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Epistemology

Edited by Matthew McGrath (University of Missouri, Columbia)
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  1. added 2016-06-28
    Nathan Ballantyne (2015). Debunking Biased Thinkers. Journal of the American Philosophical Association 1 (1):141--162.
    ABSTRACT ABSTRACT: Most of what we believe comes to us from the word of others, but we do not always believe what we are told. We often reject thinkers’ reports by attributing biases to them. We may call this debunking. In this essay, I consider how debunking might work and then examine whether, and how often, it can help to preserve rational belief in the face of disagreement.
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  2. added 2016-06-28
    Tad Brennan (1994). Criterion and Appearance in Sextus Empiricus: The Scope of Sceptical Doubt, the Status of Sceptical Belief. Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies 39:151-169.
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  3. added 2016-06-27
    Nasim Mahoozi & Thomas Mormann, Not Much Higher-Order Vagueness in Williamson’s ’Logic of Clarity’.
    This paper deals with higher-order vagueness in Williamson's 'logic of clarity'. Its aim is to prove that for 'fixed margin models' (W,d,α ,[ ]) the notion of higher-order vagueness collapses to second-order vagueness. First, it is shown that fixed margin models can be reformulated in terms of similarity structures (W,~). The relation ~ is assumed to be reflexive and symmetric, but not necessarily transitive. Then, it is shown that the structures (W,~) come along with naturally defined maps h and s (...)
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  4. added 2016-06-27
    C. Kelp & M. Simion (forthcoming). Criticism and Blame in Action and Assertion. Journal of Philosophy.
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  5. added 2016-06-27
    C. Kelp (2016). Towards a Knowledge-Based Account of Understanding. In S. Grimm, C. Baumberger & S. Ammon (eds.), Explaining Understanding. Routledge
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  6. added 2016-06-27
    C. Kelp (2016). Epistemic Frankfurt Cases Revisited. American Philosophical Quarterly 53:27-37.
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  7. added 2016-06-27
    C. Kelp & H. Ghijsen (2016). Perceptual Justification: Factive Reasons and Fallible Virtues. In C. Mi, M. Slote & E. Sosa (eds.), Moral and Intellectual Virtues in Western and Chinese Philosophy. Routledge
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  8. added 2016-06-27
    César Schirmer dos Santos (2015). Self-Knowledge and Epistemic Virtues: Between Reliabilism and Responsibilism. Veritas: Revista de Filosofia da PUCRS 60 (3):579-593.
    This paper is about the role of self-knowledge in the cognitive life of a virtuous knower. The main idea is that it is hard to know ourselves because introspection is an unreliable epistemic source, and reason can be a source of insidious forms of self-deception. Nevertheless, our epistemic situation is such that an epistemically responsible agent must be constantly looking for a better understanding of her own character traits and beliefs, under the risk of jeopardizing her own status as a (...)
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  9. added 2016-06-27
    C. Kelp (2014). Two for the Knowledge Goal of Inquiry. American Philosophical Quarterly 51:227-32.
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  10. added 2016-06-27
    C. Kelp (2014). Knowledge, Understanding and Virtue. In A. Fairweather (ed.), Virtue Scientia. Virtue Epistemology and Philosophy of Science. Springer
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  11. added 2016-06-25
    Emmalon Davis (2016). Typecasts, Tokens, and Spokespersons: A Case for Credibility Excess as Testimonial Injustice. Hypatia 31 (2):n/a-n/a.
    Miranda Fricker maintains that testimonial injustice is a matter of credibility deficit, not excess. In this article, I argue that this restricted characterization of testimonial injustice is too narrow. I introduce a type of identity-prejudicial credibility excess that harms its targets qua knowers and transmitters of knowledge. I show how positive stereotyping and prejudicially inflated credibility assessments contribute to the continued epistemic oppression of marginalized knowers. In particular, I examine harms such as typecasting, compulsory representation, and epistemic exploitation and consider (...)
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  12. added 2016-06-24
    V. T. Cheshko, L. V. Ivanitskaya & V. I. Glazko (2016). EVOLUTIONARY RISK OF HIGH HUME TECHNOLOGIES. Article 3. EVOLUTIONARY SEMANTICS AND BIOETHICS. Integrative Annthropology (1):21-27.
    The co-evolutionary concept of three-modal stable evolutionary strategy of Homo sapiens is developed. The concept based on the principle of evolutionary complementarity of anthropogenesis: value of evolutionary risk and evolutionary path of human evolution are defined by descriptive (evolutionary efficiency) and creative-teleological (evolutionary correctness) parameters simultaneously, that cannot be instrumental reduced to other ones. Resulting volume of both parameters define the vectors of biological, social, cultural and techno-rationalistic human evolution by two gear mechanism — genetic and cultural co-evolution and techno-humanitarian (...)
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  13. added 2016-06-24
    Juliano Santos do Carmo & Eduardo Ferreira das Neves Filho (2015). Wittgenstein: Uma Solução Fundacionista ao Problema do Regresso Epistêmico. Revista Dissertatio de Filosofia:109-127.
    As notas que compõem a obra Da Certeza (Über Gewissheit) expressam nitidamente a preocupação de Ludwig Wittgenstein com os problemas clássicos da epistemologia, em especial o uso dos termos epistêmicos tradicionais e os erros costumeiros dos filósofos que negligenciam suas profundas estruturas gramaticais. Em diversas passagens é fácil observar a tentativa de esclarecer os erros de realistas, idealistas e céticos no que diz respeito às nossas alegações ordinárias de conhecimento em contextos céticos moderados. A questão do ceticismo sobre a justificação (...)
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  14. added 2016-06-24
    V. T. Cheshko, L. V. Ivanitskaya & V. I. Glazko (2015). EVOLUTIONARY RISK OF HIGH HUME TECHNOLOGIES. Article 2. THE GENESIS AND MECHANISMS OF EVOLUTIONARY RISK. Integrative Anthropology (1):4-15.
    Sources of evolutionary risk for stable strategy of adaptive Homo sapiens are an imbalance of: (1) the intra-genomic co-evolution (intragenomic conflicts); (2) the gene-cultural co-evolution; (3) inter-cultural co-evolution; (4) techno-humanitarian balance; (5) inter-technological conflicts (technological traps). At least phenomenologically the components of the evolutionary risk are reversible, but in the aggregate they are in potentio irreversible destructive ones for biosocial, and cultural self-identity of Homo sapiens. When the actual evolution is the subject of a rationalist control and/or manipulation, the magnitude (...)
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  15. added 2016-06-24
    David Papineau, David Macarthur, Mario De Caro, Juliano Santos do Carmo, Ruth Garret Millikan, Clademir Araldi, Flávia Carvalho, Evandro Barbosa, Fabrício Pontin, Thomas Sukopp, José Eduardo Porcher, João Hobuss, Susana Nuccetelli, Jack Ritchie, Nythamar Oliveira, Felipe Karasek, Adriano Naves de Brito, Sofia Stein & Luis Rosa (eds.) (2015). A Companion to Naturalism. NEPFIL Online | Dissertatio's Series of Philosophy.
    Offering a engaging and accessible portrait of the current state of the field, A Companion to Naturaslim shows students how to think about the relation between Philosophy and Science, and why is both essencial and fascinating to do so. All the authors in this collection reconsider the core questions in Philosophical Naturalism in light of the challenges raised in Contemporary Philosophy. They explore how philosophical questions are connected to vigorous current debates - including complex questions about metaphysics, semantics, religion, intentionality, (...)
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  16. added 2016-06-24
    V. T. Cheshko, L. V. Ivanitskaya & V. I. Glazko (2014). EVOLUTIONARY RISK OF HIGH HUME TECHNOLOGIES. Article 1. STABLE ADAPTIVE STRATEGY OF HOMO SAPIENS. Integrative Anthropology (2):4-14.
    Stable adaptive strategy of Homo sapiens (SASH) is a result of the integration in the three-module fractal adaptations based on three independent processes of generation, replication, and the implementation of adaptations — genetic, socio-cultural and symbolic ones. The evolutionary landscape SASH is a topos of several evolutionary multi-dimensional vectors: 1) extraversional projective-activity behavioral intention (adaptive inversion 1), 2) mimesis (socio-cultural inheritance), 3) social (Machiavellian) intelligence, 4) the extension of inter-individual communication beyond their own social groups and their own species in (...)
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  17. added 2016-06-23
    Wendell Allan Marinay (2015). Emmanuel Kant's Theory of Knowledge: Exploring the Relation Between Sensibility and Understanding. The Pelican 7:56-66.
    Kant mentions two faculties of the mind that are involved in the knowing process, namely, sensibility and understanding. Through the former, the objects are “given” while through the latter, objects are “thought of.” The receiving faculty, that of sensibility, deals with space and time as pure intuitions. On the other, the thinking faculty - that of understanding, treats concepts or categories. Thus, these faculties of the human reason presuppose the two elements of knowledge: contents or intuitions and thoughts or concepts (...)
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  18. added 2016-06-22
    Cameron Boult (forthcoming). Epistemic Conditions on "Ought": E=K as a Case Study. Acta Analytica.
    In The Norm of Belief, John Gibbons claims that there is a “natural reaction” to the general idea that one can be normatively required to Ø when that requirement is in some sense outside of one’s first person perspective or inaccessible to one. The reaction amounts to the claim that this isn’t possible. Whether this is a natural or intuitive idea or not, it is difficult to articulate exactly why we might think it is correct. To do so, we need (...)
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  19. added 2016-06-22
    Marcus McGahhey & Neil Van Leeuwen (forthcoming). Interpreting Intuitions. In Julie Kirsch Patrizia Pedrini (ed.), Third-Person Self-Knowledge, Self-Interpretation, and Narrative. Springer
    We argue that many intuitions do not have conscious propositional contents. In particular, many of the intuitions had in response to philosophical thought experiments, like Gettier cases, do not have such contents. They are more like hunches, urgings, murky feelings, and twinges. Our view thus goes against the received view of intuitions in philosophy, which we call Mainstream Propositionalism. Our positive view is that many thought-experimental intuitions are conscious, spontaneous, non-theoretical, non-propositional psychological states that often motivate belief revision, but they (...)
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  20. added 2016-06-22
    Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting, If You Justifiably Believe That You Ought To?, You Ought To?
    In this paper, we claim that, if you justifiably believe that you ought to perform some act, it follows that you ought to perform that act. In the first half, we argue for this claim by reflection on what makes for correct reasoning from beliefs about what you ought to do. In the second half, we consider a number of objections to this argument and its conclusion. In doing so, we arrive at another argument for the view that justified beliefs (...)
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  21. added 2016-06-21
    Alexander Greenberg & Christopher Cowie (forthcoming). Is the Norm on Belief Evaluative? A Response to McHugh. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
    We respond to Conor McHugh’s claim that an evaluative account of the normative relation between belief and truth is preferable to a prescriptive account. We claim that his arguments fail to establish this. We then draw a more general sceptical conclusion: we take our arguments to put pressure on any attempt to show that an evaluative account will fare better than a prescriptive account. We briefly express scepticism about whether McHugh’s more recent ‘fitting attitude’ account fares better.
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  22. added 2016-06-21
    Stephen Biggs & Jessica Wilson (2016). The a Priority of Abduction. Philosophical Studies:1-24.
    Here we challenge the orthodoxy according to which abduction is an a posteriori mode of inference. We start by providing a case study illustrating how abduction can justify a philosophical claim not justifiable by empirical evidence alone. While many grant abduction's epistemic value, nearly all assume that abductive justification is a posteriori, on grounds that our belief in abduction's epistemic value depends on empirical evidence about how the world contingently is. Contra this assumption, we argue, first, that our belief in (...)
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  23. added 2016-06-20
    Stephen C. Sanders, A Defense of Modest Foundationalism.
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  24. added 2016-06-19
    Clayton Littlejohn (forthcoming). Do Reasons and Evidence Share the Same Residence? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    This is part of an authors meets critics session on Daniel Star's wonderful book, Knowing Better. I discuss a potential problem with Kearns and Star's Reasons as Evidence thesis. The issue has to do with the difficulties we face is we treat normative reasons as evidence and impose no possession conditions on evidence. On such a view, it's hard to see how practical reasoning could be a non-monotonic process. One way out of the difficulty would be to allow for (potent) (...)
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  25. added 2016-06-19
    Ray Scott Percival (1999). Appeal to the Court of Experience. [REVIEW] Times Higher Education.
    Geoffrey Stokes's introduction to Karl Popper's work portrays it as an evolving system of ideas and aims to explore the little-understood intricate logical relationships between Popper's work on scientific method and his philosophy of politics. It is one of the few books to cover the debate between Popper and the Frankfurt School. Characteristic of many of Stokes's "criticisms" is that they are presented as Popper "admitting" or "granting" them - as if Popper was not the one who originally raised and (...)
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  26. added 2016-06-18
    Ori Freiman (2016). Review: Cass R. Sunstein. Conspiracy Theories and Other Dangerous Ideas. 304 Pp. Simon & Schuster, 2014. [REVIEW] Spontaneous Generations 8 (1):100-104.
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  27. added 2016-06-17
    Marc-Kevin Daoust (forthcoming). Tolérance libérale et délibération : l'apport de la neutralité scientifique. Les ateliers de l'éthique/The Ethics Forum 10 (3).
    Cet article poursuit la réflexion de Dilhac (2014) touchant la relation entre politique et vérité. Au terme d’une analyse de la tolérance chez Mill et Popper, Dilhac conclut qu’une conception épistémique de la tolérance manque sa dimension politique, et qu’il est préférable d’opter pour le concept rawlsien de consensus raisonnable. Discutant ces résultats, le premier objectif est ici de montrer qu’une notion de « raisonnabilité » peut facilement trouver ses racines dans la neutralité scientifique wébérienne, et donc être porteuse d’une (...)
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  28. added 2016-06-17
    Viatcheslav Vetrov (2016). Von Schweinen im Kraut und Läufen mit Hindernissen: Ein Versuch über die Ironie in Max Webers China-Studie (On Pigs in the Weeds and Obstacle Courses: Approaching Irony in Max Weber's Study on China. An anthropological reading). Saeculum: Jahrbuch Für Universalgeschichte 65 (2):321-348.
    Objectivity is one of the central themes in Max Weber's work. Weber criticizes uncontrolled mixing up of thought and feeling which is to be avoided in investigations of cultures. At the same time he is convinced that any cultural study is necessarily an expression of some "one-sided points of view" espoused by scholars. This consideration is crucial for Max Weber's method. The present study analyzes the application of Max Weber's methodology to his study on China. Special attention is paid to (...)
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  29. added 2016-06-17
    Ray Scott Percival (2016). Does the New Classicism Need Evolutionary Theory? In Elizabeth Millán (ed.), After the Avant-Gardes: Reflections on the Future of the Fine Arts. 109 - 125.
    Drawing on work on modularity of mind and evolutionary psychology, I explore how evolutionary theory may support a return to classical artistic standards (the new classicism). At the same time, I argue for much that is admirable in the avant garde. I connect this question to the theory of epistemology and aesthetic biases, suggesting that aesthetics embody evolved knowledge.
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  30. added 2016-06-16
    Terence Cuneo & Christos Kyriacou (forthcoming). Defending the Moral/Epistemic Parity. In C. McHugh J. Way & D. Whiting (eds.), Metaepistemology.
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  31. added 2016-06-15
    Fabian Dorsch (2011). Experience and Reason. Rero Doc.
    This collection brings together a selection of my recently published or forthcoming articles. What unites them is their common concern with one of the central ambitions of philosophy, namely to get clearer about our first-personal perspective onto the world and our minds. Three aspects of that perspective are of particular importance: consciousness, intentionality, and rationality. The collected essays address metaphysical and epistemological questions both concerning the nature of each of these aspects and concerning the various connections among them. More generally, (...)
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  32. added 2016-06-14
    Sophie Horowitz (forthcoming). Epistemic Value and the Jamesian Goals. In Jeffrey Dunn Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij (ed.), Epistemic Consequentialism. Oxford University Press
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  33. added 2016-06-14
    Fabian Dorsch (forthcoming). The Phenomenal Presence of Perceptual Reasons. In Fabian Dorsch & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Phenomenal Presence. Oxford University Press
    Doxasticism about our awareness of normative (i.e. justifying) reasons – the view that we can recognise reasons for forming attitudes or performing actions only by means of normative judgements or beliefs – is incompatible with the following triad of claims: -/- (1) Being motivated (i.e. forming attitudes or performing actions for a motive) requires responding to and, hence, recognising a relevant reason. -/- (2) Infants are capable of being motivated. -/- (3) Infants are incapable of normative judgement or belief. -/- (...)
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  34. added 2016-06-13
    Michael Starks, A Master Wittgensteinian Surveys Human Nature--A Review of Peter Hacker 'Human Nature-the Categorial Framework' (2012).
    Materialism, reductionism, behaviorism, functionalism, dynamic systems theory and computationalism are popular views, but they were shown by Wittgenstein to be incoherent. The study of behavior encompasses all of human life but behavior is largely automatic and unconscious and even the conscious part, mostly expressed in language (which Wittgenstein equates with the mind), is not perspicuous, so it is critical to have a framework which Searle calls the Logical Structure of Rationality (LSR) and I call the Descriptive Psychology of Higher Order (...)
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  35. added 2016-06-13
    Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting (2016). If You Justifiably Believe That You Ought to Φ, You Ought to Φ. Philosophical Studies 173 (7):1873-1895.
    In this paper, we claim that, if you justifiably believe that you ought to perform some act, it follows that you ought to perform that act. In the first half, we argue for this claim by reflection on what makes for correct reasoning from beliefs about what you ought to do. In the second half, we consider a number of objections to this argument and its conclusion. In doing so, we arrive at another argument for the view that justified beliefs (...)
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  36. added 2016-06-12
    Michael Starks, Do Our Automated Unconscious Behaviors Reveal Our Real Selves and Hidden Truths About the Universe? -- A Review of David Hawkins ‘Power Vs Force-the Hidden Determinants of Human Behavior –Author’s Official Authoritative Edition’ 412p(2012)(Original Edition 1995).
    I am very used to strange books and special people but Hawkins stands out due to his use of a simple technique for testing muscle tension as a key to the “truth” of any kind of statement whatsoever—i.e., not just to whether the person being tested believes it, but whether it is really true! What is well known is that people will show automatic, unconscious physiological and psychological responses to just about anything they are exposed to—images, sounds, touch, odors, ideas, (...)
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  37. added 2016-06-12
    Michael Starks, What Do Paraconsistent, Undecidable, Random, Computable and Incomplete Mean? A Review of Godel's Way: Exploits Into an Undecidable World by Gregory Chaitin, Francisco A Doria , Newton C.A. Da Costa 160p (2012).
    In ‘Godel’s Way’ three eminent scientists discuss issues such as undecidability, incompleteness, randomness, computability and paraconsistency. I approach these issues from the Wittgensteinian viewpoint that there are two basic issues which have completely different solutions. There are the scientific or empirical issues, which are facts about the world that need to be investigated observationally and philosophical issues as to how language can be used intelligibly (which include certain questions in mathematics and logic), which need to be decided by looking at (...)
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  38. added 2016-06-12
    James Hutton (1794). Investigation of the Principles of Knowledge. A. Strahan, and T. Cadell.
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  39. added 2016-06-09
    Michael J. Shaffer (forthcoming). “Filling In”, Thought Experiments and Intuitions. Episteme.
    Recently Timothy Williamson (2007) has argued that characterizations of the standard (i.e. intuition-based) philosophical practice of philosophical analysis are misguided because of the erroneous manner in which this practice has been understood. In doing so he implies that experimental critiques of the reliability of intuition are based on this misunderstanding of philosophical methodology and so have little or no bearing on actual philosophical practice or results. His main point is that the orthodox understanding of philosophical methodology is incorrect in that (...)
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  40. added 2016-06-08
    Neil Sinhababu (forthcoming). In Defense of Partisanship. In David Killoren, Emily Crookston & Jonathan Trerise (eds.), Ethics in Politics: New Papers on the Rights and Obligations of Political Agents. Routledge
    This essay explains why partisanship is justified in contemporary America and environments with similar voting systems and coalition structures. It explains how political parties operate, how helping a party succeed can be a goal of genuine ethical significance, and how trusting one party while mistrusting another can be a reliable route to true belief about important political issues.
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  41. added 2016-06-07
    Cameron Boult (forthcoming). Excusing Prospective Agents. Logos and Episteme.
    Blameless norm violation in young children is an underexplored phenomenon in epistemology. An understanding of it is important for accounting for the full range of normative standings at issue in debates about epistemic norms, and the internalism-externalism debate generally. More specifically, it is important for proponents of factive epistemic norms. I examine this phenomenon and put forward a positive proposal. I claim that we should think of the normative dimension of certain actions and attitudes of young children in terms of (...)
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  42. added 2016-06-07
    Cameron Boult (forthcoming). Review of Naturalizing Epistemic Virtue. [REVIEW] Journal of Moral Philosophy.
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  43. added 2016-06-07
    Luca Sciortino (2016). On Ian Hacking’s Notion of Style of Reasoning. Erkenntnis:1-22.
    The analytical notion of ‘scientific style of reasoning’, introduced by Ian Hacking in the middle of the 1980s, has become widespread in the literature of the history and philosophy of science. However, scholars have rarely made explicit the philosophical assumptions and the research objectives underlying the notion of style: what are its philosophical roots? How does the notion of style fit into the area of research of historical epistemology? What does a comparison between Hacking’s project on styles of thinking and (...)
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  44. added 2016-06-07
    Luca Sciortino (2016). E Pluribus Unum: gli Stili del Pensiero Scientifico. Prometeo 133 (34):22-29.
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  45. added 2016-06-06
    Nicholas Southwood (forthcoming). The Motivation Question. Philosophical Studies.
    How does it happen that our beliefs about what we ought to do cause us to intend to do what we believe we ought to do? This is what John Broome calls the "motivation question." Broome’s answer to the motivation question is that we can bring ourselves, by our own efforts, to intend to do what we believe we ought to do by exercising a special agential capacity: the capacity to engage in what he calls enkratic reasoning. My aim is (...)
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  46. added 2016-06-04
    Wesley H. Holliday (forthcoming). Knowledge, Time, and Paradox: Introducing Sequential Epistemic Logic. In Hans van Ditmarsch & Gabriel Sandu (eds.), Outstanding Contributions to Logic: Jaakko Hintikka. Springer
    Epistemic logic in the tradition of Hintikka provides, as one of its many applications, a toolkit for the precise analysis of certain epistemological problems. In recent years, dynamic epistemic logic has expanded this toolkit. Dynamic epistemic logic has been used in analyses of well-known epistemic “paradoxes”, such as the Paradox of the Surprise Examination and Fitch’s Paradox of Knowability, and related epistemic phenomena, such as what Hintikka called the “anti-performatory effect” of Moorean announcements. In this paper, we explore a variation (...)
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  47. added 2016-06-04
    Fraser Macbride (2014). THE TRANSCENDENTAL METAPHYSIC OF G.F. STOUT: HIS DEFENCE AND ELABORATION OF TROPE THEORY. In A. Reboul (ed.), Mind, Value and Metaphysics: Papers Dedicated to Kevin Mulligan. Springer 141-58.
    G. F. Stout is famous as an early twentieth century proselyte for abstract particulars, or tropes as they are now often called. He advanced his version of trope theory to avoid the excesses of nominalism on the one hand and realism on the other. But his arguments for tropes have been widely misconceived as metaphysical, e.g. by Armstrong. In this paper, I argue that Stout’s fundamental arguments for tropes were ideological and epistemological rather than metaphysical. He moulded his scheme to (...)
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  48. added 2016-06-03
    James Andow (forthcoming). Abduction by Philosophers: Reorienting Philosophical Methodology. Metaphilosophy.
    A reorientation is needed in methodological debate about the role of intuitions in philosophy. Methodological debate has lost sight of the reason why it makes sense to focus on questions about intuitions when thinking about the methods or epistemology of philosophy. The problem is an approach to methodology which gives a near exclusive focus to questions about some evidential role that intuitions may or may not play in philosophers' arguments. A new approach is needed. Approaching methodological questions about the role (...)
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  49. added 2016-06-03
    Annalisa Coliva & Danièle Moyal-Sharrock (2016). Introduction: Hinge Epistemology. International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 6 (2-3):73-78.
    _ Source: _Volume 6, Issue 2-3, pp 73 - 78 This introduction gives a summary of the content of the special issue _Hinge Epistemology_, grouping the papers in three sections: more exegetical accounts of Wittgenstein’s notion of hinge certainties and their bearing on a theory of justification and knowledge as well as on the topic of external world scepticism; papers critical of the very notion of hinge certainty; and papers that apply the notion to various areas of epistemology and compare (...)
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  50. added 2016-06-03
    Annalisa Coliva (2016). Which Hinge Epistemology? International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 6 (2-3):79-96.
    _ Source: _Volume 6, Issue 2-3, pp 79 - 96 The paper explores the idea of a “hinge epistemology,” considered as a theory about justification which gives center-stage to Wittgenstein’s notion of _hinges_. First, some basic methodological considerations regarding the relationship between merely exegetical work on Wittgenstein’s texts and more theoretically committed work are put forward. Then, the main problems raised in _On Certainty_ and the most influential interpretative lines it has given rise to so far are presented and discussed. (...)
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