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Epistemology

Edited by Matthew McGrath (University of Missouri, Columbia)
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  1. added 2015-01-25
    Anthony Bolos (2015). Is Knowledge of God a Cognitive Achievement? Ratio 28 (1).
    This essay considers whether reformed epistemology is compatible with the claim that knowledge is a cognitive achievement. It is argued that knowledge of God is not only compatible with a more general achievement claim, but is also compatible with a much stronger achievement claim – namely, the strong achievement thesis where achievements are characterized by the overcoming of some obstacle. With respect to reformed epistemology, then, it is argued that the obstacle that is overcome is an environment that is not (...)
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  2. added 2015-01-24
    Roger Clarke (forthcoming). Preface Writers Are Consistent. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
    The preface paradox does not show that it can be rational to have inconsistent beliefs, because preface writers do not have inconsistent beliefs. I argue, first, that a fully satisfactory solution to the preface paradox would have it that the preface writer’s beliefs are consistent. The case here is on basic intuitive grounds, not the consequence of a theory of rationality or of belief. Second, I point out that there is an independently motivated theory of belief—-sensitivism—-which allows such a solution. (...)
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  3. added 2015-01-23
    Rachel McKinnon (forthcoming). Trans*Formative Experiences. Res Philosophica 92 (2).
    What happens when we consider transformative experiences from the perspective of gender transitions? In this paper I suggest that at least two insights emerge. First, trans* persons’ experiences of gender transitions show some limitations to L.A. Paul’s (forthcoming) decision theoretic account of transformative decisions. This will involve exploring some of the phenomenology of coming to know that one is trans, and in coming to decide to transition. Second, what epistemological effects are there to undergoing a transformative experience? By connecting some (...)
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  4. added 2015-01-23
    Daniel Whiting (forthcoming). Truth is (Still) the Norm for Assertion: A Reply to Littlejohn. Erkenntnis.
    In a paper (Erkenntnis 78: 847–867, 2013), I defend the view that truth is the fundamental norm for assertion and, in doing so, reject the view that knowledge is the fundamental norm for assertion. In a recent response, Littlejohn (Erkenntnis 79: 1355–1365, 2014) raises a number of objections against my arguments. In this reply, I argue that Littlejohn’s objections are unsuccessful.
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  5. added 2015-01-23
    Federico Luzzi (2014). What Does Knowledge-Yielding Deduction Require Of Its Premises? Episteme 11 (3):261-275.
    According to the principle of Knowledge Counter-Closure , knowledge-yielding single-premise deduction requires a known premise: if S believes q solely on the basis of deduction from p, and S knows q, then S must know p. Although prima facie plausible, widely accepted, and supported by seemingly compelling motivations, KCC has recently been challenged by cases where S arguably knows q solely on the basis of deduction from p, yet p is false or p is true but not known . I (...)
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  6. added 2015-01-23
    Geoff Pynn (2014). Unassertability And The Appearance Of Ignorance. Episteme 11 (2):125-143.
    Whether it seems that you know something depends in part upon practical factors. When the stakes are low, it can seem to you that you know that p, but when the stakes go up it'll seem to you that you don't. The apparent sensitivity of knowledge to stakes presents a serious challenge to epistemologists who endorse a stable semantics for knowledge attributions and reject the idea that whether you know something depends on how much is at stake. After arguing that (...)
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  7. added 2015-01-23
    Casey Perin (2014). Scepticism, Truth, and Value: A Reply to Brennan. International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 4 (1):51-62.
    In response to Tad Brennan’s critical notice of The Demands of Reason, I offer further arguments in defense of the distinction between appearance and belief, the claim that truth for its own sake is the Pyrrhonist’s goal, and the centrality of the rationalist interpretation of Sextus’s work.
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  8. added 2015-01-23
    Martin Montminy & Wes Skolits (2014). Defending The Coherence Of Contextualism. Episteme 11 (3):319-333.
    According to a popular objection against epistemic contextualism, contextualists who endorse the factivity of knowledge, the principle of epistemic closure and the knowledge norm of assertion cannot coherently defend their theory without abandoning their response to skepticism. After examining and criticizing three responses to this objection, we offer our own solution. First, we question the assumption that contextualists ought to be interpreted as asserting the content of their theory. Second, we argue that contextualists need not hold that high epistemic standards (...)
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  9. added 2015-01-23
    Darren Bradley (2014). A Relevant Alternatives Solution to the Bootstrapping and Self-Knowledge Problems. Journal of Philosophy 111 (7):379-393.
  10. added 2015-01-23
    A. Morton (2013). Hume’s Skeptical Crisis. [REVIEW] International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 3 (3):229-231.
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  11. added 2015-01-22
    Moti Mizrahi (forthcoming). On Appeals to Intuition: A Reply to Muñoz-Suárez. The Reasoner.
    I reply to Muñoz-Suárez's objection to my argument by analogy with appeals to authority for the following necessary, but not sufficient, condition for strong appeals to intuition: (PAI) When philosophers appeal to intuitions, there must be an agreement among the relevant philosophers concerning the intuition in question; otherwise, the appeal to intuition is weak.
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  12. added 2015-01-22
    Boaz Miller (forthcoming). Why (Some) Knowledge is the Property of a Community but None of Its Members. Philosophical Quarterly.
    Mainstream analytic epistemology regards knowledge as the property of individuals, rather ‎than groups. Drawing on insights from the reality of knowledge production and dissemination ‎in the sciences, I argue, from within the analytic framework, that this view is wrong. I defend ‎the thesis of “knowledge-level justification communalism”, which states that at least some ‎knowledge, typically knowledge obtained from expert testimony, is the property of a ‎community but none of its members, in that only the community collectively possesses ‎knowledge-level justification for (...)
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  13. added 2015-01-22
    Adrian Heathcote (2015). Testimony and Gettier: A Reply to Vance. Ratio 28 (1):n/a-n/a.
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  14. added 2015-01-21
    Andrei A. Buckareff (2014). Deciding to Believe Redux. In Jonathan Matheson Rico Vitz (ed.), The Ethics of Belief: Epistemic Norms and Social Contexts. Oxford University Press. 33-50.
    The ways in which we exercise intentional agency are varied. I take the domain of intentional agency to include all that we intentionally do versus what merely happens to us. So the scope of our intentional agency is not limited to intentional action. One can also exercise some intentional agency in omitting to act and, importantly, in producing the intentional outcome of an intentional action. So, for instance, when an agent is dieting, there is an exercise of agency both with (...)
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  15. added 2015-01-19
    David Rose (forthcoming). Belief is Prior to Knowledge. Episteme.
    Orthodoxy has it that knowledge is a composite of belief and non-mental factors. However, Timothy Williamson suggests that orthodoxy implies that the concept of belief is acquired before the concept of knowledge, whereas developmental data suggest the reverse. More recently, Jennifer Nagel reviews the psychological evidence, building a psychological case that the concept of knowledge emerges prior to belief. I assess the psychological state of the art and find support for the opposite conclusion. Overall the empirical evidence supports the orthodox (...)
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  16. added 2015-01-17
    Joseph Shieber (2015). A Philosophical Introduction to Testimony. Routledge.
    The epistemology of testimony has experienced a growth in interest over the last twenty-five years that has been matched by few, if any, other areas of philosophy. Testimony: A Philosophical Introduction provides an epistemology of testimony that surveys this rapidly growing research area while incorporating a discussion of relevant empirical work from social and developmental psychology, as well as from the interdisciplinary study of knowledge-creation in groups. The past decade has seen a number of scholarly monographs on the epistemology of (...)
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  17. added 2015-01-14
    Chase Wrenn (2015). Truth. Polity.
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  18. added 2015-01-13
    Steven W. Patterson (2009). Review of Informal Logic: A Pragmatic Approach. [REVIEW] Cogency 1 (1):139-147.
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  19. added 2015-01-09
    Scott Stapleford (forthcoming). Epistemic Versus All Things Considered Requirements. Synthese:1-21.
    Epistemic obligations are constraints on belief stemming from epistemic considerations alone. Anthony Robert Booth (2012) is one of the many philosophers who deny that there are epistemic obligations. Any obligation pertaining to belief is an all things considered obligation, according to him—a strictly generic, rather than specifically epistemic, requirement. Though Booth’s argument is valid, I will try to show that it is unsound. There are two central premises: (1) S is justified in believing that P iff S is blameless in (...)
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  20. added 2015-01-09
    Daniel Pilchman & Margaret Gilbert (2014). Belief, Acceptance, and What Happens in Groups. In Jennifer Lackey (ed.), Essays in Collective Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
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  21. added 2015-01-09
    Maria Aloni & Bruno Jacinto (2014). Knowing Who: How Perspectives and Contexts Interact. In Frank Lihoreau & Manuel Rebuschi (eds.), Epistemology, Context and Formalism. Synthese Library.
  22. added 2015-01-08
    Jonathan Livengood & David Rose (forthcoming). Experimental Philosophy and Causal Attribution. In Justin Sytsma & Wesley Buckwalter (eds.), A Companion to Experimental Philosophy. Blackwell.
    Humans often attribute the things that happen to one or another actual cause. In this chapter, we survey some recent philosophical and psychological research on causal attribution. We pay special attention to the relation between graphical causal modeling and theories of causal attribution. We think that the study of causal attribution is one place where formal and experimental techniques nicely complement one another.
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  23. added 2015-01-08
    Andreas Dorschel (2010). Ideengeschichte. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.
    What are ideas? How have new ideas emerged? How have ideas been preserved or altered? Whoever ‘has got an idea’ may believe it fell from the skies. Yet in so far as they become intelligible, ideas must have grown out of some tradition, and in so far as they are significant, new ideas grow from them. In a nutshell: Ideas are always connected historically. How such connections are to be explored constitutes the subject matter of this book, focussing on method.
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  24. added 2015-01-07
    Gabriella Crocco & Eva-Maria Engelen (eds.) (forthcoming). Kurt Gödel: Philosopher-Scientist. Presses Universitaires de Provence.
    This volume represents the beginning of a new stage of research in interpreting Kurt Gödel’s philosophy in relation to his scientific work. It is more than a collection of essays on Gödel. It is in fact the product of a long enduring international collaboration on Kurt Gödel’s Philosophical Notebooks (Max Phil). New and significant material has been made accessible to a group of experts, on which they rely for their articles. In addition to this, Gödel’s Nachlass is presented in a (...)
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  25. added 2015-01-07
    Jeff Kasser (2014). Prospects for a Jamesian Expressivism. William James Studies 10.
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  26. added 2015-01-06
    Daniel Whiting (forthcoming). The Glass is Half Empty: A New Argument for Pessimism About Aesthetic Testimony. British Journal of Aesthetics.
    Call the view that it is possible to acquire aesthetic knowledge via testimony, optimism, and its denial, pessimism. In this paper, I offer a novel argument for pessimism. It works by turning attention away from the basis of the relevant belief, namely, testimony, and toward what that belief in turn provides a basis for, namely, other attitudes. In short, I argue that an aesthetic belief acquired via testimony cannot provide a rational basis for further attitudes, such as admiration, and that (...)
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  27. added 2015-01-06
    Eugen Fischer (2015). Mind the Metaphor! A Systematic Fallacy in Analogical Reasoning. Analysis 75 (1):67-77.
    Conceptual metaphors facilitate both productive and pernicious analogical reasoning. This article addresses the question: When and why does the frequently helpful use of metaphor become pernicious? By applying the most influential theoretical framework from cognitive psychology in analysing the philosophically most prominent example of pernicious metaphorical reasoning , we identify a philosophically relevant but previously undescribed fallacy in analogical reasoning with metaphors. We then outline an explanation of why even competent thinkers commit this fallacy and obtain a psychologically informed ‘debunking’ (...)
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  28. added 2015-01-06
    Mark Richard (2015). Analysis, Concepts, and Intuitions. Analytic Philosophy 55 (3):n/a-n/a.
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  29. added 2015-01-06
    Eugen Fischer (2014). Paradox-Psychologie: Kognitive Epistemologie und philosophische Problemaufloesung. In Thomas Grundmann, Joachim Horvath & Jens Kipper (eds.), Die Experimentelle Philosophie in der Diskussion. Suhrkamp. 322-349.
    Der Aufsatz stellt einen Strang der experimentellen Philosophie vor, der sich nicht mit empirischen Umfragen begnügt, sondern bemüht, psychologische Experimente und Erklärungen für die philosophische Arbeit nutzbar zu machen: Das prominent propagierte, aber bislang nur vereinzelt praktizierte Forschungsprogramm der kognitiven Epistemologie (alias ‚sources project‘) verwendet bereits vorliegende experimentelle und theoretische Ergebnisse der Kognitions- und Sozialpsychologie, um ihrerseits experimentell überprüfbare Erklärungen philosophisch relevanter Intuitionen zu entwickeln, die deren epistemologische Bewertung erlauben. Während die Diskussion in und um die experimentelle Philosophie sich bislang (...)
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  30. added 2015-01-06
    Tomasz Żuradzki (2014). Trzeci rodzaj normatywności – wymóg reagowania na racje. Filozofia Nauki 88 (4):35-51.
    Celem artykułu jest krytyka przyjętego przez niektórych filozofów podziału na normatywność w podstawowym sensie oraz normatywność wymogów wąsko rozumianej racjonalności. Pokazuję, że podział taki nie jest wyczerpujący, ponieważ pomija ważny typ wymogów normatywnych, a mianowicie reagowanie na racje. Z jednej strony tego rodzaju wymogi nie przypominają wymogów normatywnych w podstawowym sensie, a z drugiej — istotnie różnią się od racjonalności rozumianej jako spójność między nastawieniami. Dochodzę do wniosku, że reagowanie na racje należy uznać za trzeci typ wymogów normatywnych.
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  31. added 2015-01-05
    Clayton Littlejohn (forthcoming). How and Why Knowledge is First. In A. Carter, E. Gordon & B. Jarvis (eds.), Knowledge First. Oxford University Press.
    A defense of the idea that knowledge is first in the sense that there is nothing prior to knowledge that puts reasons or evidence in your possession. Includes a critical discussion of the idea that perception or perceptual experience might provide reasons and a defense of a knowledge-first approach to justified belief.
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  32. added 2015-01-02
    Howard Sankey (forthcoming). Constructively Engaging with Relativism. Metascience:1-5.
    Traditional epistemology is haunted by the spectre of scepticism. Yet the more pressing concern in the contemporary intellectual scene must surely be relativism rather than scepticism. This has been the case in the history and philosophy of science since the work of Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend, to say nothing of the emergence of the sociology of scientific knowledge.In Epistemic Relativism: A Constructive Critique, Markus Seidel comes firmly to grips with this modern spectre. Though Seidel devotes attention to other forms (...)
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  33. added 2015-01-02
    Brent G. Kyle (forthcoming). The New and Old Ignorance Puzzles: How Badly Do We Need Closure? Synthese:1-31.
    Skeptical puzzles and arguments often employ knowledge-closure principles (e.g. If S knows that P, and knows that P entails Q, then S knows that Q). Epistemologists widely believe that an adequate reply to the skeptic should explain why her reasoning is appealing albeit misleading; but it's unclear what would explain the appeal of the skeptic's closure principle, if not for its truth. In this paper, I aim to challenge the widespread commitment to knowledge-closure. But I proceed by first examining a (...)
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  34. added 2014-12-31
    Chris Tweedt (forthcoming). Review of Hilary Kornblith's On Reflection. [REVIEW] Journal of Moral Philosophy.
    In this short book, Hilary Kornblith argues that there isn’t any reason to think reflection is more valuable than unreflective processes. This is because reflection doesn’t have any special powers above what unreflective processes have, and, in fact, reflection isn’t even different in kind from unreflective processes. We don’t learn all of this, though, until the end of the book. In the beginning, Kornblith gives two arguments against views that afford reflection a special power that unreflective processes don’t have. He (...)
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  35. added 2014-12-30
    Mark McEvoy (2014). Causal Tracking Reliabilism and the Gettier Problem. Synthese 191:4115-4130.
    This paper argues that reliabilism can handle Gettier cases once it restricts knowledge producing reliable processes to those that involve a suitable causal link between the subject’s belief and the fact it references. Causal tracking reliabilism (as this version of reliabilism is called) also avoids the problems that refuted the causal theory of knowledge, along with problems besetting more contemporary theories (such as virtue reliabilism and the “safety” account of knowledge). Finally, causal tracking reliabilism allows for a response to Linda (...)
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  36. added 2014-12-30
    María G. Navarro (2010). Elements for an Argumentative Method of Interpretation. Rozenberg Quarterly. The Magazine 1 (1).
    When are we, in fact, arguing? Even one and the same author may offer more than one definition of what he understands by argumentation: this is partly because the problem of argumentation is not confined to a single area of knowledge or of practical life. Definitions of argumentation are as varied as the different positions taken on the question of what exactly we do when we argue. Be that as it may, we are struck by the fact that the problem (...)
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  37. added 2014-12-28
    Anna-Maria A. Eder (forthcoming). No Match Point for the Permissibility Account. Erkenntnis.
    In the literature, one finds two accounts of the normative status of rational belief: the ought account and the permissibility account. Both have their advantages and shortcomings, making it difficult to favour one over the other. Imagine that there were two principles of rational belief or rational degrees of belief commonly considered plausible, but which, however, yielded a paradox together with one account, but not with the other. One of the accounts therefore requires us to give up one of the (...)
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  38. added 2014-12-25
    Luca Moretti & Tommaso Piazza, Phenomenal Conservatism and Bergmann's Dilemma.
    In this paper we argue that Michael Huemer’s (PC) phenomenal conservatism––the internalist view according to which our beliefs are prima facie justified if based on how things seems or appears to us to be––doesn’t fall afoul of Michael Bergmann’s dilemma for epistemological internalism. We start by showing that the thought experiment that Bergmann adduces to conclude that (PC) is vulnerable to his dilemma misses its target. After that, we distinguish between two ways in which a mental state can contribute to (...)
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  39. added 2014-12-22
    Andreas Dorschel (ed.) (2009). Kunst und Wissen in der Moderne. Böhlau.
    The relationship between art and knowledge is subject to historical change. In the early 19th century, the view was still prevalent that art was about eternal values, especially beauty, whereas science was entirely involved in historical time: The former was seen as contemplative, the latter as searching. But ever since, most artists have given up that stance and hence the once imagined detachment from historical time. They search, and sometimes research, too. Does that mean that art and science have come (...)
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  40. added 2014-12-22
    Andreas Dorschel (2005). Über das Verstehen und Interpretieren von Kunstwerken. In Wolf-Jürgen Cramm, Wulf Kellerwessel, David Krause & Hans-Christoph Kupfer (eds.), Diskurs und Reflexion. Wolfgang Kuhlmann zum 65. Geburtstag. Königshausen & Neumann. 375-387.
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  41. added 2014-12-22
    Andreas Dorschel (2002). Vorgriffe. Über Präsumtionen, Präsuppositionen und Vorurteile. Internationale Zeitschrift für Philosophie 11 (1):85-100.
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  42. added 2014-12-20
    Cecilia Tohaneanu (1998). Epistemologia istoriei. Între mitul faptelor şi mitul semnificaţiilor. Editura Stiintifica.
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  43. added 2014-12-19
    Christian List, Social Choice Theory. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Social choice theory is the study of collective decision processes and procedures. It is not a single theory, but a cluster of models and results concerning the aggregation of individual inputs (e.g., votes, preferences, judgments, welfare) into collective outputs (e.g., collective decisions, preferences, judgments, welfare). Central questions are: How can a group of individuals choose a winning outcome (e.g., policy, electoral candidate) from a given set of options? What are the properties of different voting systems? When is a voting system (...)
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  44. added 2014-12-17
    Markus Christen, Mark Alfano & Brian Robinson, The Semantic Neighborhood of Intellectual Humility. Proceedings of the European Conference on Social Intelligence.
    Intellectual humility is an interesting but underexplored disposition. The claim “I am (intellectually) humble” seems paradoxical in that someone who has the disposition in question would not typically volunteer it. There is an explanatory gap between the meaning of the sentence and the meaning the speaker expresses by uttering it. We therefore suggest analyzing intellectual humility semantically, using a psycholexical approach that focuses on both synonyms and antonyms of ‘intellectual humility’. We present a thesaurus-based method to map the semantic space (...)
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  45. added 2014-12-17
    Andreas Dorschel & Matthias Kettner (1996). Systemrationalität? In Karl-Otto Apel & Matthias Kettner (eds.), Die eine Vernunft und die vielen Rationalitäten. Suhrkamp. 349-372.
    We judge actions to be rational if means are adequate to ends. In modern societies, innumerable actions are interconnected into complex systems. Does rationality, then, become a feature of systems? If so, it will not do to view means in the light of ends, Niklas Luhmann maintained. In ‘The Concept of Purpose and Systems Rationality’ (‘Zweckbegriff und Systemrationalität’) (1968), he defined the rationality of systems as their capacity to reduce complexity (“Reduktion von Komplexität”); in his later work, Luhmann elaborated and (...)
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  46. added 2014-12-17
    Andreas Dorschel (1993). Gefühl Als Argument? In Andreas Dorschel, Matthias Kettner, Wolfgang Kuhlmann & Marcel Niquet (eds.), Transzendentalpragmatik. Ein Symposion für Karl-Otto Apel. Suhrkamp. 167-186.
    Does having some feeling or other ever count as an argument – and, should it? As a matter of fact, not just do persons sometimes refer to their feelings to make a point in debate. Often, they even treat them as irrefutable arguments; for they are, of course, certain of their own feelings. To make a point in debate by reference to one’s feelings, one has got to articulate them. As language is the core medium of debate (though it can (...)
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  47. added 2014-12-14
    Andreas Dorschel (2006). Einwände gegen das Vergleichen. Ein Versuch, sie zu beantworten. Philosophisches Jahrbuch 113 (1):175-183.
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  48. added 2014-12-12
    Nicholas Maxwell (forthcoming). Can Scientific Method Help Us Create a Wiser World? In N. Dalal, A. Intezari & M. Heitz (eds.), Practical Wisdom in the Age of Technology: Insights, Issues and Questions for a New Millennium. Ashgate.
    Two great problems of learning confront humanity: (1) learning about the universe, and about ourselves as a part of the universe, and (2) learning how to make progress towards as good a world as possible. We solved the first problem when we created modern science in the 17th century, but we have not yet solved the second problem. This puts us in a situation of unprecedented danger. Modern science and technology enormously increase our power to act, but not our power (...)
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  49. added 2014-12-12
    Lisa Bortolotti (2014). Irrationality. Polity Press.
    We talk about irrationality when behaviour defies explanation or prediction, when decisions are driven by emotions or instinct rather than by reflection, when reasoning fails to conform to basic principles of logic and probability, and when beliefs lack coherence or empirical support. Depending on the context, agents exhibiting irrational behaviour may be described as foolish, ignorant, unwise or even insane. -/- In this clear and engaging introduction to current debates on irrationality, Lisa Bortolotti presents the many facets of the concept (...)
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  50. added 2014-12-12
    Amber L. Griffioen (2014). (Ad-)Ventures in Faith: A Critique of Bishop's Doxastic Venture Model. Religious Studies:1-17.
    While some philosophical models reduce religious faith to either mere belief or affect, more recent accounts have begun to look at the volitional component of faith. In this spirit, John Bishop has defended the notion of faith as a ‘doxastic venture’. In this article, I consider Bishop's view in detail and attempt to show that his account proves on the one hand too permissive and on the other too restrictive. Thus, although the doxastic-venture model offers certain advantages over other prominent (...)
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