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  1. Tibor Bosse, Martijn C. Schut & Jan Treur (2009). Formal Analysis of Dynamics Within Philosophy of Mind by Computer Simulation. Minds and Machines 19 (4):543-555.
    Computer simulations can be useful tools to support philosophers in validating their theories, especially when these theories concern phenomena showing nontrivial dynamics. Such theories are usually informal, whilst for computer simulation a formally described model is needed. In this paper, a methodology is proposed to gradually formalise philosophical theories in terms of logically formalised dynamic properties. One outcome of this process is an executable logic-based temporal specification, which within a dedicated software environment can be used as a simulation model to (...)
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  2. Igor Douven (2010). The Pragmatics of Belief. Journal of Pragmatics 42 (1):35-47.
    This paper argues that pragmatic considerations similar to the ones that Grice has shown pertain to assertability pertain to acceptability. It further shows how this should affect some widely held epistemic principles. The idea of a pragmatics of belief is defended against some seemingly obvious objections.
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  3. R. Elio (ed.) (2002). Common Sense, Reasoning, and Rationality. Vancouver Studies in Cognitive Science (Vol. 11). Oxford University Press.
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  4. Ivan Fox (1994). Our Knowledge of the Internal World. In Christopher Hill (ed.), The Philosophy of Daniel Dennett. University of Arkansas Press. 59--106.
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  5. Brie Gertler (forthcoming). Renewed Acquaintance. In Declan Smithies & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Introspection and Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
    I will elaborate and defend a set of metaphysical and epistemic claims that comprise what I call the acquaintance approach to introspective knowledge of the phenomenal qualities of experience. The hallmark of this approach is the thesis that, in some introspective judgments about experience, (phenomenal) reality intersects with the epistemic, that is, with the subject’s grasp of that reality. In Section 1 of the paper I outline the acquaintance approach by drawing on its Russellian lineage. A more detailed picture of (...)
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  6. Stephen R. Grimm (unknown). The Need for Explanation in the Philosophy of Mind: A Case Study. :237-244.
    Explanatory inquiry characteristically begins with a certain puzzlement about the world. But why do certain situations elicit our puzzlement (or curiosity) while others leave us, in some epistemically relevant sense, cold? Moreover, what exactly is involved in the move from a state of puzzlement to a state where one’s puzzlement is satisfied? In this paper I try to make sense of these questions by focusing on two case studies, one from the popular literature on string theory and one from recent (...)
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  7. Rick Grush, Manifolds, Coordinations, Imagination, Objectivity.
    Each of us distinguishes between himself and states of himself on the one hand, and what is not himself or a state of himself on the other. What are the conditions of our making this distinction, and how are they fulfilled? In what way do we make it, and why do we make it in the way we do?
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  8. Christopher Hill (ed.) (1994). The Philosophy of Daniel Dennett. University of Arkansas Press.
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  9. Jim Hopkins, The Death Drive.
    Freud's biological notion of a death drive is not well founded but a number of closely associated notions (including those of a drive, and of aggression turned against the self) are.
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  10. Jim Hopkins (forthcoming). Conflict Creates an Unconscious Id. Neuropsychoanalysis.
    Recent work in neuroscience indicates that the subcortical mechanisms that generate motives also generate consciousness. As Mark Solms argues, this enables us to integrate neuroscience with the Freudian Ego and Id. If we take full account of the role of conflict, as described in terms of the superego, we can see that the complex role of aggression in human life ensures that much of our emotional life is unconscious.
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  11. Jim Hopkins (forthcoming). Psychoanalysis, Philosophical Issues. In SAGE Reference project Encyclopedia of Philosophy and the Social Sciences. Sage.
    Psychoanalysis is supported as an interpretive extension of commonsense psychology that provides the best explanation of a large range of empirical data in accord with Bayesian principles. Suggestion provides no such explanation, and recent work in attachment, developmental psychology, and neuroscience accord with this view.
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  12. Jim Hopkins (forthcoming). Understanding and Healing: Psychiatry and Psychoanalysis in the Era of Neuroscience. In W. Fulford (ed.), Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Psychiatry.
    Psychoanalysis enables us to see mental disorder as rooted in emotional conflicts, particularly concerning aggression, to which our species has a natural liability. These can be traced in development, and seem rooted in both parent-offspring conflict and in-group cooperation for out-group conflict. In light of this we may hope that work in psychoanalysis and neuroscience will converge in indicating the most likely paths to a better neurobiological understanding of mental disorder.
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  13. Jim Hopkins (2012). Psychoanalysis Representation and Neuroscience: The Freudian Unconscious and the Bayesian Brain. In A. Fotopoulu, D. Pfaff & M. Conway (eds.), From the Couch to the Lab: Psychoanalysis, Neuroscience and Cognitive Psychology in Dialoge. OUP.
    Recent work in neuroscience accords with research in attachment and developmental psychology in enabling us to understand both consciousness and the Freudian unconscious in the context of the Bayesian brain.
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  14. Jim Hopkins (2012). Rules, Privacy, and Physicalism. In J. Ellis & D. Guevara (eds.), Wittgenstein and the Philosophy of Mind. OUP.
    Wittgenstein's arguments about rule-following and private language turn both on interpretation and what he called our 'pictures' of the mind. His remarks about these can be understood in terms of the conceptual metaphor of the mind as a container, and enable us to give a better account of physicalism.
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  15. Jim Hopkins (2004). Conscience and Conflict: Darwin, Freud, and the Origins of Human Aggression. In D. Evans & P. Cruse (eds.), Emotion, Evolution, and Rationality. OUP.
    Darwin's and Freud's theories cohere in explaining human group conflict.
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  16. Jim Hopkins (2003). Emotion, Evolution and Conflict. In Man Chung (ed.), Psychoanalytic Knowledge.
    The psychoanalytic notions of identification and projection fit with Darwinian theory in explaining human group conflict and relating it to emotional conflict in individuals.
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  17. Jim Hopkins (1999). Freud and the Science of Mind. In G. Howie (ed.), The Edinburgh Encylopaedia of Continental Philosophy. Edinburgh University Press.
    Freudian theory as an extension of commonsense psychology that is potentially cogent, cumulative, and radical.
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  18. Jim Hopkins (1999). Patterns of Interpretation: Speech, Action, and Dream. In L. Marcus (ed.), Cultural Documents: The Interpretation of Dream. Manchester University Press.
    Freud's account of dreams can be understood via interpretive patterns that span language and action, enabling an extension of common sense psychology that is potentially cogent, cumulative, and radical.
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  19. Jim Hopkins (1999). Wittgenstein, Davidson, and Radical Interpretation. In F. Hahn (ed.), The Library of Living Philosophers: Donald Davidson. Open Court.
    Davidson's account of interpretation is closely related to that offered by Wittgenstein in his remarks on following a rule.
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  20. Jim Hopkins (1996). Psychoanalytic and Scientific Reasoning. British Journal of Psychotherapy 13 (1).
    Psychoanalytic reasoning is an instance of inference to the best explanation and provides an extension of commonsense psychology that is potentially cogent, cumulative, and radical.
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  21. Jim Hopkins (1995). Wittgenstein, Interpretation, and the Foundations of Psychoanalysis. New Formations.
    In his work on following a rule Wittgenstein discerned principles of interpretation that apply to commonsense psychology and psychoanalysis. We can use these to assess the cogency of psychoanalytic reasoning.
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  22. Jim Hopkins (1992). Psychoanalysis Interpretation and Science. In J. Hopkins & A. Savile (eds.), Psychoanalysis Mind and Art. Blackwell.
    Our commonsense understanding of meaning and motive is realized via the semantic encoding of causal role. Appreciating this together with other features of semantic theories enables us to see that methodological critiques of psychoanalysis, such as those by Popper and Grunbaum, systematically fail to take account of empirical data, and if taken seriously would render commonsense understanding of mind and language void. This is particularly problematic if we consider much of what we regard ourselves as knowing is registered in language, (...)
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  23. Jim Hopkins (1991). The Interpretation of Dreams. In J. Neu (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Freud.
    Freud's account of dreams has a cogent interpretive basis.
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  24. Jim Hopkins (1988). Epistemology and Depth Psychology. In C. Wright & P. Clark (eds.), Mind, Psychoanalysis, and Science. Blackwell.
    Psychoanalysis provides the best explanation of a range of empirical phenomena; epistemic criics do not take this fully into account.
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  25. Jim Hopkins (1987). Synthesis in the Imagination: Psychoanalysis, Infantile Experience, and the Concept of an Object. In James Russell (ed.), Philosophical Perspectives on Developmental Psychology.
    Infants apparently start to understand their experience via the linked concepts of numerical identity and spatio-temporally continuous objects during the forth month of life. As described by Piaget and Klein, this development requires them to synthesise their experience in a new ways: in particular they must start to acknowledge that the main target of their anger at frustration and the main target of their gratitude and love are the same person, who is unique and irreplaceable. This seems to have an (...)
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  26. Jim Hopkins (1982). Introduction: Philosophical Essays on Freud. In R. Wollheim & J. Hopkins (eds.), Philosophical Essays on Freud. CUP.
    Psychoanalytic theory can be regarded as a cogent extension of commonsense psychology by interpretive means internal to it.
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  27. Jim Hopkins (1973). Visual Geometry. Philosophical Review 82 (1):3-34.
    We cannot imagine two straight lines intersecting at two points even though they may do so. In this case our abilities to imagine depend upon our abilities to visualise.
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  28. Bernard W. Kobes (1990). Individualism and Artificial Intelligence. Philosophical Perspectives 4:429-56.
  29. Henry Laycock (1969). Wittgenstein and the Problem of Other Minds. Ed. By Harold Morick, New York and Toronto: McGraw-Hill, 1967. Pp. Xxii, 231. [REVIEW] Dialogue 8 (02):337-338.
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  30. Giuseppe Mininni (2009). Mind as an Horizon of Sense. World Futures 65 (2):111 – 125.
    One of the most fascinating topics of research within human sciences is the “Body-Mind Problem.” Since its beginning psychological research has focused on the notions of mind and consciousness adopting a purely naturalist perspective, which tends to explain them in terms of causal relationships and to reduce their intrinsic complexity. Conversely, the analysis of the discursive practices through which mind and consciousness reveal themselves through communication suggest the adoption of a psycho-semiotic approach, thus enhancing a “culturalist epistemology.” The aim of (...)
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  31. Adam Morton (1990). Who Am I? Cogito 4 (3):186-191.
    This is a popularisation of ideas current when it was written, on personal identity and the concept of a person, making a link with problems about 'knowing who' on the border of epistemology and the philosophy of language.
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  32. Danièle Moyal-Sharrock (2007). Wittgenstein on Psychological Certainty. In , Perspicuous Presentations: Essays on Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Psychology. Palgrave Macmillan.
    As is well known, Wittgenstein pointed out an asymmetry between first- and third-person psychological statements: the first, unlike the latter, involve observation or a claim to knowledge and are constitutionally open to uncertainty. In this paper, I challenge this asymmetry and Wittgenstein's own affirmation of the constitutional uncertainty of third-person psychological statements, and argue that Wittgenstein ultimately did too. I first show that, on his view, most of our third-person psychological statements are noncognitive; they stem from a subjective certainty: a (...)
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  33. Giovanni Pezzulo & Cristiano Castelfranchi (2009). Thinking as the Control of Imagination: A Conceptual Framework for Goal-Directed Systems. Psychological Research 73 (4):559-577.
    This paper offers a conceptual framework which (re)integrates goal-directed control, motivational processes, and executive functions, and suggests a developmentalpathway from situated action to higher level cognition. We first illustrate a basic computational (control-theoretic) model of goal-directed action that makes use of internalmodeling. We then show that by adding the problem of selection among multiple actionalternatives motivation enters the scene, and that the basic mechanisms of executivefunctions such as inhibition, the monitoring of progresses, and working memory, arerequired for this system to (...)
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  34. Giovanni Pezzulo & Cristiano Castelfranchi (2009). Thinking as the Control of Imagination: A Conceptual Framework for Goal-Directed Systems. Psychological Research 73 (4):559-577.
    This paper offers a conceptual framework which (re)integrates goal-directed control, motivational processes, and executive functions, and suggests a developmentalpathway from situated action to higher level cognition. We first illustrate a basic computational (control-theoretic) model of goal-directed action that makes use of internalmodeling. We then show that by adding the problem of selection among multiple actionalternatives motivation enters the scene, and that the basic mechanisms of executivefunctions such as inhibition, the monitoring (...)
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  35. Joëlle Proust (2012). The Norms of Acceptance. Philosophical Issues 22 (1):316-333.
    An area in the theory of action that has received little attention is how mental agency and world-directed agency interact. The purpose of the present contribution is to clarify the rational conditions of such interaction, through an analysis of the central case of acceptance. There are several problems with the literature about acceptance. First, it remains unclear how a context of acceptance is to be construed. Second, the possibility of conjoining, in acceptance, an epistemic component, which is essentially mind-to-world, and (...)
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  36. David-Hillel Ruben (1992). Simple Attentive Miscalculation. Analysis 52 (3):184-190.
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  37. Paul Thagard, Chris Eliasmith, Paul Rusnock & Cameron Shelley (2002). Epistemic Coherence. In R. Elio (ed.), Common sense, reasoning, and rationality. Vancouver Studies in Cognitive Science (Vol. 11). Oxford University Press. 104-131.
    Many contemporary philosophers favor coherence theories of knowledge (Bender 1989, BonJour 1985, Davidson 1986, Harman 1986, Lehrer 1990). But the nature of coherence is usually left vague, with no method provided for determining whether a belief should be accepted or rejected on the basis of its coherence or incoherence with other beliefs. Haack's (1993) explication of coherence relies largely on an analogy between epistemic justification and crossword puzzles. We show in this paper how epistemic coherence can be understood in terms (...)
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  1. J. L. Bermudez (2013). Immunity to Error Through Misidentification and Past-Tense Memory Judgements. Analysis 73 (2):211-220.
    Autobiographical memories typically give rise either to memory reports (“I remember going swimming”) or to first person past-tense judgements (“I went swimming”). This article focuses on first person past-tense judgements that are (epistemically) based on autobiographical memories. Some of these judgements have the IEM property of being immune to error through misidentification. This article offers an account of when and why first person past-tense judgements have the IEM property.
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  2. Sven Bernecker (2008). Representationalism, First-Person Authority, and Second-Order Knowledge. In Anthony E. Hatzimoysis (ed.), Self-Knowledge. Oxford University Press.
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  3. M. Engel (1993). The Problem of Other Minds: A Reliable Solution. Acta Analytica 11 (11):87-109.
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  4. Carl N. Still (2001). Do We Know All After Death? Thomas Aquinas on the Disembodied Soul's Knowledge. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 75:107-119.
    This paper examines Aquinas’s epistemological treatment of the disembodied soul in order to reveal (1) its relationship to the person it once was, and (2) the nature and extent of its self-knowledge. I argue first that disembodiment entails not only loss of personhood, but severe restriction of one’s concept of self. Consequently, individual self-consciousness is minimized. By contrast, I argue that the soul’s knowledge of its nature is likely to be realized more perfectly in the separated state, not so much (...)
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Observation-Based Accounts of Self-Knowledge
  1. Lauren Ashwell (2013). Review of Transparent Minds: A Study of Self-Knowledge, by Jordi Fernandez. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 8.
  2. J. L. Bermudez (2013). The Opacity of Mind: An Integrative Theory of Self-Knowledge, by Peter Carruthers. Mind 122 (485):263-266.
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  3. Anthony L. Brueckner (2003). Self-Knowledge Via Inner Observation of External Objects? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (1):118-122.
    Harold Langsam has recently presented a novel observational account of self-knowledge. I critically discuss this account and argue that it fails to provide a uniform understanding of how we are able to know the contents of our own thoughts.
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  4. Peter Carruthers (2011). The Opacity of Mind: An Integrative Theory of Self-Knowledge. OUP Oxford.
    It is widely believed that people have privileged and authoritative access to their own thoughts, and many theories have been proposed to explain this supposed fact. The Opacity of Mind challenges the consensus view and subjects the theories in question to critical scrutiny, while showing that they are not protected against the findings of cognitive science by belonging to a separate 'explanatory space'. The book argues that our access to our own thoughts is almost always interpretive, grounded in perceptual awareness (...)
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  5. Steven M. Duncan, The Inescapable Self.
    In this paper I discuss the existence of the substantial self and argue against those, like Hume, who deny its reality.
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  6. David H. Finkelstein (1999). On Self-Blindness and Inner Sense. Philosophical Topics 26 (1/2):105-19.
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  7. Martin F. Fricke & Paul Snowdon (2003). Solidity and Impediment. Analysis 63 (279):173–178.
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  8. Brie Gertler (2011). Self-Knowledge. Routledge.
    The problem of self-knowledge is one of the most fascinating in all of philosophy and has crucial significance for the philosophy of mind and epistemology. Gertler assesses the leading theoretical approaches to self-knowledge, explaining the work of many of the key figures in the field: from Descartes and Kant, through to Bertrand Russell and Gareth Evans, as well as recent work by Tyler Burge, David Chalmers, William Lycan and Sydney Shoemaker. -/- Beginning with an outline of the distinction between self-knowledge (...)
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  9. Brie Gertler (2009). Introspection. In Patrick Wilken, Timothy J. Bayne & Axel Cleeremans (eds.), The Oxford Companion to Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
    Alas, things are not quite so simple. As James implies, the term ‘introspection’ literally means ‘looking within’, but of course we do not visually inspect the interiors of our crania. What unites proponents of introspection is the claim that we can recognize our own mental states through some sort of attention—a non-visual ‘looking’—whose immediate objects are thoughts or sensations within oneself, in a non-spatial sense of ‘within’. (The term ‘introspection’ is occasionally given an ecumenical gloss, to refer to any method (...)
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