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Epistemology

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  1. added 2016-07-23
    Fabio Sterpetti (2016). Models, Brains, and Scientific Realism. In L. Magnani & C. Casadio (eds.), Model Based Reasoning in Science and Technology. Logical, Epistemological, and Cognitive Issues. Springer 639-661.
    Prediction Error Minimization theory (PEM) is one of the most promising attempts to model perception in current science of mind, and it has recently been advocated by some prominent philosophers as Andy Clark and Jakob Hohwy. Briefly, PEM maintains that “the brain is an organ that on aver-age and over time continually minimizes the error between the sensory input it predicts on the basis of its model of the world and the actual sensory input” (Hohwy 2014, p. 2). An interesting (...)
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  2. added 2016-07-22
    J. Adam Carter (forthcoming). Sosa on Knowledge, Judgment and Guessing. Synthese.
    In Chapter 3 of Judgment and Agency, Ernest Sosa (2015) explicates the concept of a fully apt performance. In the course of doing so, he draws from illustrative examples of practical performances and applies lessons drawn to the case of cognitive performances, and in particular, to the cog- nitive performance of judging. Sosa's examples in the practical sphere are rich and instructive. But there is, I will argue, an interesting disanalogy between the practical and cognitive examples he relies on. Ultimately, (...)
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  3. added 2016-07-22
    Jochen Briesen (forthcoming). Evidentielle Einzigkeit in klassischer und formaler Erkenntnistheorie. Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung.
    Die These der evidentiellen Einzigkeit besagt, dass es im Lichte von Gesamt-Evidenz E genau eine doxastische Einstellung – Für-Wahr-Halten, Für-Falsch-Halten, Enthaltung – gibt, die von Subjekten in Bezug auf eine beliebige Proposition rationalerweise eingenommen werden kann. Auf den ersten Blick ist diese These sehr plausibel. Der vorliegende Aufsatz diskutiert zunächst die Relevanz des Prin- zips sowohl in klassischen (nicht-formalen) sowie in formalen erkenntnistheoretischen Forschungstraditionen. Anschließend wird untersucht, wie plausibel das Prinzip bei genauerer Betrachtung tatsächlich ist und auf welchen Überlegungen dessen (...)
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  4. added 2016-07-21
    Jacob Stegenga (2011). Henk W. De Regt, Sabina Leonelli and Kai Eigner , Scientific Understanding: Philosophical Perspectives. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2009. Pp. Ix+352. ISBN 978-0-8229-4378-6. $65.00. [REVIEW] British Journal for the History of Science 44 (4):578-580.
  5. added 2016-07-19
    Christian Quast (2016). Expertise: A Practical Explication. Topoi:1-17.
    In this paper I will introduce a practical explication for the notion of expertise. At first, I motivate this attempt by taking a look on recent debates which display great disagreement about whether and how to define expertise in the first place. After that I will introduce the methodology of practical explications in the spirit of Edward Craig’s Knowledge and the state of nature along with some conditions of adequacy taken from ordinary and scientific language. This eventually culminates in the (...)
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  6. added 2016-07-18
    Slobodan Perovic (2016). Optimal Research Team Composition: Data Envelopment Analysis of Fermilab Experiments. Scientometrics 108 (1).
    We employ data envelopment analysis on a series of experiments performed in Fermilab, one of the major high-energy physics laboratories in the world, in order to test their efficiency (as measured by publication and citation rates) in terms of variations of team size, number of teams per experiment, and completion time. We present the results and analyze them, focusing in particular on inherent connections between quantitative team composition and diversity, and discuss them in relation to other factors contributing to scientific (...)
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  7. added 2016-07-16
    Finlay Malcolm & Michael Scott (forthcoming). Faith, Belief and Fictionalism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
    Is propositional religious faith constituted by belief? Recent debate has focussed on whether faith may be constituted by a positive non-doxastic cognitive state, which can stand in place of belief. This paper sets out and defends the doxastic theory. We consider and reject three arguments commonly used in favour of non-doxastic theories of faith: (1) the argument from religious doubt; (2) the use of ‘faith’ in linguistic utterances; and (3) the possibility of pragmatic faith. We argue that belief is required (...)
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  8. added 2016-07-16
    Hans Van Eyghen (2015). Religious Cognition as Social Cognition. Studia Religiologica 48 (4):301-312.
    In this paper, I examine the relationship between social cognition and religious cognition. Many cognitive theories of religion claim that these two forms are somehow related, but the details are usually left unexplored and insights from theories of social cognition are not taken on board. I discuss the three main (groups of) theories of social cognition, namely the theory-theory, the simulation theory and enactivist theories. Secondly, I explore how these theories can help to enrich a number of cognitive theories of (...)
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  9. added 2016-07-15
    Wade Munroe (forthcoming). Testimonial Injustice and Prescriptive Credibility Deficits. Canadian Journal of Philosophy:1-24.
    In light of recent social psychological literature, I expand Miranda Fricker’s important notion of testimonial injustice. A fair portion of Fricker’s account rests on an older paradigm of stereotype and prejudice. Given recent empirical work, I argue for what I dub prescriptive credibility deficits in which a backlash effect leads to the assignment of a diminished level of credibility to persons who act in counter-stereotypic manners, thereby flouting prescriptive stereotypes. The notion of a prescriptive credibility deficit is not merely an (...)
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  10. added 2016-07-14
    Kevin McCain (2016). The Nature of Scientific Knowledge: An Explanatory Approach. Springer.
    This book offers a comprehensive and accessible introduction to the epistemology of science. It not only introduces readers to the general epistemological discussion of the nature of knowledge, but also provides key insights into the particular nuances of scientific knowledge. No prior knowledge of philosophy or science is assumed by The Nature of Scientific Knowledge. Nevertheless, the reader is taken on a journey through several core concepts of epistemology and philosophy of science that not only explores the characteristics of the (...)
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  11. added 2016-07-12
    Marko Jurjako (forthcoming). Do Philosophical Intuitions Need Calibration? Anthropology and Philosophy.
    In his seminal paper ‘Reflection on Reflective Equilibrium’ Robert Cummins argued that if intuitions are to serve as reliable guides to philosophical truths then we should be able to check their reliability in particular cases. However, if we can check the reliability of intuitions then that means that we have an independent non-intuitive access to the domain that intuitions are supposed to disclose, which in effect makes intuitions obsolete. Overgaard, Gilbert and Burwood in their book ‘An Introduction to Metaphilosophy’ respond (...)
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  12. added 2016-07-12
    Domingos Faria (2016). Is There Room for Justified Beliefs Without Evidence? A Critical Assessment of Epistemic Evidentialism. Logos and Episteme: An International Journal of Epistemology (2):137-152.
    In the first section of this paper I present epistemic evidentialism and, in the following two sections, I discuss that view with counterexamples. I shall defend that adequately supporting evidence is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for epistemic justification. Although we need epistemic elements other than evidence in order to have epistemic justification, there can be no epistemically justified belief without evidence. However, there are other kinds of justification beyond the epistemic justification, such as prudential or moral justification; (...)
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  13. added 2016-07-12
    Xingming Hu (2016). Why Do True Beliefs Differ in Epistemic Value? Ratio 29 (2):n/a-n/a.
    Veritism claims that only true beliefs are of basic epistemic value. Michael DePaul argues that veritism is false because it entails the implausible view that all true beliefs are of equal epistemic value. In this paper, I discuss two recent replies to DePaul's argument: one offered by Nick Treanor and the other by Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij and Stephen Grimm. I argue that neither of the two replies is successful. I propose a new response to DePaul's argument and defend my response against (...)
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  14. added 2016-07-12
    N. Maxwell, A Priori Conjectural Knowledge in Physics.
    The history of western philosophy is split to its core by a long-standing, fundamental dispute. On the one hand there are the so-called empiricists, like Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Mill, Russell, the logical positivists, A. J. Ayer, Karl Popper and most scientists, who hold empirical considerations alone can be appealed to in justifying, or providing a rationale for, claims to factual knowledge, there being no such thing as a priori knowledge – items of factual knowledge that are accepted on grounds other (...)
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  15. added 2016-07-11
    Christian Piller (forthcoming). ‘How to Overstretch the Ethics-Epistemology Analogy: Berker’s Critique of Epistemic Consequentialism’. In Martin Grajner (ed.), Epistemic Reasons, Epistemic Norms, and Epistemic Goals. De Gruyter 305-319.
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  16. added 2016-07-11
    John-Michael Kuczynski (2016). Empiricism and Rationalism. Amazon Digital Services LLC.
    Empiricism is the doctrine that all knowledge has a strictly observational basis. Rationalism is the doctrine that least some knowledge has non-observational, purely conceptual basis. In the present work, empiricism is carefully considered and found to have four dire shortcomings: -/- (1) Empiricism cannot account for our knowledge of what doesn't exist, let alone what cannot exist. -/- (2) Empiricism cannot account for our knowledge of dependence-relations, given (1), coupled with the fact that 'P depends on Q' is equivalent with (...)
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  17. added 2016-07-11
    John-Michael Kuczynski (2016). A Priori Knowledge and Analytic Truth. CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform.
    This book answers three questions: (i) What is it for a statement to be analytically true? (ii) What is a priori knowledge? (How does it differ from inherited empirical knowledge? And how does it differ from acquired conceptual (non-empirical) knowledge, such as one's knowledge that not all continuous functions are differentiable?). (iii) Do we have a priori knowledge? It is shown that content-externalism is an 'epistemologicization' of the (logically, not psychologically) innocuous fact that, if a sentence S of natural language (...)
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  18. added 2016-07-10
    Komarine Romdenh-Romluc (forthcoming). Hermeneutical Injustice: Blood-Sports and the English Defence League. Social Epistemology:1-19.
    Miranda Fricker identifies a form of injustice she calls “hermeneutical injustice”. She argues that each culture has a stock of shared meanings that its members can use to describe their experience. Cultures are made up of different social groups, with uneven relations of power between them. In some cases, a culture’s shared meanings will reflect the experiences of more powerful groups, and be a poor fit for the experiences of less powerful members, who are subsequently disadvantaged. This is what Fricker (...)
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  19. added 2016-07-10
    Katrina Hutchison, Wendy Rogers & Vikki A. Entwistle (forthcoming). Addressing Deficits and Injustices: The Potential Epistemic Contributions of Patients to Research. Health Care Analysis:1-18.
    Patient or public involvement in health research is increasingly expected as a matter of policy. In theory, PPI can contribute both to the epistemic aims intrinsic to research, and to extrinsically valued features of research such as social inclusion and transparency. In practice, the aims of PPI have not always been clear, although there has been a tendency to encourage the involvement of so-called ordinary people who are regarded as representative of an assumed patient perspective. In this paper we focus (...)
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  20. added 2016-07-10
    Emmalon Davis (2016). Typecasts, Tokens, and Spokespersons: A Case for Credibility Excess as Testimonial Injustice. Hypatia 31 (3):485-501.
    Miranda Fricker maintains that testimonial injustice is a matter of credibility deficit, not excess. In this article, I argue that this restricted characterization of testimonial injustice is too narrow. I introduce a type of identity-prejudicial credibility excess that harms its targets qua knowers and transmitters of knowledge. I show how positive stereotyping and prejudicially inflated credibility assessments contribute to the continued epistemic oppression of marginalized knowers. In particular, I examine harms such as typecasting, compulsory representation, and epistemic exploitation and consider (...)
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  21. added 2016-07-10
    Charlie Crerar (2016). Taboo, Hermeneutical Injustice, and Expressively Free Environments. Episteme 13 (2):195-207.
    In Epistemic Injustice, Miranda Fricker has insightfully introduced the notion of a hermeneutical injustice, where historic conditions of marginalisation serve to deprive individuals of the appropriate hermeneutical resources with which to render significant patches of their experience fully intelligible to themselves and others. In this paper I draw attention to a shortcoming in Fricker's account: that the only hermeneutical resource she acknowledges is a shared conceptual framework. Consequently, Fricker creates the impression that hermeneutical injustice manifests itself almost exclusively in the (...)
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  22. added 2016-07-10
    Joel Michael Reynolds (2015). The Ableism of Quality of Life Judgments in Disorders of Consciousness: Who Bears Epistemic Responsibility? AJOB Neuroscience 7 (1):59-61.
  23. added 2016-07-10
    Peter D. Klein (2012). What Makes Knowledge the Most Highly Prized Form of True Belief? In Tim Black & Kelly Becker (eds.), The Sensitivity Principle in Epistemology.
    This chapter provides grounds for thinking that it is the quality of the reasons for the propositional content of our belief-states with true propositional contents, rather than the etiology of those belief-states, that determines whether the belief-state qualifies as knowledge. Normative epistemology rather than naturalized epistemology holds the key to understanding knowledge. This chapter delineates some important features of epistemic luck. It explores the etiology view and presents reasons for concluding that it cannot adequately account for epistemic luck. The chapter (...)
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  24. added 2016-07-10
    Patrick Bondy, When Reasons Don’T Work.
    The aim of this paper is to extend Miranda Fricker’s conception of testimonial injustice to what I call “argumentative injustice”: those cases where an arguer’s social identity brings listeners to place too little or too much credibility in an argument. My recommendation is to put in place a type of indirect “affirmative action” plan for argument evaluation. I also situate my proposal in Johnson ’s framework of argumentation as an exercise in manifest rationality.
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  25. added 2016-07-08
    Gabor Tahin (forthcoming). Cicero on Pompey’s Command: Heuristic Rhetoric and Teaching the Art of Strategic Reasoning. Topoi:1-12.
    Through the example of a paradigmatic deliberative speech from classical oratory, the paper addresses two fundamental questions of teaching rhetorical reasoning. First, the paper shows that a speech from ancient Greek and Roman political or judicial oratory could provide effective means to teach a variety of argumentation skills, the recognition of fallacies and an awareness of biases in the target audience. Second, the paper uses the speech to consider an elusive problem of rhetorical or critical reasoning instruction, namely how students (...)
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  26. added 2016-07-08
    Insa Lawler (forthcoming). Dirk Koppelberg and Stefan Tolksdorf (Eds) : Erkenntnistheorie - Wie Und Wozu? [REVIEW] Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie:1-5.
    To what end should or do we pursue philosophy and how? Meta-philosophical questions along these lines have gained more and more interest recently. The collected volume "Erkenntnistheorie — Wie und wozu?" (Engl.: "Epistemology — How and to what end?") aspires to raise and tackle issues addressing the meta-epistemological questions "How is epistemology practiced and to what end?". Although this aim sounds like a descriptive meta-epistemological endeavor, it is not surprising that many authors rather argue for normative claims surrounding the questions (...)
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  27. added 2016-07-08
    Diego Machuca (2016). De Praktische En Epistemische Waarde van Het Pyrronisme. Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte 108 (1):73-98.
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  28. added 2016-07-08
    Tristan Haze (2016). Reply to Adams and Clarke. Logos and Episteme (2):221-225.
    Here I defend two counterexamples to Nozick’s truth-tracking theory of knowledge from an attack on them by Adams and Clarke. With respect to the first counterexample, Adams and Clarke make the error of judging that my belief counts as knowledge. More demonstrably, with respect to the second counterexample they make the error of thinking that, on Nozick’s method-relativized theory, the method M in question in any given case must be generally reliable.
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  29. added 2016-07-08
    Frans H. van Eemeren & Peter Houtlosser, Strategic Maneuvering with the Burden of Proof.
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  30. added 2016-07-07
    Samuli Pöyhönen (forthcoming). Value of Cognitive Diversity in Science. Synthese:1-22.
    When should a scientific community be cognitively diverse? This article presents a model for studying how the heterogeneity of learning heuristics used by scientist agents affects the epistemic efficiency of a scientific community. By extending the epistemic landscapes modeling approach introduced by Weisberg and Muldoon, the article casts light on the micro-mechanisms mediating cognitive diversity, coordination, and problem-solving efficiency. The results suggest that social learning and cognitive diversity produce epistemic benefits only when the epistemic community is faced with problems of (...)
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  31. added 2016-07-07
    Ray Scott Percival (2016). Does the New Classicism Need Evolutionary Theory? In Elizabeth Millán (ed.), After the Avant-Gardes: Reflections on the Future of the Fine Arts. Open Court Publishing Company 109 - 125.
    Drawing on work on modularity of mind and evolutionary psychology, I explore how evolutionary theory may support a return to classical artistic standards (the new classicism). At the same time, I argue for much that is admirable in the avant garde. I connect this question to the theory of epistemology and aesthetic biases, suggesting that aesthetics embody evolved knowledge.
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  32. added 2016-07-07
    Ray Scott Percival (2000). Review of Doubt and Certainty,. [REVIEW] Science Spectra (20).
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  33. added 2016-07-07
    Ray Scott Percival (1999). Review of A House Built on Sand. [REVIEW] Science Spectra.
    A review of a collection of arguments against relativism in the social sciences.
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  34. added 2016-07-07
    Ray Scott Percival (1999). Review of Unweaving The Rainbow (by Richard Dawkins). [REVIEW] Science Spectra.
  35. added 2016-07-06
    Jan Willem Wieland (forthcoming). Responsibility for Strategic Ignorance. Synthese:1-21.
    Strategic ignorance is a widespread phenomenon. In a laboratory setting, many participants avoid learning information about the consequences of their behaviour in order to act egoistically. In real life, many consumers avoid information about their purchases or the working conditions in which they were produced in order to retain their lifestyle. The question is whether agents are blameworthy for such strategically ignorant behaviour. In this paper, I explore quality of will resources, according to which agents are blameworthy, roughly, depending on (...)
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  36. added 2016-07-06
    Clayton Littlejohn (forthcoming). Learning From Learning From Our Mistakes. In Martin Grajner & Pedro Schmechtig (eds.), Epistemic Reasons, Epistemic Norms, and Epistemic Goals. DeGruyter
    What can we learn from cases of knowledge from falsehood? Critics of knowledge-first epistemology have argued that these cases provide us with good reason for rejecting the knowledge accounts of evidence, justification, and the norm of belief. I shall offer a limited defense of the knowledge-first approach to these matters. Knowledge from falsehood cases should undermine our confidence in like-from-like reasoning in epistemology. Just as we should be open to the idea that knowledge can come from non-knowledge, we should be (...)
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  37. added 2016-07-06
    Clayton Littlejohn (forthcoming). The Truth in Gnosticism. Análisis. Revista de Investigación Filosófica.
    The paper discusses some challenges to veritism, the view that the fundamental epistemic good is knowledge. It looks like the best way to meet these challenges might be to appeal to some of Sosa's ideas about the value of achievements, but I argue that the performance normativity framework only gives us part of what we want. What we need is a more radical break with the veritist approach. We need to embrace gnosticism, the view that knowledge is the fundamental epistemic (...)
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  38. added 2016-07-06
    Clayton Littlejohn (forthcoming). Learning From Learning From Our Mistakes. In Martin Grajner & Pedro Schmechtig (eds.), Epistemic Reasons, Epistemic Norms, and Epistemic Goals. DeGruyter
    What can we learn from cases of knowledge from falsehood? Critics of knowledge-first epistemology have argued that these cases provide us with good reason for rejecting the knowledge accounts of evidence, justification, and the norm of belief. I shall offer a limited defense of the knowledge-first approach to these matters. Knowledge from falsehood cases should undermine our confidence in like-from-like reasoning in epistemology. Just as we should be open to the idea that knowledge can come from non-knowledge, we should be (...)
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  39. added 2016-07-06
    Clayton Littlejohn (forthcoming). Learning From Learning From Our Mistakes. In Martin Grajner & Pedro Schmechtig (eds.), Epistemic Reasons, Epistemic Norms, and Epistemic Goals. DeGruyter
    What can we learn from cases of knowledge from falsehood? Critics of knowledge-first epistemology have argued that these cases provide us with good reason for rejecting the knowledge accounts of evidence, justification, and the norm of belief. I shall offer a limited defense of the knowledge-first approach to these matters. Knowledge from falsehood cases should undermine our confidence in like-from-like reasoning in epistemology. Just as we should be open to the idea that knowledge can come from non-knowledge, we should be (...)
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  40. added 2016-07-06
    Christophe Menant (2016). Meaning Generation for Constraint Satisfaction. An Evolutionary Thread for Biosemiotics. Dissertation, Prague Charles University. Gatherings in Biosemiotics 2016
    One of the mains challenges of biosemiotics is ‘to attempt to naturalize biological meaning’ [Sharov & all 2015]. That challenge brings to look at a possible evolutionary thread for biosemiotics based on meaning generation for internal constraint satisfaction, starting with a pre-biotic entity emerging from a material universe. Such perspective complements and extends previous works that used a model of meaning generation for internal constraint satisfaction (the Meaning Generator System) [Menant 2003a, b; 2011]. We propose to look at such an (...)
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  41. added 2016-07-06
    Blake Roeber (2016). The Pragmatic Encroachment Debate. Noûs (2).
    Does knowledge depend in any interesting way on our practical interests? This is the central question in the pragmatic encroachment debate. Pragmatists defend the affirmative answer to this question while purists defend the negative answer. The literature contains two kinds of arguments for pragmatism: principle-based arguments and case-based arguments. Principle-based arguments derive pragmatism from principles that connect knowledge to practical interests. Case-based arguments rely on intuitions about cases that differ with respect to practical interests. I argue that there are insurmountable (...)
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  42. added 2016-07-06
    Clayton Littlejohn (2013). XV-The Russellian Retreat. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 113 (3pt3):293-320.
    Belief does aim at the truth. When our beliefs do not fit the facts, they cannot do what they are supposed to do because they cannot provide us with reasons. We cannot plausibly deny that a truth norm is among the norms that govern belief. What we should not say is that the truth norm is the fundamental epistemic norm. In this paper, I shall argue that knowledge is the norm of belief and that the truth norm has a derivative (...)
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  43. added 2016-07-06
    Ray Scott Percival (2012). The Necessity of Exosomatic Knowledge for Civilization and a Revision to Our Epistemology. In Norbert-Bertrand Barbe (ed.), Le Néant dans la Pensée contemporaine. [The Nothing in Contemporary Thought.]. 136-150.
    The traditional conception of knowledge is justified, true belief. If one looks at a modern textbook on epistemology, the great bulk of questions with which it deals are to do with personal knowledge, as embodied in beliefs and the proper experiences that someone ought to have had in order to have the right (or justification) to know. I intend to argue that due to the explosive growth of knowledge whose domain is “outside the head”, this conception has outlived its relevance. (...)
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  44. added 2016-07-06
    Ray Scott Percival (1994). Dawkins and Mind Viruses: Memes, Rationality and Evolution. Journal of Social and Evolutionary Systems 17 (3):243 – 286.
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  45. added 2016-07-03
    Marianna Bergamaschi Ganapini (forthcoming). Doubting Assertion. Philosophia:1-13.
    One main argument that has been offered in support of the Knowledge Account of Assertion is that it successfully makes sense of a variety of Moorean-paradoxical claims. David Sosa has objected to the Knowledge Account by arguing that it does not generalize satisfactorily to make sense of the oddity of iterated conjunctions of the form “p but I don’t know whether I know that p”. Recently, Martin Montminy has offered a defense of the Knowledge Account. In this paper, I show (...)
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  46. added 2016-07-03
    Eric Johannesson & Sara Packalén (2016). The A Priori‐Operator and the Nesting Problem. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 5 (2):n/a-n/a.
    Many expressions intuitively have different epistemic and modal profiles. For example, co-referring proper names are substitutable salva veritate in modal contexts but not in belief-contexts. Two-dimensional semantics, according to which terms have both a so-called primary and a secondary intension, is a framework that promises to accommodate and explain these diverging intuitions. The framework can be applied to indexicals, proper names or predicates. Graeme Forbes argues that the two-dimensional semantics of David Chalmers fails to account for so-called nested contexts. These (...)
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  47. added 2016-07-01
    Paul Crichton, Havi Carel & Ian James Kidd (forthcoming). Epistemic Injustice and Psychiatry. Psychiatry Bulletin.
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  48. added 2016-07-01
    Ian James Kidd (forthcoming). Confidence, Humility, and Virtue in Nineteenth Century Philosophies. In Herman Paul & Jeroen van Dongen (eds.), Epistemic Virtues in the Sciences and the Humanities (Dordrecht:). Springer
    Most historians explains changes in conceptions of the epistemic virtues and vices in terms of social and historical developments. I argue that such approaches, valuable as they are, neglect the fact that certain changes also reflect changes in metaphysical sensibilities. Certain epistemic virtues and vices are defined relative to an estimate of our epistemic situation that is, in turn, defined by a broader vision or picture of the nature of reality. I defend this claim by charting changing conceptions of the (...)
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  49. added 2016-07-01
    Ian James Kidd & Havi Carel (forthcoming). Epistemic Injustice in Medicine and Healthcare. In Ian James Kidd, Gaile Pohlhaus & José Medina (eds.), The Routledge Handbook to Epistemic Injustice. Routledge
  50. added 2016-07-01
    Ian James Kidd & Havi Carel (2015). Epistemic Injustice in Healthcare: A Philosophical Analysis. Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 17 (4):529-540.
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