
- Stephen Stich, Reply to Sosa.
- Stephen Stich & Jonathan M. Weinberg, Empirical Challenges to the Use of Intuitions as Evidence in Philosophy, or Why We Are Not “Judgment Skeptics”.
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