Bookmark and Share

Epistemology

Edited by Matthew McGrath (University of Missouri, Columbia)
Most recently added entries found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Sort by:
1 — 50 / 76
  1. added 2014-07-23
    W. P. Hall (2011). Physical Basis for the Emergence of Autopoiesis, Cognition and Knowledge. Kororoit Institute Working Papers (2):1-63.
    Paper type: Conceptual perspective. Background(s): Physics, biology, epistemology Perspectives: Theory of autopoietic systems, Popperian evolutionary epistemology and the biology of cognition. Context: This paper is a contribution to developing the theories of hierarchically complex living systems and the natures of knowledge in such systems. Problem: Dissonance between the literatures of knowledge management and organization theory and my observations of the living organization led to consideration of foundation questions: What does it mean to be alive? What is knowledge? How are life (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. added 2014-07-21
    Jennifer Lackey (2014). Assertion and Expertise. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (1).
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. added 2014-07-20
    Jonny Anomaly (forthcoming). Race, Genes, and the Ethics of Belief: A Review of Nicholas Wade, A Troublesome Inheritance. [REVIEW] Hastings Center Report.
  4. added 2014-07-19
    Janice Dowell, J. L. (forthcoming). The Metaethical Insignificance of Moral Twin Earth. In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics. Oxford.
  5. added 2014-07-17
    Brian Epstein (2010). The Diviner and the Scientist: Revisiting the Question of Alternative Standards of Rationality. Journal of the American Academy of Religion 78 (4):1048-1086.
    Are the standards of reasoning and rationality in divination, religious practice, and textual exegesis different from those in the sciences? Can there be different standards of reasoning and rationality at all? The intense “rationality debate” of the 1960s, 70s, and 80s focused on these questions and the related problems of relativism across cultures and systems of practice. Although philosophers were at the center of these debates at the time, they may appear to have abandoned the question in recent years. On (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. added 2014-07-16
    K. Brad Wray (2013). Social Epistemology. In Stathis Psillos & Martin Curd (eds.), Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Science. Routledge.
  7. added 2014-07-15
    K. Brad Wray (forthcoming). COLLABORATIVE RESEARCH, DELIBERATION, AND INNOVATION. Episteme.
    I evaluate the extent to which we could learn something about how we should be conducting collaborative research in science from the research on groupthink. I argue that Solomon has set us in the wrong direction, failing to recognize that the consensus in scientific specialties is not the result of deliberation. But the attention to the structure of problem-solving that has emerged in the groupthink research conducted by psychologists can help us see when deliberation could lead to problems for a (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. added 2014-07-14
    Duncan MacIntosh (1986). Commentary: Rationalizing Naturalism; On Hilary Kornblith's "Naturalizing Rationality&Quot;. In Newton Garver & Peter H. Hare (eds.), Naturalism and Rationality. Prometheus Books. 135-139.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. added 2014-07-12
    Michael Bergmann & Patrick Kain (eds.) (2014). Challenges to Moral and Religious Belief: Disagreement and Evolution. Oxford University Press.
    Challenges to Moral and Religious Belief contains fourteen original essays by philosophers, theologians, and social scientists on challenges to moral and religious belief from disagreement and evolution. Three main questions are addressed: Can one reasonably maintain one's moral and religious beliefs in the face of interpersonal disagreement with intellectual peers? Does disagreement about morality between a religious belief source, such as a sacred text, and a non-religious belief source, such as a society's moral intuitions, make it irrational to continue trusting (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. added 2014-07-12
    Michael Bergmann & Patrick Kain (2014). Challenges to Moral and Religious Belief: Overview and Future Directions. In Challenges to Moral and Religious Belief: Disagreement and Evolution.
  11. added 2014-07-11
    Chris Tucker (forthcoming). Acquaintance and Fallible Non-Inferential Justification. In Michael Bergmann & Brett Coppenger (eds.), Traditional Epistemic Internalism. Oxford University Press.
    Classical acquaintance theory is any version of classical foundationalism that appeals to acquaintance in order to account for non-inferential justification. Such theories are well suited to account for a kind of infallible non-inferential justification. Why am I justified in believing that I’m in pain? An initially attractive (partial) answer is that I’m acquainted with my pain. But since I can’t be acquainted with what isn’t there, acquaintance with my pain guarantees that I’m in pain. What’s less clear is whether, given (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. added 2014-07-11
    Gerhard Schurz & Paul D. Thorn (2014). TTB Vs. Franklin's Rule in Environments of Different Redundancy. Frontiers in Psychology.
    This is an appendix to the paper "Cognitive Success: Instrumental Justifications of Normative Systems of Reasoning".
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. added 2014-07-09
    Sylvia Wenmackers, Danny E. P. Vanpoucke & Igor Douven (2014). Rationality: A Social-Epistemology Perspective. Frontiers in Psychology 5 (581).
    Both in philosophy and in psychology, human rationality has traditionally been studied from an “individualistic” perspective. Recently, social epistemologists have drawn attention to the fact that epistemic interactions among agents also give rise to important questions concerning rationality. In previous work, we have used a formal model to assess the risk that a particular type of social-epistemic interactions lead agents with initially consistent belief states into inconsistent belief states. Here, we continue this work by investigating the dynamics to which these (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. added 2014-07-08
    Tim Button (forthcoming). Brains in Vats and Model Theory. In Sanford Goldberg (ed.), The Brain in a Vat. Cambridge University Press.
    Hilary Putnam’s BIV argument first occurred to him when ‘thinking about a theorem in modern logic, the “Skolem–Löwenheim Theorem”’ (Putnam 1981: 7). One of my aims in this paper is to explore the connection between the argument and the Theorem. But I also want to draw some further connections. In particular, I think that Putnam’s BIV argument provides us with an impressively versatile template for dealing with sceptical challenges. Indeed, this template allows us to unify some of Putnam’s most enduring (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. added 2014-07-06
    Endre Begby (forthcoming). Lexical Norms, Language Comprehension, and the Epistemology of Testimony. Canadian Journal of Philosophy.
    Most testimonial exchange occurs by way of linguistic communication. This suggests that the epistemology of language comprehension is importantly implicated in the epistemology of testimony. But how? This paper takes its departure from a recent argument developed by Sanford Goldberg. According to Goldberg, reflection on the connections between the epistemologies of language comprehension and testimony provides a novel argument for linguistic normativity: without positing public linguistic norms we would be at a loss to account for widely assumed epistemic entitlements to (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. added 2014-07-03
    Karen Frost‐Arnold (2014). Imposters, Tricksters, and Trustworthiness as an Epistemic Virtue. Hypatia 29 (3).
    This paper argues that trustworthiness is an epistemic virtue that promotes objectivity. I show that untrustworthy imposture can be an arrogant act of privilege that silences marginalized voices. But, as epistemologists of ignorance have shown, sometimes trickery and the betrayal of epistemic norms are important resistance strategies. This raises the question: when is betrayal of trust epistemically virtuous? After establishing that trust is central to objectivity, I argue for the following answer: a betrayal is epistemically vicious when it strengthens or (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. added 2014-07-02
    Luca Moretti (forthcoming). Phenomenal Conservatism. Analysis.
    I review recent work on Phenomenal Conservatism, the position introduced by Michael Huemer according to which if it seems that P to a subject S, in absence of defeaters S has thereby some degree of justification for believing P.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. added 2014-06-30
    Stephen Grimm (forthcoming). Wisdom in Theology. In William and Frederick Abraham and Aquino (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Epistemology of Theology.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. added 2014-06-30
    Patrick Bondy (forthcoming). Counterfactuals and Epistemic Basing Relations. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
    This paper is about the epistemic basing relation, which is the relation which obtains between beliefs and the reasons for which they are held. We need an adequate account of the basing relation if we want to have a satisfactory account of doxastic justification, which we should want to have. To that end, this paper aims to achieve two goals. The first is to show that a plausible account of the basing relation must invoke counterfactual concepts. The second is to (...)
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. added 2014-06-30
    Stephen Grimm (forthcoming). Value of Reflection. In Miguel Angel Fernandez (ed.), Performance Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. added 2014-06-30
    Stephen Grimm (forthcoming). Wisdom. Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
    What is it that makes someone wise, or one person wiser than another? I argue that wisdom consists in knowledge of how to live well, and that this knowledge of how to live well is constituted by various further kinds of knowledge. One concern for this view is that knowledge is not needed for wisdom but rather some state short of knowledge, such as having rational or justified beliefs about various topics. Another concern is that the emphasis on knowing how (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. added 2014-06-26
    Danny Frederick, The Contrast Between Dogmatic and Critical Arguments.
    Karl Popper lamented the prevalence of dogmatic argument in philosophy and commended the kind of critical argument that is found in the sciences. David Miller criticises the uncritical nature of so-called critical thinking because of its attachment to dogmatic arguments. I expound and clarify Popper’s distinction between critical and dogmatic arguments and the background to it. I criticise some errors in Miller’s discussion. I reaffirm the need for philosophers to eschew dogmatic arguments in favour of critical ones.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. added 2014-06-25
    Silvia Tossut (forthcoming). Membership and Knowledge. Scientific Research as a Group Activity. Episteme:1-19.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. added 2014-06-25
    Anne Schulherr Waters, Syllabi: Native Studies 436-001: Environmental Practice and Ethics in Native America, Spring 2005, University of New Mexico. American Philosophical Association Newsletter On American Indians in Philosophy.
    This syllabus explores complex ways that Native peoples form relationships with environments. Topics include Native American environmental thought, ethics, technology, and aesthetics of practice. A comparative approach shows differences and similarities of Native and Western templates of understanding that frame relations in our human environment. Texts discuses understanding of traditional and contemporary indigenous philosophical frameworks of environmental practices, and why they collide with technology. Required text authors include Gregory Cajete, J. Baird Caldicott, Michael P. Nelson, Donald Grinde, and Bruce E. (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. added 2014-06-21
    Justin Clarke-Doane (forthcoming). Justification and Explanation in Mathematics and Morality. In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics. Oxford University Press.
    In an influential book, Harman writes, "In explaining the observations that support a physical theory, scientists typically appeal to mathematical principles. On the other hand, one never seems to need to appeal in this way to moral principles [1977, 9 – 10]." What is the epistemological relevance of this contrast? In this article, I argue that ethicists and philosophers of mathematics have misunderstood it. They have confused what I shall call the justificatory challenge for realism about an area, D – (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. added 2014-06-19
    John Turri, Wesley Buckwalter & Peter Blouw (forthcoming). Knowledge and Luck. Psychonomic Bulletin and Review.
    Nearly all success is due to some mix of ability and luck. But some successes we attribute to the agent’s ability, whereas others we attribute to luck. To better understand the criteria distinguishing credit from luck, we conducted a series of four studies on knowledge attributions. Knowledge is an achievement that involves reaching the truth. But many factors affecting the truth are beyond our control and reaching the truth is often partly due to luck. Which sorts of luck are compatible (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. added 2014-06-16
    Moti Mizrahi (forthcoming). Don't Believe the Hype: Why Should Philosophical Theories Yield to Intuitions? Teorema.
    In this paper, I argue that, contrary to common opinion, a counterexample against a philosophical theory does not amount to conclusive evidence against that theory. Instead, the method of counterexamples allows for the derivation of a disjunction, i.e., ‘either the theory is false or an auxiliary assumption is false’, not a negation of the target theory. This is so because, whenever the method of counterexamples is used in an attempt to refute a philosophical theory, there is a crucial auxiliary assumption (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. added 2014-06-15
    Michael Hannon, The Purpose and Semantics of Knowledge Ascriptions.
    A large debate centers on whether the correct semantics of knowledge ascriptions is invariant or context-sensitive. Recently, a handful of theorists have tried to use putative facts about the purpose of knowledge ascriptions to shed light on their semantics. My paper raises doubts about the viability of this strategy.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. added 2014-06-15
    Michael Hannon, The Thresholds for Knowledge.
    This paper is about the ‘threshold problem’ for knowledge, namely, how do we determine what fixes the level of justification required for knowledge in a non-arbitrary way? One popular strategy for answering this problem is impurism, which is the view that the required level of justification is fixed by one’s practical reasoning situation. In a recent article, Jessica Brown (2014) considers but rejects the impurist strategy. My goal is to defend a new version of impurism that eludes Brown’s objections and (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. added 2014-06-14
    Clayton Littlejohn (forthcoming). Fake Barns and False Dilemmas. Episteme.
    The central thesis of robust virtue epistemology (RVE) is that the difference between knowledge and mere true belief is that knowledge involves success that is attributable to a subject's abilities. An influential objection to this approach is that RVE delivers the wrong verdicts in cases of environmental luck. Critics of RVE argue that the view needs to be supplemented with modal anti-luck condition. This particular criticism rests on a number of mistakes about the nature of ability that I shall try (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. added 2014-06-10
    Robert Lockie (forthcoming). Perspectivism, Deontologism And Epistemic Poverty. Social Epistemology.
    The epistemic poverty objection is commonly levelled by externalists against deontological conceptions of epistemic justification. This is that an ‘oughts’ based account of epistemic justification together with ‘ought’ implies ‘can’ must lead us to hold to be justified, epistemic agents who are objectively not truth-conducive cognizers. The epistemic poverty objection has led to a common response from deontologists, namely to embrace accounts of bounded (perspectival) rationality – subjective, practical or regulative accounts rather than objective, absolute or theoretical accounts. But the (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. added 2014-06-09
    Selim Berker (forthcoming). Reply to Goldman: Cutting Up the One to Save the Five in Epistemology. Episteme.
    I argue that Alvin Goldman has failed to save process reliabilism from my critique in earlier work of consequentialist or teleological epistemic theories. First, Goldman misconstrues the nature of my challenge: two of the cases he discusses I never claimed to be counterexamples to process reliabilism. Second, Goldman’s reply to the type of case I actually claimed to be a counterexample to process reliabilism is unsuccessful. He proposes a variety of responses, but all of them either feature an implausible restriction (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. added 2014-06-08
    Robert Lockie (forthcoming). The Regulative and the Theoretical in Epistemology. Abstracta.
    The distinction between the regulative (‘practical’, ‘subjective’, ‘decision-procedural’) and the theoretical (‘objective’, ‘absolute’) pertains to the aims (the desiderata) of an account of justification. This distinction began in ethics and spread to epistemology. Each of internalism, externalism, is separately forced to draw this distinction to avoid a stock, otherwise fatal, argument levelled against them by the other. Given this situation however, we may finesse much partisan conflict in epistemology by simply seeing differing accounts of justification as answering to radically distinct (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. added 2014-06-08
    Nick Hughes (forthcoming). Is Knowledge the Ability to Φ for the Reason That P? Episteme:1-6.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. added 2014-06-06
    Alan Thomas (2014). McDowell on Transcendental Arguments, Scepticism and “Error Theory”. International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 4 (2):109-124.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36. added 2014-06-06
    Christophe Grellard (2014). Book Review: Les Académiques. Academica, Written by Cicéron. [REVIEW] International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 4 (2):141-144.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. added 2014-06-06
    Shaul Tor (2014). Sextus and Wittgenstein on the End of Justification. International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 4 (2):81-108.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. added 2014-06-06
    Mikael Janvid (2014). Book Review: The Possibility of Philosophical Understanding: Reflections on the Thought of Barry Stroud, Edited by Jason Bridges, Niko Kolodny, and Wai-Hung Wong. [REVIEW] International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 4 (2):145-151.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  39. added 2014-06-04
    Jonathan Matheson & Brandon Carey (2013). How Skeptical is the Equal Weight View? In Diego Machuca (ed.), Disagreement and Skepticism. Routledge. 131-149.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  40. added 2014-06-04
    Jonathan Matheson (2012). Epistemic Relativism. In Andrew Cullison (ed.), Continuum Companion to Epistemology. Continuum. 161-179.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41. added 2014-06-03
    Markus Seidel (2014). Throwing the Baby Out with the Water: From Reasonably Scrutinizing Authorities to Rampant Scepticism About Expertise. Informal Logic 34 (2):192-218.
    In this paper, I argue that many arguments from expert opinion are strong arguments. Therefore, in many cases it is rational to rely on experts since in many cases the fact that an expert says that p makes it highly likely that p is true. I will defend this claim by providing 5 arguments that illuminate and elaborate on 5 crucial claims about expertise. In this way, I aim to undermine recent attempts to establish a rampant scepticism about arguments from (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  42. added 2014-05-30
    Catherine Legg (forthcoming). “Things Unreasonably Compulsory”: A Peircean Challenge to a Humean Theory of Perception, Particularly With Respect to Perceiving Necessary Truths. Cognitio.
    Much mainstream analytic epistemology is built around a sceptical treatment of modality which descends from Hume. The roots of this scepticism are argued to lie in Hume’s (nominalist) theory of perception, which is excavated, studied and compared with the very different (realist) theory of perception developed by Peirce. It is argued that Peirce’s theory not only enables a considerably more nuanced and effective epistemology, it also (unlike Hume’s theory) does justice to what happens when we appreciate a proof in mathematics.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43. added 2014-05-30
    Katia Vavova (2014). Debunking Evolutionary Debunking. Oxford Studies in Metaethics 9:76-101.
    Evolutionary debunking arguments start with a premise about the influence of evolutionary forces on our evaluative beliefs, and conclude that we are not justified in those beliefs. The value realist holds that there are attitude-independent evaluative truths. But the debunker argues that we have no reason to think that the evolutionary forces that shaped human evaluative attitudes would track those truths. Worse yet, we seem to have a good reason to think that they wouldn’t: evolution selects for characteristics that increase (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  44. added 2014-05-29
    Lisa Miracchi (forthcoming). Competence to Know. Philosophical Studies:1-28.
    I argue against traditional virtue epistemology on which knowledge is a success due to a competence to believe truly, by revealing an in-principle problem with the traditional virtue epistemologist’s explanation of Gettier cases. The argument eliminates one of the last plausible explanation of Gettier cases, and so of knowledge, in terms of non-factive mental states and non-mental conditions. I then I develop and defend a different kind of virtue epistemology, on which knowledge is an exercise of a competence to know. (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  45. added 2014-05-29
    Carlo Penco, Between Knowing How and Knowing That. Liber Amicorum Pascal Engel.
    I wonder whether the idea of knowing how as kind of knowing that with a peculiar mode of presentation really helps in the debate between philosophers and scientists.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  46. added 2014-05-27
    Mikael Janvid (forthcoming). Understanding Understanding: An Epistemological Investigation. Philosophia:1-15.
    Understanding has received growing interest from epistemologists in recent years, but no consensus regarding its epistemic properties has yet been reached. This paper extracts, but also rejects, candidates of epistemic properties for construing an epistemological model of understanding from the writings of epistemologists participating in the current discussion surrounding that state. On the basis of these results, a suggestion is put forward according to which understanding is a non-basic epistemic state of warrant rather than knowledge. It is argued that this (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  47. added 2014-05-27
    María G. Navarro (forthcoming). Agencia y paciencia de la utopía. [REVIEW] Isegoría 50.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  48. added 2014-05-26
    Anthony Robert Booth (2014). On Some Recent Moves in Defence of Doxastic Compatibilism. Synthese 191 (8).
    According to the doxastic compatibilist, compatibilist criteria with respect to the freedom of action rule-in our having free beliefs. In Booth (Philosophical Papers 38:1–12, 2009), I challenged the doxastic compatibilist to either come up with an account of how doxastic attitudes can be intentional in the face of it very much seeming to many of us that they cannot. Or else, in rejecting that doxastic attitudes need to be voluntary in order to be free, to come up with a principled (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  49. added 2014-05-25
    Jan Willem Wieland (2014). Infinite Regress Arguments. Springer.
    This book on infinite regress arguments provides (i) an up-to-date overview of the literature on the topic, (ii) ready-to-use insights for all domains of philosophy, and (iii) two case studies to illustrate these insights in some detail. Infinite regress arguments play an important role in all domains of philosophy. There are infinite regresses of reasons, obligations, rules, and disputes, and all are supposed to have their own moral. Yet most of them are involved in controversy. Hence the question is: what (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  50. added 2014-05-23
    Susanna Rinard (forthcoming). A Decision Theory for Imprecise Credences. Philosophers' Imprint.
    Those who model doxastic states with a set of probability functions, rather than a single function, face a pressing challenge: can they provide a plausible decision theory compatible with their view? Adam Elga (2010) and others claim that they cannot, and that the set of functions model should be rejected for this reason. This paper aims to answer this challenge. The key insight is that the set of functions model can be seen as an instance of the supervaluationist approach to (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
1 — 50 / 76