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Epistemology

Edited by Matthew McGrath (University of Missouri, Columbia)
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  1. added 2015-02-28
    John Turri (2015). An Open and Shut Case: Epistemic Closure in the Manifest Image. Philosophers' Imprint 15 (2).
    The epistemic closure principle says that knowledge is closed under known entailment. The closure principle is deeply implicated in numerous core debates in contemporary epistemology. Closure’s opponents claim that there are good theoretical reasons to abandon it. Closure’s proponents claim that it is a defining feature of ordinary thought and talk and, thus, abandoning it is radically revisionary. But evidence for these claims about ordinary practice has thus far been anecdotal. In this paper, I report five studies on the status (...)
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  2. added 2015-02-28
    Federico Luzzi (2014). What Does Knowledge-Yielding Deduction Require Of Its Premises? Episteme 11 (3):261-275.
    According to the principle of Knowledge Counter-Closure , knowledge-yielding single-premise deduction requires a known premise: if S believes q solely on the basis of deduction from p, and S knows q, then S must know p. Although prima facie plausible, widely accepted, and supported by seemingly compelling motivations, KCC has recently been challenged by cases where S arguably knows q solely on the basis of deduction from p, yet p is false or p is true but not known . I (...)
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  3. added 2015-02-28
    K. Wray (2003). What Really Divides Gilbert and the Rejectionists? ProtoSociology: An International Journal of Interdisciplinary Research 18.
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  4. added 2015-02-28
    Robert J. O'Hara (1994). Vita: Chauncey Wright—Brief Life of an "Indolent Genius": 1830–1875. Harvard Magazine 96 (4): 42–43.
    Chauncey Wright (1830–1874) was one of the first American philosophers to explore the implications of Charles Darwin's work in evolutionary biology. Wright became a strong supporter of the idea of natural selection and a strong critic of the anti-selectionist and teleological arguments of St. George Jackson Mivart and Herbert Spencer, and he laid the groundwork for the field that is today called evolutionary epistemology. As the mentor of the original Cambridge "Metaphysical Club" (William James, Charles Sanders Peirce, and Oliver Wendell (...)
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  5. added 2015-02-27
    Uri D. Leibowitz (forthcoming). Moral Deliberation and Ad Hominem Fallacies. Journal of Moral Philosophy.
    Many of us read Peter Singer’s work on our obligations to those in desperate need with our students. Famously, Singer argues that we have a moral obligation to give a significant portion of our assets to famine relief. If my own experience is not atypical, it is quite common for students, upon grasping the implications of Singer’s argument, to ask whether Singer gives to famine relief. In response it might be tempting to remind students of the (so called) ad hominem (...)
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  6. added 2015-02-26
    Ilya Kasavin (forthcoming). Philosophical Realism: The Challenges for Social Epistemologists. Social Epistemology:1-14.
    Social epistemology assumes a justification as a realist philosophy in both dealing with cognitive and ontological matters, and providing a profound and refined picture of knowledge and reality. Compared to scientific realism, social epistemology’s advantage consists of grasping the variety of conditions and circumstances influencing the cognitive process. Social epistemology also provides limitations for naturalism in offering a genuine philosophical vision of knowledge and reality. From a social epistemological perspective, extreme forms of defending scientific realism are considered especially relevant as (...)
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  7. added 2015-02-25
    Steven Bland (forthcoming). Circularity, Scepticism and Epistemic Relativism. Social Epistemology:1-13.
    It would seem that an epistemic framework can be justified only by means of a non-circular argument that establishes its truth-conduciveness. The problem of epistemic circularity suggests that no such argument is possible. Externalists and particularists have addressed the problem of scepticism by claiming that epistemically circular arguments can establish the truth-conduciveness of a framework’s epistemic methods. However, since these arguments are available for a good many frameworks, this response does nothing to answer the threat of epistemic relativism. The purpose (...)
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  8. added 2015-02-24
    Daniel Eaton & Timothy Pickavance (forthcoming). Wagering on Pragmatic Encroachment. In Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion. Oxford.
    Lately, there has been an explosion of literature exploring the the relationship between one’s practical situation and one’s knowledge. Some involved in this discussion have suggested that facts about a person’s practical situation might affect whether or not a person knows in that situation, holding fixed all the things standardly associated with knowledge (like evidence, the reliability of one’s cognitive faculties, and so on). According to these “pragmatic encroachment” views, then, one’s practical situation encroaches on one’s knowledge. Though we won’t (...)
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  9. added 2015-02-23
    Teresa Marques, Desacordo. Compêndio Em Linha de Problemas de Filosofia Analítica.
    Discordamos sobre todo o tipo de coisas: o que existe, como as coisas funcionam, o que fazer, de que gostamos, etc. Entre os vários tipos de desacordo discutidos em debates filosóficos contemporâneos encontram-se os desacordos irrepreensíveis, os desacordos meramente verbais, e os desacordos entre pares. Os diferentes tipos de desacordo dão lugar a diversos problemas filosóficos. Há filósofos defendem que se o desacordo sobre uma questão é irrepreensível, então talvez não haja verdades objectivas sobre essa questão, e que se um (...)
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  10. added 2015-02-23
    Jeremy Howick, Ashley Graham Kennedy & Alexander Mebius, Philosophy of Evidence Based Medicine (Oxford Bibliography: Http://Www.Oxfordbibliographies.Com/View/Document/Obo-9780195396577/Obo-9780195396577-0253.Xml). Oxford Bibliography.
    Since its introduction just over two decades ago, evidence-based medicine (EBM) has come to dominate medical practice, teaching, and policy. There are a growing number of textbooks, journals, and websites dedicated to EBM research, teaching, and evidence dissemination. EBM was most recently defined as a method that integrates best research evidence with clinical expertise and patient values and circumstances in the treatment of patients. There have been debates throughout the early 21st century about what counts as good research evidence between (...)
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  11. added 2015-02-21
    Eric T. Kerr & J. Adam Carter (forthcoming). Richard Rorty and Epistemic Normativity. Social Epistemology:1-22.
    The topic of epistemic normativity has come to the fore of recent work in epistemology, and so naturally, theories of knowledge, truth and justification have been increasingly held accountable to preserving normative epistemological platitudes. Central to discussions of epistemic normativity are questions about epistemic agency and epistemic value. Here, our aim is to take up some of these issues as they come to bear on the rather unconventional brand of epistemology that was defended by Richard Rorty. Our purpose is to (...)
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  12. added 2015-02-21
    Adam Riggio (forthcoming). Lessons for the Relationship of Philosophy and Science From the Legacy of Henri Bergson. Social Epistemology:1-14.
    One of the many narratives of twentieth century philosophy regards the relationship of philosophy to science: the opinions and arguments over whether philosophy as a discipline should be an assistant, critic, or master over science, and what particular ways philosophy could articulate these roles. One can interpret most of the major conflicts and disciplinary divisions of philosophy as having to do with its relationship with science. The conceptual roots of the general acceptability of a convergence of science and metaphysics would (...)
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  13. added 2015-02-21
    Benjamin W. McCraw (forthcoming). The Nature of Epistemic Trust. Social Epistemology:1-18.
    This paper offers an analysis of the nature of epistemic trust . With increased philosophical attention to social epistemology in general and testimony in particular, the role for an epistemic or intellectual version of trust has loomed large in recent debates. But, too often, epistemologists talk about trust without really providing a sustained examination of the concept. After some introductory comments, I begin by addressing various components key to trust simpliciter. In particular, I examine what we might think of when (...)
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  14. added 2015-02-21
    Ian Werkheiser (forthcoming). Community Epistemic Capacity. Social Epistemology:1-20.
    Despite US policy documents which recommend that in areas of environmental risk, interaction between scientific experts and the public move beyond the so-called “Decide, Announce, and Defend model,” many current public involvement policies still do not guarantee meaningful public participation. In response to this problem, various attempts have been made to define what counts as sufficient or meaningful participation and free informed consent from those affected. Though defining “meaningfulness” is a complex task, this paper explores one under-examined dimension that concerns (...)
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  15. added 2015-02-21
    Seumas Miller (forthcoming). Joint Epistemic Action and Collective Moral Responsibility. Social Epistemology:1-23.
    In this paper, I explore the relationship between joint epistemic action and collective moral responsibility. Here, we need to distinguish between the genus, joint action, and an important species of joint action which I introduced in some earlier work, namely, joint epistemic action. In the case of the latter, but not necessarily the former, participating agents have epistemic goals, e.g. the acquisition of knowledge. The notion of joint action per se is a familiar one in the philosophical literature, albeit I (...)
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  16. added 2015-02-20
    Clayton Littlejohn (forthcoming). Knowledge and Awareness. Analysis.
    This paper takes a critical look at the idea that knowledge involves reflective access to reasons that provide rational support. After distinguishing between different kinds of awareness, I argue that the kind of awareness involved in awareness of reasons is awareness of something general rather than awareness of something that instances some generality. Such awareness involves the exercise of conceptual capacities and just is knowledge. Since such awareness is knowledge, this kind of awareness cannot play any interesting role in a (...)
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  17. added 2015-02-19
    Raymond Aaron Younis (1995). Scientific and Religious Belief. [REVIEW] Metascience (8):142-147.
  18. added 2015-02-18
    Ian M. Church & Peter L. Samuelson (forthcoming). Intellectual Humility: An Introduction to the Philosophy and Science. Bloomsbury Academic.
    Two intellectual vices seem to always tempt us: arrogance and diffidence. Regarding the former, the world is permeated by dogmatism and table-thumping close-mindedness. From politics, to religion, to simple matters of taste, zealots and ideologues all too often define our disagreements, often making debate and dialogue completely intractable. But to the other extreme, given a world with so much pluralism and heated disagreement, intellectual apathy and a prevailing agnosticism can be simply all too alluring. So the need for intellectual humility, (...)
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  19. added 2015-02-18
    Moti Mizrahi (forthcoming). An Argument for External World Skepticism From the Appearance/Reality Distinction. International Journal for the Study of Skepticism.
    In this paper, I argue that arguments from skeptical hypotheses for external world skepticism derive their support from a skeptical argument from the distinction between appearance and reality. This skeptical argument from the appearance/reality distinction gives the external world skeptic her conclusion (i.e., that S doesn’t know that p) without appealing to skeptical hypotheses and without assuming that knowledge is closed under known entailments. If this is correct, then this skeptical argument from the appearance/reality distinction poses a new skeptical challenge (...)
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  20. added 2015-02-16
    Matthew A. Benton (forthcoming). Lying, Belief, and Knowledge. In Jörg Meibauer (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Lying. Oxford University Press.
    What is the relationship between lying, belief, and knowledge? Prominent accounts of lying define it in terms of belief, namely telling someone something one believes to be false, often with the intent to deceive. This paper develops a novel account of lying by deriving evaluative dimensions of responsibility from the knowledge norm of assertion. Lies are best understood as special cases of vicious assertion; lying is the anti-paradigm of proper assertion. This enables an account of lying in terms of knowledge: (...)
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  21. added 2015-02-16
    Thomas Grundmann & Joachim Horvath (2014). Thought Experiments and the Problem of Deviant Realizations. Philosophical Studies 170 (3):525-533.
    Descriptions of Gettier cases can be interpreted in ways that are incompatible with the standard judgment that they are cases of justified true belief without knowledge. Timothy Williamson claims that this problem cannot be avoided by adding further stipulations to the case descriptions. To the contrary, we argue that there is a fairly simple way to amend the Ford case, a standard description of a Gettier case, in such a manner that all deviant interpretations are ruled out. This removes one (...)
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  22. added 2015-02-15
    Declan Smithies (forthcoming). Ideal Rationality and Logical Omniscience. Synthese.
    Does rationality require logical omniscience? Our best formal theories of rationality imply that it does, but our ordinary evaluations of rationality seem to suggest otherwise. This paper aims to resolve the tension by arguing that our ordinary evaluations of rationality are not only consistent with the thesis that rationality requires logical omniscience, but also provide a compelling rationale for accepting this thesis in the first place.
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  23. added 2015-02-15
    Declan Smithies (forthcoming). Perception and the External World. Philosophical Studies.
    In this paper, I argue that perception justifies belief about the external world in virtue of its phenomenal character together with its relations to the external world. But I argue that perceptual relations to the external world impact on the justifying role of perception only by virtue of their impact on its representational content. Epistemic level-bridging principles provide a principled rationale for avoiding more radically externalist theories of perceptual justification.
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  24. added 2015-02-15
    Declan Smithies (forthcoming). Reflection On: On Reflection. Analysis.
    In his book, On Reflection, Hilary Kornblith criticizes what he regards as a chronic tendency in philosophy towards inflating the significance of reflection in ways that manifest a combination of philosophical naiveté and scientific ignorance about how reflection actually works. In these comments, I respond to Kornblith's challenge by sketching an account of the philosophical significance of reflection in the theory of epistemic justification.
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  25. added 2015-02-14
    Alexander Jackson (forthcoming). How You Know You Are Not a Brain in a Vat. Philosophical Studies:1-24.
    A sensible epistemologist may not see how she could know that she is not a brain in a vat ; but she doesn’t panic. She sticks with her empirical beliefs, and as that requires, believes that she is not a BIV. Drawing on the psychological literature on metacognition, I describe a mechanism that’s plausibly responsible for a sensible epistemologist coming to believe she is not a BIV. I propose she thereby knows that she is not a BIV. The particular belief-forming (...)
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  26. added 2015-02-12
    James Andow (forthcoming). Thin, Fine and with Sensitivity: A Metamethodology of Intuitions. Review of Philosophy and Psychology.
    Do philosophers use intuitions? Should philosophers use intuitions? Can philosophical methods (where intuitions are concerned) be improved upon? In order to answer these questions we need to have some idea of how we should go about answering them. I defend a way of going about methodology of intuitions: a metamethodology. I claim the following: (i) we should approach methodological questions about intuitions with a thin conception of intuitions in mind; (ii) we should carve intuitions finely; and, (iii) we should carve (...)
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  27. added 2015-02-12
    James Andow (forthcoming). Expecting Moral Philosophers to Be Reliable. Dialectica.
    Are philosophers’ intuitions more reliable than philosophical novices’? Are we entitled to assume the superiority of philosophers’ intuitions just as we assume that experts in other domains have more reliable intuitions than novices? Ryberg raises some doubts and his arguments promise to undermine the expertise defence of intuition-use in philosophy once and for all. In this paper, I raise a number of objections to these arguments. I argue that philosophers receive sufficient feedback about the quality of their intuitions and that (...)
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  28. added 2015-02-11
    Sarah K. Paul (forthcoming). Doxastic Self-Control. American Philosophical Quarterly 52 (2).
    Discusses the possibility of autonomy in our epistemic lives, and the importance of the concept of the first person in weathering fluctuations in our epistemic perspective over time.
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  29. added 2015-02-11
    Kris Mcdaniel (2014). Metaphysics, History, Phenomenology. Res Philosophica 91 (3):339-365.
    There are three interconnected goals of this paper. The first is to articulate and motivate a view of the methodology for doing metaphysics that is broadly phenomenological in the sense of Husserl circa the Logical Investigations. The second is to articulate an argument for the importance of studying the history of philosophy when doing metaphysics that is in accordance with this methodology. The third is to confront this methodology with a series of objections and determine how well it fares in (...)
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  30. added 2015-02-10
    Catherine Legg & James Franklin (forthcoming). Perceiving Necessity. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
    In many diagrams one seems to perceive necessity – one sees not only that something is so, but that it must be so. That conflicts with a certain empiricism largely taken for granted in contemporary philosophy, which believes perception is not capable of such feats. The reason for this belief is often thought well-summarized in Hume’s maxim: ‘there are no necessary connections between distinct existences’. It is also thought that even if there were such necessities, perception is too passive or (...)
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  31. added 2015-02-10
    Ulf Hlobil (forthcoming). Chains of Inferences and the New Paradigm in the Psychology of Reasoning. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-16.
    The new paradigm in the psychology of reasoning draws on Bayesian formal frameworks, and some advocates of the new paradigm think of these formal frameworks as providing a computational-level theory of rational human inference. I argue that Bayesian theories should not be seen as providing a computational-level theory of rational human inference, where by “Bayesian theories” I mean theories that claim that all rational credal states are probabilistically coherent and that rational adjustments of degrees of belief in the light of (...)
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  32. added 2015-02-10
    Jonathan Matheson (2015). Epistemic Norms and Self Defeat: A Reply to Littlejohn. Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 4 (2):26-32.
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  33. added 2015-02-10
    Jonathan Matheson (2014). A Puzzle About Disagreement and Rationality. Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 3 (4):1-3.
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  34. added 2015-02-09
    Guy Axtell, Philosophical Implications of Dual Process Theory.
    A further exploration of philosophical implications of ecological rationality and dual-process theories. Topics include the reasons-responsiveness of automaticity and heuristic/T1 processing; DPT as a response to epistemic situationism; implications for character epistemology of substantial individual differences shown in T2 critical reasoning dispositions; and connections to work on more effective pedagogy for developing critical reasoning skills and dispositions.
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  35. added 2015-02-08
    T. Parent, Self-Reflection for the Opaque Mind.
    [Excerpts from the book I’m writing. Includes the first section of the preamble, and most of chapter 1.] *Self-Reflection for the Opaque Mind* attempts to solve a grave problem about critical reflection on one's own beliefs. The worry is that we critical thinkers are all in “epistemic bad faith” in light of what semantics and psychology tell us. For instance, psychological data shows we are ignorant of even our own ordinary beliefs--including reasons for our moral judgments (Haidt 2001), and also (...)
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  36. added 2015-02-08
    Susanna Rinard, Reasoning One's Way Out of Skepticism.
    Many have thought that it is impossible to rationally persuade an external world skeptic that we have knowledge of the external world. This paper aims to show how this could be done. I argue, while appealing only to premises that a skeptic could accept, that it is not rational to believe external world skepticism, because doing so commits one to more extreme forms of skepticism in a way that is self-undermining. In particular, the external world skeptic is ultimately committed to (...)
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  37. added 2015-02-08
    Donald W. Miller & Clifford Miller (2011). The Real World Failure of Evidence-Based Medicine. International Journal of Person Centered Medicine 1 (2):295-300.
    As a way to make medical decisions, Evidence-Based Medicine (EBM) has failed. EBM's failure arises from not being founded on real-world decision-making. EBM aspires to a scientific standard for the best way to treat a disease and determine its cause, but it fails to recognise that the scientific method is inapplicable to medical and other real-world decision-making. EBM also wrongly assumes that evidence can be marshaled and applied according to an hierarchy that is determined in an argument by authority to (...)
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  38. added 2015-02-07
    Lars Bergström (2014). Quine and the A Priori. In Gilbert Harman & Ernie Lepore (eds.), A Companion to W. V. O. Quine. Wiley Blackwell. 38–53.
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  39. added 2015-02-06
    Clayton Littlejohn (forthcoming). A Plea for Epistemic Excuses. In Fabian Dorsch Julien Dutant (ed.), The New Evil Demon Problem. Oxford University Press.
    The typical epistemology course begins with a discussion of the distinction between justification and knowledge and ends without any discussion of the distinction between justification and excuse. This is unfortunate. If we had a better understanding of the justification-excuse distinction, we would have a better understanding of the intuitions that shape the internalism-externalism debate. My aims in this paper are these. First, I will explain how the kinds of excuses that should interest epistemologists exculpate. Second, I will explain why the (...)
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  40. added 2015-02-06
    Michael Blome-Tillmann (2014). Knowledge and Presuppositions. Oxford University Press.
    Knowledge and Presuppositions develops a novel account of epistemic contextualism based on the idea that pragmatic presuppositions play a central role in the semantics of knowledge attributions. According to Blome-Tillmann, knowledge attributions are sensitive to what is pragmatically presupposed at the context of ascription. The resulting theory--Presuppositional Epistemic Contextualism (PEC)--is simple and straightforward, yet powerful enough to have far-reaching and important consequences for a variety of hotly debated issues in epistemology and philosophy of language. -/- In this book, Blome-Tillmann first (...)
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  41. added 2015-02-06
    William E. Herfel (1990). Coming Attractions: Chaos and Complexity in Scientific Models. Dissertation, Temple University
    Chaos, once considered antithetical to scientific law and order, is presently the subject of a vigorous and progressive scientific research program. "Chaos" as it is used in current scientific literature is a technical term: it refers to stochastic behavior generated by deterministic systems. This behavior has appeared in models of a wide range of phenomena including atmospheric patterns, population dynamics, celestial motion, heartbeat rhythms, turbulent fluids, chemical reactions and social structures. In general, chaos arises in the nonlinear dynamics of complex (...)
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  42. added 2015-02-04
    Max Gottschlich (forthcoming). Anschauung und Begriff in formaler und transzendentaler Logik. Fichte-Studien.
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  43. added 2015-02-03
    Jonathan Matheson (2014). Disagreement: Idealized and Everyday. In Jonathan Matheson Rico Vitz (ed.), The Ethics of Belief: Individual and Social. Oxford University Press. 315-330.
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  44. added 2015-02-02
    Jussi Suikkanen (2015). Putting Metaphysics First: Essays on Metaphysics and Epistemology, by Michael Devitt. Mind 124 (493):327-331.
    This is a review of Michael Devitt's collection of previous published articles entitled Putting Metaphysics First: Essays on Metaphysics and Epistemology. The review also suggests a new way of formulation the realism/anti-realism contrast on the basis of Devitt's work. This contrast is understood in terms explanatory priority: should we in a given domain begin our theorizing from metaphysics (realism) or semantics (anti-realism)?
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  45. added 2015-02-01
    Nicholas Maxwell (2015). How Humanity Might Avoid Devastation. Ethical Record 120 (1):18-23.
    We face grave global problems. One might think universities are doing all they can to help solve these problems. But universities, in successfully pursuing scientific knowledge and technological know-how in a way that is dissociated from a more fundamental concern with problems of living, have actually made possible the genesis of all our current global problems. Modern science and technology have led to modern industry and agriculture, modern medicine and hygiene, modern armaments, which in turn have led to habitat destruction, (...)
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  46. added 2015-01-31
    Doug McConnell & Anke Snoek (2012). Narrating Truths Worth Living: Addiction Narratives. American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 3:77-78.
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  47. added 2015-01-30
    Gregory Stoutenburg (forthcoming). The Epistemic Analysis of Luck. Episteme.
    Duncan Pritchard has argued that luck is fundamentally a modal notion: an event is lucky when it occurs in the actual world, but does not occur in more than half of the relevant nearby possible worlds. Jennifer Lackey has provided counterexamples to accounts which, like Pritchard’s, only allow for the existence of improbable lucky events. Neil Levy has responded to Lackey by offering a modal account of luck which attempts to respect the intuition that some lucky events occur in more (...)
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  48. added 2015-01-30
    Christopher Michael Cloos (forthcoming). Responsibilist Evidentialism. Philosophical Studies:1-18.
    When is a person justified in believing a proposition? In this paper, I defend a view according to which a person is justified in believing a proposition just in case the person’s evidence sufficiently supports the proposition and the person responsibly acquired and sustained the evidence that supports the proposition. This view overcomes a deficiency in a prominent theory of epistemic justification. As championed by Earl Conee and Richard Feldman, Evidentialism is a theory subject to counterexamples at the hands of (...)
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  49. added 2015-01-28
    Alex Worsnip (forthcoming). Narrow-Scoping for Wide-Scopers. Synthese:1-30.
    Many philosophers think that requirements of rationality are “wide-scope”. That is to say: they are requirements to satisfy some material conditional, such that one counts as satisfying the requirement iff one either makes the conditional’s antecedent false or makes its consequent true. These contrast with narrow-scope requirements, where the requirement takes scope only over the consequent of the conditional. Many of the philosophers who have preferred wide-scope requirements to narrow-scope requirements have also endorsed a corresponding semantic claim, namely that ordinary (...)
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  50. added 2015-01-28
    Diego E. Machuca (forthcoming). Suspension, Equipollence, and Inquiry: A Reply to Wieland. Analytic Philosophy.
    It is generally thought that suspension of judgment about a proposition p is the doxastic attitude one is rationally compelled to adopt whenever the epistemic reasons for and against p are equipollent or equally credible, that is, whenever the total body of available evidence bearing on p epistemically justifies neither belief nor disbelief in p. However, in a recent contribution to this journal, Jan Wieland proposes “to broaden the conditions for suspension, and argue that it is rational to suspend belief (...)
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