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Epistemology

Edited by Matthew McGrath (University of Missouri, Columbia)
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  1. added 2016-05-01
    Andrew Reisner (forthcoming). Two Thesis About the Distinctness of Practical and Theoretical Normativity. In C. McHugh, J. Way & D. Whiting (eds.), Normativity: Practical and Theoretical. Oxford University Press
    In tradition linked to Aristotle and Kant, many contemporary philosophers treat practical and theoretical normativity as two genuinely distinct domains of normativity. In this paper I consider the question of what it is for normative domains to be distinct. I suggest that there are two different ways that the distinctness thesis might be understood and consider the different implications of the two different distinctness theses.
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  2. added 2016-05-01
    Christos Kyriacou, Metaepistemology. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    An Introduction to basic metaepistemological debates and positions.
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  3. added 2016-04-30
    Mike Sutton, Kant's View of the World.
    This essay is about the way Kant sees the world rather than about his moral philosophy and his theories of justice. It concentrates on perception of the physical world, and how far this can take us in understanding the world of the mind and how we think and make decisions about our lives. It proposes that Kant can be seen as the founder not just of theories of the problem of knowledge, but also of such modern ideas as existentialism.
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  4. added 2016-04-29
    Alexander Gebharter & Gerhard Schurz (forthcoming). A Modeling Approach for Mechanisms Featuring Causal Cycles. Philosophy of Science.
    Mechanisms play an important role in many sciences when it comes to questions concerning explanation, prediction, and control. Answering such questions in a quantitative way requires a formal represention of mechanisms. Gebharter (2014) suggests to represent mechanisms by means of one or more causal arrows of an acyclic causal net. In this paper we show how this approach can be extended in such a way that it can also be fruitfully applied to mechanisms featuring causal feedback.
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  5. added 2016-04-29
    Peter Baumann (2015). Safety, Virtue, Scepticism: Remarks on Sosa. Croatian Journal of Philosophy (45):295-306.
    Ernest Sosa has made and continues to make major contributions to a wide variety of topics in epistemology. In this paper I discuss some of his core ideas about the nature of knowledge and scepticism. I start with a discussion of the safety account of knowledge – a view he has championed and further developed over the years. I continue with some questions concerning the role of the concept of an epistemic virtue for our understanding of knowledge. Safety (...)
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  6. added 2016-04-28
    Maarten Steenhagen (forthcoming). Against Adversarial Discussion. Collingwood and British Idealism Studies.
    Why did R.G. Collingwood come to reject the adversarial style of philosophical discussion so popular among his Oxford peers? The main aim of this paper is to explain that Collingwood came to reject his colleagues’ specific style of philosophical dialogue on methodological grounds, and to show how the argument against adversarial philosophical discussion is integrated with Collingwood’s overall criticism of realist philosophy. His argument exploits a connection between method and practice that should be taken seriously even today.
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  7. added 2016-04-27
    Ulrike Hahn, Frank Zenker & Roland Bluhm (forthcoming). Causal Argument. In Michael R. Waldmann (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Causal Reasoning. Oxford University Press
    In this chapter, we outline the range of argument forms involving causation that can be found in everyday discourse. We also survey empirical work concerned with the generation and evaluation of such arguments. This survey makes clear that there is presently no unified body of research concerned with causal argument. We highlight the benefits of a unified treatment both for those interested in causal cognition and those interested in argumentation, and identify the key challenges that must be met (...)
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  8. added 2016-04-27
    Corine Besson (forthcoming). Norms, Reasons and Reasoning: A Guide Through Lewis Carroll’s Regress Argument. In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity.
  9. added 2016-04-27
    Steph Menken, Machiel Keestra, Lucas Rutting, Ger Post, Mieke de Roo, Sylvia Blad & Linda de Greef (eds.) (2016). An Introduction to Interdisciplinary Research. Theory and Practice. Amsterdam University Press.
    This book (128 pp.) serves as an introduction and manual to guide students through the interdisciplinary research process. We are becoming increasingly aware that, as a result of technological developments and globalisation, problems are becoming so complex that they can only be solved through cooperation between multiple disciplines. Healthcare, climate change, food security, energy, financial markets and quality of life are just a few examples of issues that require scientists and academics to work in a crossdisciplinary way. As a result (...)
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  10. added 2016-04-27
    Amos Keestra & Machiel Keestra (2015). A ‘Circulation Model’ of Education: A Response to Challenges of Education at the New University. Krisis: Journal for Contemporary Philosophy 2015 (2):90-98.
    The protests at the Universiteit van Amsterdam (UvA) that began in November 2014 as a reaction to severe cuts in the department of humanities have sparked a broad debate nationally and even internationally about the future of the university and the values and ideals that should define it. It turned out that dissatisfaction was much more widespread in different parts of the university than some had previously thought, and many turned out to share the concerns first put forward in the (...)
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  11. added 2016-04-27
    Frederique Janssen-Lauret & Gary Kemp (eds.) (2015). Quine and His Place in History. Palgrave.
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  12. added 2016-04-26
    Tony Ward (2016). Expert Testimony, Law and Epistemic Authority. Journal of Applied Philosophy 33 (1).
    This article discusses the concept of epistemic authority in the context of English law relating to expert testimony. It distinguishes between two conceptions of epistemic authority, one strong and one weak, and argues that only the weak conception is appropriate in a legal context, or in any other setting where reliance on experts can be publicly justified. It critically examines Linda Zagzebski's defence of a stronger conception of epistemic authority and questions whether epistemic authority is as closely analogous to practical (...)
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  13. added 2016-04-26
    Christoph Baumberger (2013). Art and Understanding. In Defence of Aesthetic Cognitivism. In Marc Greenlee, Rainer Hammwöhner, Bernd Köber, Christoph Wagner & Christian Wolff (eds.), Bilder sehen. Perspektiven der Bildwissenschaft. Schnell + Steiner 41-67.
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  14. added 2016-04-26
    Christoph Baumberger, Explanatorisches Verstehen. Ein Definitionsvorschlag. Was Dürfen Wir Glauben? Was Sollen Wir Tun? – Sektionsbeiträge des Achten Internationalen Kongresses der Gesellschaft Für Analytische Philosophie E.V.
    In diesem Aufsatz entwickle ich eine Definition von explanatorischem Verstehen, indem ich dieses mit Wissen vergleiche. Erstens zeige ich, inwiefern explanatorisches Verstehen das Erfassen einer anspruchsvolleren Erklärung und eine anspruchsvollere Rechtfertigung verlangt als explanatorisches Wissen. Zweitens argumentiere ich dafür, dass die Erklärung den Tatsachen gerecht werden muss, explanatorisches Verstehen aber im Gegensatz zu Wissen nicht immer faktiv ist. Drittens verteidige ich die Auffassung, dass explanatorisches Verstehen, anders als Wissen, mit epistemischem Glück kompatibel ist. Als Ergebnis schlage ich vor, dass S (...)
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  15. added 2016-04-26
    Christoph Baumberger (2011). Types of Understanding: Their Nature and Their Relation to Knowledge. Conceptus: Zeitschrift Fur Philosophie 40 (98):67-88.
    What does it mean to understand something? I approach this question by comparing understanding with knowledge. Like knowledge, understanding comes, at least prima facia, in three varieties: propositional, interrogative and objectual. I argue that explanatory understanding (this being the most important form of interrogative understanding) and objectual understanding are not reducible to one another and are neither identical with, nor even a form of, the corresponding type of knowledge (nor any other type of knowledge). My discussion suggests that definitions of (...)
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  16. added 2016-04-26
    Christoph Baumberger (2011). Understanding and its Relation to Knowledge. In Christoph Jäger Winfrid Löffler (ed.), Epistemology: Contexts, Values, Disagreement. Papers of the 34th International Wittgenstein Symposium. Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society 16-18.
    Is understanding the same as or at least a species of knowledge? This question has to be answered with respect to each of three types of understanding and of knowledge. I argue that understanding-why and objectual understanding are not reducible to one another and neither identical with nor a species of the corresponding or any other type of knowledge. My discussion reveals important characteristics of these two types of understanding and has consequences for propositional understanding.
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  17. added 2016-04-25
    Jan Willem Wieland (forthcoming). Willful Ignorance. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice:1-15.
    Michelle Moody-Adams suggests that “the main obstacle to moral progress in social practices is the tendency to widespread affected ignorance of what can and should already be known.” This explanation is promising, though to understand it we need to know what willful (affected, motivated, strategic) ignorance actually is. This paper presents a novel analysis of this concept, which builds upon Moody-Adams (1994) and is contrasted with a recent account by Lynch (2016).
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  18. added 2016-04-24
    Tsung‐Hsing Ho (2016). Epistemic Normativity as Performance Normativity. Theoria 82 (2):n/a-n/a.
    Virtue epistemology maintains that epistemic normativity is a kind of performance normativity, according to which evaluating a belief is like evaluating a sport or musical performance. I examine this thesis through the objection that a belief cannot be evaluated as a performance because it is not a performance but a state. I argue that virtue epistemology can be defended on the grounds that we often evaluate a performance through evaluating the result of the performance. The upshot of my account is (...)
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  19. added 2016-04-23
    Luca Moretti, Phenomenal Conservatism and the Problem of Reflective Awareness.
    This paper criticizes phenomenal conservatism––the influential view according to which a subject S’s seeming that P provides S with defeasible justification for believing P. I argue that phenomenal conservatism, if true at all, has a significant limitation: seeming-based justification is elusive because S can easily lose it by just reflecting on her seemings and speculating about their causes––I call this the problem of reflective awareness. Because of this limitation, phenomenal conservatism doesn’t have all the epistemic merits attributed to it by (...)
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  20. added 2016-04-23
    Matthew Frise (forthcoming). No Need to Know. Philosophical Studies:1-11.
    I introduce and defend an argument against the popular view that anything falling short of knowledge falls short in value. The nature of belief and cognitive psychological research on memory, I claim, support the argument. I also show that not even the most appealing mode of knowledge is distinctively valuable.
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  21. added 2016-04-23
    Julien Dutant (2015). The Legend of the Justified True Belief Analysis. Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):95-145.
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  22. added 2016-04-21
    Matthew A. Benton (forthcoming). Lotteries and Prefaces. In Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Contextualism. Routledge
    The lottery and preface paradoxes pose puzzles in epistemology concerning how to think about the norms of reasonable or permissible belief. Contextualists in epistemology have focused on knowledge ascriptions, attempting to capture a set of judgments about knowledge ascriptions and denials in a variety of contexts (including those involving lottery beliefs and the principles of closure). This article surveys some contextualist approaches to handling issues raised by the lottery and preface, while also considering some of the difficulties encountered by those (...)
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  23. added 2016-04-21
    Matthew A. Benton, John Hawthorne & Dani Rabinowitz (eds.) (forthcoming). Knowledge, Belief, and God: New Insights in Religious Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
    A collection of 16 new essays in the epistemology of religion, broadly construed. Includes work from historical perspectives (the medieval period; Hume; Scotus; Maimonides); in social epistemology (on testimony, disagreement, and expertise); formal epistemology (especially fine-tuning and many-worlds hypotheses); and rationality considerations (practical factors, modal arguments, phenomenal conservatism). -/- Contributors: Charity Anderson, Richard Cross, Billy Dunaway, Dani Rabinowitz, Isaac Choi, Hans Halvorson, John Hawthorne & Yoaav Isaacs, Roger White, Max Baker-Hytch, Rachel Elizabeth Fraser, Jennifer Lackey, Paulina Sliwa, Matthew Benton, (...)
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  24. added 2016-04-21
    Matthew A. Benton (forthcoming). Pragmatic Encroachment and Theistic Knowledge. In Matthew A. Benton, John Hawthorne & Dani Rabinowitz (eds.), Knowledge, Belief, and God: New Insights in Religious Epistemology. Oxford University Press
    If knowledge is sensitive to practical stakes, then whether one knows depends in part on the practical costs of being wrong. When considering religious belief, the practical costs of being wrong about theism may differ dramatically between the theist (if there is no God) and the atheist (if there is a God). This paper explores the prospects, on pragmatic encroachment, for knowledge of theism (even if true) and of atheism (even if true), given two types of practical costs: (...)
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  25. added 2016-04-20
    Darrell P. Rowbottom (forthcoming). What Is (Dis)Agreement? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    When do we agree? The answer might once have seemed simple and obvious; we agree that p when we each believe that p. But from a formal epistemological perspective, where degrees of belief are more fundamental than beliefs, this answer is unsatisfactory. On the one hand, there is reason to suppose that it is false; degrees of belief about p might differ when beliefs simpliciter on p do not. On the other hand, even if it is true, it is too (...)
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  26. added 2016-04-17
    Guido Melchior (2016). Easy Knowledge, Closure Failure, or Skepticism: A Trilemma. Metaphilosophy 47 (2):214-232.
    This article aims to provide a structural analysis of the problems related to the easy knowledge problem. The easy knowledge problem is well known. If we accept that we can have basic knowledge via a source without having any prior knowledge about the reliability or accuracy of this source, then we can acquire knowledge about the reliability or accuracy of this source too easily via information delivered by the source. Rejecting any kind of basic knowledge, however, leads into an infinite (...)
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  27. added 2016-04-16
    Michael Caie (forthcoming). Agreement Theorems for Self-Locating Belief. Review of Symbolic Logic.
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  28. added 2016-04-16
    Katalin Farkas (forthcoming). Practical Know-Wh. Noûs.
    The central and paradigmatic cases of knowledge discussed in philosophy involve the possession of truth. Is there in addition a distinct type of practical knowledge, which does not aim at the truth? This question is often approached through asking whether states attributed by “know-how” locutions are distinct from states attributed by “know-that”. This paper argues that the question of practical knowledge can be raised not only about some cases of “know-how” attributions, but also about some cases of so-called “know-wh” attributions; (...)
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  29. added 2016-04-15
    Andrew P. Carlin (forthcoming). On Some Limits of Interdisciplinarity. Social Epistemology:1-19.
    This paper examines the use of “literature” in research projects in Sociology and Library & Information Science and proposes that there are some limits to the programme of interdisciplinarity. The loci of considerations are found in literature review sections of published articles. “The literature” is an arbitrary term that refers to recognized and relevant collections of work according to context. Associating aspects of disciplinary work such as concepts, methods and writings, with Wes Sharrock’s ethnomethodological notion of “ownership”, affords analysis of (...)
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  30. added 2016-04-15
    Brian Weatherson (forthcoming). Reply to Eaton and Pickvance. Philosophical Studies:1-3.
    David Eaton and Timothy Pickvance argued that interest-relative invariantism has a surprising and interesting consequence. They take this consequence to be so implausible that it refutes interest-relative invariantism. But in fact it is a consequence that any theory of knowledge that has the resources to explain familiar puzzles must have.
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  31. added 2016-04-14
    James H. Collier (2016). Introduction. Social Epistemology 30 (3):227-228.
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  32. added 2016-04-14
    Jan Forsman (2015). Tahto ja arvostelmasta pidättäytyminen Descartesin filosofiassa. Ajatus 72:15-51.
    Artikkelissa otan kantaa niin sanottuun voluntarismikiistaan Descartesin tahdon käsitykseen ja arvostelmateoriaan liittyen kannattaen epäsuoraa voluntarismia. Käsittelen erityisesti kysymystä voiko tahdolla Descartesin mukaan olla suora kontrolli ihmisen arvostelmasta pidättäytymiseen?Pitkään vallassa olleen tulkintasuuntauksen mukaan Descartesin käsityksessä tahdolla on kyky vaikuttaa doksastisiin tiloihin suoraan, pelkällä tahdon aktilla. Tätä kutsutaan suoraksi voluntarismiksi ja se tarkoittaa lyhyesti sanottuna sitä, että meillä on kyky hyväksyä, olla hyväksymättä sekä pidättäytyä arvostelemasta täysin tahdonvaraisesti. Tässä tekstissä kannatan kuitenkin epäsuoraa voluntarismia: tahto kykenee vaikuttamaan doksastiseen tilaan epäsuorasti vaikuttamalla uskomuksen muodostamisen (...)
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  33. added 2016-04-14
    Karel Leyva (2009). Los presupuestos teóricos de la Epistemología Compleja. A Parte Rei: Revista de Filosofía 61:01-18.
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  34. added 2016-04-13
    Will Fleisher (forthcoming). Virtuous Distinctions. Synthese:1-31.
    Virtue epistemology has been divided into two camps: reliabilists and responsibilists. This division has been attributed in part to a focus on different types of virtues, viz., faculty virtues and character virtues. I will argue that this distinction is unhelpful, and that we should carve up the theoretical terrain differently. Making several better distinctions among virtues will show us two important things. First, that responsibilists and reliabilists are actually engaged in different, complementary projects; and second, (...)
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  35. added 2016-04-12
    Brian Kim & Anubav Vasudevan (forthcoming). How to Expect a Surprising Exam. Synthese.
    In this paper, we provide a Bayesian analysis of the well-known surprise exam paradox. Central to our analysis is a probabilistic account of what it means for the student to accept the teacher's announcement that he will receive a surprise exam. According to this account, the student can be said to have accepted the teacher's announcement provided he adopts a subjective probability distribution relative to which he expects to receive the exam on a day on which he expects not to (...)
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  36. added 2016-04-11
    Duncan Pritchard (forthcoming). Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Defeat. Synthese:1-13.
    This paper explores how a certain theory of knowledge—known as anti-luck virtue epistemology—can account for, and in the process shed light on, the notion of an epistemic defeater. To this end, an overview of the motivations for anti-luck virtue epistemology is offered, along with a taxonomy of different kinds of epistemic defeater. It is then shown how anti-luck virtue epistemology can explain: why certain kinds of putative epistemic defeater are not bona fide; how certain kinds of epistemic defeater are genuine (...)
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  37. added 2016-04-11
    Berit Brogaard & Chudnoff Elijah (forthcoming). Against Emotional Dogmatism. Philosophical Issues 26.
    It may seem that when you have an emotional response to a perceived object or event that makes it seem to you that the perceived source of the emotion possesses some evaluative property, then you thereby have prima facie, immediate justification for believing that the object or event possesses the evaluative property. Call this view ‘dogmatism about emotional justification’. We defend a view of the structure of emotional awareness according to which the objects of emotional awareness are derived from (...)
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  38. added 2016-04-11
    Benj Hellie (forthcoming). Praxeology, Imperatives, and Shifts of View. In Rowland Stout (ed.), Process, action, and experience. Oxford UP
    I outline a radically `first-personal' program in <em>praxeology</em> (aka 'philosophy of practical reason'): embrace of nonpropositional imperatival content is what is characteristically practical; this embrace connects to agentive behavior 'transcendentally'---through a constraint on shifts of view, inaccessible within any single viewpoint.
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  39. added 2016-04-11
    Elijah Chudnoff (forthcoming). Epistemic Elitism and Other Minds. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    Experiences justify beliefs about our environment. Sometimes the justification is immediate: seeing a red light immediately justifies believing there is a red light. Other times the justification is mediate: seeing a red light justifies believing one should brake in a way that is mediated by background knowledge of traffic signals. How does this distinction map onto the distinction between what is and what isn’t part of the content of experience? Epistemic egalitarians think that experiences immediately justify whatever is part of (...)
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  40. added 2016-04-10
    Dennis Whitcomb (forthcoming). One Kind of Asking. Philosophical Quarterly:pqw027.
    This paper extends several themes from recent work on norms of assertion. It does as much by applying those themes to the speech act of asking. In particular, it argues for the view that there is a species of asking which is governed by a certain norm, a norm to the effect that one should ask a question only if one doesn’t know its answer.
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  41. added 2016-04-09
    Emma C. Bullock (forthcoming). Knowing and Not-Knowing for Your Own Good: The Limits of Epistemic Paternalism. Journal of Applied Philosophy.
    Epistemic paternalism is the thesis that a paternalistic interference with an individual’s inquiry is justified when it is likely to bring about an epistemic improvement in her. In this paper I claim that in order to motivate epistemic paternalism we must first account for the value of epistemic improvements. I propose that the epistemic paternalist has two options: either epistemic improvements are valuable because they contribute to wellbeing, or they are epistemically valuable. I will argue that these options constitute the (...)
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  42. added 2016-04-08
    Leslie Allan, Towards an Objective Theory of Rationality.
    Drawing on insights from Imre Lakatos' seminal work on theories of rationality, Leslie Allan develops seven criteria for rational theory choice that avoid presuming the rationality of the scientific enterprise. He shows how his axioms of rationality follow from the general demands of an objectivist epistemology. Allan concludes by considering two weighty objections to his framework.
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  43. added 2016-04-07
    Natalia Washington, I Don't Want to Change Your Mind: A Reply to Sherman. Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective.
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  44. added 2016-04-05
    Conor McHugh & Jonathan Way (forthcoming). Against the Taking Condition. Philosophical Issues.
    According to Paul Boghossian and others, inference is subject to the taking condition: it necessarily involves the thinker taking his premises to support his conclusion, and drawing the conclusion because of that fact. Boghossian argues that this condition vindicates the idea that inference is an expression of agency, and that it has several other important implications too. However, we argue in this paper that the taking condition should be rejected. The condition gives rise to several serious prima facie problems and (...)
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  45. added 2016-04-05
    Philip J. Nickel (2016). Vrijheid door scepticisme. Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte 108 (1).
    In this paper, I consider a form of skepticism that has a permissive conclusion, according to which we are rationally permitted to suspend judgment in an area, or to have beliefs in that area. I argue that such a form of skepticism is resistant to some traditional strategies of refutation. It also carries a benefit, namely that it increases voluntary control over doxastic states by introducing options, and therefore greater freedom, into the realm of belief. I argue that intellectual preferences (...)
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  46. added 2016-04-04
    Starks Michael, The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language as Revealed in the Writings of Wittgenstein and Searle.
    I provide a critical survey of some of the major findings of Wittgenstein and Searle on the logical structure of intentionality (mind, language, behavior), taking as my starting point Wittgenstein’s fundamental discovery –that all truly ‘philosophical’ problems are the same—confusions about how to use language in a particular context, and so all solutions are the same—looking at how language can be used in the context at issue so that its truth conditions (Conditions of Satisfaction or COS) are clear. The basic (...)
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  47. added 2016-04-04
    Luca Moretti (2016). Tal and Comesaña on Evidence of Evidence. The Reasoner 10 (5):38-39.
    R. Feldman defends a general principle about evidence the slogan form of which says that ‘evidence of evidence is evidence’. B. Fitelson considers three renditions of this principle and contends they are all falsified by counterexamples. Against both Feldman and Fitelson, J. Comesaña and E. Tal show that the third rendition––the one actually endorsed by Feldman––isn’t affected by Fitelson’s counterexamples, but only because it is trivially true and thus uninteresting. Tal and Comesaña defend a fourth version of Feldman’s principle, which––they (...)
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  48. added 2016-04-03
    Ingo Brigandt (2016). Why the Difference Between Explanation and Argument Matters to Science Education. Science and Education 25:251-275.
    Contributing to the recent debate on whether or not explanations ought to be differentiated from arguments, this article argues that the distinction matters to science education. I articulate the distinction in terms of explanations and arguments having to meet different standards of adequacy. Standards of explanatory adequacy are important because they correspond to what counts as a good explanation in a science classroom, whereas a focus on evidence-based argumentation can obscure such standards of what makes an explanation explanatory. I provide (...)
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  49. added 2016-04-03
    Susan E. Babbitt (2005). Reasons, Explanation, and Saramago's Bell. Hypatia 20 (4):144-163.
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  50. added 2016-04-03
    Susan E. Babbitt (2005). Stories From the South: A Question of Logic. Hypatia 20 (3):1-21.
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