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Subcategories:History/traditions: Epistemology of Mind
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  1. H. B. Acton (1934). MITCHELL, Sir W. -The Place of Minds in the World. [REVIEW] Mind 43:243.
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  2. Leo Apostel (1987). Zeno VENDLER, "The Matter of Minds". [REVIEW] Revue Internationale de Philosophie 41 (1):148.
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  3. D. M. Armstrong (1994). Introspection. In Quassim Cassam (ed.), Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Oxford University Press 109--117.
    This paper will argue that there is no such thing as introspective access to judgments and decisions. I t won't challenge the existence of introspective access to perceptual and imagistic states, nor to emotional feelings and bodily sensations. On the contrary, the model presented in Section 2 presumes such access. Hence introspection is here divided into two categories: introspection of propositional attitude events, on the one hand, and introspection of broadly perceptual events, on the other. I shall assume that the (...)
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  4. Janet Wilde Astington & E. Filippova (2005). Language as the Route Into Other Minds. In B. Malle & S. Hodges (eds.), Other Minds. Guilford Press
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  5. Anita Avramides (2002). Other Minds? Think 1 (2):61.
    One of the most intriguing of philosophical puzzles concerns other minds. How do you know there are any? Yes, you're surrounded by living organisms that look and behave much as you do. They even say they have minds. But do they? Perhaps other humans are mindless zombies: like you on the outside, but lacking any inner conscious life, including emotions, thoughts, experiences and even pain. What grounds do you possess for supposing that other humans aren't zombies? Perhaps less than you (...)
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  6. A. J. Ayer (1956). The Problem of Knowledge. Harmondsworth.
  7. Jayapul Azariah (2004). Many Facets Of Our Minds. Eubios Journal of Asian and International Bioethics 14 (1):10-12.
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  8. Victor Balowitz (1990). The Matter of Minds. International Studies in Philosophy 22 (1):142-143.
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  9. Dorit Bar-On (2004). Speaking My Mind: Expression and Self-Knowledge. Oxford University Press Uk.
    Dorit Bar-On develops and defends a novel view of avowals and self-knowledge. Drawing on resources from the philosophy of language, the theory of action, epistemology, and the philosophy of mind, she offers original and systematic answers to many long-standing questions concerning our ability to know our own minds. We are all very good at telling what states of mind we are in at a given moment. When it comes to our own present states of mind, what we say goes; an (...)
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  10. Marjorie Barker & T. Givon (2005). Representation of the Interlocutor's Mind During Conversation. In B. Malle & S. Hodges (eds.), Other Minds. Guilford Press
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  11. Clare Batty (2009). Review of Stalnaker, Robert C., Our Knowledge of the Internal World. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (6).
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  12. Jules Belford (1970). A Physicalistic Approach to the Problem of Other Minds. Dissertation, University of Miami
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  13. Bergmann Bergmann (1953). ISDOM'S Other Minds. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 14:112.
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  14. Sven Bernecker (1997). Knowing One's Own Mind. Dissertation, Stanford University
    This dissertation addresses the question whether externalism about thought content is consistent with claims about the epistemically special access that subjects have to their own present and conscious thoughts. Externalism is the view that the contents of many of our thoughts are determined at least in part by external affairs. Given externalism, knowledge of one's thoughts seems to require information beyond what is available to introspection. This conclusion is inconsistent with the intuitive conviction that such knowledge is environmentally neutral. ;I (...)
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  15. Otto Bird (1955). Knowledge and Expression. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 29:236-248.
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  16. Jean Bocharova (2014). The Emergence of Mind: Personal Knowledge and Connectionism. Tradition and Discovery 41 (3):20-31.
    At the end of Personal Knowledge, Polanyi discusses human development, arguing for a view of the human person as emerging out of but not constituted by its material substrate. As part of this view, he argues that the human person can never be likened to a computer, an inference machine, or a neural model because all are based in formalized processes of automation, processes that cannot account for the contribution of unformalizable, tacit knowing. This paper revisits Polanyi’s discussion of the (...)
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  17. Roy R. Bode (1955). Knowledge and Expression. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 29:135-139.
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  18. Tibor Bosse, Martijn C. Schut & Jan Treur (2009). Formal Analysis of Dynamics Within Philosophy of Mind by Computer Simulation. Minds and Machines 19 (4):543-555.
    Computer simulations can be useful tools to support philosophers in validating their theories, especially when these theories concern phenomena showing nontrivial dynamics. Such theories are usually informal, whilst for computer simulation a formally described model is needed. In this paper, a methodology is proposed to gradually formalise philosophical theories in terms of logically formalised dynamic properties. One outcome of this process is an executable logic-based temporal specification, which within a dedicated software environment can be used as a simulation model to (...)
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  19. Jewel Spears Brooker (1998). T. E. Hulme and the Twentiety-Century Mind. Modern Schoolman 76 (1):67-71.
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  20. C. Delisle Burns (1923). The Contact Between Minds. A Metaphysical Hypothesis. Journal of Philosophy 20 (23):629-633.
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  21. Peter Carruthers (2013). The Opacity of Mind: An Integrative Theory of Self-Knowledge. Oxford University Press Uk.
    It is widely believed that people have privileged and authoritative access to their own thoughts. The Opacity of Mind challenges the consensus view and subjects the theories in question to critical scrutiny, while showing that they are not protected against the findings of cognitive science by belonging to a separate 'explanatory space'. Access to our own thoughts is almost always interpretive, grounded in perceptual awareness of our own circumstances and behavior, together with our own sensory imagery. Peter Carruthers proposes and (...)
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  22. Peter Carruthers (2009). Review: Simulation and the First-Person. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 144 (3):467 - 475.
    This article focuses on, and critiques, Goldman's view that third-person mind-reading is grounded in first-person introspection. It argues, on the contrary, that first-person awareness of propositional attitude events is always interpretative, resulting from us turning our mind-reading abilities upon ourselves.
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  23. Peter Carruthers (2009). Simulation and the First-Person. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 144 (3):467 - 475.
    This article focuses on, and critiques, Goldman’s view that third-person mind-reading is grounded in first-person introspection. It argues, on the contrary, that first-person awareness of propositional attitude events is always interpretative, resulting from us turning our mind-reading abilities upon ourselves.
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  24. Quassim Cassam (2015). What Asymmetry? Knowledge of Self, Knowledge of Others, and the Inferentialist Challenge. Synthese:1-19.
    There is widely assumed to be a fundamental epistemological asymmetry between self-knowledge and knowledge of others. They are said to be ’categorically different in kind and manner’ , and the existence of such an asymmetry is taken to be a primitive datum in accounts of the two kinds of knowledge. I argue that standard accounts of the differences between self-knowledge and knowledge of others exaggerate and misstate the asymmetry. The inferentialist challenge to the asymmetry focuses on the extent to which (...)
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  25. Venant Cauchy (1955). Knowledge and Expression. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 29:208-220.
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  26. Chieh-Ling Cheng, Self-Consciousness, Self-Ascription, and the Mental Self.
    Galen Strawson argues that we have a sense of mental selves, which are entities that have mental features but do not have bodily features. In particular, he argues that there is a form of self-consciousness that involves a conception of the mental self. His mental self view is opposed to the embodied self view, the view that the self must be conceived of as an entity that has both mental and bodily features. In this paper, I will argue against Strawson’s (...)
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  27. William Child (1996). Solipsism and First Person/Third Person Asymmetries. European Journal of Philosophy 4 (2):137-154.
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  28. Steve Clarke (2008). Moral Minds. Minerva 46 (1):147-150.
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  29. L. J. Cohen (1987). G. Macdonald and C. Wright , "Fact, Science and Morality". Philosophical Quarterly 37 (149):468.
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  30. Jonathan Cole (2001). Empathy Needs a Face. Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (5-7):5-7.
    The importance of the face is best understood, it is suggested, from the effects of visible facial difference in people. Their experience reflects the ways in which the face may be necessary for the interpersonal relatedness underlying such 'sharing' mind states as empathy. It is proposed that the face evolved as a result of several evolutionary pressures but that it is well placed to assume the role of an embodied representation of the increasingly refined inner states of mind that developed (...)
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  31. Annalisa Coliva (2003). The First Person. Journal of Philosophy 100 (8):416 - 431.
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  32. Arthur W. Collins (1967). The Epistemological Status of the Concept of Perception. Philosophical Review 76 (4):436-459.
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  33. Richard Cording (1972). Some Criticisms of Chappell's Argument for Solipsism. Journal of Critical Analysis 4 (1):21-24.
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  34. Carlos João Correia (2008). The Feeling of What Happens and Animal Minds. A Critical Analysis of Hauser's Wild Minds. Philosophica 31:7-18.
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  35. Tim Crane, Knowledge of the Mind and Knowledge of the Brain.
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  36. Frederick J. Crosson (1961). Personal Knowledge. New Scholasticism 35 (2):258-260.
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  37. Manuel de Pinedo (2007). When My Own Beliefs Are Not First-Personal Enough. Theoria 22 (1):35-41.
    Richard Moran has argued, convincingly, in favour of the idea that there must be more than one path to access our own mental contents. The existence of those routes, one first-personal —through avowal— the other third-personal —no different to the one used to ascribe mental states to other people and to interpret their actions— is intimately connected to our capacity to respond to norms. Moran’s account allows for conflicts between first personal and third personal authorities over my own beliefs; this (...)
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  38. Frédérique De Vignemont, The Co-Consciousness Hypothesis.
    Self-knowledge seems to be radically different from the knowledge of other people. However, rather than focusing on the gap between self and others, we should emphasize their commonality. Indeed, different “mirror matching mechanisms” have been found in monkeys as well as in humans showing that one uses the same representations for oneself and for the others. But do these shared representations allow one to report the mental states of others as if they were one's own? I intend in this essay (...)
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  39. John Dewey (1942). How is Mind to Be Known? Journal of Philosophy 39 (2):29-35.
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  40. Dr G. Dinani, Simple Knowledge and Composite Knowledge. Kheradnameh Sadra Quarterly 23.
    Thought and knowledge represent the most obvious aspects of man's identity. There are fundamental differences between human thought and what is called animal perception. In the meaning of thought, the1-There is another Nizam al-Din Ahmad mentioned in biographies, who is one of Fayd's grandchildren, and died in 1160 H. Care should be taken to not confuse thisNizam al-Din Ahmad with Mulla Sadra's son perception of perception and the knowledge of knowledge are also embedded and this is what we can call (...)
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  41. Kevin E. Dodson (1999). Philosophy and the Return to Self-Knowledge. Review of Metaphysics 52 (3):731-732.
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  42. Igor Douven (2010). The Pragmatics of Belief. Journal of Pragmatics 42 (1):35-47.
    This paper argues that pragmatic considerations similar to the ones that Grice has shown pertain to assertability pertain to acceptability. It further shows how this should affect some widely held epistemic principles. The idea of a pragmatics of belief is defended against some seemingly obvious objections.
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  43. Dolina Sylvia Dowling, Arguments for Other Minds.
    If I am aware of my own mental states by introspection How can I know that other people have minds? and How can I know what their mental states are? These are two of the questions with which I will be concerned in this dissertation. I discuss five different attempts to deal with them. The claim that we can know that other people have minds by an argument from analogy. I show a number of serious flaws in Russell's and other (...)
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  44. Sing Choe Leung Edwin (1989). Can There Be Apossible World In Which Memory Is Unreliable? Philosophical Inquiry 11 (3-4):46-47.
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  45. R. Elio (ed.) (2002). Common Sense, Reasoning, and Rationality. Vancouver Studies in Cognitive Science (Vol. 11). Oxford University Press.
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  46. S. Evnine (2010). Our Knowledge of the Internal World * By ROBERT C. STALNAKER. Analysis 70 (2):393-395.
    (No abstract is available for this citation).
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  47. F. (1982). Psychology as Self-Knowledge: The Development of the Concept of the Mind in German Rationalistic Psychology and its Relevance Today. [REVIEW] Review of Metaphysics 35 (4):896-897.
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  48. A. Falk (1987). Reference to Myself. Behaviorism 15 (2):89-105.
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  49. Neil Philip Feit (1996). Subjectivity and the Objects of Belief. Dissertation, University of Massachusetts Amherst
    This dissertation is a study of the problem of beliefs about oneself, or so-called de se beliefs: for example, the beliefs that I would express by saying 'I am left-handed' or 'I am in Massachusetts'. The problem arises against the background conception of belief as a propositional attitude, i.e., as a relation between conscious subjects and abstract entities that are either true or false absolutely. ;Many philosophers have recently argued that the intentional objects of one's de se beliefs could not (...)
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  50. J. N. Findlay (1945). On Mind and Our Knowledge of It. Philosophy 20 (77):206 - 226.
    This paper is an attempt to clarify our talk about minds and thoughts—our own minds and the thoughts which run through them and which we know directly, as well as the minds of other people and the thoughts with which we credit them. We do so in order to be able to characterize satisfactorily our whole performance in talking about minds and thoughts, the rules according to which such talk operates and the goals it purports to reach. We also hope (...)
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