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Subcategories:History/traditions: Epistemology of Mind
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  1. Tibor Bosse, Martijn C. Schut & Jan Treur (2009). Formal Analysis of Dynamics Within Philosophy of Mind by Computer Simulation. Minds and Machines 19 (4):543-555.
    Computer simulations can be useful tools to support philosophers in validating their theories, especially when these theories concern phenomena showing nontrivial dynamics. Such theories are usually informal, whilst for computer simulation a formally described model is needed. In this paper, a methodology is proposed to gradually formalise philosophical theories in terms of logically formalised dynamic properties. One outcome of this process is an executable logic-based temporal specification, which within a dedicated software environment can be used as a simulation model to (...)
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  2. Jonathan Cole (2001). Empathy Needs a Face. Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (5-7):5-7.
    The importance of the face is best understood, it is suggested, from the effects of visible facial difference in people. Their experience reflects the ways in which the face may be necessary for the interpersonal relatedness underlying such 'sharing' mind states as empathy. It is proposed that the face evolved as a result of several evolutionary pressures but that it is well placed to assume the role of an embodied representation of the increasingly refined inner states of mind that developed (...)
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  3. Kevin E. Dodson (1999). Philosophy and the Return to Self-Knowledge. Review of Metaphysics 52 (3):731-732.
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  4. Igor Douven (2010). The Pragmatics of Belief. Journal of Pragmatics 42 (1):35-47.
    This paper argues that pragmatic considerations similar to the ones that Grice has shown pertain to assertability pertain to acceptability. It further shows how this should affect some widely held epistemic principles. The idea of a pragmatics of belief is defended against some seemingly obvious objections.
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  5. Edwin (1989). Can There Be Apossible World In Which Memory Is Unreliable? Philosophical Inquiry 11 (3-4):46-47.
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  6. R. Elio (ed.) (2002). Common Sense, Reasoning, and Rationality. Vancouver Studies in Cognitive Science (Vol. 11). Oxford University Press.
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  7. A. Falk (1987). Reference to Myself. Behaviorism 15 (2):89-105.
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  8. Peter Forrest (1986). Imagination and Other Minds: A Review Of. [REVIEW] Behaviorism 14 (1):57-60.
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  9. Ivan Fox (1994). Our Knowledge of the Internal World. In Christopher Hill (ed.), The Philosophy of Daniel Dennett. University of Arkansas Press. 59--106.
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  10. Varela Francisco & Shaer Jonathan (1999). First-Person Methodologies. Journal of Consciousness Studies 6:1-14.
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  11. Nivedita Gangopadhyay & Katsunori Miyahara (2014). Perception and the Problem of Access to Other Minds. Philosophical Psychology:1-20.
    In opposition to mainstream theory of mind approaches, some contemporary perceptual accounts of social cognition do not consider the central question of social cognition to be the problem of access to other minds. These perceptual accounts draw heavily on phenomenological philosophy and propose that others' mental states are “directly” given in the perception of the others' expressive behavior. Furthermore, these accounts contend that phenomenological insights into the nature of social perception lead to the dissolution of the access problem. We argue, (...)
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  12. Brie Gertler (forthcoming). Renewed Acquaintance. In Declan Smithies & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Introspection and Consciousness. Oxford University Press. 89-123.
    I will elaborate and defend a set of metaphysical and epistemic claims that comprise what I call the acquaintance approach to introspective knowledge of the phenomenal qualities of experience. The hallmark of this approach is the thesis that, in some introspective judgments about experience, (phenomenal) reality intersects with the epistemic, that is, with the subject’s grasp of that reality. In Section 1 of the paper I outline the acquaintance approach by drawing on its Russellian lineage. A more detailed picture of (...)
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  13. Stephen R. Grimm (unknown). The Need for Explanation in the Philosophy of Mind: A Case Study. Philosophical Explorations:237-244.
    Explanatory inquiry characteristically begins with a certain puzzlement about the world. But why do certain situations elicit our puzzlement (or curiosity) while others leave us, in some epistemically relevant sense, cold? Moreover, what exactly is involved in the move from a state of puzzlement to a state where one’s puzzlement is satisfied? In this paper I try to make sense of these questions by focusing on two case studies, one from the popular literature on string theory and one from recent (...)
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  14. Rick Grush, Manifolds, Coordinations, Imagination, Objectivity.
    Each of us distinguishes between himself and states of himself on the one hand, and what is not himself or a state of himself on the other. What are the conditions of our making this distinction, and how are they fulfilled? In what way do we make it, and why do we make it in the way we do?
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  15. Christopher Hill (ed.) (1994). The Philosophy of Daniel Dennett. University of Arkansas Press.
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  16. Jim Hopkins, The Death Drive.
    Freud's biological notion of a death drive is not well founded but a number of closely associated notions (including those of a drive, and of aggression turned against the self) are.
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  17. Jim Hopkins (forthcoming). The Significance of Consilience: Psychoanalysis, Attachment, Neuroscience, and Evolution. In L. Brakel & V. Talvete (eds.), Psychoanalysis and Philosophy of Mind: Unconscious mentality in the 21st century. Karnac.
    This paper considers clinical psychoanalysis together with developmental psychology (particularly attachment theory), evolution, and neuroscience in the context a Bayesian account of confirmation and disconfrimation. -/- In it I argue that these converging sources of support indicate that the combination of relatively low predictive power and broad explanatory scope that characterise the theories of both Freud and Darwin suggest that Freud's theory, like Darwin's, may strike deeply into natural phenomena. -/- The same argument, however, suggests that conclusive confirmation for Freudian (...)
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  18. Jim Hopkins (2014). Psychoanalysis, Philosophical Issues. In SAGE Reference project Encyclopedia of Philosophy and the Social Sciences. Sage.
    This paper briefly addresses questions of confirmation and disconfirmation in psychoanalysis. It argues that psychoanalysis enjoys Bayesian support as an interpretive extension of commonsense psychology that provides the best explanation of a large range of empirical data. Suggestion provides no such explanation, and recent work in attachment, developmental psychology, and neuroscience accord with this view.
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  19. Jim Hopkins (2013). Conflict Creates an Unconscious Id. Neuropsychoanalysis 15.
    This note is part of a discussion of Mark Solm's 'The Conscious Id'. -/- It seconds Solms' claim that recent work in neuroscience indicates that the subcortical mechanisms that generate motives also generate consciousness, and that his enables us to integrate neuroscience with the Freudian Ego and Id. -/- Still this is not reason to regard the Id as conscious. If we take full account of the role of conflict, as described in terms of the Freudian superego, we can see (...)
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  20. Jim Hopkins (2013). Understanding and Healing: Psychiatry and Psychoanalysis in the Era of Neuroscience. In FulfordW (ed.), Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Psychiatry.
    This paper argues that psychoanalysis enables us to see mental disorder as rooted in emotional conflicts, particularly concerning aggression, to which our species has a natural liability. These can be traced in development, and seem rooted in both parent-offspring conflict and in-group cooperation for out-group conflict. In light of this we may hope that work in psychoanalysis and neuroscience will converge in indicating the most likely paths to a better neurobiological understanding of mental disorder.
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  21. Jim Hopkins (2012). Psychoanalysis Representation and Neuroscience: The Freudian Unconscious and the Bayesian Brain. In A. Fotopoulu, D. Pfaff & M. Conway (eds.), From the Couch to the Lab: Psychoanalysis, Neuroscience and Cognitive Psychology in Dialoge. OUP.
    This paper argues that recent work in the 'free energy' program in neuroscience enables us better to understand both consciousness and the Freudian unconscious, including the role of the superego and the id. This work also accords with research in developmental psychology (particularly attachment theory) and with evolutionary considerations bearing on emotional conflict. This argument is carried forward in various ways in the work that follows, including 'Understanding and Healing', 'The Significance of Consilience', 'Psychoanalysis, Philosophical Issues', and 'Kantian Neuroscience and (...)
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  22. Jim Hopkins (2012). Rules, Privacy, and Physicalism. In J. Ellis & D. Guevara (eds.), Wittgenstein and the Philosophy of Mind. OUP.
    Wittgenstein's arguments about rule-following and private language turn both on interpretation and what he called our 'pictures' of the mind. His remarks about these can be understood in terms of the conceptual metaphor of the mind as a container, and enable us to give a better account of physicalism.
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  23. Jim Hopkins (2004). Conscience and Conflict: Darwin, Freud, and the Origins of Human Aggression. In D. Evans & P. Cruse (eds.), Emotion, Evolution, and Rationality. OUP.
    Darwin's and Freud's theories cohere in explaining human group conflict.
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  24. Jim Hopkins (2003). Emotion, Evolution and Conflict. In Man Chung (ed.), Psychoanalytic Knowledge.
    The psychoanalytic notions of identification and projection fit with Darwinian theory in explaining human group conflict and relating it to emotional conflict in individuals.
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  25. Jim Hopkins (1999). Freud and the Science of Mind. In G. Howie (ed.), The Edinburgh Encylopaedia of Continental Philosophy. Edinburgh University Press.
    Freudian theory as an extension of commonsense psychology that is potentially cogent, cumulative, and radical.
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  26. Jim Hopkins (1999). Patterns of Interpretation: Speech, Action, and Dream. In L. Marcus (ed.), Cultural Documents: The Interpretation of Dream. Manchester University Press.
    Freud's account of dreams can be understood via interpretive patterns that span language and action, enabling an extension of common sense psychology that is potentially cogent, cumulative, and radical.
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  27. Jim Hopkins (1999). Wittgenstein, Davidson, and Radical Interpretation. In F. Hahn (ed.), The Library of Living Philosophers: Donald Davidson. Open Court.
    Davidson's account of interpretation is closely related to that offered by Wittgenstein in his remarks on following a rule.
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  28. Jim Hopkins (1996). Psychoanalytic and Scientific Reasoning. British Journal of Psychotherapy 13 (1).
    Psychoanalytic reasoning is an instance of inference to the best explanation and provides an extension of commonsense psychology that is potentially cogent, cumulative, and radical.
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  29. Jim Hopkins (1995). Wittgenstein, Interpretation, and the Foundations of Psychoanalysis. New Formations.
    In his work on following a rule Wittgenstein discerned principles of interpretation that apply to commonsense psychology and psychoanalysis. We can use these to assess the cogency of psychoanalytic reasoning.
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  30. Jim Hopkins (1992). Psychoanalysis Interpretation and Science. In J. Hopkins & A. Savile (eds.), Psychoanalysis Mind and Art. Blackwell.
    Our commonsense understanding of meaning and motive is realized via the semantic encoding of causal role. Appreciating this together with other features of semantic theories enables us to see that methodological critiques of psychoanalysis, such as those by Popper and Grunbaum, systematically fail to take account of empirical data, and if taken seriously would render commonsense understanding of mind and language void. This is particularly problematic if we consider much of what we regard ourselves as knowing is registered in language, (...)
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  31. Jim Hopkins (1991). The Interpretation of Dreams. In J. Neu (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Freud.
    Freud's account of dreams has a cogent interpretive basis.
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  32. Jim Hopkins (1988). Epistemology and Depth Psychology. In C. Wright & P. Clark (eds.), Mind, Psychoanalysis, and Science. Blackwell.
    Psychoanalysis provides the best explanation of a range of empirical phenomena; epistemic criics do not take this fully into account.
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  33. Jim Hopkins (1987). Synthesis in the Imagination: Psychoanalysis, Infantile Experience, and the Concept of an Object. In James Russell (ed.), Philosophical Perspectives on Developmental Psychology.
    Infants apparently start to understand their experience via the linked concepts of numerical identity and spatio-temporally continuous objects during the forth month of life. As described by Piaget and Klein, this development requires them to synthesise their experience in a new ways: in particular they must start to acknowledge that the main target of their anger at frustration and the main target of their gratitude and love are the same person, who is unique and irreplaceable. This seems to have an (...)
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  34. Jim Hopkins (1982). Introduction: Philosophical Essays on Freud. In R. Wollheim & J. Hopkins (eds.), Philosophical Essays on Freud. CUP.
    Psychoanalytic theory can be regarded as a cogent extension of commonsense psychology by interpretive means internal to it.
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  35. Jim Hopkins (1973). Visual Geometry. Philosophical Review 82 (1):3-34.
    We cannot imagine two straight lines intersecting at two points even though they may do so. In this case our abilities to imagine depend upon our abilities to visualise.
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  36. Robert J. Howell (2006). Self-Knowledge and Self-Reference. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (1):44-70.
    Self-Knowledge and Self-Reference is a defense and reconciliation of the two apparently conflicting theses that the self is peculiarly elusive and that our basic, cogito-judgments are certain. On the one hand, Descartes seems to be correct that nothing is more certain than basic statements of self-knowledge, such as "I am thinking." On the other hand, there is the compelling Humean observation that when we introspect, nothing is found except for various "impressions." The problem, then, is that the Humean and Cartesian (...)
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  37. A. E. J. (1966). Self-Knowledge and Self-Identity. Review of Metaphysics 19 (3):601-601.
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  38. T. Jamsa (2004). Johannes Roessler & Naomi Elian (Ed.), Agency & Self-Awareness. In Anthony I. Jack (ed.), Journal of Consciousness Studies. Thorverton Uk: Imprint Academic. 11--95.
  39. R. Jarman (1995). M. Bavidge & I. Ground, Can We Understand Animal Minds? Journal of Consciousness Studies 2:379-379.
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  40. Bernard W. Kobes (1990). Individualism and Artificial Intelligence. Philosophical Perspectives 4:429-56.
  41. Mark A. Krause & Gordon M. Burghardt (1999). Access to Another Mind: Naturalistic Theories Require Naturalistic Data. Psyche 5 (32).
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  42. Joel Krueger (forthcoming). Emotions and Other Minds. In Rudiger Campe & Julia Weber (eds.), Interiority/Exteriority: Rethinking Emotion. Walter de Gruyter.
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  43. E. Lalumera (2012). Self-Knowledge * Edited by Anthony Hatzimoysis. Analysis 72 (3):619-620.
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  44. Henry Laycock (1969). Wittgenstein and the Problem of Other Minds. Ed. By Harold Morick, New York and Toronto: McGraw-Hill, 1967. Pp. Xxii, 231. [REVIEW] Dialogue 8 (02):337-338.
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  45. Peter Lipton (2006). Methodological Socialism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (5):88-98.
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  46. Mary Midgley (1999). Being Scientific About Our Selves. Journal of Consciousness Studies 6 (4):85-98.
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  47. Giuseppe Mininni (2009). Mind as an Horizon of Sense. World Futures 65 (2):111 – 125.
    One of the most fascinating topics of research within human sciences is the “Body-Mind Problem.” Since its beginning psychological research has focused on the notions of mind and consciousness adopting a purely naturalist perspective, which tends to explain them in terms of causal relationships and to reduce their intrinsic complexity. Conversely, the analysis of the discursive practices through which mind and consciousness reveal themselves through communication suggest the adoption of a psycho-semiotic approach, thus enhancing a “culturalist epistemology.” The aim of (...)
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  48. Nadia Moro (2006). Armonia e contrappunto nel pensiero di J.F. Herbart. Unicopli.
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  49. Adam Morton (1990). Who Am I? Cogito 4 (3):186-191.
    This is a popularisation of ideas current when it was written, on personal identity and the concept of a person, making a link with problems about 'knowing who' on the border of epistemology and the philosophy of language.
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  50. Danièle Moyal-Sharrock (2007). Wittgenstein on Psychological Certainty. In , Perspicuous Presentations: Essays on Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Psychology. Palgrave Macmillan.
    As is well known, Wittgenstein pointed out an asymmetry between first- and third-person psychological statements: the first, unlike the latter, involve observation or a claim to knowledge and are constitutionally open to uncertainty. In this paper, I challenge this asymmetry and Wittgenstein's own affirmation of the constitutional uncertainty of third-person psychological statements, and argue that Wittgenstein ultimately did too. I first show that, on his view, most of our third-person psychological statements are noncognitive; they stem from a subjective certainty: a (...)
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