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  1. J. Adam Carter & Jesper Kallestrup (2016). Extended Cognition and Propositional Memory. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (3):691-714.
    The philosophical case for extended cognition is often made with reference to ‘extended-memory cases’ ; though, unfortunately, proponents of the hypothesis of extended cognition as well as their adversaries have failed to appreciate the kinds of epistemological problems extended-memory cases pose for mainstream thinking in the epistemology of memory. It is time to give these problems a closer look. Our plan is as follows: in §1, we argue that an epistemological theory remains compatible with HEC only if its epistemic assessments (...)
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  2. Fred Adams (2011). Husker Du? Philosophical Studies 153 (1):81-94.
    Sven Bernecker develops a theory of propositional memory that is at odds with the received epistemic theory of memory. On Bernecker’s account the belief that is remembered must be true, but it need not constitute knowledge, nor even have been true at the time it was acquired. I examine his reasons for thinking the epistemic theory of memory is false and mount a defense of the epistemic theory.
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  3. David B. Annis (1980). Memory and Justification. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 40 (3):324-333.
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  4. Robert Audi (1995). Memorial Justification. Philosophical Topics 23 (1):31-45.
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  5. J. B. Baillie (1917). On the Nature of Memory-Knowledge. Mind 26 (103):249-272.
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  6. William P. Banks & Kathy Pezdek (1994). The Recovered Memory/False Memory Debate. Consciousness and Cognition 3 (3-4):265-268.
  7. David James Barnett (2015). Is Memory Merely Testimony From One's Former Self? Philosophical Review 124 (3):353-392.
    A natural view of testimony holds that a source's statements provide one with evidence about what the source believes, which in turn provides one with evidence about what is true. But some theorists have gone further and developed a broadly analogous view of memory. According to this view, which this essay calls the “diary model,” one's memory ordinarily serves as a means for one's present self to gain evidence about one's past judgments, and in turn about the truth. This essay (...)
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  8. Ralph Barton Perry (1906). The Knowledge of Past Events. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 3 (23):617-626.
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  9. Sven Bernecker (2015). Visual Memory and the Bounds of Authenticity. In Annalisa Coliva, Volker Munz & Danièle Moyal-Sharrock (eds.), Mind, Language and Action: Proceedings of the 36th International Wittgenstein Symposium. De Gruyter 445-464.
    It has long been known that memory need not be a literal reproduction of the past but may be a constructive process. To say that memory is a constructive process is to say that the encoded content may differ from the retrieved content. At the same time, memory is bound by the authenticity constraint which states that the memory content must be true to the subject's original perception of reality. This paper addresses the question of how the constructive nature of (...)
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  10. Sven Bernecker (2011). Further Thoughts on Memory: Replies to Schechtman, Adams, and Goldberg. Philosophical Studies 153 (1):109-121.
    This is a response to three critical discussions of my book Memory: A Philosophical Study (Oxford University Press 2010): Marya Schechtman, Memory and Identity , Fred Adams, Husker Du? , and Sanford Goldberg The Metasemantics of Memory.
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  11. Sven Bernecker (2011). Précis of Memory: A Philosophical Study. Philosophical Studies 153 (1):61-64.
  12. Sven Bernecker (2009). Memory: A Philosophical Study. Oxford University Press.
    In this book, Sven Bernecker investigates the defining characteristics of memory and the issues essential to understanding it. The book gives a comprehensive philosophical account of memory and illuminates issues central to contemporary discussions of metaphysics and epistemology such as personal identity, causation, mental content, and justification.
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  13. Sven Bernecker (2008). The Metaphysics of Memory. Springer.
    This book investigates central issues in the philosophy of memory. Does remembering require a causal process connecting the past representation to its subsequent recall and, if so, what is the nature of the causal process? Of what kind are the primary intentional objects of memory states? How do we know that our memory experiences portray things the way they happened in the past? Given that our memory is not only a passive device for reproducing thoughts but also an active device (...)
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  14. Sven Bernecker (2007). Remembering Without Knowing. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (1):137 – 156.
    This paper challenges the standard conception of memory as a form of knowledge. Unlike knowledge, memory implies neither belief nor justification.
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  15. Sven Bernecker & Kourken Michaelian (eds.) (2017). The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory. Routledge.
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  16. Paul Boghossian (1989). Content and Self-Knowledge. Philosophical Topics 17 (1):5-26.
    This paper argues that, given a certain apparently inevitable thesis about content, we could not know our own minds. The thesis is that the content of a thought is determined by its relational properties.
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  17. Francis H. Bradley (1899). Some Remarks on Memory and Inference. Mind 8 (30):145-166.
  18. Richard B. Brandt (1955). The Epistemological Status of Memory Beliefs. Philosophical Review 64 (1):78-95.
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  19. Richard B. Brandt (1954). A Puzzle in Lewis's Theory of Memory. Philosophical Studies 5 (6):88 - 95.
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  20. Daniel Brunson (2007). Memory and Peirce's Pragmatism. Cognitio-Estudos 4 (2):71-80.
    Interpretations of Peirce’s frequent references to a proof of his brand of pragmatism vary, ranging from its impossibility to its substantive completion. This paper takes seriously Peirce’s claim that a philosophical argument should be composed of multiple fibers and suggests a relatively neglected perspective that connects much of Peirce’s thought. This additional fiber is Peirce’s account of memory, often only intimated. The importance of this account arises from Peirce’s claim that the practically indubitable existence of memory is a strong argument (...)
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  21. Bruce Stephen Bubacz (1975). Augustine's Account of Factual Memory. Augustinian Studies 6:181-192.
  22. Tyler Burge (1998). Memory and Self-Knowledge. In Peter Ludlow & N. Martin (eds.), Externalism and Self-Knowledge. Csli
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  23. Tyler Burge (1997). Interlocution, Perception, and Memory. Philosophical Studies 86 (1):21-47.
  24. Tyler Burge (1993). Content Preservation. Philosophical Review 102 (4):457-488.
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  25. Stephen J. Ceci, Mary Lyndia Crotteau Huffman, Elliott Smith & Elizabeth F. Loftus (1994). Repeatedly Thinking About a Non-Event: Source Misattributions Among Preschoolers. Consciousness and Cognition 3 (3-4):388-407.
    In this paper we review the factors alleged to be responsible for the creation of inaccurate reports among preschool-aged children, focusing on so-called "source misattribution errors." We present the first round of results from an ongoing program of research that suggests that source misattributions could be a powerful mechanism underlying children′s false beliefs about having experienced fictitious events. Preliminary findings from this program of research indicate that all children of all ages are equally susceptible to making source misattributions. Data from (...)
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  26. William Child (2006). Memory, Expression, and Past-Tense Self-Knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (1):54–76.
    How should we understand our capacity to remember our past intentional states? And what can we learn from Wittgenstein's treatment of this topic? Three questions are considered. First, what is the relation between our past attitudes and our present beliefs about them? Realism about past attitudes is defended. Second, how should we understand Wittgenstein's view that self-ascriptions of past attitudes are a kind of "response" and that the "language-game" of reporting past attitudes is "the primary thing"? The epistemology and metaphysics (...)
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  27. Roderick M. Chisholm (1973). Empirical Knowledge; Readings From Contemporary Sources. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.,Prentice-Hall.
    Nelson, L. The impossibility of the "Theory of knowledge."--Moore, G. E. Four forms of skepticism.--Lehrer, K. Skepticism & conceptual change.--Quine, W. V. Epistemology naturalized.--Rozeboom, W. W. Why I know so much more than you do.--Price, H. H. Belief and evidence.--Lewis, C. I. The bases of empirical knowledge.--Malcolm, N. The verification argument.--Firth, R. The anatomy of certainty.--Chisholm, R. M. On the nature of empirical evidence.--Meinong, A. Toward an epistemological assessment of memory.--Brandt, R. The epistemological status of memory beliefs.--Malcolm, N. A definition (...)
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  28. David Christensen & Hilary Kornblith (1997). Testimony, Memory and the Limits of the a Priori. Philosophical Studies 86 (1):1-20.
    A number of philosophers, from Thomas Reid1 through C. A. J. Coady2, have argued that one is justified in relying on the testimony of others, and furthermore, that this should be taken as a basic epistemic presumption. If such a general presumption were not ultimately dependent on evidence for the reliability of other people, the ground for this presumption would be a priori. Such a presumption would then have a status like that which Roderick Chisholm claims for the epistemic principle (...)
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  29. Robert C. Coburn (1960). A Defect in Harrod's Inductive Justification of Memory. Philosophical Studies 11 (6):81 - 85.
  30. J. Comesana (2011). Conservatism, Preservationism, Conservationism and Mentalism. Analysis 71 (3):489-492.
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  31. Earl Conee & Richard Feldman (2008). Evidence. In Quentin Smith (ed.), Epistemology: New Essays. Oxford University Press
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  32. Earl Conee & Richard Feldman (2001). Internalism Defended. In Hilary Kornblith (ed.), American Philosophical Quarterly. Blackwell 1 - 18.
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  33. James W. Cornman (1966). More on Mistaken Memory. Analysis 26 (December):57-58.
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  34. James W. Cornman (1965). Malcolm's Mistaken Memory. Analysis 25 (April):161-167.
  35. Dorothea Debus (2010). Accounting for Epistemic Relevance: A New Problem for the Causal Theory of Memory. American Philosophical Quarterly 47 (1):17-29.
    In their paper "Remembering," first published in the Philosophical Review in 1966, Martin and Deutscher develop what has since come to be known as the Causal Theory of Memory. The core claim of the Causal Theory of Memory runs as follows: If someone remembers something, whether it be "public," such as a car accident, or "private," such as an itch, then the following criteria must be fulfilled: 1. Within certain limits of accuracy he represents that past thing. 2. I f (...)
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  36. Dorothea Debus (2008). Experiencing the Past: A Relational Account of Recollective Memory. Dialectica 62 (4):405-432.
    Sometimes we remember past objects or events in a vivid, experiential way. The present paper addresses some fundamental questions about the metaphysics of such experiential or 'recollective' memories. More specifically, it develops the 'Relational Account' of recollective memory, which consists of the following three claims. (1) A subject who recollectively remembers (or 'R-remembers') a past object or event stands in an experiential relation (namely, a 'recollective relation') to the relevant past object or event. (2) The R-remembered object or event itself (...)
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  37. Raphael Demos (1921). Memory as Knowledge of the Past. The Monist 31 (3):397-408.
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  38. Sinan Dogramaci (2015). Forget and Forgive: A Practical Approach to Forgotten Evidence. Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy 2.
    We can make new progress on stalled debates in epistemology if we adopt a new practical approach, an approach concerned with the function served by epistemic evaluations. This paper illustrates how. I apply the practical approach to an important, unsolved problem: the problem of forgotten evidence. Section 1 describes the problem and why it is so challenging. Section 2 outlines and defends a general view about the function of epistemic evaluations. Section 3 then applies that view to solve the problem (...)
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  39. Jérôme Dokic (2001). Is Memory Purely Preservative? In Christoph Hoerl & Teresa McCormack (eds.), Time and Memory. Oxford University Press 213--232.
  40. Jim Edwards (2000). Burge on Testimony and Memory. Analysis 60 (1):124–131.
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  41. Kevin Falvey (2003). Memory and Knowledge of Content. In Susana Nuccetelli (ed.), New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge. MIT Press
  42. Paulo Faria (2010). Memory as Acquaintance with the Past: Some Lessons From Russell, 1912-1914. Kriterion: Journal of Philosophy 51 (121):149-172.
    Russell’s theory of memory as acquaintance with the past seems to square uneasily with his definition of acquaintance as the converse of the relation of presentation of an object to a subject. We show how the two views can be made to cohere under a suitable construal of ‘presentation’, which has the additional appeal of bringing Russell’s theory of memory closer to contemporary views on direct reference and object-dependent thinking than is usually acknowledged. The drawback is that memory as acquaintance (...)
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  43. Richard Feldman (1988). Having Evidence. In D. F. Austin (ed.), Philosophical Analysis. Kluwer Academic Publishers 83--104.
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  44. Jordi Fernández (2016). Epistemic Generation in Memory. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (3):620-644.
    Does memory only preserve epistemic justification over time, or can memory also generate it? I argue that memory can generate justification based on a certain conception of mnemonic content. According to it, our memories represent themselves as originating on past perceptions of objective facts. If this conception of mnemonic content is correct, what we may believe on the basis of memory always includes something that we were not in a position to believe before we utilised that capacity. For that reason, (...)
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  45. Jordi Fernández (2015). Epistemic Generation in Memory. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (2):n/a-n/a.
    Does memory only preserve epistemic justification over time, or can memory also generate it? I argue that memory can generate justification based on a certain conception of mnemonic content. According to it, our memories represent themselves as originating on past perceptions of objective facts. If this conception of mnemonic content is correct, what we may believe on the basis of memory always includes something that we were not in a position to believe before we utilised that capacity. For that reason, (...)
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  46. Jordi Fernandez (2006). Memory and Perception: Remembering Snowflake. Theoria 21 (56):147-164.
    If I remember something, I tend to believe that I have perceived it. Similarly, if I remember something, I tend to believe that it happened in the past. My aim here is to propose a notion of mnemonic contentaccounts for these facts. Certain proposals build perceptual experiences into the content of memories. I argue that they Have trouble with the second belief. Other proposals build references to temporal locations into mnemonic content. I argue that they have trouble with the second (...)
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  47. Matthew Frise (forthcoming). No Need to Know. Philosophical Studies:1-11.
    I introduce and defend an argument against the popular view that anything falling short of knowledge falls short in value. The nature of belief and cognitive psychological research on memory, I claim, support the argument. I also show that not even the most appealing mode of knowledge is distinctively valuable.
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  48. Matthew Frise (forthcoming). Internalism and the Problem of Stored Beliefs. Erkenntnis:1-20.
    A belief is stored if it is in no way before the subject’s mind. The problem of stored beliefs is that of satisfactorily explaining how the stored beliefs which seem justified are indeed justified. In this paper I challenge the two leading internalist attempts to solve this problem. Internalism about epistemic justification, at a minimum, states that one’s mental life alone determines what one is justified in believing. First I dispute the attempt from epistemic conservatism, which states that believing justifies (...)
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  49. Matthew Frise, Memory, Epistemology Of. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    We learn a lot. Friends tell us about their lives. Books tell us about the past. We see the world. We reason and we reflect on our mental lives. As a result we come to know and to form justified beliefs about a range of topics. We also seem to keep these beliefs. How? The natural answer is: by memory. It is not too hard to understand that memory allows us to retain information. It is harder to understand exactly how (...)
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  50. E. J. Furlong (1948). Memory. Mind 57 (January):16-44.
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