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Epistemology

Edited by Matthew McGrath (University of Missouri, Columbia)
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  1. added 2015-05-27
    Ori Freiman (2014). Towards the Epistemology of the Internet of Things: Techno-Epistemology and Ethical Considerations Through the Prism of Trust. International Review of Information Ethics 22:6-22.
    This paper discusses the epistemology of the Internet of Things [IoT] by focusing on the topic of trust. It presents various frameworks of trust, and argues that the ethical framework of trust is what constitutes our responsibility to reveal desired norms and standards and embed them in other frameworks of trust. The first section briefly presents the IoT and scrutinizes the scarce philosophical work that has been done on this subject so far. The second section suggests that the field of (...)
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  2. added 2015-05-26
    Boaz Miller (forthcoming). What is Hacking's Argument for Entity Realism? ‎. Synthese.
    According to Ian Hacking’s Entity Realism, unobservable entities that scientists carefully ‎manipulate to study other phenomena are real. Although Hacking presents his case in an intuitive, ‎attractive, and persuasive way, his argument remains elusive. I present five possible readings of ‎Hacking’s argument: a no-miracle argument, an indispensability argument, a transcendental ‎argument, a Vichian argument, and a non-argument. I elucidate Hacking’s argument according to ‎each reading, and review their strengths, their weaknesses, and their compatibility with each other.‎.
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  3. added 2015-05-25
    Guido Melchior (2014). Is Epistemological Disjunctivism the Holy Grail? Grazer Philosophische Studien, Vol. 86-2012 90:335-346.
    Pritchard argues that epistemological disjunctivism seems plainly false at first sight, but if it were right, it would represent the “holy grail of epistemology” (1), a view that allows us “to have our cake and eat it too” (3). This prospect motivates Pritchard to develop and defend an account that prima facie might seem simply false. It is disputable whether ED really seems plainly false at first sight or whether this intuition is based on a particular philosophical tradition. However, in (...)
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  4. added 2015-05-25
    Gilbert Plumer (2009). Commentary On: Marcin Lewiński’s “‘You’Re Moving From Irrelevant to Irrational’—Critical Reactions in Internet Discussion Forums”. In Juho Ritola (ed.), Argument Cultures. Proceedings of the 8th OSSA Conference [CD-ROM]. Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation. 1-3.
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  5. added 2015-05-24
    Kevin Lynch (forthcoming). Willful Ignorance and Self-Deception. Philosophical Studies:1-19.
    Willful ignorance is an important concept in criminal law and jurisprudence, though it has not received much discussion in philosophy. When it is mentioned, however, it is regularly assumed to be a kind of self-deception. In this article I will argue that self-deception and willful ignorance are distinct psychological kinds. First, some examples of willful ignorance are presented and discussed, and an analysis of the phenomenon is developed. Then it is shown that current theories of self-deception give no support to (...)
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  6. added 2015-05-24
    Gilbert Plumer (2012). Commentary On: John E. Fields' "Credibility and Commitment in the Making of Truly Astonishing First-Person Reports". In Frank Zenker (ed.), Argumentation: Cognition & Community. Proceedings of the 9th International Conference of the Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation [CD-ROM]. Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation. 1-4.
  7. added 2015-05-22
    John Corcoran (2009). Sentence, Proposition, Judgment, Statement, and Fact: Speaking About the Written English Used in Logic. In W. A. Carnielli (ed.), The Many Sides of Logic. College Publications. 71-103.
    The five English words—sentence, proposition, judgment, statement, and fact—are central to coherent discussion in logic. However, each is ambiguous in that logicians use each with multiple normal meanings. Several of their meanings are vague in the sense of admitting borderline cases. In the course of displaying and describing the phenomena discussed using these words, this paper juxtaposes, distinguishes, and analyzes several senses of these and related words, focusing on a constellation of recommended senses. One of the purposes of this paper (...)
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  8. added 2015-05-21
    Milena Ivanova (forthcoming). Conventionalism, Structuralism and Neo-Kantianism in Poincaré׳s Philosophy of Science. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics.
    Poincaré is well known for his conventionalism and structuralism. However, the relationship between these two theses and their place in Poincaré׳s epistemology of science remain puzzling. In this paper I show the scope of Poincaré׳s conventionalism and its position in Poincaré׳s hierarchical approach to scientific theories. I argue that for Poincaré scientific knowledge is relational and made possible by synthetic a priori, empirical and conventional elements, which, however, are not chosen arbitrarily. By examining his geometric conventionalism, his hierarchical account of (...)
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  9. added 2015-05-19
    K. Brad Wray (2015). Kuhn’s Social Epistemology and the Sociology of Science. In William J. Devlin & Alisa Bokulich (eds.), Kuhn's Structure of Scientific Revolutions - 50 Years On. Springer. 167-183.
    I aim to clarify the relationship between Kuhn’s social epistemology of science and the sociology of science, and the nature of Kuhn’s positive legacy to the philosophy of science. I begin by recounting Kuhn’s relationship to the sociology of science. First, I examine the influence of sociology of science on Structure. Surprisingly, sociology of science had very little influence on Kuhn as he wrote Structure. Second, I examine early responses to Kuhn’s work by sociologists of science. Both the Mertonians and (...)
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  10. added 2015-05-18
    J. Adam Carter & Martin Peterson (forthcoming). On the Epistemology of the Precautionary Principle: Reply to Steglich-Peterson. Erkenntnis.
    In recent paper in this journal (2015), we proposed two novel puzzles associated with the precautionary principle. Both are puzzles that materialise, we argue, once we investigate the principle through an epistemological lens, and each constitutes a philosophical hurdle for any proponent of a plausible version of the precautionary principle. Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (2014) claims, also in this journal, that he has resolved our puzzles. In this short note, we explain why we remain skeptical.
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  11. added 2015-05-18
    Luis M. Augusto (2009). Do Unconscious Beliefs Yield Knowledge? Revista Filosófica de Coimbra 35:161-184.
    This paper defends the view that a correct analysis of knowledge must take empirical data into consideration. The data here provided is from experimental psychology, namely from phenomena involving unconscious cognition.
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  12. added 2015-05-17
    J. Adam Carter & Bolesław Czarnecki (forthcoming). Extended Knowledge-How. Erkenntnis.
    According to reductive intellectualists about knowledge-how (e.g. Stanley and Williamson 2001; Stanley 2011; Brogaard 2008; 2009) knowledge how is a kind of knowledge-that. To the extent that this is right, then insofar as we might conceive of ways knowledge could be extended with reference to active externalist (e.g. Clark and Chalmers 1998; Clark 2008) approaches in the philosophy of mind (e.g. the extended mind thesis and the hypothesis of extended cognition), we should expect no interesting difference between the two. However, (...)
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  13. added 2015-05-17
    Lisa Bortolotti & Kengo Miyazono (forthcoming). The Ethics of Delusional Belief. Erkenntnis.
    In this paper we address the ethics of adopting delusional beliefs and we apply consequentialist and deontological considerations to the epistemic evaluation of delusions. Delusions are characterised by their epistemic shortcomings and they are often defined as false and irrational beliefs. Despite this, when agents are overwhelmed by negative emotions due to the effects of trauma or previous adversities, or when they are subject to anxiety and stress as a result of hypersalient experience, the adoption of a delusional belief can (...)
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  14. added 2015-05-16
    Susanna Schellenberg (forthcoming). Phenomenal Evidence and Factive Evidence Defended. Philosophical Studies.
    This is part of a symposium on my paper “Phenomenal Evidence and Factive Evidence”.
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  15. added 2015-05-16
    Jeff Kochan (2015). Objective Styles in Northern Field Science. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 52:1-12.
    Social studies of science have often treated natural field sites as extensions of the laboratory. But this overlooks the unique specificities of field sites. While lab sites are usually private spaces with carefully controlled borders, field sites are more typically public spaces with fluid boundaries and diverse inhabitants. Field scientists must therefore often adapt their work to the demands and interests of local agents. I propose to address the difference between lab and field in sociological terms, as a difference in (...)
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  16. added 2015-05-15
    Robert K. Garcia & Nathan L. King (forthcoming). Intellectual Virtue and Classroom Debate. In Jason Baehr (ed.), Intellectual Virtues and Education: Essays In Applied Virtue Epistemology. Routledge.
    We have witnessed the athleticization of political discourse, whereby debate is treated like an athletic contest in which the aim is to vanquish one's opponents. When political discourse becomes as zero-sum game, it is characterized by suspicions, accusations, belief polarization, and ideological entrenchment. Unfortunately, athleticization is ailing the classroom as well, making it difficult for educators to prepare students to make valuable contributions to healthy civic discourse. Such preparation requires an educational environment that fosters the intellectual virtues that characterize an (...)
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  17. added 2015-05-14
    Neil Mehta (forthcoming). Knowledge and Other Norms for Assertion, Action, and Belief. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    Here I advance a unified account of the structure of the epistemic normativity of assertion, action, and belief. According to my Teleological Account, all of these are epistemically successful just in case they fulfill the primary aim of knowledgeability, an aim which in turn generates a host of secondary epistemic norms. The central features of the Teleological Account are these: it is compact in its reliance on a single central explanatory posit, knowledge-centered in its insistence that knowledge sets the fundamental (...)
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  18. added 2015-05-14
    Alison Bailey (2014). Navigating Epistemic Pushback in Feminist and Critical Race Philosophy Classes. Apa Newsletter on Feminism and Philosophy 14 (1):3-7.
    My contribution to this conversation sets out to accomplish two things: First, I offer a definition of epistemic pushback. Epistemic pushback is an expression of epistemic resistance that occurs regularly in classroom discussions that touch our core beliefs, sense of self, politics, or worldv iews. Epistemic pushback is structural: It broadly characterizes a family of cognitive, affective, and verbal tactics that are deployed regularly to dodge the challenging and exhausting chore of engaging topics and questions that scare us. It can (...)
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  19. added 2015-05-14
    José Antúnez Cid (2011). Dios y postmodernidad. In G. Richi (ed.), Dios en la sociedad postsecular. San Dámaso. 51-75.
    A critical and reflexive approach to God's question from diverse lines of the Postmodernity; showing roots, shadows and lights of some of the nowadays philosophies.
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  20. added 2015-05-13
    Caleb Dewey, Naturalism Favours Utilitarianism.
    Ever since the founding of utilitarianism, philosophers have noted that naturalists (among others) have a particular affinity towards utilitarianism. In 1999, Jon Mendle explored whether naturalism actually implied utilitarianism and found that it did not. However, implication is not the only way for naturalism to favour utilitarianism. In this essay, I define utilitarianism in terms of practical reason, which I call ``the utilitarian backstory''. This backstory demonstrates that naturalism creates conditions in which rationality subsumes utilitarianism, making non-utilitarian ethics irrational. In (...)
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  21. added 2015-05-13
    Jochen Briesen (forthcoming). Epistemic Consequentialism: Its Relation to Ethical Consequentialism and the Truth-Indication Principle. In P. Schmechtig & M. Grajner (eds.), Epistemic Reasons, Norms, and Goals.
    Consequentialist positions in philosophy spell out normative notions by recourse to final aims. Hedonistic versions of ethical consequentialism spell out what is morally right/justified via recourse to the aim of increasing pleasure and decreasing pain. Veritistic versions of epistemic consequentialism spell out what is epistemically right/justified via recourse to the aim of increasing the number of true beliefs and decreasing the number of false ones. Even though these theories are in many respects structurally analogous, there are also interesting disanalogies. For (...)
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  22. added 2015-05-13
    Baron Reed (forthcoming). Reasons for Reasons. Episteme:1-7.
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  23. added 2015-05-13
    Jennifer Lackey (forthcoming). Reliability and Knowledge in the Epistemology of Testimony. Episteme:1-6.
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  24. added 2015-05-13
    Grimm Stephen (forthcoming). "Understanding and Transparency". In Explaining Understanding: New Essays in Epistemology and the Philosophy of Science. Routledge.
    I explore the extent to which the epistemic state of understanding is transparent to the one who understands. Against several contemporary epistemologists, I argue that it is not transparent in the way that many have claimed, drawing on results from developmental psychology, animal cognition, and other fields.
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  25. added 2015-05-13
    Patrick Bondy (forthcoming). Epistemic Deontologism and Strong Doxastic Voluntarism: A Defense. Dialogue.
    The following claims are independently plausible but jointly inconsistent: (1) epistemic deontologism is correct (i.e., there are some beliefs we ought to have, and some beliefs we ought not to have); (2) we have no voluntary control over our beliefs; (3) S’s lack of control over whether she φs implies that S has no obligation to φ or to not φ (i.e., ought-implies-can). The point of this paper is to argue that there are active and passive aspects of belief, which (...)
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  26. added 2015-05-12
    Alvin I. Goldman (forthcoming). Reliabilism, Veritism, and Epistemic Consequentialism. Episteme:1-13.
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  27. added 2015-05-08
    Paul D. Thorn (forthcoming). Wise Crowds, Clever Meta-Inductivists. In Uskali Mäki, Stéphanie Ruphy, Gerhard Schurz & Ioannis Votsis (eds.), Recent Developments in the Philosophy of Science: EPSA13 Helsinki. Springer.
    Formal and empirical work on the Wisdom of Crowds has extolled the virtue of diverse and independent judgment as essential to the maintenance of ‘wise crowds’. In other words, com-munication and imitation among members of a group may have the negative effect of decreasing the aggregate wisdom of the group. In contrast, it is demonstrable that certain meta-inductive methods provide optimal means for predicting unknown events. Such meta-inductive methods are essentially imitative, where the predictions of other agents are imitated to (...)
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  28. added 2015-05-08
    Sarah Wright (forthcoming). Comments on “What the Internalist Should Say to the Tortoise. Episteme:1-5.
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  29. added 2015-05-08
    Gerhard Schurz & Paul D. Thorn (forthcoming). The Revenge of Ecological Rationality: Strategy Selection by Meta-Induction Within Changing Environments. Minds and Machines:1-29.
    ccording to the paradigm of adaptive rationality, successful inference and prediction methods tend to be local and frugal. As a complement to work within this paradigm, we investigate the problem of selecting an optimal combination of prediction methods from a given toolbox of such local methods, in the context of changing environments. These selection methods are called meta-inductive (MI) strategies, if they are based on the success-records of the toolbox-methods. No absolutely optimal MI strategy exists—a fact that we call the (...)
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  30. added 2015-05-08
    Paulina Sliwa (forthcoming). Understanding and Knowing. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society.
    What is the relationship between understanding and knowing? Much of the recent literature argues that understanding is a distinctive cognitive state: unlike knowledge, understanding comes in degrees, it is immune to certain forms of epistemic luck, and it has a different relationship to testimony. In light of this, it has been suggested that we need to make room in our epistemic theorizing for a distinct notion of understanding. My aim in this paper is to push back against this trend and (...)
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  31. added 2015-05-08
    Michael Veber (forthcoming). Knowing What's Not Up the Road by Seeing What's Right in Front of You: Epistemological Disjunctivism's Fake Barn Problem. Episteme:1-12.
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  32. added 2015-05-06
    Bryan Frances (forthcoming). Worrisome Skepticism About Philosophy. Episteme.
    A new kind of skepticism about philosophy is articulated and argued for. The key premise is the claim that many of us are well aware that in the past we failed to have good responses to substantive objections to our philosophical beliefs. The conclusion is disjunctive: either we are irrational in sticking with our philosophical beliefs, or we commit some other epistemic sin in having those beliefs.
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  33. added 2015-05-06
    J. Adam Carter (forthcoming). Assertion, Uniqueness and Epistemic Hypocrisy. Synthese.
    Pascal Engel (2008) has insisted that a number of notable strategies for rejecting the knowledge norm of assertion are put forward on the basis of the wrong kinds of reasons. A central aim of this paper will be to establish the contrast point: I argue that one very familiar strategy for defending the knowledge norm of assertion—viz., that it is claimed to do better in various respects than its competitors (e.g. the justification and the truth norms)— relies on a presupposition (...)
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  34. added 2015-05-06
    J. Adam Carter & S. Orestis Palermos (forthcoming). Active Externalism and Epistemology. Oxford Bibliographies Online.
  35. added 2015-05-06
    J. Adam Carter & Ben Kotzee (forthcoming). Epistemology of Education. Oxford Bibliographies Online.
  36. added 2015-05-06
    Speranta Dumitru (2005). La Raison Publique : Une Conception Politique Et Non Épistémologique ? Archives de Philosophie du Droit 49:159-170.
    Les derniers écrits de John Rawls sont marqués à la fois par la reconnaissance du « fait du pluralisme » et par la défense d’une conception « politique » de justifica-tion publique, indépendante de considérations métaphysiques et épistémiques. Le but de cet article est de montrer que l’abstinence épistémique n’est ni une façon d’assurer le respect mutuel des citoyens, ni un moyen de diminuer le désaccord dans une société pluraliste. Faire de son mieux dans l’observance des normes épistémiques de la (...)
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  37. added 2015-05-04
    Andrew Reisner (forthcoming). Pragmatic Reasons for Belief. In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Normativity and Reasons. Oxford University Press.
    This is a discussion of the state of discussion on pragmatic reasons for belief.
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  38. added 2015-04-29
    P. Roger Turner (forthcoming). More On Religious Exclusivism: A Reply to Richard Feldman. Faith and Philosophy.
    In his “Plantinga on Exclusivisim,” Richard Feldman argues that Alvin Plantinga, in an earlier paper, has not sufficiently addressed a particular problem for the religious exclusivist. The particular problem that Feldman thinks Plantinga has failed sufficiently to address is the problem of epistemic peer disagreement—that is, disagreement between two (or more) equally competent thinkers who share equally good reasons for, and are in equally good epistemic situations regarding, their contradictory beliefs—in matters of religious belief. To demonstrate that Plantinga has so (...)
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  39. added 2015-04-29
    Francisco Caruso & Roberto Moreira Xavier (1987). On the Physical Problem of Spatial Dimensions: An Alternative Procedure to Stability Arguments. Fundamenta Scientiae 8 (1):73-91.
    Why is space 3-dimensional? The fi rst answer to this question, entirely based on Physics, was given by Ehrenfest, in 1917, who showed that the stability requirement for n-dimensional two-body planetary system very strongly constrains space dimensionality, favouring 3-d. This kind of approach will be generically called "stability postulate" throughout this paper and was shown by Tangherlini, in 1963, to be still valid in the framework of general relativity as well as for quantum mechanical hydrogen atom, giving the same constraint (...)
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  40. added 2015-04-28
    Susanna Schellenberg (forthcoming). Phenomenal Evidence and Factive Evidence. Philosophical Studies.
  41. added 2015-04-27
    Kevin Reuter, Lara Kirfel, Raphael van Riel & Luca Barlassina (2014). The Good, the Bad, and the Timely: How Temporal Order and Moral Judgment Influence Causal Selection. Frontiers in Psychology 5:1-10.
    Causal selection is the cognitive process through which one or more elements in a complex causal structure are singled out as actual causes of a certain effect. In this paper, we report on an experiment in which we investigated the role of moral and temporal factors in causal selection. Our results are as follows. First, when presented with a temporal chain in which two human agents perform the same action one after the other, subjects tend to judge the later agent (...)
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  42. added 2015-04-26
    Boaz Miller (forthcoming). “Trust Me—I’M a Public Intellectual”: Margaret Atwood’s and David Suzuki’s Social Epistemologies of Climate Science. In Michael Keren & Richard Hawkins‎ (eds.), Speaking Power to Truth: Knowledge and the Public Intellectual in a Changing World‎. Athabasca University Press‎.
    Margaret Atwood and David Suzuki are two of the most prominent Canadian public ‎intellectuals ‎involved in the global warming debate. They both argue that anthropogenic global ‎warming is ‎occurring, warn against its grave consequences, and urge governments and the ‎public to take ‎immediate, decisive, extensive, and profound measures to prevent it. They differ, ‎however, in the ‎reasons and evidence they provide in support of their position. While Suzuki ‎stresses the scientific ‎evidence in favour of the global warming theory and the (...)
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  43. added 2015-04-25
    Allan Hazlett (2014). A Critical Introduction to Skepticism. Bloomsbury.
    Skepticism remains a central and defining issue in epistemology, and in the wider tradition of Western philosophy. To better understand the contemporary position of this important philosophical subject, Allan Hazlett introduces a range of topics, including: -/- • Ancient skepticism • skeptical arguments in the work of Hume and Descartes • Cartesian skepticism in contemporary epistemology • anti-skeptical strategies, including Mooreanism, nonclosure, and contextualism • additional varieties of skepticism • the practical consequences of Cartesian skepticism -/- Presenting a comprehensive survey (...)
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  44. added 2015-04-25
    Crispin Wright (1991). Scepticism and Dreaming: Imploding the Demon. Mind 100 (1):87-116.
  45. added 2015-04-22
    Logan Paul Gage (forthcoming). Phenomenal Conservatism and the Subject's Perspective Objection. Acta Analytica.
    For some years now, Michael Bergmann has urged a dilemma against internalist theories of epistemic justification. For reasons I explain below, some epistemologists have thought that perhaps Michael Huemer’s principle of Phenomenal Conservatism (PC) can split the horns of Bergmann’s Dilemma. Bergmann has recently argued, however, that PC must inevitably, like all other internalist views, fall prey to his dilemma. In this paper, I explain the nature of Bergmann’s Dilemma and his reasons for thinking PC cannot escape it before arguing (...)
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  46. added 2015-04-20
    Ian M. Church (forthcoming). 50 Years of Gettier: A New Direction in Religious Epistemology? Journal of Analytic Theology.
    In this paper, I lend credence to the move toward non-reductive religious epistemology by highlighting the systematic failings of Alvin Plantinga’s seminal, religious epistemology when it comes to surmounting the Gettier Problem. Taking Plantinga’s account as archetypal, I argue that we have systematic reasons to believe that no reductive theory of knowledge (religious or otherwise) can viably surmount the Gettier Problem, that the future of religious epistemology lies in non-reductive models of knowledge.
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  47. added 2015-04-20
    David Christensen (2014). Disagreement and Public Controversy. In Jennifer Lackey (ed.), Essays in Collective Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
    One of Mill’s main arguments for free speech springs from taking disagreement as an epistemically valuable resource for fallible thinkers. Contemporary conciliationist treatments of disagreement spring from the same motivation, but end up seeing the epistemic implications of disagreement quite differently. Conciliationism also encounters complexities when transposed from the 2-person toy examples featured in the literature to the public disagreements among groups that give the issue much of its urgency. Group disagreements turn out to be in some ways more powerful (...)
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  48. added 2015-04-20
    Wellington Amâncio da Silva (2014). A Ordem Do Discurso No Contexto Docente E Suas Representações-Uma Nova Proposta de Reconstrução de Sentidos. Revista Educação-Ung 9 (1):35--48.
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  49. added 2015-04-18
    Scott Stapleford (2015). Epistemic Value Monism and the Swamping Problem. Ratio 28 (2).
    Many deontologists explain the epistemic value of justification in terms of its instrumental role in promoting truth – the original source of value in the epistemic domain. The swamping problem for truth monism appears to make this position indefensible, at least for those monists who maintain the superiority of knowledge to merely true belief. I propose a new solution to the swamping problem that allows monists to maintain the greater epistemic value of knowledge over merely true belief. My trick is (...)
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  50. added 2015-04-17
    Dennis Whitcomb, Heather Battaly, Jason Baehr & Daniel Howard-Snyder, Intellectual Humility: Owning Our Limitations.
    What is intellectual humility? In this essay, we aim to answer this question by (i) assessing several contemporary accounts of intellectual humility, (ii) developing our own account, (iii) offering two reasons for our account, and (iv) meeting two objections and solving one puzzle.
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