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Epistemology

Edited by Matthew McGrath (University of Missouri, Columbia)
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  1. added 2015-03-27
    Paulina Sliwa & Sophie Horowitz (forthcoming). Respecting All the Evidence. Philosophical Studies:1-24.
    Plausibly, you should believe what your total evidence supports. But cases of misleading higher-order evidence—evidence about what your evidence supports—present a challenge to this thought. In such cases, taking both first-order and higher-order evidence at face value leads to a seemingly irrational incoherence between one’s first-order and higher-order attitudes: you will believe P, but also believe that your evidence doesn’t support P. To avoid sanctioning tension between epistemic levels, some authors have abandoned the thought that both first-order and higher-order evidence (...)
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  2. added 2015-03-27
    Tomas Bogardus & Anna Brinkerhoff (forthcoming). The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays By David Christensen and Jennifer Lackey. Analysis:anu160.
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  3. added 2015-03-27
    Sanford C. Goldberg (forthcoming). Should Have Known. Synthese:1-32.
    In this paper I will be arguing that there are cases in which a subject, S, should have known that p, even though, given her state of evidence at the time, she was in no position to know it. My argument for this result will involve making two claims. The uncontroversial claim is this: S should have known that p when another person has, or would have, legitimate expectations regarding S’s epistemic condition, the satisfaction of these expectations would require that (...)
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  4. added 2015-03-27
    Karl Schafer (2015). How Common is Peer Disagreement? On Self‐Trust and Rational Symmetry. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (2):n/a-n/a.
    In this paper I offer an argument for a view about the epistemology of peer disagreement, which I call the “Rational Symmetry View”. I argue that this view follows from a natural conception of the epistemology of testimony, together with a basic entitlement to trust our own faculties for belief formation. I then discuss some objections to this view, focusing on its relationship to other well-known views in the literature. The upshot of this discussion is that, if the Rational Symmetry (...)
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  5. added 2015-03-27
    Bonnie Talbert (2013). Screened Conversations: Technologically Mediated Interactions and Knowledge of Other Minds. Techné: Research in Philosophy and Technology 17 (3):333-349.
    Social scientists have documented some recent, dramatic changes in the nature of our social lives. Many scholars have thought that our reliance on technology to communicate with others is in large part responsible for that loss. However, there is also data to support the opposite conclusion—it might be the case that social networking technologies have helped, rather than hindered our social interactions. What I would like to propose is a philosophical argument, which I hope will offer a different sort of (...)
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  6. added 2015-03-27
    Víctor Verdejo (2013). A Puzzle About Disagreement. Disputatio.
    Verdejo, Víctor_A Puzzle about Disagreement.
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  7. added 2015-03-27
    Charles Scott (2009). Epistemological Multilingualism: A Tool for Conviviality. Paideusis 18:43-54.
    In a globalized world where the traditional, the modern, and the postmodern increasingly meet, there is a growing need for understanding, particularly of views different from our own. In this paper, I want to explore the concept of epistemological multilingualism and its value to scholarship, advancing the notion that epistemological multilingualism—the ability to respect and understand multiple epistemic standpoints—emerges out of a postmodern, integral perspective which sees the reality of several epistemological frameworks, as well as the ability to understand, learn (...)
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  8. added 2015-03-27
    Peter Olen (2008). Now, Is That Really Blasphemy? Heretical Meaning And Belief. Florida Philosophical Review 1 (1):31-40.
    Religious tensions in America, as well as abroad, are nothing new. Yet, in this current epoch various cultures around the world are involved in internal clashes between religious and secular groups that pull at the attention of the public more often than not. Though a myriad of issues confront anyone interested in investigating these tensions, one must first wonder what, exactly, blasphemy means to both sides of the debate. In the course of doing so, one interesting question arises: What does (...)
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  9. added 2015-03-27
    Jeremy Kirby (2001). Outstanding Graduate Philosophy Paper Award: "Contextualism and Confusability". Florida Philosophical Review 1 (1):16-28.
    In "Contextualism and Confusability" I defend Epistemological Contextualism. Contextualists think that the statements "I know that I have hands," "I don't know that I'm not a brain in a vat," and "if I don't know that I'm not a brain in a vat, I don't know that I have hands," are all true—albeit not simultaneously. The first statement is true when an individual is not cognizant of the hypothesis that he might be a brain in a vat receiving just those (...)
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  10. added 2015-03-27
    Duncan Pritchard (2000). Doubt Undogmatized. Principia: Revista Internacional de Epistemologia 4 (2):187-214.
    It has become almost a conventional wisdom to argue that Cartesian scepticism poses a far more radical sceptical threat than its classical Pyrrhonian counterpart. Such a view fails to recognise, however, that there is a species of sceptical concern that can only plausibly be regarded as captured by the Pyrrhonian strategy. For whereas Cartesian scepticism is closely tied to the contentious doctrine of epistemological internalism, it is far from obvious that Pyrrhonian scepticism bears any such theoretical commitments. It is argued (...)
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  11. added 2015-03-27
    Pierre Bourdieu (1996). Understanding. Theory, Culture and Society 13 (2):17-37.
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  12. added 2015-03-26
    David Godden (forthcoming). On the Priority of Agent-Based Argumentative Norms. Topoi:1-13.
    This paper argues against the priority of pure, virtue-based accounts of argumentative norms [VA]. Such accounts are agent-based and committed to the priority thesis: good arguments and arguing well are explained in terms of some prior notion of the virtuous arguer arguing virtuously. Two problems with the priority thesis are identified. First, the definitional problem: virtuous arguers arguing virtuously are neither sufficient nor necessary for good arguments. Second, the priority problem: the goodness of arguments is not explained virtuistically. Instead, being (...)
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  13. added 2015-03-26
    Matthew Harrison-Trainor, Wesley H. Holliday & Thomas F. Icard (forthcoming). A Note on Cancellation Axioms for Comparative Probability. Theory and Decision.
    We prove that the generalized cancellation axiom for incomplete comparative probability relations introduced by Rios Insua (1992) and Alon and Lehrer (2014) is stronger than the standard cancellation axiom for complete comparative probability relations introduced by Scott (1964), relative to their other axioms for comparative probability in both the finite and infinite cases. This result has been suggested but not proved in the previous literature.
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  14. added 2015-03-26
    David Godden & Frank Zenker (2015). Denying Antecedents and Affirming Consequents: The State of the Art. Informal Logic 35 (1):88-134.
    Recent work on conditional reasoning argues that denying the antecedent [DA] and affirming the consequent [AC] are defeasible but cogent patterns of argument, either because they are effective, rational, albeit heuristic applications of Bayesian probability, or because they are licensed by the principle of total evidence. Against this, we show that on any prevailing interpretation of indicative conditionals the premises of DA and AC arguments do not license their conclusions without additional assumptions. The cogency of DA and AC inferences rather (...)
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  15. added 2015-03-26
    David Godden (2012). Rethinking the Debriefing Paradigm: The Rationality of Belief Perseverance. Logos and Episteme 3:51-74.
    By examining particular cases of belief perseverance following the undermining of their original evidentiary grounds, this paper considers two theories of rational belief revision: foundation and coherence. Gilbert Harman has argued for coherence over foundationalism on the grounds that the foundations theory absurdly deems most of our beliefs to be not rationally held. A consequence of the unacceptability of foundationalism is that belief perseverance is rational. This paper defends the intuitive judgement that belief perseverance is irrational by offering a competing (...)
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  16. added 2015-03-26
    David Godden & William H. Brenner (2010). Wittgenstein and the Logic of Deep Disagreement. Cogency: Journal of Reasoning and Argumentation 2:41-80.
    In “The logic of deep disagreements” (Informal Logic, 1985), Robert Fogelin claimed that there is a kind of disagreement – deep disagreement – which is, by its very nature, impervious to rational resolution. He further claimed that these two views are attributable to Wittgenstein. Following an exposition and discussion of that claim, we review and draw some lessons from existing responses in the literature to Fogelin’s claims. In the final two sections (6 and 7) we explore the role reason can, (...)
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  17. added 2015-03-26
    David Godden (2010). Corroborative Evidence. In Chris Reed & Christopher W. Tindale (eds.), Dialectics, dialogue and argumentation: An examination of Douglas Walton's theories of reasoning and argument. College Publications. 201-212.
    Corroborative evidence can have a dual function in argument whereby not only does it have a primary function of providing direct evidence supporting the main conclusion, but it also has a secondary, bolstering function which increases the probative value of some other piece of evidence in the argument. It has been argued (Redmayne, 2000) that this double function gives rise to the fallacy of double counting whereby the probative weight of evidence is overvalued by counting it twice. Walton has proposed (...)
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  18. added 2015-03-26
    Nick Tosh (2009). Agnotology: The Making and Unmaking of Ignorance. [REVIEW] British Journal for the History of Science 42 (4):615-616.
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  19. added 2015-03-26
    Bjørn Jespersen (2008). Knowing That P Rather Than Q. Sorites 20:125-134.
    I offer a two-tiered critique of epistemological contrastivism as developed by Jonathan Schaffer. First, I investigate the cornerstone of contrastivism, the notion of knowing the selected proposition p rather than the eliminated, or contrast, proposition q. Contrastivism imposes the ternicity constraint that the knowledge relation should span a knower and two propositions. However, contrastivism has yet to explain how to square this constraint with the required contrast between the selected and the eliminated propositions, and it is not immediately obvious how (...)
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  20. added 2015-03-26
    Robert Hudson (2007). The Empirical Basis To Skepticism. Minerva 11:101-112.
    Broadly speaking, there are two different ways in which one might defend skepticism – an a priori wayand an empirical way. My first task in this paper is to defend the view that the preferred way to defendskepticism is empirical. My second task is to explain why this approach actually makes sense. Iaccomplish this latter task by responding to various criticisms one might advance against the possibilityof empirically defending skepticism. In service of this response, I distinguish between two differentkinds of (...)
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  21. added 2015-03-26
    Kent Staley (2007). No Easy Answers: Science and the Pursuit of Knowledge. [REVIEW] British Journal for the History of Science 40 (3):455-457.
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  22. added 2015-03-26
    David Godden (2005). Deductivism as an Interpretative Strategy: A Reply to Groarke's Defense of Reconstructive Deductivism. Argumentation and Advocacy: Journal of the American Forensic Association 41:168-183.
    Deductivism has been variously presented as an evaluative thesis and as an interpretive one. I argue that deductivism fails as a universal evaluative thesis, and as such that its value as an interpretive thesis must be supported on other grounds. As a reconstructive strategy, deductivism is justified only on the grounds that an arguer is, or ought to be, aiming at the deductive standard of evidence. As such, the reconstruction of an argument as deductive must be supported by contextual and (...)
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  23. added 2015-03-26
    Wesley Cooper (2004). Tracking, Reliabilism, And Possible Worlds. Minerva 8:114-131.
    Robert Nozick’s tracking account of knowledge is defended against Colin McGinn’s criticisms bydrawing on David Deutsch’s ’multiverse’ conception of possible worlds. Knowledge on the trackingaccount requires a ’method’ or ’way’ of believing. Exploiting this feature undercuts the apparent force of McGinn’s counter-examples.
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  24. added 2015-03-26
    Leslie Armour (2003). Being and Knowledge. Maritain Studies/Etudes Maritainiennes 19:71-84.
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  25. added 2015-03-26
    Ivor Grattan-Guinness (2003). Such Silver Currents: The Story of William and Lucy Clifford 1845–1929. [REVIEW] British Journal for the History of Science 36 (1):87-127.
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  26. added 2015-03-26
    Jussi Haukioja (2002). Water, Phlogiston, Brains, and Vats. Sorites 14:16-20.
    Ted Warfield has presented a new version of the Putnamian argument for the conclusion that we are not brains in a vat. This version is intended to avoid reliance on some questionable background assumptions which other versions have made. It seems that Warfield's argument fails, for reasons pointed out by Anthony Brueckner. However, in this paper I present a new version of the argument -- my version relies on assumptions no more objectionable than Warfield's, yet it is immune to Brueckner's (...)
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  27. added 2015-03-26
    E. Brandon (2002). Michael Williams And The Hypothetical World. Minerva 6:151-161.
    Michael Williams has frequently considered and rejected approaches to “our knowledge of the external world”that see it as the best explanation for certain features of experience.This paper examines the salience of his position to approaches such as Mackie’s that do not deny thepresentational directness of ordinary experience but do permit a gap between how things appear and how theyare that allows for sceptical doubts.Williams’ main argument is that, to do justice to its place in a foundationalist strategy, the external world (...)
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  28. added 2015-03-26
    Armando Cíntora (2002). Can a Localist and Descriptive Epistemological Naturalism Avoid Dogmatic Foundations? Sorites 14:42-56.
    It is argued that epistemological naturalism is the result of a holist thesis plus a high valuation of empirical science. Epistemological naturalism criticizes the sceptic for entertaining unjustified global doubts and naturalism tries to avoid scepticism by taking for granted as non problematic our background scientific knowledge and by recommending only a localist or piecemealist mending of our corpus of knowledge, these corrections will be motivated by limited and justified questions. It is argued that the epistemological naturalist: i) Cannot justify (...)
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  29. added 2015-03-26
    Silvio Pinto (2001). The Justification of Deduction. Sorites 13:33-47.
    According to Michael Dummett, deductive inference stands in need of justification which must be provided by the theory of meaning for natural language. Such a theory, he insists, should deliver an explanation for the two essential features of deduction: validity and fruitfulness. Dummett claims that only a molecularist theory of meaning could offer the desired justification. In this paper, I will consider and criticize his solution to the problem of the justification of deduction: the so-called molecular verificationist explanation. My aim (...)
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  30. added 2015-03-26
    Jeff Johnson (2001). Explanation, Evidence, And Mystical Experience. Minerva 5:63-93.
    This article argues that the testimony of mystics provides an interesting potential source of evidence fortheism. The model of inference to the best explanation is utilized to analyze and assess mystics’ testimony.It is argued that the evidential value of the reports from mystics, both within the theistic tradition and fromwithout, ultimately proves weak.
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  31. added 2015-03-26
    Douglas J. Den Uyl (1998). Virtues of the Mind: An Inquiry Into the Nature of Virtue and the Ethical Foundations of Knowledge. [REVIEW] Review of Metaphysics 51 (3):728-730.
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  32. added 2015-03-26
    M. Wise (1996). Trust in Numbers: The Pursuit of Objectivity in Science and Public Life. [REVIEW] British Journal for the History of Science 29 (2):246-247.
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  33. added 2015-03-26
    Peter Dear (1995). Trust Boyle. British Journal for the History of Science 28 (4):451-454.
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  34. added 2015-03-26
    James Thomas (1995). Connatural Knowledge. Maritain Studies/Etudes Maritainiennes 11:191-201.
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  35. added 2015-03-26
    Paul Ernest (1992). Social Epistemology. [REVIEW] Philosophy of Mathematics Education Journal 6.
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  36. added 2015-03-26
    Gilbert Harman (1982). Philosophy: Beliefs, Attitudes, and Justification. [REVIEW] Reason Papers 8:59-70.
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  37. added 2015-03-26
    L. S. W. (1981). The Claim of Reason: Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy. [REVIEW] Review of Metaphysics 34 (3):601-602.
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  38. added 2015-03-26
    Frederick Will (1976). On Universal Ignorance. [REVIEW] Reason Papers 3:99-107.
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  39. added 2015-03-26
    G. (1974). Objectivity in Social Science. [REVIEW] Review of Metaphysics 28 (2):343-343.
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  40. added 2015-03-26
    L. J. (1973). Probability and Evidence. [REVIEW] Review of Metaphysics 26 (3):523-524.
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  41. added 2015-03-26
    A. W. W. (1973). Knowing the Unknown God. [REVIEW] Review of Metaphysics 27 (1):129-130.
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  42. added 2015-03-26
    J. H. W. (1973). God Knowable and Unknowable. [REVIEW] Review of Metaphysics 27 (1):156-157.
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  43. added 2015-03-26
    G. H. B. (1973). Problems in the Theory of Knowledge. [REVIEW] Review of Metaphysics 26 (4):771-772.
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  44. added 2015-03-26
    A. C. D. (1973). The Theory of Knowledge of Vital du Four. [REVIEW] Review of Metaphysics 27 (1):143-144.
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  45. added 2015-03-26
    W. S. J. (1971). On Historical and Political Knowing. [REVIEW] Review of Metaphysics 25 (2):356-357.
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  46. added 2015-03-26
    T. A. (1971). Reality, Knowledge and Value: A Basic Introduction to Philosophy. [REVIEW] Review of Metaphysics 25 (2):368-369.
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  47. added 2015-03-26
    M. V. J. (1971). The Concept of Knowledge. [REVIEW] Review of Metaphysics 25 (2):350-350.
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  48. added 2015-03-26
    G. L. (1971). Philosophy and Science as Modes of Knowing. [REVIEW] Review of Metaphysics 24 (4):764-765.
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  49. added 2015-03-26
    T. K. (1971). Belief, Existence, and Meaning. [REVIEW] Review of Metaphysics 24 (4):749-750.
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  50. added 2015-03-26
    J. E. J. (1970). The Epistemology of G. E. Moore. [REVIEW] Review of Metaphysics 23 (3):558-558.
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1 — 50 / 271