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  1. Eugen Fischer (forthcoming). Philosophical Intuitions, Heuristics, and Metaphors. Synthese:1-38.
    Psychological explanations of philosophical intuitions can help us assess their evidentiary value, and our warrant for accepting them. To explain and assess conceptualor classificatory intuitions about specific situations, some philosophers have suggested explanations which invoke heuristic rules proposed by cognitive psychologists. The present paper extends this approach of intuition assessment by heuristics-based explanation, in two ways: It motivates the proposal of a new heuristic, and shows that this metaphor heuristic helps explain important but neglected intuitions: general factualintuitions which have been (...)
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Epistemology of Philosophy, Misc
  1. Theodore Bach, Philosophical Discovery Through the Activity of Comparison.
    I argue that at least one of the reasons that philosophy is difficult is because it requires students to master “relational categories”, which contrast with “object” or “entity” categories. An object category is one whose members are united on the basis of perceptual and/ or salient properties, and a relational category is one whose members are united on the basis of a relational property. Empirical evidence shows that relational categories are more difficult to grasp than object categories. If learning philosophy (...)
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  2. Alessandro Bertinetto (2007). Die transzendentale Argumentation in der Transzendentalen Logik Fichtes. Fichte-Studien 31:255-265.
  3. Jason Brennan (2010). Scepticism About Philosophy. Ratio 23 (1):1-16.
    Suppose a person who is agnostic about most philosophical issues wishes to have true philosophical beliefs but equally wishes to avoid false philosophical beliefs. I argue that this truth-seeking, error-avoiding agnostic would not have good grounds for pursuing philosophy. Widespread disagreement shows that pursuing philosophy is not a reliable method of discovering true answers to philosophical questions. More likely than not, pursuing philosophy leads to false belief. Many attempts to rebut this sceptical argument fail.
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  4. Yuri Cath (2012). Evidence and Intuition. Episteme 9 (4):311-328.
    Many philosophers accept a view according to which intuitions are crucial evidence in philosophy. Recently, Williamson (2004, 2007: ch. 1) has argued that such views are best abandoned because they lead to a psychologistic conception of philosophical evidence that encourages scepticism about the armchair judgements relied upon in philosophy. In this paper I respond to this criticism by showing how the intuition picture can be formulated in such a way that: (i) it is consistent with a wide range of views (...)
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  5. Carlo Cellucci (2008). Why Still Philosophy: Introduction. In Carlo Cellucci (ed.), Perché ancora la filosofia. Laterza.
    Since the seventeenth century science has invaded many fields traditionally covered by philosophy, thus making the role of philosophy appear problematic. The answer to this new situation has not been unique. There have been both radical answers (e.g., Wittgenstein, Heidegger) and moderate answers (e.g., Husserl, Rorty). Such answers, however, are all inadequate for several reasons. This has lead several philosophers (e.g., Wittgenstein, Heidegger) and scientists (e.g., Hawking, Mullis) to claim that philosophy is dead and has dissolved into the sciences. An (...)
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  6. David Colaco, Wesley Buckwalter & Stephen Stich, Epistemic Intuitions in Fake-Barn Thought Experiments.
    In epistemology, fake-barn thought experiments are often taken to be intuitively clear cases in which a justified true belief does not qualify as knowledge. We report a study designed to determine whether non-philosophers share this intuition. The data suggest that while participants are less inclined to attribute knowledge in fake-barn cases than in unproblematic cases of knowledge, they nonetheless do attribute knowledge to protagonists in fake-barn cases. Moreover, the intuition that fake-barn cases do count as knowledge is negatively correlated with (...)
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  7. Simon Cullen (2010). Survey-Driven Romanticism. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (2):275-296.
    Despite well-established results in survey methodology, many experimental philosophers have not asked whether and in what way conclusions about folk intuitions follow from people’s responses to their surveys. Rather, they appear to have proceeded on the assumption that intuitions can be simply read off from survey responses. Survey research, however, is fraught with difficulties. I review some of the relevant literature—particularly focusing on the conversational pragmatic aspects of survey research—and consider its application to common experimental philosophy surveys. I argue for (...)
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  8. Robert M. Ellis (2012). Middle Way Philosophy 1: The Path of Objectivity. Lulu.
    The first of a planned series of 5 volumes on Middle Way Philosophy. Middle Way Philosophy was originally inspired by the Middle Way of the Buddha but is developed in an entirely Western context. It addresses the questions of objectivity, justification, facts and values, and the relationship of philosophy and psychology. It develops the concept of experiential adequacy to provide a non-metaphysical resolution of the dichotomy between absolutism and relativism in both facts and values.
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  9. Eugen Fischer (2011). Philosophical Delusion and its Therapy: Outline of a Philosophical Revolution. Routledge.
    Philosophical Delusion and its Therapy provides new foundations and methods for the revolutionary project of philosophical therapy pioneered by Ludwig Wittgenstein. The book vindicates this currently much-discussed project by reconstructing the genesis of important philosophical problems: With the help of concepts adapted from cognitive linguistics and cognitive psychology, the book analyses how philosophical reflection is shaped by pictures and metaphors we are not aware of employing and are prone to misapply. Through innovative case-studies on the genesis of classical problems about (...)
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  10. Eugen Fischer (2009). Philosophical Pictures and Secondary Qualities. Synthese 171 (1).
    The paper presents a novel account of nature and genesis of some philosophical problems, which vindicates a new approach to an arguably central and extensive class of such problems: The paper develops the Wittgensteinian notion of ‘philosophical pictures’ with the help of some notions adapted from metaphor research in cognitive linguistics and from work on unintentional analogical reasoning in cognitive psychology. The paper shows that adherence to such pictures systematically leads to the formulation of unwarranted claims, ill-motivated problems, and pointless (...)
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  11. Danko Georgiev (forthcoming). Quantum No-Go Theorems and Consciousness. Axiomathes:1-13.
    Our conscious minds exist in the Universe, therefore they should be identified with physical states that are subject to physical laws. In classical theories of mind, the mental states are identified with brain states that satisfy the deterministic laws of classical mechanics. This approach, however, leads to insurmountable paradoxes such as epiphenomenal minds and illusionary free will. Alternatively, one may identify mental states with quantum states realized within the brain and try to resolve the above paradoxes using the standard Hilbert (...)
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  12. Jonathan Ichikawa, Sosa on Virtues, Perception, and Intuition.
    I critically evaluate Ernest Sosa's (2007) contrast between intuitive justification and perceptual justification. I defend a competence-based approach to intuitive justification that is continuous with epistemic justification generally.
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  13. Jonathan Ichikawa (2009). Review: Knowing the Intuition and Knowing the Counterfactual. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 145 (3):435 - 443.
    I criticize Timothy Williamson's characterization of thought experiments on which the central judgments are judgments of contingent counterfactuals. The fragility of these counterfactuals makes them too easily false, and too difficult to know.
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  14. Joseph Kaipayil (1995). The Epistemology of Comparative Philosophy: A Critique with Reference to P.T. Raju's Views. Rome: Centre for Indian and Inter-Religious Studies.
    Even as dismissive of pursuing Comparative Philosophy for achieving East-West synthesis in philosophy, the author maintains the need for “open philosophizing.” “Open philosophizing” is one characterized by dialogical openness to culturally diverse philosophical traditions and thought-patterns.
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  15. Uriah Kriegel (forthcoming). The Epistemological Challenge of Revisionary Metaphysics. Philosophers' Imprint.
  16. Rodrigo Laera (ed.) (2011). Los Desvíos de la Razón: El Lugar de la Facticidad En la Cadena de Justificaciones. Miño y Dávila.
    Moviéndose con libertad entre distintas tradiciones filosóficas, ajeno a cualquier división escolar del pensamiento, el autor describe las formas que toma el simulacro en un recorrido de gran alcance, que abarca desde teoría de la referencia hasta la ontología existencial. "`Todo lo que es profundo ama la máscara´, escribió Nietzsche. En efecto, ¿qué es nuestra existencia, sino una inmensa mascarada? Vivimos como si entendiéramos lo que sucede a nuestro alrededor. Nos comportamos como si pudiéramos prever las consecuencias de nuestros actos. (...)
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  17. Anna-Sara Malmgren (2013). Review of "Philosophy Without Intuitions" by Herman Cappelen. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
  18. M. G. F. Martin (2009). Reupholstering a Discipline: Comments on Williamson. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 145 (3):445 - 453.
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  19. James McBain (1999). The Role of Theory Contamination in Intuitions. Southwest Philosophy Review 15 (1):197-204.
    It is all too common in philosophy to claim that a particular philosophical theory is mistaken because it fails to coincide with most philosophers' or normal inquirers' intuitions as represented in a particular case or counterexample. This suggests, as Alvin Goldman and Joel Pust point out, that our intuitions provide a sort of evidential basis for particular theories. Yet, the question remains as to whether this assessment is correct, and, if it is, whose intuitions (either those trained within the area (...)
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  20. Andrew Melnyk (2010). What Do Philosophers Know? [REVIEW] Grazer Philosophische Studien 80 (1):297-307.
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  21. David Perez-Chico (2010). Filosofía sin lágrimas. Breve repaso a la filosofía de Stanley Cavell. In Antonio Lastra (ed.), Stanley Cavell. Mundos vistos y ciudades de palabras. Plaza & Valdés.
    El presente trabajo nació como una reflexión posterior a la traducción del libro de Stanley Cavell Contesting Tears: The Hollywood Melodrama of the Unknown Woman. La reflexión era necesaria habida cuenta de las dudas suscitadas por la traducción del título del libro. Para ser más exacto, la reflexión giraba en torno a las lágrimas que forman parte de la primera parte del título, las lágrimas vertidas por las mujeres desconocidas que protagonizan los melodramas analizados en el libro. En mi opinión, (...)
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  22. Duncan Pritchard (2008). Review of Christian Beyer, and Alex Burri (Eds.), Philosophical Knowledge: Its Possibility and Scope. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2008 (6).
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  23. Athanassios Raftopoulos (2009). Cognition and Perception: How Do Psychology and Neural Science Inform Philosophy? Mit Press.
    An argument that there are perceptual mechanisms that retrieve information in cognitively and conceptually unmediated ways and that this sheds light on various ...
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  24. Joseph Shieber (2012). A Partial Defense of Intuition on Naturalist Grounds. Synthese 187 (2):321-341.
    The debate concerning the role of intuitions in philosophy has been characterized by a fundamental disagreement between two main camps. The first, the autonomists, hold that, due to the use in philosophical investigation of appeals to intuition, most of the central questions of philosophy can in principle be answered by philosophical investigation and argument without relying on the sciences. The second, the naturalists, deny the possibility of a priori knowledge and are skeptical of the role of intuition in providing evidence (...)
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  25. Justin Sytsma (2012). Experimental Philosophy and Philosophical Disputes. Essays in Philosophy.
    One view of philosophy that is sometimes expressed, especially by scientists, is that while philosophers are good at asking questions, they are poor at producing convincing answers. And the perceived divide between philosophical and scientific methods is often pointed to as the major culprit behind this lack of progress. Looking back at the history of philosophy, however, we find that this methodological divide is a relatively recent invention. Further, it is one that has been challenged over the past decade by (...)
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  26. Jessica Wilson (forthcoming). Three Dogmas of Metaphysical Methodology. In Matthew Haug (ed.), New Essays on Philosophical Methodology. Routledge.
    In what does philosophical progress consist? 'Vertical' progress corresponds to development within a specific paradigm/framework for theorizing (of the sort associated, revolutions aside, with science); 'horizontal' progress corresponds to the identification and cultivation of diverse paradigms (of the sort associated, conservativism aside, with art and pure mathematics). Philosophical progress seems to involve both horizontal and vertical dimensions, in a way that is somewhat puzzling: philosophers work in a number of competing frameworks (like artists or mathematicians), while typically maintaining that only (...)
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  27. Jennifer Wright (2010). On Intuitional Stability: The Clear, the Strong, and the Paradigmatic. Cognition 115 (3):491-503.
    Skepticism about the epistemic value of intuition in theoretical and philosophical inquiry has recently been bolstered by empirical research suggesting that people’s concrete-case intuitions are vulnerable to irrational biases (e.g., the order effect). What is more, skeptics argue that we have no way to ‘‘calibrate” our intuitions against these biases and no way of anticipating intuitional instability. This paper challenges the skeptical position, introducing data from two studies that suggest not only that people’s concrete-case intuitions are often stable, but also (...)
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  28. Juhani Yli-Vakkuri (2013). Modal Skepticism and Counterfactual Knowledge. Philosophical Studies 162 (3):605-623.
    Abstract Timothy Williamson has recently proposed to undermine modal skepticism by appealing to the reducibility of modal to counterfactual logic ( Reducibility ). Central to Williamson’s strategy is the claim that use of the same non-deductive mode of inference ( counterfactual development , or CD ) whereby we typically arrive at knowledge of counterfactuals suffices for arriving at knowledge of metaphysical necessity via Reducibility. Granting Reducibility, I ask whether the use of CD plays any essential role in a Reducibility-based reply (...)
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Metaphilosophical Skepticism
  1. David J. Alexander (forthcoming). The Problem of Respecting Higher-Order Doubt. Philosophers' Imprint.
    This paper argues that higher-order doubt generates an epistemic dilemma. One has a higher-order doubt with regards to P insofar as one justifiably withholds belief as to what attitude towards P is justified. That is, one justifiably withholds belief as to whether one is justified in believing, disbelieving, or withholding belief in P. Using the resources provided by Richard Feldman’s recent discussion of how to respect one’s evidence, I argue that if one has a higher-order doubt with regards to P, (...)
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  2. Robert P. Amico (2000). Scepticism and the Foundation of Epistemology. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (3):711-714.
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  3. Antanas Andrijauskas (2009). Reflections on Metaphilosophy and the Underlying Causes of Methodological Transformations in Modern Comparative Philosophy. In M. T. Stepani͡ant͡s (ed.), Knowledge and Belief in the Dialogue of Cultures. Council for Research in Values and Philosophy.
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  4. Robert Audi (2008). Skepticism About A Priori Justification: Self-Evidence, Defeasibility, and Cogito Propositions. In John Greco (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Skepticism. Oxford University Press.
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  5. James Beebe (2011). A Priori Skepticism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (3):583-602.
    In this article I investigate a neglected form of radical skepticism that questions whether any of our logical, mathematical and other seemingly self-evident beliefs count as knowledge. ‘A priori skepticism,’ as I will call it, challenges our ability to know any of the following sorts of propositions: (1.1) The sum of two and three is five. (1.2) Whatever is square is rectangular. (1.3) Whatever is red is colored. (1.4) No surface can be uniformly red and uniformly blue at the same (...)
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  6. James Beebe (2008). BonJour's Arguments Against Skepticism About the "a Priori". Philosophical Studies 137 (2):243 - 267.
    I reconstruct and critique two arguments Laurence BonJour has recently offered against skepticism about the a priori. While the arguments may provide anti-skeptical, internalist foundationalists with reason to accept the a priori, I show that neither argument provides sufficient reason for believing the more general conclusion that there is no rational alternative to accepting the a priori.
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  7. Michael Bergmann (2008). Skeptical Theism and the Problem of Evil. In Thomas P. Flint & Michael C. Rea (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Theology. Oxford University Press.
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  8. Michael Bergmann (2001). Skeptical Theism and Rowe's New Evidential Argument From Evil. Noûs 35 (2):278–296.
  9. Michael Bergmann & Michael Rea (2005). In Defence of Sceptical Theism: A Reply to Almeida and Oppy. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (2):241 – 251.
    Some evidential arguments from evil rely on an inference of the following sort: 'If, after thinking hard, we can't think of any God-justifying reason for permitting some horrific evil then it is likely that there is no such reason'. Sceptical theists, us included, say that this inference is not a good one and that evidential arguments from evil that depend on it are, as a result, unsound. Michael Almeida and Graham Oppy have argued (in a previous issue of this journal) (...)
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  10. Debra B. Bergoffen (1980). The Moral Value of Philosophy. Journal of Moral Education 9 (2):122-129.
    Abstract Students arrive at their Introduction to Philosophy classes unsure of the nature of Philosophy and sceptical of its value. They usually assume that philosophy is some abstract thing which, whatever it is, is irrelevant to everyday life. This essay explores the ways in which the figures, philosophies and lives of Socrates and Bertrand Russell serve as models of the philosophic perspective. It develops the thesis that we can, by appealing to Socrates and Russell as role models, counter the assumption (...)
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  11. Núria Sara Miras Boronat, Die Welt Als Grund: Wittgenstein, Gadamer Und James. Akten des XXII. Deutscher Kongress für Philosophie.
  12. Jason Brennan (2010). Scepticism About Philosophy. Ratio 23 (1):1-16.
    Suppose a person who is agnostic about most philosophical issues wishes to have true philosophical beliefs but equally wishes to avoid false philosophical beliefs. I argue that this truth-seeking, error-avoiding agnostic would not have good grounds for pursuing philosophy. Widespread disagreement shows that pursuing philosophy is not a reliable method of discovering true answers to philosophical questions. More likely than not, pursuing philosophy leads to false belief. Many attempts to rebut this sceptical argument fail.
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  13. J. Bridges, N. Kolodny & W. Wong (eds.) (forthcoming). The Possibility of Philosophical Understanding: Essays for Barry Stroud. Oxford University Press.
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  14. Anthony Brueckner (2007). Scepticism About Self-Knowledge Redux. Analysis 67 (296):311–315.
  15. Anthony L. Brueckner (1990). Scepticism About Knowledge of Content. Mind 99 (395):447-51.
  16. Stephen M. Campbell (2009). The Surprise Twist in Hume's Treatise. Hume Studies 35 (1&2):103-34.
    A Treatise of Human Nature opens with ambitious hopes for the science of man, but Hume eventually launches into a series of skeptical arguments that culminates in a report of radical skeptical despair. This essay is a preliminary exploration of how to interpret this surprising development. I first distinguish two kinds of surprise twist: those that are incompatible with some preceding portion of the work, and those that are not. This suggests two corresponding pictures of Hume. On one picture, he (...)
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  17. James Cargile (1972). In Reply to a Defense of Skepticism. Philosophical Review 81 (2):229-236.
  18. Yuri Cath, Metaphilosophy. Oxford Bibliographies Online.
    Often philosophers have reason to ask fundamental questions about the aims, methods, nature, or value of their own discipline. When philosophers systematically examine such questions, the resulting work is sometimes referred to as “metaphilosophy.” Metaphilosophy, it should be said, is not a well-established, or clearly demarcated, field of philosophical inquiry like epistemology or the philosophy of art. However, in the late 20th and early 21st centuries there has been a great deal of metaphilosophical work on issues concerning the methodology of (...)
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  19. Christopher Cherry & Guy Robinson (1977). Scepticism About Scepticism. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 51:221 - 253.
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  20. Stewart Cohen (1998). Review: Fumerton on Metaepistemology and Skepticism. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (4):913 - 918.
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  21. Annalisa Coliva, Sebastiano Moruzzi & Giorgio Volpe (2012). Introduction. Synthese 189 (2):221-234.
  22. Paul Davies (2005). Asymmetry and Transcendence: On Scepticism and First Philosophy. Research in Phenomenology 35 (1):118-140.
    In attempting to re-think the notion of asymmetry and its relations with 'first philosophy' and to see how that notion is tracked by the provocation of scepticism, the paper demonstrates something about the implications of Levinas' ethical asymmetry. The paper considers Levinas' tendency to introduce the topic of scepticism when confronted by the logical and textual difficulties that necessarily befall his account of the ethical relation. It argues that such an introduction commits Levinas to the claim: first philosophy entails a (...)
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  23. William Deangelis (2003). Hume's Scepticism and the Science of Human Nature. Hume Studies 29 (1):150-154.
  24. Kenneth M. Ehrenberg (2008). Archimedean Metaethics Defended. Metaphilosophy 39 (4-5):508-529.
    Abstract: We sometimes say our moral claims are "objectively true," or are "right, even if nobody believes it." These additional claims are often taken to be staking out metaethical positions, representative of a certain kind of theorizing about morality that "steps outside" the practice in order to comment on its status. Ronald Dworkin has argued that skepticism about these claims so understood is not tenable because it is impossible to step outside such practices. I show that externally skeptical metaethical theory (...)
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  25. Robert M. Ellis (2012). Middle Way Philosophy 1: The Path of Objectivity. Lulu.
    The first of a planned series of 5 volumes on Middle Way Philosophy. Middle Way Philosophy was originally inspired by the Middle Way of the Buddha but is developed in an entirely Western context. It addresses the questions of objectivity, justification, facts and values, and the relationship of philosophy and psychology. It develops the concept of experiential adequacy to provide a non-metaphysical resolution of the dichotomy between absolutism and relativism in both facts and values.
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  26. Glenn W. Erickson (1990). Negative Dialectics and the End of Philosophy. Longwood Academic.
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  27. Bryan Frances (forthcoming). Philosophical Renegades. In Jennifer Lackey & David Christensen (eds.), The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays. OUP.
    If you retain your belief upon learning that a large number and percentage of your recognized epistemic superiors disagree with you, then what happens to the epistemic status of your belief? I investigate that theoretical question as well has the applied case of philosophical disagreement—especially disagreement regarding purely philosophical error theories, theories that do not have much empirical support and that reject large swaths of our most commonsensical beliefs. I argue that even if all those error theories are false, either (...)
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  28. Bryan Frances (2012). Discovering Disagreeing Epistemic Peers and Superiors. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 20 (1):1 - 21.
    Abstract Suppose you know that someone is your epistemic peer regarding some topic. You admit that you cannot think of any relevant epistemic advantage you have over her when it comes to that topic; you admit that she is just as likely as you to get P?s truth-value right. Alternatively, you might know that she is your epistemic superior regarding the topic. And then after learning this about her you find out that she disagrees with you about P. In those (...)
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  29. Bryan Frances (2010). The Reflective Epistemic Renegade. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (2):419-463.
    Philosophers often find themselves in disagreement with contemporary philosophers they know full well to be their epistemic superiors on the topics relevant tothe disagreement. This looks epistemically irresponsible. I offer a detailed investigation of this problem of the reflective epistemic renegade. I argue that although in some cases the renegade is not epistemically blameworthy, and the renegade situation is significantly less common than most would think, in a troublesome number of cases in which the situation arises the renegade is blameworthy (...)
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  30. Bryan Frances (2008). Live Skeptical Hypotheses. In John Greco (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Skepticism. Oxford.
    Those of us who take skepticism seriously typically have two relevant beliefs: (a) it’s plausible (even if false) that in order to know that I have hands I have to be able to epistemically neutralize, to some significant degree, some skeptical hypotheses, such as the brain-in-a-vat (BIV) one; and (b) it’s also plausible (even if false) that I can’t so neutralize those hypotheses. There is no reason for us to also think (c) that the BIV hypothesis, for instance, is plausible (...)
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  31. Bryan Frances (2005). Preface to 'Scepticism Comes Alive'. OUP.
    I once overheard a telling conversation between two of my colleagues. One asked the other about a new book on a topic of some importance to both of them. He asked whether they would have to do anything different because of the book. The second colleague said not, so the first colleague said he would not read the book. The conversation encapsulates an excellent test of the worth of a philosophical work: an idea is important if as a result of (...)
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  32. Bryan Frances (2005). When a Skeptical Hypothesis is Live. Noûs 39 (4):559–595.
    I’m going to argue for a set of restricted skeptical results: roughly put, we don’t know that fire engines are red, we don’t know that we sometimes have pains in our lower backs, we don’t know that John Rawls was kind, and we don’t even know that we believe any of those truths. However, people unfamiliar with philosophy and cognitive science do know all those things. The skeptical argument is traditional in form: here’s a skeptical hypothesis; you can’t epistemically neutralize (...)
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  33. Alfred J. Freddoso, Fides Et Ratio: A 'Radical' Vision of Intellectual Inquiry.
    Commentators on Pope John Paul II's encyclical Fides et Ratio(1) have not failed to notice the incongruity that envelops the Pope's defense of the powers of reason against contemporary forms of skepticism. As Nicholas Wolterstorff has put it: "How surprising and ironic that roughly two centuries after Voltaire and his cohorts mocked the church as the bastion of irrationality, the church, in the person of the pope, should be the one to put in a good word for reason." (2) In (...)
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  34. Richard Fumerton (1998). Review: Précis of Metaepistemology and Skepticism. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (4):905 - 906.
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  35. Walter S. Gamertsfelder (1933). Current Skepticism of Metaphysics. The Monist 43 (1):105-118.
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  36. Carl Gillett (2001). The Methodological Role of Physicalism: A Minimal Skepticism. In Carl Gillett & Barry M. Loewer (eds.), Physicalism and its Discontents. Cambridge University Press.
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  37. Alan H. Goldman (1974). Can a Priori Arguments Refute the Sceptic? Dialogue 13 (01):105-109.
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  38. Daniel Greco (2012). The Impossibility of Skepticism. Philosophical Review 121 (3):317-358.
    Epistemologists and philosophers of mind both ask questions about belief. Epistemologists ask normative questions about belief—which beliefs ought we to have? Philosophers of mind ask metaphysical questions about belief—what are beliefs, and what does it take to have them? While these issues might seem independent of one another, there is potential for an interesting sort of conflict: the epistemologist might think we ought to have beliefs that, according to the philosopher of mind, it is impossible to have. This essay argues (...)
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  39. Jani Hakkarainen (2012). Why Hume Cannot Be A Realist. Journal of Scottish Philosophy 10 (2):143-161.
    In this paper, I argue that there is a sceptical argument against the senses advanced by Hume that forms a decisive objection to the Metaphysically Realist interpretations of his philosophy – such as the different naturalist and New Humean readings. Hume presents this argument, apparently starting with the primary/secondary qualities distinction, both in A Treatise of Human Nature, Book 1, Part 4, Section 4 (Of the modern philosophy) (1739) and An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, Section 12 (Of the Academical or (...)
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  40. Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward (1987). Relativism and Ontology. Philosophical Quarterly 37 (148):278-290.
    This paper deals with the question of whether there is objectivist truth about set-theoretic matters. The dogmatist and skeptic agree that there is such truth. They disagree about whether this truth is knowable. In contrast, the relativist says there is no objective truth to be known. Two versions of relativism are distinguished in the paper. One of these versions is defended.
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  41. John Kekes (1971). Scepticism, Rationalism, and Language. Metaphilosophy 2 (3):227–240.
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  42. Alexander Kelly (forthcoming). Ramseyan Humility, Scepticism and Grasp. Philosophical Studies.
    In ‘Ramseyan Humility’ David Lewis argues that a particular view about fundamental properties, quidditism, leads to the position that we are irredeemably ignorant of the identities of fundamental properties. We are ignorant of the identities of fundamental properties since we can never know which properties play which causal roles, and we have no other way of identifying fundamental properties other than by the causal roles they play. It has been suggested in the philosophical literature that Lewis’ argument for Humility is (...)
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  43. Peter D. Klein (2003). Coherence, Knowledge and Skepticism. In Olsson Erik (ed.), The Epistemology of Keith Lehrer. Kluwer.
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  44. Jennifer Lackey & David Christensen (eds.) (forthcoming). An OUP Volume on Disagreement. OUP.
  45. Rodrigo Laera (ed.) (2011). Los Desvíos de la Razón: El Lugar de la Facticidad En la Cadena de Justificaciones. Miño y Dávila.
    Moviéndose con libertad entre distintas tradiciones filosóficas, ajeno a cualquier división escolar del pensamiento, el autor describe las formas que toma el simulacro en un recorrido de gran alcance, que abarca desde teoría de la referencia hasta la ontología existencial. "`Todo lo que es profundo ama la máscara´, escribió Nietzsche. En efecto, ¿qué es nuestra existencia, sino una inmensa mascarada? Vivimos como si entendiéramos lo que sucede a nuestro alrededor. Nos comportamos como si pudiéramos prever las consecuencias de nuestros actos. (...)
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  46. Barry Lam (2011). On the Rationality of Belief-Invariance in Light of Peer Disagreement. Philosophical Review 120 (2):207-245.
    This paper considers two questions. First, what is the scope of the Equal Weight View? Is it the case that meeting halfway is the uniquely rational method of belief-revision in all cases of known peer disagreement? The answer is no. It is sometimes rational to maintain your own opinion in the face of peer disagreement. But this leaves open the possibility that the Equal Weight View is indeed sometimes the uniquely rational method of belief revision. Precisely what is the skeptical (...)
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  47. Stephen Law (2007). Enlightened Scepticism. The Philosopher's Magazine (38):55-57.
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  48. Jimmy Alfonso Licon (2012). Sceptical Thoughts on Philosophical Expertise. Logos and Episteme 3 (3):449-458.
    My topic is two-fold: a reductive account of expertise as an epistemic phenomenon, and applying the reductive account to the question of whether or not philosophers enjoy expertise. I conclude, on the basis of the reductive account, that even though philosophers enjoy something akin to second-order expertise (i.e. they are often experts on the positions of other philosophers, current trends in the philosophical literature, the history of philosophy, conceptual analysis and so on), they nevertheless lack first-order philosophical expertise (i.e. expertise (...)
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  49. S. Luper (ed.) (2003). The Skeptics. Ashgate Publishing.
    Presented throughout in an accessible style, this book will prove particularly useful for students, researchers and general readers of philosophy who are ...
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  50. Michael P. Lynch (2012). In Praise of Reason. MIT Press.
    Can we give objective reasons for our most basic standards of reason-- our fundamental epistemic principles? I argue, against several forms of skepticism about reason, that we can, but that the reasons we can give for epistemic principles are ultimately practical, not epistemic.
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  51. Kevin Mulligan, Peter Simons & Barry Smith (2006). What's Wrong with Contemporary Philosophy? Topoi 25 (1-2).
    Philosophy in the West divides into three parts: Analytic Philosophy (AP), Continental Philosophy (CP), and History of Philosophy (HP). But all three parts are in a bad way. AP is sceptical about the claim that philosophy can be a science, and hence is uninterested in the real world. CP is never pursued in a properly theoretical way, and its practice is tailor-made for particular political and ethical conclusions. HP is mostly developed on a regionalist basis: what is studied is determined (...)
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  52. Jennifer Nagel (2012). Mindreading in Gettier Cases and Skeptical Pressure Cases. In Jessica Brown & Mikkel Gerken (eds.), Knowledge Ascriptions. Oxford University Press.
    To what extent should we trust our natural instincts about knowledge? The question has special urgency for epistemologists who want to draw evidential support for their theories from certain intuitive epistemic assessments while discounting others as misleading. This paper focuses on the viability of endorsing the legitimacy of Gettier intuitions while resisting the intuitive pull of skepticism – a combination of moves that most mainstream epistemologists find appealing. Awkwardly enough, the “good” Gettier intuitions and the “bad” skeptical intuitions seem to (...)
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  53. Shaun Nichols, Stephen Stich & Jonathan M. Weinberg (2003). Metaskepticism: Meditations in Ethnoepistemology. In S. Luper (ed.), The Skeptics. Ashgate.
    Throughout the 20th century, an enormous amount of intellectual fuel was spent debating the merits of a class of skeptical arguments which purport to show that knowledge of the external world is not possible. These arguments, whose origins can be traced back to Descartes, played an important role in the work of some of the leading philosophers of the 20th century, including Russell, Moore and Wittgenstein, and they continue to engage the interest of contemporary philosophers. (e.g., Cohen 1999, DeRose 1995, (...)
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  54. Kai Nielsen (1993). Skeptical Remarks on the Scope of Philosophy. Social Theory and Practice 19 (2):117-160.
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  55. Kai Nielsen (1986). How to Be Sceptical About Philosophy. Philosophy 61 (235):83-.
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  56. Benjamin Noys (2011). Foucault, the Sceptical Samurai. The Philosopher's Magazine (52):111-112.
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  57. Douglas Odegard (1977). Ignorance: A Case for Scepticism. By Peter Unger. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1975. 323 + Xi. $20.75. Dialogue 16 (01):167-171.
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  58. Frederick A. Olafson (1954). Skepticism and Animal Faith. Journal of Philosophy 51 (2):42-46.
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  59. Fred Parker (2003). Scepticism and Literature: An Essay on Pope, Hume, Sterne, and Johnson. OUP Oxford.
    'The more we enquire, the less we can resolve,' wrote Johnson. Scepticism-a reasoned emphasis on the severe limitations of rationality-would seem to undermine the grounds of belief and action. But in some of the best eighteenth-century literature, a theoretically paralysing critique of the pretensions of reason, precept, and language went hand in hand with a vigorous intellectual, moral, and linguistic confidence. To realise philosophical scepticism as literature was effectively to transform it. Dr Parker traces the presence of this life-giving irony (...)
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  60. Joel Pust (2001). Against Explanationist Skepticism Regarding Philosophical Intuitions. Philosophical Studies 106 (3):227 - 258.
    Though most of analytic philosophy is based upon intuitions, some philosophers are beginning to question whether intuitions are an appropriate basis for philosophical theory. This paper responds to the arguments of some contemporary philosophers who hold that intuitions should not be treated as evidence for anything other than our contingent psychological constitution. It begins with a demonstration that skeptical arguments by Gilbert Harman and Alvin Goldman are variations on an argument with the potential to undermine the use of intuitions in (...)
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  61. Hilary Putnam (2012). Philosophy in an Age of Science: Physics, Mathematics, and Skepticism. Harvard University Press.
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  62. Baron Reed (2007). The Long Road to Skepticism. Journal of Philosophy 104 (5):236-262.
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  63. Brian Ribeiro (2011). Philosophy and Disagreement. Crítica 43:3-25.
    Disagreement as we find it in both the history and the contemporary practice of philosophy is an inadequately understood phenomenon. In this paper I outline and motivate the problem of disagreement, arguing that "hard cases" of disagreement confront us with an unresolved, and seemingly unresolvable, challenge to the rationality of philosophical discourse, thereby raising the specter of a worrisome form of metaphilosophical skepticism. A variety of responses and attempted evasions are considered, though none are found to be particularly satisfying: Thus, (...)
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  64. Brian Ribeiro (2004). Skeptical Parasitism and the Continuity Argument. Metaphilosophy 35 (5):714-732.
    Recent literature on skepticism has raised a nearly univocal voice in condemning skeptical argumentation on the grounds that such argumentation necessarily involves our adopting some nonordinary or unnatural perspective. Were this really so, then skeptical conclusions would not speak to us in the way in which skeptics think they do: We would be "insulated" from any such conclusions. I argue that skeptical argumentation need not rely on any nonordinary or unnatural standards. Rather, the skeptic's procedure is to offer a critique (...)
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  65. Brian Ribeiro (2002). Greco, John. Putting Skeptics in Their Place: The Nature of Skeptical Arguments and Their Role in Philosophical Inquiry. The Review of Metaphysics 55 (3):632-634.
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  66. A. K. Rogers (1904). Scepticism. Philosophical Review 13 (6):627-641.
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  67. Sherrilyn Roush, Skepticism About Reasoning.
    Less discussed than Hume’s skepticism about what grounds there could be for projecting empirical hypotheses is his concern with a skeptical regress that he thought threatened to extinguish any belief when we reflect that our reasoning is not perfect. The root of the problem is the fact that a reflection about our reasoning is itself a piece of reasoning. If each reflection is negative and undermining, does that not give us a diminution of our original belief to nothing? (...)
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  68. Stuart G. Shanker (1984). Sceptical Confusions About Rule-Following. Mind 93 (July):423-29.
  69. Paul Silva (forthcoming). Epistemically Self-Defeating Arguments and Skepticism About Intuition. Philosophical Studies.
    An argument is epistemically self-defeating when either the truth of an argument's conclusion or belief in an argument's conclusion defeats one's justification to believe at least one of that argument's premises. Some extant defenses of the evidentiary value of intuition have invoked considerations of epistemic self-defeat in their defense. I argue that there is one kind of argument against intuition, an unreliability argument, which, even if epistemically self-defeating, can still imply that we are not justified in thinking intuition has evidentiary (...)
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  70. Houston Smit (2003). Internalism and the Origin of Rational Motivation. Journal of Ethics 7 (2):183-231.
    What makes a subject''s motivationrational is its originating in her practicalreasoning. I explain the appeal of this thesisabout rational motivation, and explore itsrelation to recent discussions of internalismabout reasons for action. I do so in theservice of clarifying an important meta-ethicaldebate between Humean motivational skeptics andtheir Kantian opponents. This debate is oneover whether, as this skeptic contends andKantians deny, considerations about ourmotivational capacities, together withinternalism, restrict genuine reasons foraction to merely instrumental ones. I arguethat properly adjudicating this debate requiresidentifying one (...)
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  71. Abraham D. Stone (2000). On Husserl and Cavellian Scepticism. Philosophical Quarterly 50 (198):1-21.
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