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Subcategories:History/traditions: Epistemology of Mind
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  1. H. B. Acton (1934). MITCHELL, Sir W. -The Place of Minds in the World. [REVIEW] Mind 43:243.
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  2. D. M. Armstrong (1994). Introspection. In Quassim Cassam (ed.), Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Oxford University Press 109--117.
    This paper will argue that there is no such thing as introspective access to judgments and decisions. I t won't challenge the existence of introspective access to perceptual and imagistic states, nor to emotional feelings and bodily sensations. On the contrary, the model presented in Section 2 presumes such access. Hence introspection is here divided into two categories: introspection of propositional attitude events, on the one hand, and introspection of broadly perceptual events, on the other. I shall assume that the (...)
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  3. Janet Wilde Astington & E. Filippova (2005). Language as the Route Into Other Minds. In B. Malle & S. Hodges (eds.), Other Minds. Guilford Press
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  4. Anita Avramides (2002). Other Minds? Think 1 (2):61.
    One of the most intriguing of philosophical puzzles concerns other minds. How do you know there are any? Yes, you're surrounded by living organisms that look and behave much as you do. They even say they have minds. But do they? Perhaps other humans are mindless zombies: like you on the outside, but lacking any inner conscious life, including emotions, thoughts, experiences and even pain. What grounds do you possess for supposing that other humans aren't zombies? Perhaps less than you (...)
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  5. A. J. Ayer (1956). The Problem of Knowledge. Harmondsworth.
  6. Jayapul Azariah (2004). Many Facets Of Our Minds. Eubios Journal of Asian and International Bioethics 14 (1):10-12.
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  7. Louise Barrett (2012). Minds and Morals. BioScience 62 (3):307-310.
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  8. Jules Belford (1970). A Physicalistic Approach to the Problem of Other Minds. Dissertation, University of Miami
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  9. Bergmann Bergmann (1953). ISDOM'S Other Minds. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 14:112.
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  10. Otto Bird (1955). Knowledge and Expression. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 29:236-248.
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  11. Roy R. Bode (1955). Knowledge and Expression. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 29:135-139.
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  12. Tibor Bosse, Martijn C. Schut & Jan Treur (2009). Formal Analysis of Dynamics Within Philosophy of Mind by Computer Simulation. Minds and Machines 19 (4):543-555.
    Computer simulations can be useful tools to support philosophers in validating their theories, especially when these theories concern phenomena showing nontrivial dynamics. Such theories are usually informal, whilst for computer simulation a formally described model is needed. In this paper, a methodology is proposed to gradually formalise philosophical theories in terms of logically formalised dynamic properties. One outcome of this process is an executable logic-based temporal specification, which within a dedicated software environment can be used as a simulation model to (...)
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  13. Jewel Spears Brooker (1998). T. E. Hulme and the Twentiety-Century Minds. Modern Schoolman 76 (1):67-71.
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  14. Peter Carruthers (2009). Simulation and the First-Person. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 144 (3):467 - 475.
    This article focuses on, and critiques, Goldman’s view that third-person mind-reading is grounded in first-person introspection. It argues, on the contrary, that first-person awareness of propositional attitude events is always interpretative, resulting from us turning our mind-reading abilities upon ourselves.
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  15. Venant Cauchy (1955). Knowledge and Expression. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 29:208-220.
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  16. Steve Clarke (2008). Moral Minds. Minerva 46 (1):147-150.
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  17. L. J. Cohen (1987). G. Macdonald and C. Wright , "Fact, Science and Morality". Philosophical Quarterly 37 (149):468.
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  18. Jonathan Cole (2001). Empathy Needs a Face. Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (5-7):5-7.
    The importance of the face is best understood, it is suggested, from the effects of visible facial difference in people. Their experience reflects the ways in which the face may be necessary for the interpersonal relatedness underlying such 'sharing' mind states as empathy. It is proposed that the face evolved as a result of several evolutionary pressures but that it is well placed to assume the role of an embodied representation of the increasingly refined inner states of mind that developed (...)
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  19. Carlos João Correia (2008). The Feeling of What Happens and Animal Minds. A Critical Analysis of Hauser's Wild Minds. Philosophica 31:7-18.
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  20. Dr G. Dinani (unknown). Simple Knowledge and Composite Knowledge. Kheradnameh Sadra Quarterly 23.
    Thought and knowledge represent the most obvious aspects of man's identity. There are fundamental differences between human thought and what is called animal perception. In the meaning of thought, the1-There is another Nizam al-Din Ahmad mentioned in biographies, who is one of Fayd's grandchildren, and died in 1160 H. Care should be taken to not confuse thisNizam al-Din Ahmad with Mulla Sadra's son perception of perception and the knowledge of knowledge are also embedded and this is what we can call (...)
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  21. Kevin E. Dodson (1999). Philosophy and the Return to Self-Knowledge. Review of Metaphysics 52 (3):731-732.
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  22. Igor Douven (2010). The Pragmatics of Belief. Journal of Pragmatics 42 (1):35-47.
    This paper argues that pragmatic considerations similar to the ones that Grice has shown pertain to assertability pertain to acceptability. It further shows how this should affect some widely held epistemic principles. The idea of a pragmatics of belief is defended against some seemingly obvious objections.
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  23. Dolina Sylvia Dowling, Arguments for Other Minds.
    If I am aware of my own mental states by introspection How can I know that other people have minds? and How can I know what their mental states are? These are two of the questions with which I will be concerned in this dissertation. I discuss five different attempts to deal with them. The claim that we can know that other people have minds by an argument from analogy. I show a number of serious flaws in Russell's and other (...)
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  24. Sing Choe Leung Edwin (1989). Can There Be Apossible World In Which Memory Is Unreliable? Philosophical Inquiry 11 (3-4):46-47.
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  25. R. Elio (ed.) (2002). Common Sense, Reasoning, and Rationality. Vancouver Studies in Cognitive Science (Vol. 11). Oxford University Press.
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  26. A. Falk (1987). Reference to Myself. Behaviorism 15 (2):89-105.
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  27. Neil Philip Feit (1996). Subjectivity and the Objects of Belief. Dissertation, University of Massachusetts Amherst
    This dissertation is a study of the problem of beliefs about oneself, or so-called de se beliefs: for example, the beliefs that I would express by saying 'I am left-handed' or 'I am in Massachusetts'. The problem arises against the background conception of belief as a propositional attitude, i.e., as a relation between conscious subjects and abstract entities that are either true or false absolutely. ;Many philosophers have recently argued that the intentional objects of one's de se beliefs could not (...)
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  28. James Adams Ford (1970). The Problem of Introspection with Specific Reference to Broad and Ryle. Dissertation, University of Toronto (Canada)
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  29. Peter Forrest (1986). Imagination and Other Minds: A Review Of. [REVIEW] Behaviorism 14 (1):57-60.
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  30. Ivan Fox (1994). Our Knowledge of the Internal World. In Christopher Hill (ed.), Philosophical Topics. University of Arkansas Press 59--106.
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  31. Varela Francisco & Shaer Jonathan (1999). First-Person Methodologies. Journal of Consciousness Studies 6:1-14.
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  32. L. H. G. (1980). Wittgenstein and Knowledge. Review of Metaphysics 33 (4):794-795.
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  33. Nivedita Gangopadhyay & Katsunori Miyahara (2014). Perception and the Problem of Access to Other Minds. Philosophical Psychology (5):1-20.
    In opposition to mainstream theory of mind approaches, some contemporary perceptual accounts of social cognition do not consider the central question of social cognition to be the problem of access to other minds. These perceptual accounts draw heavily on phenomenological philosophy and propose that others' mental states are “directly” given in the perception of the others' expressive behavior. Furthermore, these accounts contend that phenomenological insights into the nature of social perception lead to the dissolution of the access problem. We argue, (...)
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  34. Brie Gertler (forthcoming). Renewed Acquaintance. In Declan Smithies & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Introspection and Consciousness. Oxford University Press 89-123.
    I will elaborate and defend a set of metaphysical and epistemic claims that comprise what I call the acquaintance approach to introspective knowledge of the phenomenal qualities of experience. The hallmark of this approach is the thesis that, in some introspective judgments about experience, (phenomenal) reality intersects with the epistemic, that is, with the subject’s grasp of that reality. In Section 1 of the paper I outline the acquaintance approach by drawing on its Russellian lineage. A more detailed picture of (...)
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  35. Amihud Gilead (2015). Can Brain Imaging Breach Our Mental Privacy? Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (2):275-291.
    Brain-imaging technologies have posed the problem of breaching our brain privacy. Until the invention of those technologies, many of us entertained the idea that nothing can threaten our mental privacy, as long as we kept it, for each of us has private access to his or her own mind but no access to any other. Yet, philosophically, the issue of private, mental accessibility appears to be quite unsettled, as there are still many philosophers who reject the idea of private, mental (...)
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  36. Amihud Gilead (ed.) (2011). The Privacy of the Psychical. Rodopi.
    Accessibilities and the metaphysics of privacy -- A myth of externalism -- The privacy of experience -- What? -- Why are many philosophers still blind to private accessibility? -- Psychical accessibility and literary fiction -- Appendix I: language, intersubjectivity, and privacy -- Appendix II: Darwin's predicta moth as a pure, 'A Priori' accessible possibility.
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  37. Carl Ginet (1985). Plantinga and the Philosophy of Mind. In James Tomberlin & Peter van Ingwagen (eds.), Alvin Plantinga. 199-224.
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  38. Carl Ginet & Sydney Shoemaker (eds.) (1983). Knowledge and Mind: Essays Presented to Norman Malcolm. Oxford Univresity Press.
  39. Ana María Giraldo Giraldo (2014). Autobiografía e histrionismo: una Imagen del autoconocimiento en la obra tardía de Wittgenstein. Eidos: Revista de Filosofía de la Universidad Del Norte 21:147-159.
    El objetivo de este artículo es describir el fenómeno del autoconocimiento desde una perspectiva wittgensteiniana. En la obra tardía de Wittgenstein gran parte de sus reflexiones se centra en el análisis de expresiones de estados fenomenológicos y actitudes proposicionales. A partir del análisis de las autoadscrip-ciones de estados mentales, muchos filósofos han intentado construir una imagen de lo que sería el autoconocimiento para el filósofo austríaco en sus últimos escritos. En este artículo pretendemos mostrar que Wittgenstein tiene una posición dual (...)
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  40. Stephen R. Grimm (2006). The Need for Explanation in the Philosophy of Mind: A Case Study. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 80:237-244.
    Explanatory inquiry characteristically begins with a certain puzzlement about the world. But why do certain situations elicit our puzzlement while others leave us, in some epistemically relevant sense, cold? Moreover, what exactly is involved in the move from a state of puzzlement to a state where one’s puzzlement is satisfied? In this paper I try to make sense of these questions by focusing on two case studies, one from the popular literature on string theory and one from recent debates in (...)
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  41. Rick Grush, Manifolds, Coordinations, Imagination, Objectivity.
    Each of us distinguishes between himself and states of himself on the one hand, and what is not himself or a state of himself on the other. What are the conditions of our making this distinction, and how are they fulfilled? In what way do we make it, and why do we make it in the way we do?
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  42. Richard Hamilton, Expressing Pain: Wittgenstein and the 'Problems of Other Minds'.
    Neurophenomena such as central sensitisation, hyperalgesia and allodynia, speak of a brain that is anything but hardwired. The brain's ability to self-organise in staggeringly complex ways forces us to look beyond what turn out to be perceptions of a body-mind reference, ie the idea of a mind is more a story than an actuality. There are mounting criticisms of body-mind dualism, , but with poor understanding of what philosophical narrative can replace it. Clearly, our human condition and pain's unique role (...)
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  43. Charles A. Hart (1955). Knowledge and Expression. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 29:44-53.
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  44. Christopher Hill (ed.) (1994). The Philosophy of Daniel Dennett. University of Arkansas Press.
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  45. Jim Hopkins, The Death Drive.
    Freud's biological notion of a death drive is not well founded but a number of closely associated notions (including those of a drive, and of aggression turned against the self) are.
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  46. Jim Hopkins (forthcoming). The Significance of Consilience: Psychoanalysis, Attachment, Neuroscience, and Evolution. In L. Brakel & V. Talvete (eds.), Psychoanalysis and Philosophy of Mind: Unconscious mentality in the 21st century. Karnac
    This paper considers clinical psychoanalysis together with developmental psychology (particularly attachment theory), evolution, and neuroscience in the context a Bayesian account of confirmation and disconfrimation. -/- In it I argue that these converging sources of support indicate that the combination of relatively low predictive power and broad explanatory scope that characterise the theories of both Freud and Darwin suggest that Freud's theory, like Darwin's, may strike deeply into natural phenomena. -/- The same argument, however, suggests that conclusive confirmation for Freudian (...)
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  47. Jim Hopkins (2014). Psychoanalysis, Philosophical Issues. In SAGE Reference project Encyclopedia of Philosophy and the Social Sciences. Sage
    This paper briefly addresses questions of confirmation and disconfirmation in psychoanalysis. It argues that psychoanalysis enjoys Bayesian support as an interpretive extension of commonsense psychology that provides the best explanation of a large range of empirical data. Suggestion provides no such explanation, and recent work in attachment, developmental psychology, and neuroscience accord with this view.
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  48. Jim Hopkins (2013). Conflict Creates an Unconscious Id. Neuropsychoanalysis 15.
    This note is part of a discussion of Mark Solm's 'The Conscious Id'. -/- It seconds Solms' claim that recent work in neuroscience indicates that the subcortical mechanisms that generate motives also generate consciousness, and that his enables us to integrate neuroscience with the Freudian Ego and Id. -/- Still this is not reason to regard the Id as conscious. If we take full account of the role of conflict, as described in terms of the Freudian superego, we can see (...)
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  49. Jim Hopkins (2013). Understanding and Healing: Psychiatry and Psychoanalysis in the Era of Neuroscience. In FulfordW (ed.), Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Psychiatry.
    This paper argues that psychoanalysis enables us to see mental disorder as rooted in emotional conflicts, particularly concerning aggression, to which our species has a natural liability. These can be traced in development, and seem rooted in both parent-offspring conflict and in-group cooperation for out-group conflict. In light of this we may hope that work in psychoanalysis and neuroscience will converge in indicating the most likely paths to a better neurobiological understanding of mental disorder.
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  50. Jim Hopkins (2012). Psychoanalysis Representation and Neuroscience: The Freudian Unconscious and the Bayesian Brain. In A. Fotopoulu, D. Pfaff & M. Conway (eds.), From the Couch to the Lab: Psychoanalysis, Neuroscience and Cognitive Psychology in Dialoge. OUP
    This paper argues that recent work in the 'free energy' program in neuroscience enables us better to understand both consciousness and the Freudian unconscious, including the role of the superego and the id. This work also accords with research in developmental psychology (particularly attachment theory) and with evolutionary considerations bearing on emotional conflict. This argument is carried forward in various ways in the work that follows, including 'Understanding and Healing', 'The Significance of Consilience', 'Psychoanalysis, Philosophical Issues', and 'Kantian Neuroscience and (...)
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