Edited by Jonathan Ichikawa (University of British Columbia)
|Summary||There seems to be at least some philosophical knowledge. For example, most philosophers, having read Gettier, take themselves to know that justified true belief is not sufficient for knowledge. But how is philosophical knowledge possible? What are its features? Is philosophy (ever? always?) a priori? Are there grounds for skepticism about philosophy? What is the role of intuitions in philosophy?|
|Key works||DePaul & Ramsey 1998 contains many essays probing and challenging the sources of philosophical knowledge; Booth & Rowbottom forthcoming is a more contemporary treatment of the same issues. Weinberg et al 2001 give an influential empirical challenge to the use of intuitions in the normative realms of philosophy. Williamson 2007 defends an approach to philosophy that does not depend on intuitions in an evidential role.|
|Introductions||The literature on metaphilosophy typically occurs at a relatively advanced level; unlike many other philosophical subdisciplines, the study of philosophy requires significant antecedent familiarity with much of philosophy, so it is not particularly well-suited to introductory treatments. However, Rosenberg 1984 is one influential introductory text.|
Modal Epistemology* (286 | 4)
Philosophical Methods* (484)
Epistemology of Philosophy, Misc
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David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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