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  1. David Bain (2009). McDowell and the Presentation of Pains. Philosophical Topics 37 (1):1-24.
    It can seem natural to say that, when in pain, we undergo experiences which present to us certain experience-dependent particulars, namely pains. As part of his wider approach to mind and world, John McDowell has elaborated an interesting but neglected version of this account of pain. Here I set out McDowell’s account at length, and place it in context. I argue that his subjectivist conception of the objects of pain experience is incompatible with his requirement that such experience be presentational, (...)
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  2. Matthew J. Barker (2010). From Cognition's Location to the Epistemology of its Nature. Cognitive Systems Research 11 (357):366.
    One of the liveliest debates about cognition concerns whether our cognition sometimes extends beyond our brains and bodies. One party says Yes, another No. This paper shows that debate between these parties has been epistemologically confused and requires reorienting. Both parties frequently appeal to empirical considerations and to extra-empirical theoretical virtues to support claims about where cognition is. These things should constrain their claims, but cannot do all the work hoped. This is because of the overlooked fact, uncovered in this (...)
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  3. Henk Bij de Weg (2001). The Commonsense Conception and its Relation to Scientific Theory. Philosophical Explorations 4 (1):17 – 30.
    In this paper I discern two concepts of meaning: meaning O - which is assigned by us on the basis of our commonsense conception in order to constitute our own daily reality - and meaning I, which we assign when we interpret reality scientifically. Authors who contend that the commonsense conception is nothing but a kind of scientific theory, do not see that the two fields of life have their own concept of meaning. Commonsense and science are not separate from (...)
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  4. Tomas Bogardus (2011). What Certainty Teaches. Philosophical Psychology 25 (2):227 - 243.
    Most philosophers, including all materialists I know of, believe that I am a complex thing?a thing with parts?and that my mental life is (or is a result of) the interaction of these parts. These philosophers often believe that I am a body or a brain, and my mental life is (or is a product of) brain activity. In this paper, I develop and defend a novel argument against this view. The argument turns on certainty, that highest epistemic status that a (...)
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  5. Melinda Campbell (2012). Epistemic Error and Experiential Evidence. In Glimpse: Publication of the Society of Phenomenology and Media.
    In response to recent debates in color ontology, I present an account of color that resolves the issue in a new way by conceiving of colors as properties of appearances. Appearances are both objective and subjective: they are real-world events reducible to psychophysical interactions involving environmental stimuli and experiential states. The case is made for accepting experience as an actual component of colors themselves as well as being the fundamental epistemic evidence for their instantiation.
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  6. Alon Chasid (2014). Visual Experience: Cognitive Penetrability and Indeterminacy. Acta Analytica 29 (1):119-130.
    This paper discusses a counterexample to the thesis that visual experience is cognitively impenetrable. My central claim is that sometimes visual experience is influenced by the perceiver’s beliefs, rendering her experience’s representational content indeterminate. After discussing other examples of cognitive penetrability, I focus on a certain kind of visual experience— that is, an experience that occurs under radically nonstandard conditions—and show that it may have indeterminate content, particularly with respect to low-level properties such as colors and shapes. I then explain (...)
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  7. Christian Coseru (2013). Reason and Experience in Buddhist Epistemology. In Steven Emmanuel (ed.), A Companion to Buddhist Philosophy. Wiley-Blackwell
    As a specific domain of inquiry, “ Buddhist epistemology” stands primarily for the dialogical-disputational context in which Buddhists advance their empirical claims to knowledge and articulate the principles of reason on the basis of which such claims may be defended. The main questions pursued in this article concern the tension between the notion that knowledge is ultimately a matter of direct experience---which the Buddhist considers as more normative than other, more indirect, modes of knowing---and the largely discursive and (...)
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  8. Phillip Cummins (1982). Hylas' Parity Argument. In Colin M. Turbayne (ed.), Berkeley: Critical and Interpretive Essays.
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  9. Tanya de Villiers-Botha (2007). Why Peirce Matters: The Symbol in Deacon's Symbolic Species. Language Sciences 29 (1):88-108.
    In "Why brains matter: an integrational perspective on The Symbolic Species" Cowley (2002) [Language Sciences 24, 73-95] suggests that Deacon pictures brains as being able to process words qua tokens, which he identifies as the theory's Achilles' heel. He goes on to argue that Deacon's thesis on the co-evolution of language and mind would benefit from an integrational approach. This paper argues that Cowley's criticism relies on an invalid understanding of Deacon's use the concept of "symbolic reference", which he appropriates (...)
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  10. Simon David Dembitzer, On Mental Privacy: The Having of Mental States.
    In three chapters this thesis seeks to demonstrate that (i) there historically has been no consensus in the use of the term 'mental privacy' and that several problematic doctrines are based on confused accounts of this term; (ii) there are contemporary debates which are maintained, in large order, by the opposing sides subscribing to different notions of mental privacy; and (iii) a preliminary investigation makes clear that both mental states with propositional content and mental states with non-propositional content are private (...)
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  11. Tamás Demeter (2009). Folk Psychology Is Not a Metarepresentational Device. European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 5 (2):19-38.
    Here I challenge the philosophical consensus that we use folk psychology for the purposes of metarepresentation. The paper intends to show that folk psychology should not be conceived on par with fact-stating discourses in spite of what its surface semantics may suggest. I argue that folk-psychological discourse is organised in a way and has conceptual characteristics such that it cannot fulfill a fact-stating function. To support this claim I develop an open question argument for psychological interpretations, and I draw attention (...)
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  12. Max Deutscher (2010). Thinking From Underground. In Danielle Celermajer Andrew Schaap (ed.), Power, Judgment and Political Evil. Ashgate 27-38.
    Arendt is a philosopher despite herself, and this paper uses the resources of her <<The Life of the Mind>> to develop her comparison of thinking as a 'departure' from the world with the fore-doomed attempt by Orpheus to bring from underground into the light of day. The paper investigates how thinking, though we 'lose' it in the speech and writing that makes it public, still can have the delicate power that Arendt attributes to it.
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  13. Susannah Kate Devitt, Homeostatic Epistemology : Reliability, Coherence and Coordination in a Bayesian Virtue Epistemology.
    How do agents with limited cognitive capacities flourish in informationally impoverished or unexpected circumstances? Aristotle argued that human flourishing emerged from knowing about the world and our place within it. If he is right, then the virtuous processes that produce knowledge, best explain flourishing. Influenced by Aristotle, virtue epistemology defends an analysis of knowledge where beliefs are evaluated for their truth and the intellectual virtue or competences relied on in their creation. However, human flourishing may emerge from how degrees of (...)
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  14. Willem deVries & Timm Triplett (2006). Is Sellars'a Rylean Hypothesis Plausible? A Dialogue. In Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities. 85-114.
    A dialogue between someone who finds Sellars's Rylean myth in "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind" quite implausible and another who defends it.
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  15. Steven M. Duncan, Mind, Body, Space, and Time.
    In this essay I explore some of the basic elements of consciousness from a substance dualist point of view, incorporating some elements of Kant's Transcendental Analytic into an overall account of the constitution of consciousness.
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  16. Luca Forgione (2015). Kant on de Re. Some Aspects of the Kantian Non-Conceptualism Debate. Kant Studies Online:32-64.
    In recent years non-conceptual content theorists have taken Kant as a reference point on account of his notion of intuition (§§ 1-2). The present work aims at exploring several complementary issues intertwined with the notion of non-conceptual content: of these, the first concerns the role of the intuition as an indexical representation (§ 3), whereas the second applies to the presence of a few epistemic features articulated according to the distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description (§ 4). (...)
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  17. Luca Forgione (2011). L'autocoscienza: Un Problema Filosofico. Carocci.
    Questo libro indaga la natura dell’autocoscienza, ossia la capacità tutta umana di essere consapevoli della propria sfera mentale. E si colloca nell’alveo della riflessione strettamente filosofica, privilegiando sia un approccio filosofico-linguistico e mentalista sia una ricostruzione del pensiero di alcuni tra i protagonisti della modernità e del dibattito contemporaneo. In particolare, vengono affrontate le caratteristiche specifiche della capacità dell’uomo di rappresentare linguisticamente e mentalmente il proprio io, esaminando gli aspetti problematici dell’argomento: se si parte dal cosiddetto modello riflessivo e si (...)
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  18. Miguel Garcia-Valdecasas (2005). Psychology and Mind in Aquinas. History of Psychiatry 16 (3):291-310.
    This article stresses the main lines of Thomas Aquinas’s philosophy on the nature of the body-soul union. Following Aristotle, Aquinas sees the soul as a ‘principle of life’ which is intimately bound to a body. Together they form a noncontingent composition. In addition, the distinctive feature of the human soul is rationality, which implies that a human needs a mind to be what it is. However, this is not to say, as Descartes proposes, that the reason that I am a (...)
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  19. Brie Gertler (2016). Self‐Knowledge and Rational Agency: A Defense of Empiricism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (2).
    How does one know one's own beliefs, intentions, and other attitudes? Many responses to this question are broadly empiricist, in that they take self-knowledge to be epistemically based in empirical justification or warrant. Empiricism about self-knowledge faces an influential objection: that it portrays us as mere observers of a passing cognitive show, and neglects the fact that believing and intending are things we do, for reasons. According to the competing, agentialist conception of self-knowledge, our capacity for self-knowledge derives from our (...)
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  20. Mathias Girel (2003). The Metaphysics and Logic of Psychology: Peirce's Reading of James's Principles. Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 39 (2):163-203.
    The present paper deals thus with some fundamental agreements and disagreements between Peirce and James, on crucial issues such as perception and consciousness. When Peirce first read the Principles, he was sketching his theory of the categories, testing its applications in many fields of knowledge, and many investigations were launched, concerning indexicals, diagrams, growth and development. James's utterances led Peirce to make his own views clearer on a wide range of topics that go to the heart of the foundations (...)
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  21. Yoji K. Gondor, A Simple View of the Mind, Instinct & Intuition.
    Abstract: The understanding our own mind seems to be an interesting topic in philosophy. I recall reading Kant, he ran far away in the metaphysical space when chalanged complex problems. He used the “intuition” as a mean to justify things, much before the awareness of scientific genetics and such things that made it feasible for such a use. Not much else he could do, the 18th century access to scientific knowledge was just very limited. My view of instinct and intuition (...)
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  22. Paweł Grabarczyk (2012). W obronie Gumika - Uwagi o 'Bajkach Funkcjonalistów' Tadeusza Skalskiego. Acta Universitatis Lodziensis (25):181-185.
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  23. Mihretu P. Guta (2015). Consciousness, First-Person Perspective and Neuroimaging in Mihretu P. Guta and Sophie Gibb (Eds.) Insights Into the First-Person Perspective and the Self: An Interdisciplinary Approach. Journal of Consciousness Studies 22 (11-12):218-245.
    In this paper, my main goal is to discuss two incompatible answers proposed to what I shall call, the objectivity seeking question (OSQ). The first answer is what I shall call the primacy thesis, according to which the third-person perspective is superior to that of the first-person perspective. Ultimately I will reject this answer. The second answer is what I shall call the skepticism thesis, according to which the distinction between the first-person perspective and the third-person perspective can be maintained (...)
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  24. Dirk Hartmann (1999). Das Leib-Seele-Problem als Ergebnis der Hypostasierung theoretischer Konstrukte. In Winfried Löffler & Edmund Runggaldier (eds.), Vielfalt und Konvergenz der Philosophie : Vorträge des V. Kongresses der Österreichischen Gesellschaft für Philosophie - Teil 1. Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky 338-343.
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  25. Eric Hochstein (forthcoming). Categorizing the Mental. Philosophical Quarterly.
    A common view in the philosophy of mind and philosophy of psychology is that there is an ideally correct way of categorizing the structures and operations of the mind, and that the goal of neuroscience and psychology is to find this correct categorizational scheme. Categories which cannot find a place within this correct framework ought to be eliminated from scientific practice. In this paper, I argue that this general idea runs counter to productive scientific practices. Such a view ignores the (...)
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  26. Eric Hochstein (2015). Giving Up on Convergence and Autonomy: Why the Theories of Psychology and Neuroscience Are Codependent as Well as Irreconcilable. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A:1-19.
    There is a long-standing debate in the philosophy of mind and philosophy of science regarding how best to interpret the relationship between neuroscience and psychology. It has traditionally been argued that either the two domains will evolve and change over time until they converge on a single unified account of human behaviour, or else that they will continue to work in isolation given that they identify properties and states that exist autonomously from one another (due to the multiple-realizability of (...)
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  27. René Jagnow (2015). Can We See Natural Kind Properties? Epistemology and Philosophy of Science 44 (2):183-205.
    Which properties can we visually experience? Some authors hold that we can experience only low-level properties such as color, illumination, shape, spatial location, and motion. Others believe that we can also experience high-level properties, such as being a dog or being a pine tree. On the basis of her method of phenomenal contrast, Susanna Siegel has recently defended the latter view. One of her central claims is that we can best account for certain phenomenal contrasts if we assume that we (...)
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  28. Joshua Ward Jeffery (2013). To Live in the World, but Not Be of the World: Explorations in the Paradox of Human Immanence and Transcendence (B.A. Thesis). Dissertation, Warner Pacific College
  29. Rasmus Thybo Jensen & Dermot Moran (2013). Guest Editors' Introduction. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 21 (3):313-316.
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  30. Brian D. Josephson & Tethys Carpenter (1996). What Can Music Tell Us About the Nature of the Mind? A Platonic Model. In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & Alwyn C. Scott (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness. MIT Press
    We present an account of the phenomenon of music based upon the hypothesis that there is a close parallel between the mechanics of life and the mechanics of mind, a key factor in the correspondence proposed being the existence of close parallels between the concepts of gene and musical idea. The hypothesis accounts for the specificity, complexity, functionality and apparent arbitrariness of musical structures. An implication of the model is that music should be seen as a phenomenon of transcendental character, (...)
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  31. Stan Klein (2015). A Defense of Experiential Realism: The Need to Take Phenomenological Reality on its Own Terms in the Study of the Mind. Psychology of Consciousness: Theory, Practice and Research 2 (1):41-56.
    In this paper I argue for the importance of treating mental experience on its own terms. In defense of “experiential realism” I offer a critique of modern psychology’s all-too-frequent attempts to effect an objectification and quantification of personal subjectivity. The question is “What can we learn about experiential reality from indices that, in the service of scientific objectification, transform the qualitative properties of experience into quantitative indices?” I conclude that such treatment is neither necessary for realizing, nor sufficient for capturing, (...)
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  32. Alexei Krioukov (2015). Transzendentale Erfahrung als gedankliches Experiment. HORIZON. Studies in Phenomenology 4 (2):54-62.
    In my talk I would like to discuss a topic concerning the idea of the mental experience as an experiment in the transcendental philosophy. One can see a big difference between two branches of knowledge: humanitarian sciences and „exact“ sciences. The main difference consists in the fact that the experimental dates of the exact sciences can be verified by other researchers, but the mental dates in the mind of one humanitarian researcher cannot be repeated in the mind of another. It (...)
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  33. Ignazio Licata (2013). Incertezza. Un Approccio Sistemico. In Lucia Urbani ULivi (ed.), Strutture di Mondo 2. Il pensiero sistemico come specchio di una realtà complessa. Il Mulino 35-71.
    L’incertezza è considerata una limitazione pratica della conoscenza scientifica, legata al costo dell'acquisizione dei valori di un'osservabile. Un'analisi sistemica sui procedimenti della scienza effettivamente praticata ci rivela piuttosto che le scelte modellistiche su osservabili, scopi e risoluzione genera al tempo stesso informazione significativa ed incertezza.Un modello realizza un equilibrio omeocognitivo metastabile tra osservatore e sistema, una prospettiva di conoscenza che mette in alta risoluzione alcuni aspetti e ne lascia altri in ombra. L’esperienza con i sistemi complessi mostra che la conoscenza (...)
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  34. Ignazio Licata (2012). Seeing by Models: Vision as Adaptative Epistemology. In G. MInati (ed.), Methods, Models, Simulations and Approaches Towards a General Theory of Change. World Scientific
    In this paper we suggest a clarification in relation to the notions of computational and intrinsic emergence, by showing how the latter is deeply connected to the new Logical Openness Theory, an original extension of Gödel theorems to the model theory. The epistemological scenario we are going to make use of is that of the theory of vision, a particularly instructive one. In order to reach our goal we introduce a dynamic theory of relationship between the observer and the observed (...)
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  35. Raamy Majeed (2013). Pleading Ignorance in Response to Experiential Primitivism. Philosophical Studies 163 (1):251-269.
    Modal arguments like the Knowledge Argument, the Conceivability Argument and the Inverted Spectrum Argument could be used to argue for experiential primitivism; the view that experiential truths aren’t entailed from nonexperiential truths. A way to resist these arguments is to follow Stoljar (Ignorance and imagination. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006) and plead ignorance of a type of experience-relevant nonexperiential truth. If we are ignorant of such a truth, we can’t imagine or conceive of the various sorts of scenarios that are (...)
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  36. Leslie Marsh (ed.) (2011). Hayek in Mind: Hayek's Philosophical Psychology. Emerald.
    Hayek s philosophical psychology as set out in his The Sensory Order (1952) has, for the most part, been neglected. Despite being lauded by computer scientist grandee Frank Rosenblatt and by Nobel prize-winning biologist Gerald Edelman, cognitive scientists -- with a few exceptions -- have yet to discover Hayek s philosophical psychology. On the other hand, social theorists, Hayek s traditional disciplinary constituency, have only recently begun to take note and examine the importance of psychology in the complete Hayek corpus. (...)
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  37. Leslie Marsh (2011). SOCIALIZING THE MIND AND ‘‘COGNITIVIZING’’ SOCIALITY. In Hayek in Mind: Hayek's Philosophical Psychology. Emerald
    Hayek’s philosophical psychology as set out in his The Sensory Order (1952) has, for the most part, been neglected. Despite being lauded by computer scientist grandee Frank Rosenblatt and by Nobel prize-winning biologist Gerald Edelman, cognitive scientists -- with a few exceptions -- have yet to discover Hayek’s philosophical psychology. On the other hand, social theorists, Hayek’s traditional disciplinary constituency, have only recently begun to take note and examine the importance of psychology in the complete Hayek corpus. This volume brings (...)
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  38. Monica Meijsing (2007). Steen Olaf Welding, Die Unerkennbarkeit des Geistes. Phänomenale Erfahrung Und Menschliche Erkenntnis. [REVIEW] Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 38 (2):407-412.
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  39. A. Morton (2001). Lore-Abiding People. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 32 (3):601-606.
    I evaluate Kusch's arguments that everyday and scientific psychological beliefs are made true by the institutional facts about the people to whom they are applied. I conclude that institutional facts are among the truth-makers of such beliefs, and that this is a very significant point to have made, but that they are unlikely to be the sole such truth-makers.
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  40. Adam Morton (2009). Folk Psychology. In Brian McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. OUP Oxford
    I survey the previous 20 years work on the nature of folk psychology, with particular emphasis on the original debate between theory theorists and simulation theorists, and the positions that have emerged from this debate.
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  41. Adam Morton (2002). The Importance of Being Understood: Folk Psychology as Ethics. Routledge.
    I describe attribution of states of mind in everyday life to the needs of small-scale cooperation between individuals. This requires us to be able to anticipate one another's actions, within the context of shared projects. I argue that this shapes concepts of belief and desire and motivation, but also leads to routines of simulation which have presuppositions of cooperative intent. Publisher's blurb:_The Importance of Being Understood _is an innovative and thought-provoking exploration of the links between the way we think about (...)
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  42. Adam Morton (2000). 10 The Evolution of Strategic Thinking. In Peter Carruthers & A. Chamberlain (eds.), Evolution and the Human Mind. Cambridge University Press 218.
    I discuss ways in which innate human psychology facilitates the quasi-game-theoretical reasoning required for group life.
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  43. Sebastian J. Mueller, Ein Dilemma für modale Argumente gegen den Materialismus. Was Dürfen Wir Glauben? Was Sollen Wir Tun? Sektionsbeiträge des Achten Internationalen Kongresses der Gesellschaft für Analytische Philosophie E.V.
    In den vergangenen 40 Jahren haben Philosophen wie Saul Kripke (1980), George Bealer (1994) und David Chalmers (1996; 2010) versucht, auf Basis von Einsicht darein, was metaphysisch möglich ist, zu zeigen, dass der Materialismus falsch ist. Die Debatte um diese Argumente ist ausufernd, aber dennoch hat sich kaum ein Materialist von einem solchen Argument überzeugen lassen. Ich werde argumentieren, dass es gute Gründe hierfür gibt, da modale Argumente nur dadurch überzeugend wirken, dass sie zwei Konzeptionen von metaphysischer Modalität miteinander vermengen, (...)
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  44. Jesús Navarro (2009). Can We Say What We Mean?: Expressibility and Background. Pragmatics and Cognitionpragmatics and Cognition 17 (2):283-308.
    The aim of this paper is to discuss a basic assumption tacitly shared by many philosophers of mind and language: that whatever can be meant, can be said. It specifically targets John Searle's account of this idea, focusing on his Principle of Expressibility . In the first part of the paper, PE is exposed underlining its analyticity and its relevance for the philosophy of language , mind , society and action . In the critical part, the notion of Background is (...)
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  45. Ray Scott Percival (forthcoming). Does the New Classicism Need Evolutionary Theory? In Elizabeth Millán (ed.), After the Avant-Gardes. Open Court Publishers 109-125.
    In what way might the new classicism gain support from evolutionary theory? My rough answer is that evolutionary theory can help defend a return to more classical artistic standards and also explain why classical standards are not simply imposed by social conditioning or by powerful elites, but arise naturally from something more fundamental in the human constitution. Classical standards and themes are an expression of our evolutionary history. The mind can be seen as a biological organ or function, produced by (...)
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  46. Niki Pfeifer (2013). The New Psychology of Reasoning: A Mental Probability Logical Perspective. Thinking and Reasoning 19 (3-4):329-345.
  47. Michael Roche (2013). A Difficulty for Testing the Inner Sense Theory of Introspection. Philosophy of Science 80 (5):1019-1030.
    A common way of testing the inner sense theory of introspection exploits the possibility of damage to inner sense. Such damage is expected to lead to first-personal deficits/impairments of one kind or another. I raise various problems for this way of testing the theory. The main difficulty, I argue, stems from the existence of the method subserving confabulation.
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  48. Michael Roche (2013). Povinelli's Problem and Introspection. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4 (4):559-576.
    Povinelli’s Problem is a well-known methodological problem confronting those researching nonhuman primate cognition. In this paper I add a new wrinkle to this problem. The wrinkle concerns introspection, i.e., the ability to detect one’s own mental states. I argue that introspection either creates a new obstacle to solving Povinelli’s Problem, or creates a slightly different, but closely related, problem. I apply these arguments to Robert Lurz and Carla Krachun’s (Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2: 449–481, 2011) recent attempt at solving (...)
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  49. Michael Roche & William Roche (forthcoming). Review of Declan Smithies and Daniel Stoljar’s (Eds.) Introspection and Consciousness (2012, Oxford University Press). [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly.
    This is an excellent collection of essays on introspection and consciousness. There are fifteen essays in total (all new except for Sydney Shoemaker’s essay). There is also an introduction where the editors explain the impetus for the collection and provide a helpful overview. The essays contain a wealth of new and challenging material sure to excite specialists and shape future research. Below we extract a skeptical argument from Fred Dretske’s essay and relate the remaining essays to that argument. Due to (...)
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  50. Carl Sachs (2014). Joseph K. Schear (Ed.) , Mind, Reason, and Being-in-the-World: The McDowell-Dreyfus Debate . Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 34 (3-4):167-170.
    Here I review the essays by McDowell, Dreyfus, and many others edited by Schear for "The McDowell/Dreyfus Debate". Topics include the relation between conceptuality and "non-conceptual content", the role of embodied coping in human life, the extent of continuity and discontinuity between humans and other animals, and the legacies of German Idealism and phenomenology.
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