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Epistemology

Edited by Matthew McGrath (University of Missouri, Columbia)
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  1. added 2015-09-02
    Matthiessen Hannes Ole (2014). Epistemic Entitlement. The Right to Believe. Palgrave MacMillan.
    In Epistemic Entitlement. The Right to Believe Hannes Ole Matthiessen develops a social externalist account of epistemic entitlement and perceptual knowledge. The basic idea is that positive epistemic status should be understood as a specific kind of epistemic right, that is a right to believe. Since rights have consequences for how others are required to treat the bearer of the right, they have to be publicly accessible. The author therefore suggests that epistemic entitlement can plausibly be conceptualized as a status (...)
  2. added 2015-09-02
    Matthiessen Hannes Ole (2013). Entitlement and Public Accessibility of Epistemic Status. Grazer Philosophische Studien 87:75-97.
    In recent epistemological literature, epistemic entitlement is understood as a personal epistemic status that does not require elaborate justificatory activity on behalf of the entitled individual. It is nevertheless internalist in a weaker sense, since it is said to be grounded in perceptual experiences. It seems, however, that the conditions under which an epistemic right holds should, like in cases of most other rights, be publicly observable, because they have implications for the ways others are required to treat the entitled (...)
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  3. added 2015-08-31
    Alexander Dinges (forthcoming). Skeptical Pragmatic Invariantism: Good, but Not Good Enough. Synthese:1-17.
    In this paper, I will discuss what I will call “skeptical pragmatic invariantism” as a potential response to the intuitions we have about scenarios such as the so-called bank cases. SPI, very roughly, is a form of epistemic invariantism that says the following: The subject in the bank cases doesn’t know that the bank will be open. The knowledge ascription in the low standards case seems appropriate nevertheless because it has a true implicature. The goal of this paper is to (...)
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  4. added 2015-08-30
    Karyn L. Freedman, Group Accountability Versus Justified Belief: A Reply to Kukla. Social Epistemology Reply and Review Collective.
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  5. added 2015-08-30
    Tine Wilde (2005). Remodel[l]ing Reality (Dutch only). BLIND! 4.
    Dit artikel gaat over de gecompliceerde relatie tussen kunst en informatie. Alle kunst is informatie, kunnen we zeggen, maar niet alle informatie is kunst! Of om het anders te zeggen: we willen niet enkel worden geïnformeerd, maar ook geïnspireerd.
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  6. added 2015-08-29
    Andrew Melnyk (1996). Review of Alex Hyslop's "Other Minds". [REVIEW] Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (2):383-384.
  7. added 2015-08-28
    Franz Dietrich, Christian List & Richard Bradley, Belief Revision Generalized: A Joint Characterization of Bayes's and Jeffrey's Rules.
    We present a general framework for representing belief-revision rules and use it to characterize Bayes's rule as a classical example and Jeffrey's rule as a non-classical one. In Jeffrey's rule, the input to a belief revision is not simply the information that some event has occurred, as in Bayes's rule, but a new assignment of probabilities to some events. Despite their differences, Bayes's and Jeffrey's rules can be characterized in terms of the same axioms: "responsiveness", which requires that revised beliefs (...)
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  8. added 2015-08-28
    Kenneth Boyd (forthcoming). Testifying Understanding. Episteme.
    While it is widely acknowledged that knowledge can be acquired via testimony, it has been argued that understanding cannot. While there is no consensus about what the epistemic relationship of understanding consists in, I argue here that regardless of how understanding is conceived there are kinds of understanding that can be acquired through testimony: easy understanding (e.g. understanding simple and mundane information) and easy-s understanding (e.g. understanding information that might be complex, but is nevertheless easy for an expert S). I (...)
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  9. added 2015-08-28
    James H. Collier (2015). Introduction. Social Epistemology 29 (3):249-250.
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  10. added 2015-08-28
    Rémi Chéno (2014). L'intérêt épistémologique de la doctrine jaïna de l'anekāntavāda en vue du dialogue interreligieux. Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses 90 (4):709-730.
    With its doctrine of anekāntavāda, often illustrated by the famous fable of the blind men and the elephant, which also inspired the great Sufi masters, Jainism offers a valuable epistemological framework for the interreligious dialogue. Without overcome the main principles of Western logic, it makes possible the articulation of (for their own part) consistent but mutually contradictory discourses. Refusing skepticism and relativism as well as dogmatism, he draws a logic of the enunciation that leaves room for the opponent and its (...)
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  11. added 2015-08-27
    Psychotic Logician, Philosophical Roast or (What I Think).
  12. added 2015-08-27
    Jens Gillessen (forthcoming). Do Intentions Set Up Rational Defaults? Commitments, Reasons, and the Diachronic Dimension of Rationality. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
    Suppose that you do not do what you have previously decided to do. Are you to be charged with irrationality? A number of otherwise divergent theories of practical rationality hold that by default, you are; there are rational pressures, it is claimed, that favor the long-term stability and eventual execution of distal intentions. The paper challenges this view by examining how these purported pressures can be spelled out. Is intention a normative commitment to act? Are intentions reasons for action—or at (...)
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  13. added 2015-08-27
    Giovanni Mion (2015). Does 'Knowledge' Function Like a Quantifier? A Critique of Stanley. Philosophical Inquiries 3 (2):9-16.
    In “Elusive Knowledge” (1996), David Lewis deduces contextualism about 'knowledge' from an analysis of the nature of knowledge. For Lewis, the context relativity of 'knowledge' depends upon the fact that knowledge that p implies the elimination of all the possibilities in which ~p. But since 'all' is context relative, 'knowledge' is also context relative. In contrast to Lewis, in Knowledge and Practical Interests (2005), Jason Stanley argues that since all context sensitive expressions can have different interpretations within the same discourse, (...)
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  14. added 2015-08-27
    Giovanni Mion (2014). Grueing Gettier. Logos and Episteme 5 (4):467-470.
    The paper aims to stress the structural similarities between Nelson Goodman’s ‘new riddle of induction’ and Edmund Gettier’s counterexamples to the standard analysis of knowledge.
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  15. added 2015-08-26
    Brandon Beasley (forthcoming). Ad Infinitum: New Essays on Epistemological Infinitism. [REVIEW] Dialogue:1-3.
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  16. added 2015-08-26
    Simon D'Alfonso (forthcoming). Belief Merging with the Aim of Truthlikeness. Synthese:1-22.
    The merging/fusion of belief/data collections in propositional logic form is a topic that has received due attention within the domains of database and AI research. A distinction can be made between two types of scenarios to which the process of merging can be applied. In the first type, the collections represent preferences, such as the voting choices of a group of people, that need to be aggregated so as to give a consistent result that in some way best represents the (...)
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  17. added 2015-08-26
    Kenneth Boyd (forthcoming). Pragmatic Encroachment and Epistemically Responsible Action. Synthese.
    One prominent argument for pragmatic encroachment (PE) is that PE is entailed by a combination of a principle that states that knowledge warrants proper practical reasoning, and judgments that it is more difficult to reason well when the stakes go up. I argue here that this argument is unsuccessful. One problem is that empirical tests concerning knowledge judgments in high-stakes situations only sometimes exhibit the result predicted by PE. I argue here that those judgments that appear to support PE are (...)
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  18. added 2015-08-26
    Ann Garry, Serene Khader & Alison Stone (eds.) (2016). The Routledge Companion to Feminist Philosophy. Routledge.
  19. added 2015-08-25
    Igal Kvart, Action-Directed Pragmatics Secures Semantically Autonomous Knowledge.
    In the past couple of decades, there were a few major attempts to establish the thesis of pragmatic infringement – that a significant pragmatic ingredient figures significantly in the truth-conditions for knowledge-ascriptions. As candidates, epistemic contextualism and Relativism flaunted conversational standards, and Stanley's SSI promoted stakes. These conceptions were propelled first and foremost by obviously pragmatic examples of knowledge ascriptions that seem to require a pragmatic component in the truth-conditions of knowledge ascriptions in order to be accounted for. However, if (...)
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  20. added 2015-08-25
    Jonny Blamey, Knowledge Isn't Necessarily True.
    In this essay I hope to establish that truth is not a necessary condition for knowledge. This is not to go so far as that it is possible to know falsehoods, since not everything that is not true is therefore false. Rather the aim is to show that knowledge is that in which we are fully confident, where our confidence is supported by conclusive evidence. If these two conditions are met, then there is no further condition, truth, that needs to (...)
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  21. added 2015-08-25
    Mikkel Gerken (forthcoming). The Epistemic Norms of Intra-Scientific Testimony. Philosophy of the Social Sciences:0048393115600527.
    What is the epistemic position that a scientist must be in vis-à-vis a proposition, p, to be in a good enough epistemic position to assert that p to a fellow scientist within the scientific process? My aim is to provide an answer to this question and, more generally, to connect the epistemological debates about the epistemic norms of assertion to the debates about the nature of the scientific process. The question is important because science is a collaborative enterprise based on (...)
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  22. added 2015-08-25
    Thomas Blackson (forthcoming). Against Weatherson on How to Frame a Decision Problem. Journal of Philosophical Research.
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  23. added 2015-08-25
    Leo Townsend (forthcoming). Essays in Collective Epistemology Edited by Jennifer Lackey. [REVIEW] Analysis:anv056.
  24. added 2015-08-25
    Leo Townsend (2015). Margaret Gilbert, Joint Commitment How We Make the Social World. Reviewed By. [REVIEW] Philosophy in Review 35 (3):140-142.
  25. added 2015-08-25
    Richard Pettigrew (2015). Accuracy and the Belief-Credence Connection. Philosophers' Imprint 15 (16):1-20.
    Probabilism says an agent is rational only if her credences are probabilistic. This paper is concerned with the so-called Accuracy Dominance Argument for Probabilism. This argument begins with the claim that the sole fundamental source of epistemic value for a credence is its accuracy. It then shows that, however we measure accuracy, any non-probabilistic credences are accuracy-dominated: that is, there are alternative credences that are guaranteed to be more accurate than them. It follows that non-probabilistic credences are irrational. In this (...)
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  26. added 2015-08-25
    Fabio Sterpetti (2015). Scientific Realism, Adaptationism and the Problem of the Criterion. Kairos. Journal of Philosophy and Science 13:7-45.
    Scientific Realism (SR) has three crucial aspects: 1) the centrality of the concept of truth, 2) the idea that success is a reliable indicator of truth, and 3) the idea that the Inference to the Best Explanation is a reliable inference rule. It will be outlined how some realists try to overcome the difficulties which arise in justifying such crucial aspects relying on an adaptationist view of evolutionism, and why such attempts are inadequate. Finally, we will briefly sketch some of (...)
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  27. added 2015-08-25
    Richard Pettigrew (2015). II—Pluralism About Belief States. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 89 (1):187-204.
    With his Humean thesis on belief, Leitgeb seeks to say how beliefs and credences ought to interact with one another. To argue for this thesis, he enumerates the roles beliefs must play and the properties they must have if they are to play them, together with norms that beliefs and credences intuitively must satisfy. He then argues that beliefs can play these roles and satisfy these norms if, and only if, they are related to credences in the way set out (...)
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  28. added 2015-08-24
    Kourken Michaelian (forthcoming). Naturalism and Scientific Methods — A Brief Introduction. In Joachim Horvath (ed.), Methods in Analytic Philosophy: A Contemporary Reader. Bloomsbury
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  29. added 2015-08-24
    Peter Brössel (forthcoming). On the Role of Explanatory and Systematic Power in Scientific Reasoning. Synthese.
    The paper investigates measures of explanatory power and how to define the inference schema “Inference to the Best Explanation” (IBE). It argues that these measures can also be used to quantify the systematic power of a hypothesis and the inference schema “Inference to the Best Systematization” (IBS) is defined. It demonstrates that systematic power is a fruitful criterion for theory choice and IBS is truth-conducive. It also shows that even radical Bayesians must admit that systemic power is an integral component (...)
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  30. added 2015-08-24
    Alessandro Giordani (forthcoming). On a New Tentative Solution to Fitch’s Paradox. Erkenntnis.
    In a recent paper, Alexander argues that relaxing the requirement that sound knowers know their own soundness might provide a solution to Fitch’s paradox and introduces a suitable axiomatic system where the paradox is avoided. In this paper an analysis of this solution is proposed according to which the effective move for solving the paradox depends on the axiomatic treatment of the ontic modality rather than the limitations imposed on the epistemic one. It is then shown that, once the ontic (...)
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  31. added 2015-08-24
    Peter Brössel (forthcoming). On the Role of Explanatory and Systematic Power in Scientific Reasoning. Synthese.
    The paper investigates measures of explanatory power and how to define the inference schema “Inference to the Best Explanation” (IBE). It argues that these measures can also be used to quantify the systematic power of a hypothesis and the inference schema “Inference to the Best Systematization” (IBS) is defined. It demonstrates that systematic power is a fruitful criterion for theory choice and IBS is truth-conducive. It also shows that even radical Bayesians must admit that systemic power is an integral component (...)
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  32. added 2015-08-24
    Daniel Greco (2015). Verbal Debates in Epistemology. American Philosophical Quarterly 52 (1):41-55.
    The idea that certain philosophical debates are "merely verbal" has historically been raised as a challenge against (large parts of) metaphysics. In this paper, I explore an analogous challenge to large parts of epistemology, which is motivated by recent arguments in experimental philosophy. I argue that, while this challenge may have some limited success, it cannot serve as a wedge case for wide-ranging skepticism about the substantiveness of epistemological debates; most epistemological debates are immune to the worries it raises.
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  33. added 2015-08-24
    Steven Hales (2015). Synchronic and Diachronic Luck. In Antonio Manuel Liz Gutiérrez & Margarita Vázquez Campos (eds.), Temporal Points of View. Springer International Publishing
    I show that temporal point of view helps to establish whether an event is a lucky one. Extant theories of luck cannot accommodate temporal perspective and are thus inadequate.
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  34. added 2015-08-24
    Alessandro Giordani (2015). The Truthmaker Solution to the Gettier Problems. Epistemologia 38:66-78.
    A truthmaker solution to the Gettier problems is based on the idea that knowledge can be defined as justified true belief provided that the source of one’s justification is suitably connected with what makes the believed proposition true. Different developments of this basic intuition have been recently criticized on the basis of a series of arguments aiming at showing that no truthmaker theory can allow us to solve Gettier problems, since the very idea underlying such solution is ineffective. In this (...)
    The Concept of Knowledge in Epistemology
    The Gettier Problem in Epistemology
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  35. added 2015-08-24
    Sinan Dogramaci (2015). Why Is a Valid Inference a Good Inference? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (00).
    True beliefs and truth-preserving inferences are, in some sense, good beliefs and good inferences. When an inference is valid though, it is not merely truth-preserving, but truth-preserving in all cases. This motivates my question: I consider a Modus Ponens inference, and I ask what its validity in particular contributes to the explanation of why the inference is, in any sense, a good inference. I consider the question under three different definitions of ‘case’, and hence of ‘validity’: the orthodox definition given (...)
    Deductive Reasoning in Epistemology
    Epistemology of Logic in Logic and Philosophy of Logic
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  36. added 2015-08-24
    Tine Wilde (2012). De Artistieke Wending. BLIND! 29 (Macht).
    De onmacht van deskundigen om de crisis te bezweren komt voort uit een deficiënte benadering van de problemen. Volgens kunstenaar en filosofe Tine Wilde is een Artistieke Wending nodig om complexe vraagstukken zoals de crisis op te kunnen lossen. In dit artikel pleit zij voor het toepassen van de intuïtieve aanpak die filosofen en kunstenaars hanteren, 'vertraagd onbewust nadenken'. In deze houding ligt de macht vervat, waarover in principe ieder van ons kan beschikken. Dit is een indirecte macht, die langer (...)
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  37. added 2015-08-22
    Cory Wright (2015). The Ontic Conception of Scientific Explanation. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 54:20-30.
    Wesley Salmon’s version of the ontic conception of explanation is a main historical root of contemporary work on mechanistic explanation. This paper examines and critiques the philosophical merits of Salmon’s version, and argues that his conception’s most fundamental construct is either fundamentally obscure, or else reduces to a non-ontic conception of explanation. Either way, the ontic conception is a misconception.
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  38. added 2015-08-21
    Verena Wagner (2015). On the Analogy of Free Will and Free Belief. Synthese:1-26.
    Compatibilist methods borrowed from the free will debate are often used to establish doxastic freedom and epistemic responsibility. Certain analogies between the formation of intention and belief make this approach especially promising. Despite being a compatibilist myself in the practical debate, I will argue that compatibilist methods fail to establish doxastic freedom. My rejection is not based on an argument against the analogy of free will and free belief. Rather, I aim at showing that compatibilist free will and free belief (...)
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  39. added 2015-08-21
    Alexander Dinges (2015). Innocent Implicatures. Journal of Pragmatics 87:54-63.
    It seems to be a common and intuitively plausible assumption that conversational implicatures arise only when one of the so-called conversational maxims is violated at the level of what is said. The basic idea behind this thesis is that, unless a maxim is violated at the level of what is said, nothing can trigger the search for an implicature. Thus, non-violating implicatures wouldn’t be calculable. This paper defends the view that some conversational implicatures arise even though no conversational maxim is (...)
    Conversational Implicature in Philosophy of Language
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  40. added 2015-08-20
    Scott Sturgeon (forthcoming). Undercutting Defeat and Edgington's Burglar. In Lee Walters John Hawthorne (ed.), Conditionals, Probability & Paradox: themes from the Philosophy of Dorothy Edgington.
    This paper does four things. First it lays out an orthodox position on reasons and defeaters. Then it argues that the position just laid out is mistaken about “undercutting” defeaters. Then the paper explains an unpublished thought experiment by Dorothy Edgington. And then it uses that thought experiment to motivate a new approach to undercutting defeaters.
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  41. added 2015-08-20
    Fernando Broncano‐Berrocal (2015). No Luck in the Distance: A Reply to Freitag. Theoria 81 (3):n/a-n/a.
    In a recent article in this journal, Wolfgang Freitag argues that Gettier-style cases that are based on the notion of “distant” epistemic luck cannot be ruled out as cases of knowledge by modal conditions such as safety or sensitivity. I argue that safety and sensitivity can be easily fixed and that Freitag provides no convincing reason for the existence of “distant” epistemic luck.
    Epistemic Luck in Epistemology
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  42. added 2015-08-19
    Michael Blome-Tillmann (forthcoming). Sensitivity Actually. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    A number of prominent epistemologists claim that the principle of sensitivity “play[s] a starring role in the solution to some important epistemological problems” (DeRose 2010: 161; also Nozick (1981)). I argue that traditional sensitivity accounts fail to explain even the most basic data that are usually considered to constitute their primary motivation. To establish this result I develop Gettier and lottery cases involving necessary truths. Since beliefs in necessary truths are sensitive by default, the resulting cases give rise to a (...)
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  43. added 2015-08-19
    Moti Mizrahi (forthcoming). Why Simpler Arguments Are Better. Argumentation:1-15.
    In this paper, I argue that, other things being equal, simpler arguments are better. In other words, I argue that, other things being equal, it is rational to prefer simpler arguments over less simple ones. I sketch three arguments in support of this claim: an argument from mathematical proofs, an argument from scientific theories, and an argument from the conjunction rule.
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  44. added 2015-08-18
    Diego E. Machuca (2015). Review of Sébastien Charles & Plínio J. Smith (Eds.), Scepticism in the Eighteenth Century: Enlightenment, Lumières, Aufklärung. [REVIEW] Journal of the History of Philosophy 53 (3):551-552.
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  45. added 2015-08-17
    Brian Kim (forthcoming). In Defense of Subject-Sensitive Invariantism. Episteme.
    Keith DeRose has argued that the two main problems facing subject-sensitive invariantism (SSI) come from the appropriateness of certain third-person denials of knowledge and the inappropriateness of now you know it, now you don't claims. I argue that proponents of SSI can adequately address both problems. First, I argue that the debate between contextualism and SSI has failed to account for an important pragmatic feature of third-person denials of knowledge. Appealing to these pragmatic features, I show that straightforward third-person denials (...)
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  46. added 2015-08-14
    Teresa Marques (forthcoming). Retractions. Synthese.
    Intuitions about retractions have been used to motivate truth relativism about certain types of claims. Among these figure epistemic modals, knowledge attributions, or personal taste claims. On MacFarlane’s prominent relativist proposal, sentences like “the ice cream might be in the freezer” or “Pocoyo is funny” are only assigned a truth-value relative to contexts of utterance and contexts of assessment. Retractions play a crucial role in the argument for assessment-relativism. A retraction of a past assertion is supposed to be mandatory whenever (...)
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  47. added 2015-08-14
    James Andow (forthcoming). How Distinctive is Philosophers' Intuition-Talk? Metaphilosophy 46 (5).
    The word ‘intuition’ is one frequently used in philosophy. It is often assumed that the way in which philosophers use the word, and others like it, is very distinctive. However, this claim has been subject to little empirical scrutiny. This paper presents the first steps in a qualitative analysis of the use of intuition-talk in the academy. I present the findings of two preliminary empirical studies. The first study examines the use of intuition-talk in spoken academic English. The second examines (...)
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  48. added 2015-08-14
    B. J. C. Madison (forthcoming). Internalism in the Epistemology of Testimony Redux. Erkenntnis.
    In general, epistemic internalists hold that an individual’s justification for a belief is exhausted by her reflectively accessible reasons for thinking that the contents of her beliefs are true. Applying this to the epistemology of testimony, a hearer’s justification for beliefs acquired through testimony is exhausted by her reflectively accessible reasons to think that the contents of the speaker’s testimony is true. A consequence of internalism is that subjects that are alike with respect to their reflectively accessible reasons are alike (...)
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  49. added 2015-08-13
    Casey Rebecca Johnson (2015). Testimony and the Constitutive Norm of Assertion. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 23 (3):356-375.
    I can, given the right conditions, transmit my knowledge to you by telling you some information. If I know the time, and if all goes well, I can bring it about that you know it too. If conditions are right, all I have to do is assert to you what time it is. Paradigmatically, speakers use assertions to transmit what they know to their hearers. Clearly, assertion and testimony are tightly connected. The nature of this connection, however, is not so (...)
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  50. added 2015-08-12
    Sanford C. Goldberg (ed.) (2015). Externalism, Self-Knowledge, and Skepticism: New Essays. Cambridge University Press.
    Written by an international team of leading scholars, this collection of thirteen new essays explores the implications of semantic externalism for self-knowledge and skepticism, bringing recent developments in the philosophy of mind, the philosophy of language, and epistemology to bear on the issue. Structured in three parts, the collection looks at self-knowledge, content transparency, and then meta-semantics and the nature of mental content. The chapters examine a wide range of topics in the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of language, (...)
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