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Epistemology

Edited by Matthew McGrath (University of Missouri, Columbia)
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  1. added 2015-07-29
    Bruno Guindon (forthcoming). Sources, Reasons, and Requirements. Philosophical Studies.
    This paper offers two competing accounts of normative requirements, each of which purports to explain why some—but not all—requirements are normative in the sense of being related to normative reasons in some robust way. According to the reasons-sensitive view, normative requirements are those and only those which are sensitive to normative reasons. On this account, normative requirements are second-order statements about what there is conclusive reason to do, in the broad sense of the term. According to the reasons-providing view—which I (...)
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  2. added 2015-07-29
    Alex Worsnip (forthcoming). Belief, Credence, and the Preface Paradox. Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
    Many discussions of the “preface paradox” assume that it is more troubling for deductive constraints on rational belief if outright belief is reducible to credence. I show that this is an error: we can generate the problem without assuming such reducibility. All we need are some very weak normative assumptions about rational relationships between belief and credence. The only view that escapes my way of formulating the problem for the deductive closure constraint is in fact itself a reductive view: namely, (...)
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  3. added 2015-07-28
    Elijah Chudnoff & David DiDomenico (forthcoming). The Epistemic Unity of Perception. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
    Dogmatists and phenomenal conservatives think that if it perceptually seems to you that p, then you thereby have some prima facie justification for believing that p. Increasingly, writers about these views have argued that perceptual seemings are composed of two other states: a sensation followed by a seeming. In this paper we critically examine this movement. First we argue that there are no compelling reasons to think of perceptual seemings as so composed. Second we argue that even if they were (...)
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  4. added 2015-07-27
    Alexander Dinges (forthcoming). Epistemic Invariantism and Contextualist Intuitions. Episteme.
    Epistemic invariantism, or invariantism for short, is the position that the proposition expressed by knowledge sentences does not vary with the epistemic standard of the context in which these sentences can be used. At least one of the major challenges for invariantism is to explain our intuitions about scenarios such as the so-called bank cases. These cases elicit intuitions to the effect that the truth-value of knowledge sentences varies with the epistemic standard of the context in which these sentences can (...)
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  5. added 2015-07-25
    Daniel Greco & Brian Hedden (forthcoming). Uniqueness and Metaepistemology. Journal of Philosophy.
    We defend Uniqueness, the claim that given a body of total evidence, there is a uniquely rational doxastic state that it is rational for one to be in. Epistemic rationality doesn't give you any leeway in what beliefs to form in response to your evidence. We argue for Uniqueness by appealing to two metaepistemological pictures about the roles played by rational evaluations. First, rational evaluative terms serve to guide our practices of deference to the opinions of others. Second, they help (...)
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  6. added 2015-07-25
    Daniel Greco (forthcoming). Cognitive Mobile Homes. Mind.
    While recent discussions of contextualism have mostly focused on other issues, some influential early statements of contextualism emphasized the possibility for contextualism to provide an alternative both to coherentism and to traditional versions of foundationalism. In this essay, I will pick up on this strand of contextualist thought and argue that contextualist versions of foundationalism promise to solve some problems that their non-contextualist cousins cannot. In particular, I will argue that adopting contextualist versions of foundationalism can let us reconcile Bayesian (...)
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  7. added 2015-07-25
    Charlie Crerar (forthcoming). Taboo, Hermeneutical Injustice, and Expressively Free Environments. Episteme:1-13.
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  8. added 2015-07-25
    Ittay Nissan-Rozen (forthcoming). Against Moral Hedging. Economics and Philosophy.
    It has been argued by several philosophers that a morally motivated rational agent who has to make decisions under conditions of moral uncertainty ought to maximize expected moral value in his choices, where the expectation is calculated relative to the agent's moral uncertainty. I present a counter-example to this thesis and to a larger family of decision rules for choice under conditions of moral uncertainty. Based on this counter-example, I argue against the thesis and suggest a reason for its failure (...)
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  9. added 2015-07-25
    Daniel Greco (2015). Verbal Debates in Epistemology. American Philosophical Quarterly 52 (1):41-55.
    The idea that certain philosophical debates are "merely verbal" has historically been raised as a challenge against (large parts of) metaphysics. In this paper, I explore an analogous challenge to large parts of epistemology, which is motivated by recent arguments in experimental philosophy. I argue that, while this challenge may have some limited success, it cannot serve as a wedge case for wide-ranging skepticism about the substantiveness of epistemological debates; most epistemological debates are immune to the worries it raises.
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  10. added 2015-07-22
    Alex Worsnip (forthcoming). The Conflict of Evidence and Coherence. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    For many epistemologists, and for many philosophers more broadly, it is axiomatic that rationality requires you to take the doxastic attitudes that your evidence supports. Yet there is also another current in our talk about rationality. On this usage, rationality is a matter of the right kind of coherence between one’s mental attitudes. Surprisingly little work in epistemology is explicitly devoted to answering the question of how these two currents of talk are related. But many implicitly assume that evidence-responsiveness guarantees (...)
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  11. added 2015-07-22
    Martin Smith (forthcoming). Full Blooded Entitlement. In Nikolaj Pedersen & Peter Graham (eds.), Epistemic Entitlement. Oxford University Press
    Entitlement is defined as a sort of epistemic justification that one can possess by default – a sort of epistemic justification that does not need to be earned or acquired. Epistemologists who accept the existence of entitlement generally have a certain anti-sceptical role in mind for it – entitlement is intended to help us resist what would otherwise be compelling radical sceptical arguments. But this role leaves various details unspecified and, thus, leaves scope for a number of different potential conceptions (...)
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  12. added 2015-07-22
    Ju Wang (2015). A Davidsonian Response to Radical Scepticism. Logos and Episteme 6 (1):95-111.
    In this paper, I attempt to show how Davidson’s anti-sceptical argument can respond to the closureRK-based radical scepticism. My approach will focus on the closureRK principle rather than the possibility that our beliefs could be massively wrong. I first review Davidson’s principle of charity and the triangulation argument, and then I extract his theory on content of a belief. According to this theory, content of a belief is determined by its typical cause and other relevant beliefs. With this constraint on (...)
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  13. added 2015-07-21
    Cheng-Hung Tsai (forthcoming). Ethical Expertise and the Articulacy Requirement. Synthese:1-18.
    Recently virtue ethicists, such as Julia Annas and Matt Stichter, in order to explain what a moral virtue is and how it is acquired, suggest modeling virtue on practical expertise. However, a challenging issue arises when considering the nature of practical expertise especially about whether expertise requires articulacy, that is, whether an expert in a skill is required to possess an ability to articulate the principles underlying the skill. With regard to this issue, Annas advocates the articulacy requirement, while Stichter (...)
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  14. added 2015-07-21
    Ioan Muntean (2008). Mechanisms of Unification in Kaluza-Klein Theory. In D. Dieks (ed.), Ontology of Spacetime.
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  15. added 2015-07-20
    Shannon Spaulding (forthcoming). Imagination, Rationality, and Desire. Journal of Philosophy.
    We often have affective responses to fictional events. We feel afraid for Desdemona when Othello approaches her in a murderous rage. We feel disgust toward Iago for orchestrating this tragic event. What mental architecture could explain these affective responses? In this paper I consider the claim that the best explanation of our affective responses to fiction involves imaginative desires. Some theorists argue that accounts that do not invoke imaginative desires imply that consumers of fiction have irrational desires. I argue that (...)
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  16. added 2015-07-20
    Jeff Kochan (2015). Freedom, Forgetting, and Solidarity: A Response to Ginev. In Giovanni Galizia & David Schulman (eds.), Forgetting: An Interdisciplinary Conversation. The Hebrew University Magnes Press 244-246.
    This is a brief, invited response to Dimitri Ginev's chapter "Narrating the Self and Narrative Technologies of Forgetting".
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  17. added 2015-07-19
    Catherine Legg (2015). Review of Danielle Macbeth, "Realizing Reason: A Narraitve of Truth and Knowing". [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews:online.
  18. added 2015-07-17
    Eric Dietrich, Synopsis of Excellent Beauty: The Naturalness of Religion and the Unnaturalness of the World.
    This is a synopsis of my book Excellent Beauty: The naturalness of religion and the unnaturalness of the world (Columbia University Press). The synopsis discusses the book's two main theses: religion is an evolutionary adaptation and, as a consequence, humans are not at the center of the universe. The result of this latter point is that the universe contains profound and beautiful mysteries at which we humans can marvel but which we cannot explain away.
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  19. added 2015-07-16
    Alejandro Pérez (2015). La racionalidad del creyente: la propuesta filosófica (y teológica) analítica de Roger Pouivet. [REVIEW] Scientia Et Fides 3 (2):1-6.
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  20. added 2015-07-15
    Robert E. Goodin & Kai Spiekermann (forthcoming). Epistemic Solidarity as a Political Strategy. Episteme:1-19.
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  21. added 2015-07-14
    Michele Palmira (forthcoming). How to Condorcet a Goldman. Episteme.
    In his 2010 paper “Philosophical Naturalism and Intuitional Methodology”, Alvin I. Goldman invokes the Condorcet Jury Theorem in order to defend the reliability of intuitions. The present note argues that the original conditions of the theorem are all unrealistic when analysed in connection to the case of intuitions. Alternative conditions are discussed.
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  22. added 2015-07-14
    Cory Davia & Michele Palmira (forthcoming). Moral Deference and Deference to an Epistemic Peer. Philosophical Quarterly.
    Deference to experts is normal in many areas of inquiry, but suspicious in morality. This is puzzling if one thinks that morality is relevantly like those other areas of inquiry. We argue that this suspiciousness can be explained in terms of the suspiciousness of deferring to an epistemic peer. We then argue that this explanation is preferable to others in the literature, and explore some metaethical implications of this result.
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  23. added 2015-07-14
    Michele Palmira (2013). On the Necessity of the Evidential Equality Condition for Epistemic Peerage. Logos and Episteme 4 (1):113-123.
    A popular definition of epistemic peerage maintains that two subjects are epistemic peers if and only if they are equals with respect to general epistemic virtues and share the same evidence about the targeted issue. In this paper I shall take up the challenge of defending the necessity of the evidential equality condition for a definition of epistemic peerage from criticisms that can be elicited from the literature on peer disagreement. The paper discusses two definitions that drop this condition and (...)
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  24. added 2015-07-12
    Shaima Ahammed (forthcoming). The Essential Fit Between Qualitative Methodology and Emirati Population: Towards Meaningful Social Science Research in UAE. Social Epistemology:1-15.
    One of the most fundamental problems plaguing the state of social science research in the United Arab Emirates is the lack of methodologies that appropriately respond to the cultural context of the country. Most social science research published from the region has merely transplanted Western quantitative methods and has proved ineffective as very few social problems in UAE have been appropriately responded to by social science research. This paper suggests the use of qualitative methods to make social science research in (...)
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  25. added 2015-07-10
    Justin Clarke-Doane (forthcoming). Debunking and Dispensability. In Uri D. Leibowitz & Neil Sinclair (eds.), Explanation in Ethics and Mathematics. Oxford University Press
    In his précis of a recent book, Richard Joyce writes, “My contention…is that…any epistemological benefit-of-the-doubt that might have been extended to moral beliefs…will be neutralized by the availability of an empirically confirmed moral genealogy that nowhere…presupposes their truth.” Such reasoning – falling under the heading “Genealogical Debunking Arguments” – is now commonplace. But how might “the availability of an empirically confirmed moral genealogy that nowhere… presupposes” the truth of our moral beliefs “neutralize” whatever “epistemological benefit-of-the-doubt that might have been extended (...)
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  26. added 2015-07-09
    Benjamin R. Sherman (forthcoming). There’s No Justice: Why Pursuit of a Virtue is Not the Solution to Epistemic Injustice. Social Epistemology:1-22.
    Miranda Fricker’s book Epistemic Injustice calls attention to an important sort of moral and intellectual wrongdoing, that of failing to give others their intellectual due. When we fail to recognize others’ knowledge, or undervalue their beliefs and judgments, we fail in two important respects. First, we miss out on the opportunity to improve and refine our own sets of beliefs and judgments. Second—and more relevant to the term “injustice”—we can deny people the intellectual respect they deserve. Along with describing the (...)
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  27. added 2015-07-09
    Nancy McHugh (2015). The Limits of Knowledge: Generating Pragmatist Feminist Cases for Situated Knowing. SUNY Press.
    Argues for a transactionally situated approach to science and medicine in order to meet the needs of marginalized groups. -/- The Limits of Knowledge provides an understanding of what pragmatist feminist theories look like in practice, combining insights from the work of American pragmatist John Dewey concerning experimental inquiry and transaction with arguments for situated knowledge rooted in contemporary feminism. Using case studies to demonstrate some of the particular ways that dominant scientific and medical practices fail to meet the health (...)
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  28. added 2015-07-09
    Eugen Fischer & John Collins (2015). Rationalism and Naturalism in the Age of Experimental Philosophy. In Eugen Fischer & John Collins (eds.), Experimental Philosophy, Rationalism, and Naturalism. Rethinking Philosophical Method. Routledge 3-33.
    The paper outlines the evolution of on-going meta-philosophical debates about intuitions, explains different notions of 'intuition' employed in these debates, and argues for the philosophical relevance of intuitions in an aetiological sense taken from cognitive psychology. On this basis, it advocates a new kind of methodological naturalism which it finds implicit, for instance, in the warrant project in experimental philosophy: a meta-philosophical naturalism that promotes the use of scientific methods in meta-philosophical investigations. This 'higher-order' naturalism is consistent with both methodological (...)
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  29. added 2015-07-09
    Charles Côté-Bouchard (2015). Epistemic Instrumentalism and the Too Few Reasons Objection. International Journal of Philosophical Studies:1-19.
    According to epistemic instrumentalism, epistemic normativity arises from and depends on facts about our ends. On that view, a consideration C is an epistemic reason for a subject S to Φ only if Φ-ing would promote an end that S has. However, according to the Too Few Epistemic Reasons objection, this cannot be correct since there are cases in which, intuitively, C is an epistemic reason for S to Φ even though Φ-ing would not promote any of S’s ends. After (...)
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  30. added 2015-07-09
    Nicholaos Jones (2012). An Arrovian Impossibility Theorem for the Epistemology of Disagreement. Logos and Episteme 3 (1):97-115.
    According to conciliatory views about the epistemology of disagreement, when epistemic peers have conflicting doxastic attitudes toward a proposition and fully disclose to one another the reasons for their attitudes toward that proposition (and neither has independent reason to believe the other to be mistaken), each peer should always change his attitude toward that proposition to one that is closer to the attitudes of those peers with which there is disagreement. According to pure higher-order evidence views, higher-order evidence for a (...)
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  31. added 2015-07-08
    Marvin E. Kirsh (2015). The Spaces in the Looking Glass: Stilling the Frame/ Framing the Still. Philosophy and Cosmology Http://En.Bazaluk.Com/Journals 15:62-83.
    The purpose of this writing is to propose a frame of view, a form as the eternal world element, that is compatible with paradox within the history of ideas, modern discovery as they confront one another. Under special consideration are problems of representation of phenomena, life, the cosmos as the rational facility of mind confronts the physical/perceptual, and itself. Current topics in pursuit are near as diverse and numbered as are the possibilities for a world composed strictly of uniqueness able (...)
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  32. added 2015-07-07
    Matthew A. Benton (forthcoming). Knowledge and Evidence You Should Have Had. Episteme.
    Epistemologists focus primarily on cases of knowledge, belief, or credence where the evidence which one possesses, or on which one is relying, plays a fundamental role in the epistemic or normative status of one's doxastic state. Recent work in epistemology goes beyond the evidence one possesses to consider the relevance for such statuses of evidence which one does not possess, particularly when there is a sense in which one should have had some evidence. I focus on Sanford Goldberg's approach ("Should (...)
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  33. added 2015-07-07
    Olle Blomberg (forthcoming). Common Knowledge and Reductionism About Shared Agency. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-12.
    Most reductionist accounts of intentional joint action include a condition that it must be common knowledge between participants that they have certain intentions and beliefs that cause and coordinate the joint action. However, this condition has typically simply been taken for granted rather than argued for. The condition is not necessary for ensuring that participants are jointly responsible for the action in which each participates, nor for ensuring that each treats the others as partners rather than as social tools. It (...)
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  34. added 2015-07-07
    Philip R. Olson (forthcoming). Knowing “Necro-Waste. Social Epistemology:1-20.
    Adopting a waste-directed study of the dead human body, and various practices of body preparation and body disposition in funerary contexts, I argue that necro-waste is a ubiquitous but largely unknown presence. To know necro-waste is to examine the ways in which the dead human body is embedded in particular personal, social, historical, political, and environmental contexts. This study focuses on funerary practices in the US and Canada, where embalming has been routinely practiced. Viewing dead human bodies as materials processed (...)
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  35. added 2015-07-07
    Jeff Kochan (2015). Circles of Scientific Practice: Regressus, Mathēsis, Denkstil. In Dimitri Ginev (ed.), Critical Science Studies after Ludwik Fleck. St. Kliment Ohridski University Press 83-99.
    Hermeneutic studies of science locate a circle at the heart of scientific practice: scientists only gain knowledge of what they, in some sense, already know. This may seem to threaten the rational validity of science, but one can argue that this circle is a virtuous rather than a vicious one. A virtuous circle is one in which research conclusions are already present in the premises, but only in an indeterminate and underdeveloped way. In order to defend the validity of science, (...)
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  36. added 2015-07-06
    Jack C. Lyons (forthcoming). Review of Jose Zalabardo, Scepticism and Reliable Belief. [REVIEW] International Journal for the Study of Skepticism.
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  37. added 2015-07-06
    Jack C. Lyons (forthcoming). Perception and Intuition of Evaluative Properties. In Anna Bergqvist & Robert Cowan (eds.), Evaluative Perception.
    Outside of philosophy, ‘intuition’ means something like ‘knowing without knowing how you know’. Intuition in this broad sense is an important epistemological category. I distinguish intuition from perception and perception from perceptual experience, in order to discuss the distinctive psychological and epistemological status of evaluative property attributions. Although it is doubtful that we perceptually experience many evaluative properties and also somewhat unlikely that we perceive many evaluative properties, it is highly plausible that we intuit many instances of evaluative properties as (...)
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  38. added 2015-07-06
    Nicholas Maxwell (2015). Can The World Learn Wisdom. Philosophy Now (108):32-35.
    The crisis of our times is that we have science without wisdom. All our current global problems have arisen as a result. Learning how to become wiser has become, not a luxury, but a necessity. The key is to learn from the success of science. We need to learn from scientific progress how to achieve social progress towards a wiser world. This is an old idea that goes back to the French Enlightenment. However, in developing the idea, the philosophes of (...)
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  39. added 2015-07-01
    Anna Giustina & Uriah Kriegel (forthcoming). Phenomenal Knowledge, Introspection, and Inner Awareness. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7.
    Phenomenal beliefs are beliefs about the phenomenal properties of one's concurrent conscious states. It is an article of commonsense that such beliefs tend to be justified. Philosophers have been less convinced. It is sometimes claimed that phenomenal beliefs are not on the whole justified, on the grounds that (i) they are typically based on introspection and (ii) introspection is often unreliable. Here we argue against (ii). Central to our case is a pair of distinctions: one between what we call fact-introspection (...)
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  40. added 2015-07-01
    Abelard Podgorski (forthcoming). A Reply to the Synchronist. Mind.
    On the face of it, in ordinary practices of rational assessment, we criticize agents both for the combinations of attitudes, like belief, desire, and intention, that they possess at particular times, and for the ways that they behave cognitively over time, by forming, reconsidering, and updating those attitudes. Accordingly, philosophers have proposed norms of rationality that are synchronic - concerned fundamentally with our individual time-slices, and diachronic - concerned with our temporally extended behaviour. Recently, however, a number of philosophers have (...)
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  41. added 2015-07-01
    Nathaniel Sharadin (2015). A Partial Defense of Permissivism. Ratio 28 (2):n/a-n/a.
    Permissivism is the view that sometimes an agent's total evidential state entails both that she is epistemically permitted to believe that P and that she is epistemically permitted to believe that Q, where P and Q are contradictories. Uniqueness is the denial of Permissivism. Permissivism has recently come under attack on several fronts. If these attacks are successful, then we may be forced to accept an unwelcome asymmetry between epistemic and practical rationality. In this essay I clarify the debate by (...)
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  42. added 2015-06-30
    Andrew Reisner (forthcoming). Peer Disagreement, Rational Requirements, and Evidence of Evidence as Evidence Against. In Martin Grajner & Pedro Schmechtig (eds.), Epistemic Reasons, Epistemic Norms, Epistemic Goals. De Gruyter
    This paper addresses an ambiguity in some of the literature on rational peer disagreement about the use of the term 'rational', which is used to describe a variety of normative statuses related to reasons, justification, and reasoning. The paper considers what the upshot of (believed) peer disagreement is for the rationality, as understood in its regimented use within the current literature on theoretical reason, i.e. as a system of relations amongst doxastic states. It is argued that (believed) peer disagreement has (...)
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  43. added 2015-06-30
    Christopher G. Lucas & Charles Kemp (forthcoming). An Improved Probabilistic Account of Counterfactual Reasoning. Psychological Review.
    When people want to identify the causes of an event, assign credit or blame, or learn from their mistakes, they often reflect on how things could have gone differently. In this kind of reasoning, one considers a counterfactual world in which some events are different from their real-world counterparts and considers what else would have changed. Researchers have recently proposed several probabilistic models that aim to capture how people do (or should) reason about counterfactuals. We present a new model and (...)
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  44. added 2015-06-30
    Daniele Bertini (forthcoming). Una proposta per la caratterizzazione della credenza religiosa. Dialegesthai. Rivista Telematica di Filosofia 2015.
    My paper challenges the externalist mainstream assumptions towards the understanding of religious beliefs (i.e., reliabilism by W.Alston, the warrant belief approach by A.Plantinga, the neowittgensteinian analysis of doxastic systems). According to such assumptions, religious beliefs should be evaluated rational in terms of the same doxastic standard giving justification for ordinary factual beliefs. Moving from the empiricist intuition that the kind of content of belief matters to the form of belief and the justification practices for it, I argue for the claim (...)
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  45. added 2015-06-30
    Shari Stone-Mediatore (2013). Attending to Others: Simone Weil and Epistemic Pluralism Shari Stone-Mediatore. Philosophical Topics 41 (2):79-95.
    Since the 1980s, feminist epistemologists have traced the cultural biases that have denied epistemic value to certain epistemic styles and agents while they have explored ways to reclaim the devalued epistemic modes--including more practical, emotionally invested, and community-situated modes of knowing--that many of us have found to be meaningful ways of engaging the world. At the same time, feminist critics have sought not merely to reverse received epistemic hierarchies but to explore more pluralistic epistemologies that appreciate as well as examine (...)
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  46. added 2015-06-29
    Igal Kvart, A Short Outline of the Indicativity Theory of Knowledge.
    Abstract In this paper I present a short outline of an Indicativity Theory of Knowledge, for the cases of Perceptual Knowledge and Knowledge by Memory. I explain the main rationale for a token-indicativity approach, and how it is fleshed out precisely in terms of chances. I elaborate on the account of the value of knowledge it provides, and what that value is. I explain why, given the rationale of conceiving Knowledge as token indicativity, separate sub-accounts in terms of chances should (...)
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  47. added 2015-06-29
    Daniel Whiting (2015). Knowledge is Not Belief for Sufficient (Objective and Subjective) Reason. Logos and Episteme 6:237-243.
    Mark Schroeder has recently proposed a new analysis of knowledge. I examine that analysis and show that it fails. More specifically, I show that it faces a problem all too familiar from the post-Gettier literature, namely, that it is delivers the wrong verdict in fake barn cases.
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  48. added 2015-06-27
    Jochen Briesen (forthcoming). Epistemic Consequentialism: Its Relation to Ethical Consequentialism and the Truth-Indication Principle. In P. Schmechtig & M. Grajner (eds.), Epistemic Reasons, Norms, and Goals.
    Consequentialist positions in philosophy spell out normative notions by recourse to final aims. Hedonistic versions of ethical consequentialism spell out what is morally right/justified via recourse to the aim of increasing pleasure and decreasing pain. Veritistic versions of epistemic consequentialism spell out what is epistemically right/justified via recourse to the aim of increasing the number of true beliefs and decreasing the number of false ones. Even though these theories are in many respects structurally analogous, there are also interesting disanalogies. For (...)
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  49. added 2015-06-26
    Igal Kvart, Abstract: Cognitive Risk Bias and the Threat to the Semantics of Knowledge Ascriptions.
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  50. added 2015-06-26
    Igal Kvart, Action-Directed Pragmatics Secures Semantically Autonomous Knowledge.
    In the past couple of decades, there were a few major attempts to establish the thesis of pragmatic infringement – that a significant pragmatic ingredient figures significantly in the truth-conditions for knowledge-ascriptions. As candidates, epistemic contextualism and Relativism flaunted conversational standards, and Stanley's SSI promoted stakes. These conceptions were propelled first and foremost by obviously pragmatic examples of knowledge ascriptions that seem to require a pragmatic component in the truth-conditions of knowledge ascriptions in order to be accounted for. However, if (...)
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