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Summary If a miracle occurred, how could we find out?
Key works Swinburne 1989 discusses what kind of evidence would justify a belief that a miracle has occurred. Levine 1989 argues that it is possible that beliefes about miracles are justified through testimony or through experience.
Introductions Swinburne 1989.
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  1. Tristan Casabianca (2016). Turin Shroud, Resurrection and Science: One View of the Cathedral. New Blackfriars 97 (1072).
    In a topic as controversial as the Turin Shroud, it is always surprising to note that there remains a large area of consensus among scholars who hold opposite opinions on the origin of this piece of fabric. According to the consensus view, neither science nor history can prove that the Turin Shroud shows signs of the Resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth. However, the reasons provided for this important claim are not convincing, especially in light of recent developments in historiography and (...)
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  2. Lydia McGrew (2013). Historical Inquiry. In Charles Taliaferro Victoria Harrison & Stewart Goetz (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Theism.
    Two different types of objections to the historical investigation of miracles imply that such investigation is inappropriate or can never lead to rational belief that a historical miracle has occurred. The first objection concerns the alleged chasm between the rational realm of history and the realm of faith. The second objection alleges that God is, or would be if he existed, too much unlike ourselves for us reasonably to use Divine action as an explanatory hypothesis. Both objections involve a tacit (...)
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  3. Lydia McGrew (2013). Tall Tales and Testimony to the Miraculous. European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 8 (2):39-55.
    In the debate over testimony to miracles, a common Humean move is to emphasize the prior improbability of miracles as the most important epistemic factor. Robert Fogelin uses the example of Henry, who tells multiple tall tales about meeting celebrities, to argue that low prior probabilities alone can render testimony unbelievable, with obvious implications for testimony to miracles. A detailed Bayesian analysis of Henry’s stories shows instead that the fact that Henry tells multiple stories about events that occurred independently if (...)
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  4. Timothy McGrew & Lydia McGrew (2012). The Reliability of Witnesses and Testimony to the Miraculous. In Jake Chandler Victoria S. Harrison (ed.), Probability in the Philosophy of Religion. Oxford
    The formal representation of the strength of witness testimony has been historically tied to a formula — proposed by Condorcet — that uses a factor representing the reliability of an individual witness. This approach encourages a false dilemma between hyper-scepticism about testimony, especially to extraordinary events such as miracles, and an overly sanguine estimate of reliability based on insufficiently detailed evidence. Because Condorcet’s formula does not have the resources for representing numerous epistemically relevant details in the unique situation in which (...)
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