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Epistemology

Edited by Matthew McGrath (University of Missouri, Columbia)
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  1. added 2016-05-03
    Matthew R. X. Dentith (forthcoming). When Inferring to a Conspiracy Might Be the Best Explanation. Social Epistemology:1-20.
    Conspiracy theories are typically thought to be examples of irrational beliefs, and thus unlikely to be warranted. However, recent work in Philosophy has challenged the claim that belief in conspiracy theories is irrational, showing that in a range of cases, belief in conspiracy theories is warranted. However, it is still often said that conspiracy theories are unlikely relative to non-conspiratorial explanations which account for the same phenomena. However, such arguments turn out to rest upon how we define what gets counted (...)
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  2. added 2016-05-03
    Justin O. Parkhurst & Sudeepa Abeysinghe (forthcoming). What Constitutes “Good” Evidence for Public Health and Social Policy-Making? From Hierarchies to Appropriateness. Social Epistemology:1-15.
    Within public health, and increasingly other areas of social policy, there are widespread calls to increase or improve the use of evidence for policy-making. Often these calls rest on an assumption that increased evidence utilisation will be a more efficient or effective means of achieving social goals. Yet a clear elucidation of what can be considered “good evidence” for policy is rarely articulated. Many of the current discussions of best practise in the health policy sector derive from the evidence-based medicine (...)
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  3. added 2016-05-03
    Jonathan M. Weinberg (forthcoming). Knowledge, Noise, and Curve-Fitting: A Methodological Argument for JTB? In R. Borges, C. de Almeida & P. Klein (eds.), Explaining knowledge: new essays on the Gettier problem. Oxford
    The developing body of empirical work on the "Gettier effect" indicates that, in general, the presence of a Gettier-type structure in a case makes participants less likely to attribute knowledge in that case. But is that a sufficient reason to diverge from a JTB theory of knowledge? I argue that considerations of good model selection, and worries about noise and overfitting, should lead us to consider that a live, open question. The Gettier effect is perhaps so transient, and so sensitive (...)
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  4. added 2016-05-03
    Michael D. Doan (forthcoming). Responsibility for Collective Inaction and the Knowledge Condition. Social Epistemology:1-23.
    When confronted with especially complex ecological and social problems such as climate change, how are we to think about responsibility for collective inaction? Social and political philosophers have begun to consider the complexities of acting collectively with a view to creating more just and sustainable societies. Some have recently turned their attention to the question of whether more or less formally organized groups can ever be held morally responsible for not acting collectively, or else for not organizing themselves into groups (...)
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  5. added 2016-05-03
    Nico Stehr & Marian T. Adolf (forthcoming). The Price of Knowledge. Social Epistemology:1-30.
    Our article addresses the question how to assess and measure the value or price of knowledge, and probes the issue from a variety of social scientific and practical perspectives. Against the background of a sociological concept of knowledge, economic, political, social, and juridical perspectives that may lead to a price of knowledge are discussed. We observe that knowledge is seen to play an ever greater role within as well as across economies and politics; that its embodiment makes it difficult to (...)
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  6. added 2016-05-03
    Chris Dragos (forthcoming). Which Groups Have Scientific Knowledge? Wray Vs. Rolin. Social Epistemology:1-13.
    Kristina Rolin and Brad Wray agree with an increasing number of epistemologists that knowledge can sometimes be attributed to a group and to none of its individual members. That is, collective knowledge sometimes obtains. However, Rolin charges Wray with being too restrictive about the kinds of groups to which he attributes collective knowledge. She rejects Wray’s claim that only scientific research teams can know while the general scientific community cannot. Rolin forwards a ‘default and challenge’ account of epistemic justification toward (...)
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  7. added 2016-05-03
    Christoph Jäger (2016). Epistemic Authority, Preemptive Reasons, and Understanding. Episteme 13 (2):167-185.
    One of the key tenets of Linda Zagzebski's book Epistemic Authority: A Theory of Trust, Authority, and Autonomy in Belief is the It says that, when an agent realizes that an epistemic authority believes that p, the epistemically rational response for her is to adopt the authority's belief and to replace all of her previous reasons relevant to whether p by the reason that the authority believes that p. I argue that such a to epistemic authority yields problematic results. This (...)
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  8. added 2016-05-03
    Luca Moretti (2016). Evidence of Expert's Evidence is Evidence. Episteme 13 (2):209-218.
    John Hardwig has championed the thesis that evidence that an expert EXP has evidence for a proposition P, constituted by EXP's testimony that P, is not evidence for P itself, where evidence for P is generally characterized as anything that counts towards establishing the truth of P. In this paper, I first show that yields tensions within Hardwig's overall view of epistemic reliance on experts and makes it imply unpalatable consequences. Then, I use Shogenji-Roche's theorem of transitivity of incremental confirmation (...)
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  9. added 2016-05-03
    Brian Kim (2016). In Defense of Subject-Sensitive Invariantism. Episteme 13 (2):233-251.
    Keith DeRose has argued that the two main problems facing subject-sensitive invariantism come from the appropriateness of certain third-person denials of knowledge and the inappropriateness of now you know it, now you don't claims. I argue that proponents of SSI can adequately address both problems. First, I argue that the debate between contextualism and SSI has failed to account for an important pragmatic feature of third-person denials of knowledge. Appealing to these pragmatic features, I show that straightforward third-person denials are (...)
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  10. added 2016-05-03
    Charlie Crerar (2016). Taboo, Hermeneutical Injustice, and Expressively Free Environments. Episteme 13 (2):195-207.
    In Epistemic Injustice, Miranda Fricker has insightfully introduced the notion of a hermeneutical injustice, where historic conditions of marginalisation serve to deprive individuals of the appropriate hermeneutical resources with which to render significant patches of their experience fully intelligible to themselves and others. In this paper I draw attention to a shortcoming in Fricker's account: that the only hermeneutical resource she acknowledges is a shared conceptual framework. Consequently, Fricker creates the impression that hermeneutical injustice manifests itself almost exclusively in the (...)
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  11. added 2016-05-03
    Imran Aijaz, Jonathan McKeown-Green & Aness Webster, Burdens of Proof and the Case for Unevenness.
    How is the burden of proof to be distributed among individuals who are involved in resolving a particular issue? Under what conditions should the burden of proof be distributed unevenly? We distinguish attitudinal from dialectical burdens and argue that these questions should be answered differently, depending on which is in play. One has an attitudinal burden with respect to some proposition when one is required to possess sufficient evidence for it. One has a dialectical burden with respect to some proposition (...)
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  12. added 2016-05-02
    Milan Zafirovski (forthcoming). Rational Choice Theory at the Origin? Forms and Social Factors of “Irrational Choice”. Social Epistemology:1-36.
    The paper addresses the ‘rational choice only’ reconstruction, characterization, and interpretation of classical and neoclassical economics. It argues that such a reconstruction is inaccurate failing to do justice to the dual theoretical character of classical/neoclassical economics. The paper instead proposes and shows that the latter involves not only elements of ‘rational choice theory’ but also those of an alternative conception. It identifies various and important ideas, observations, and implications of irrational choice and action within classical/neoclassical economics. One class of such (...)
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  13. added 2016-05-02
    Bolesław Czarnecki, Knowledge-How (Reference Entry). Oxford Bibliographies in Philosophy.
    The entry is intended as an advanced introduction to the topic of knowledge-how. It starts with a list of overviews, monographs and collections, followed by selected 20th century discussions. The last two sections contain sources pertaining to Ryle's own work on the topic as well as work by other influential thinkers, and themes that are sometimes associated with knowledge-how. The remaining seven sections survey the contemporary literature on knowledge-how from three perspectives: (i) generic desiderata for accounts of knowledge-how, (ii) specific (...)
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  14. added 2016-05-02
    Michael D. Doan (2016). Responsibility for Collective Inaction and the Knowledge Condition. Social Epistemology 30.
    When confronted with especially complex ecological and social problems such as climate change, how are we to think about responsibility for collective inaction? Social and political philosophers have begun to consider the complexities of acting collectively with a view to creating more just and sustainable societies. Some have recently turned their attention to the question of whether more or less formally organized groups can ever be held morally responsible for not acting collectively, or else for not organizing themselves into groups (...)
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  15. added 2016-05-02
    Matthew Dentith (2016). When Inferring to a Conspiracy Might Be the Best Explanation. Social Epistemology 31.
    Conspiracy theories are typically thought to be examples of irrational beliefs, and thus unlikely to be warranted. However, recent work in Philosophy has challenged the claim that belief in conspiracy theories is irrational, showing that in a range of cases, belief in conspiracy theories is warranted. However, it is still often said that conspiracy theories are unlikely relative to non-conspiratorial explanations which account for the same phenomena. However, such arguments turn out to rest upon how we define what gets counted (...)
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  16. added 2016-05-01
    Andrew Reisner (forthcoming). Two Thesis About the Distinctness of Practical and Theoretical Normativity. In C. McHugh, J. Way & D. Whiting (eds.), Normativity: Practical and Theoretical. Oxford University Press
    In tradition linked to Aristotle and Kant, many contemporary philosophers treat practical and theoretical normativity as two genuinely distinct domains of normativity. In this paper I consider the question of what it is for normative domains to be distinct. I suggest that there are two different ways that the distinctness thesis might be understood and consider the different implications of the two different distinctness theses.
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  17. added 2016-05-01
    Christos Kyriacou, Metaepistemology. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    An Introduction to basic metaepistemological debates and positions.
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  18. added 2016-04-30
    Mike Sutton, Kant's View of the World.
    This essay is about the way Kant sees the world rather than about his moral philosophy and his theories of justice. It concentrates on perception of the physical world, and how far this can take us in understanding the world of the mind and how we think and make decisions about our lives. It proposes that Kant can be seen as the founder not just of theories of the problem of knowledge, but also of such modern ideas as existentialism.
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  19. added 2016-04-29
    Alexander Gebharter & Gerhard Schurz (forthcoming). A Modeling Approach for Mechanisms Featuring Causal Cycles. Philosophy of Science.
    Mechanisms play an important role in many sciences when it comes to questions concerning explanation, prediction, and control. Answering such questions in a quantitative way requires a formal represention of mechanisms. Gebharter (2014) suggests to represent mechanisms by means of one or more causal arrows of an acyclic causal net. In this paper we show how this approach can be extended in such a way that it can also be fruitfully applied to mechanisms featuring causal feedback.
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  20. added 2016-04-29
    Peter Baumann (2015). Safety, Virtue, Scepticism: Remarks on Sosa. Croatian Journal of Philosophy (45):295-306.
    Ernest Sosa has made and continues to make major contributions to a wide variety of topics in epistemology. In this paper I discuss some of his core ideas about the nature of knowledge and scepticism. I start with a discussion of the safety account of knowledge – a view he has championed and further developed over the years. I continue with some questions concerning the role of the concept of an epistemic virtue for our understanding of knowledge. Safety and virtue (...)
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  21. added 2016-04-28
    Maarten Steenhagen (forthcoming). Against Adversarial Discussion. Collingwood and British Idealism Studies.
    Why did R.G. Collingwood come to reject the adversarial style of philosophical discussion so popular among his Oxford peers? The main aim of this paper is to explain that Collingwood came to reject his colleagues’ specific style of philosophical dialogue on methodological grounds, and to show how the argument against adversarial philosophical discussion is integrated with Collingwood’s overall criticism of realist philosophy. His argument exploits a connection between method and practice that should be taken seriously even today.
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  22. added 2016-04-27
    Ulrike Hahn, Frank Zenker & Roland Bluhm (forthcoming). Causal Argument. In Michael R. Waldmann (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Causal Reasoning. Oxford University Press
    In this chapter, we outline the range of argument forms involving causation that can be found in everyday discourse. We also survey empirical work concerned with the generation and evaluation of such arguments. This survey makes clear that there is presently no unified body of research concerned with causal argument. We highlight the benefits of a unified treatment both for those interested in causal cognition and those interested in argumentation, and identify the key challenges that must be met (...)
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  23. added 2016-04-27
    Corine Besson (forthcoming). Norms, Reasons and Reasoning: A Guide Through Lewis Carroll’s Regress Argument. In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity.
  24. added 2016-04-27
    Steph Menken, Machiel Keestra, Lucas Rutting, Ger Post, Mieke de Roo, Sylvia Blad & Linda de Greef (eds.) (2016). An Introduction to Interdisciplinary Research. Theory and Practice. Amsterdam University Press.
    This book (128 pp.) serves as an introduction and manual to guide students through the interdisciplinary research process. We are becoming increasingly aware that, as a result of technological developments and globalisation, problems are becoming so complex that they can only be solved through cooperation between multiple disciplines. Healthcare, climate change, food security, energy, financial markets and quality of life are just a few examples of issues that require scientists and academics to work in a crossdisciplinary way. As (...)
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  25. added 2016-04-27
    Amos Keestra & Machiel Keestra (2015). A ‘Circulation Model’ of Education: A Response to Challenges of Education at the New University. Krisis: Journal for Contemporary Philosophy 2015 (2):90-98.
    The protests at the Universiteit van Amsterdam (UvA) that began in November 2014 as a reaction to severe cuts in the department of humanities have sparked a broad debate nationally and even internationally about the future of the university and the values and ideals that should define it. It turned out that dissatisfaction was much more widespread in different parts of the university than some had previously thought, and many turned out to share the concerns first put forward in the (...)
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  26. added 2016-04-27
    Frederique Janssen-Lauret & Gary Kemp (eds.) (2015). Quine and His Place in History. Palgrave.
    Containing three previously unpublished papers by W.V. Quine as well as historical, exegetical, and critical papers by several leading Quine scholars including Hylton, Ebbs, and Ben-Menahem, this volume aims to remedy the comparative lack of historical investigation of Quine and his philosophical context.
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  27. added 2016-04-26
    Tony Ward (2016). Expert Testimony, Law and Epistemic Authority. Journal of Applied Philosophy 33 (1).
    This article discusses the concept of epistemic authority in the context of English law relating to expert testimony. It distinguishes between two conceptions of epistemic authority, one strong and one weak, and argues that only the weak conception is appropriate in a legal context, or in any other setting where reliance on experts can be publicly justified. It critically examines Linda Zagzebski's defence of a stronger conception of epistemic authority and questions whether epistemic authority is as closely analogous to practical (...)
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  28. added 2016-04-26
    Christoph Baumberger (2013). Art and Understanding. In Defence of Aesthetic Cognitivism. In Marc Greenlee, Rainer Hammwöhner, Bernd Köber, Christoph Wagner & Christian Wolff (eds.), Bilder sehen. Perspektiven der Bildwissenschaft. Schnell + Steiner 41-67.
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  29. added 2016-04-26
    Christoph Baumberger, Explanatorisches Verstehen. Ein Definitionsvorschlag. Was Dürfen Wir Glauben? Was Sollen Wir Tun? – Sektionsbeiträge des Achten Internationalen Kongresses der Gesellschaft Für Analytische Philosophie E.V.
    In diesem Aufsatz entwickle ich eine Definition von explanatorischem Verstehen, indem ich dieses mit Wissen vergleiche. Erstens zeige ich, inwiefern explanatorisches Verstehen das Erfassen einer anspruchsvolleren Erklärung und eine anspruchsvollere Rechtfertigung verlangt als explanatorisches Wissen. Zweitens argumentiere ich dafür, dass die Erklärung den Tatsachen gerecht werden muss, explanatorisches Verstehen aber im Gegensatz zu Wissen nicht immer faktiv ist. Drittens verteidige ich die Auffassung, dass explanatorisches Verstehen, anders als Wissen, mit epistemischem Glück kompatibel ist. Als Ergebnis schlage ich vor, dass S (...)
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  30. added 2016-04-26
    Christoph Baumberger (2011). Understanding and its Relation to Knowledge. In Christoph Jäger Winfrid Löffler (ed.), Epistemology: Contexts, Values, Disagreement. Papers of the 34th International Wittgenstein Symposium. Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society 16-18.
    Is understanding the same as or at least a species of knowledge? This question has to be answered with respect to each of three types of understanding and of knowledge. I argue that understanding-why and objectual understanding are not reducible to one another and neither identical with nor a species of the corresponding or any other type of knowledge. My discussion reveals important characteristics of these two types of understanding and has consequences for propositional understanding.
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  31. added 2016-04-26
    Christoph Baumberger (2011). Types of Understanding: Their Nature and Their Relation to Knowledge. Conceptus: Zeitschrift Fur Philosophie 40 (98):67-88.
    What does it mean to understand something? I approach this question by comparing understanding with knowledge. Like knowledge, understanding comes, at least prima facia, in three varieties: propositional, interrogative and objectual. I argue that explanatory understanding (this being the most important form of interrogative understanding) and objectual understanding are not reducible to one another and are neither identical with, nor even a form of, the corresponding type of knowledge (nor any other type of knowledge). My discussion suggests that definitions of (...)
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  32. added 2016-04-25
    Jan Willem Wieland (forthcoming). Willful Ignorance. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice:1-15.
    Michelle Moody-Adams suggests that “the main obstacle to moral progress in social practices is the tendency to widespread affected ignorance of what can and should already be known.” This explanation is promising, though to understand it we need to know what willful (affected, motivated, strategic) ignorance actually is. This paper presents a novel analysis of this concept, which builds upon Moody-Adams (1994) and is contrasted with a recent account by Lynch (2016).
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  33. added 2016-04-24
    Tsung‐Hsing Ho (2016). Epistemic Normativity as Performance Normativity. Theoria 82 (2):n/a-n/a.
    Virtue epistemology maintains that epistemic normativity is a kind of performance normativity, according to which evaluating a belief is like evaluating a sport or musical performance. I examine this thesis through the objection that a belief cannot be evaluated as a performance because it is not a performance but a state. I argue that virtue epistemology can be defended on the grounds that we often evaluate a performance through evaluating the result of the performance. The upshot of my account is (...)
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  34. added 2016-04-23
    Luca Moretti, Phenomenal Conservatism and the Problem of Reflective Awareness.
    This paper criticizes phenomenal conservatism––the influential view according to which a subject S’s seeming that P provides S with defeasible justification for believing P. I argue that phenomenal conservatism, if true at all, has a significant limitation: seeming-based justification is elusive because S can easily lose it by just reflecting on her seemings and speculating about their causes––I call this the problem of reflective awareness. Because of this limitation, phenomenal conservatism doesn’t have all the epistemic merits attributed (...)
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  35. added 2016-04-23
    Matthew Frise (forthcoming). No Need to Know. Philosophical Studies:1-11.
    I introduce and defend an argument against the popular view that anything falling short of knowledge falls short in value. The nature of belief and cognitive psychological research on memory, I claim, support the argument. I also show that not even the most appealing mode of knowledge is distinctively valuable.
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  36. added 2016-04-23
    Julien Dutant (2015). The Legend of the Justified True Belief Analysis. Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):95-145.
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  37. added 2016-04-21
    Matthew A. Benton (forthcoming). Lotteries and Prefaces. In Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Contextualism. Routledge
    The lottery and preface paradoxes pose puzzles in epistemology concerning how to think about the norms of reasonable or permissible belief. Contextualists in epistemology have focused on knowledge ascriptions, attempting to capture a set of judgments about knowledge ascriptions and denials in a variety of contexts (including those involving lottery beliefs and the principles of closure). This article surveys some contextualist approaches to handling issues raised by the lottery and preface, while also considering some of the difficulties encountered by those (...)
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  38. added 2016-04-21
    Matthew A. Benton, John Hawthorne & Dani Rabinowitz (eds.) (forthcoming). Knowledge, Belief, and God: New Insights in Religious Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
    A collection of 16 new essays in the epistemology of religion, broadly construed. Includes work from historical perspectives (the medieval period; Hume; Scotus; Maimonides); in social epistemology (on testimony, disagreement, and expertise); formal epistemology (especially fine-tuning and many-worlds hypotheses); and rationality considerations (practical factors, modal arguments, phenomenal conservatism). -/- Contributors: Charity Anderson, Richard Cross, Billy Dunaway, Dani Rabinowitz, Isaac Choi, Hans Halvorson, John Hawthorne & Yoaav Isaacs, Roger White, Max Baker-Hytch, Rachel Elizabeth Fraser, Jennifer Lackey, Paulina Sliwa, Matthew Benton, Keith (...)
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  39. added 2016-04-21
    Matthew A. Benton (forthcoming). Pragmatic Encroachment and Theistic Knowledge. In Matthew A. Benton, John Hawthorne & Dani Rabinowitz (eds.), Knowledge, Belief, and God: New Insights in Religious Epistemology. Oxford University Press
    If knowledge is sensitive to practical stakes, then whether one knows depends in part on the practical costs of being wrong. When considering religious belief, the practical costs of being wrong about theism may differ dramatically between the theist (if there is no God) and the atheist (if there is a God). This paper explores the prospects, on pragmatic encroachment, for knowledge of theism (even if true) and of atheism (even if true), given two types of practical costs: (...)
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  40. added 2016-04-20
    Darrell P. Rowbottom (forthcoming). What Is (Dis)Agreement? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    When do we agree? The answer might once have seemed simple and obvious; we agree that p when we each believe that p. But from a formal epistemological perspective, where degrees of belief are more fundamental than beliefs, this answer is unsatisfactory. On the one hand, there is reason to suppose that it is false; degrees of belief about p might differ when beliefs simpliciter on p do not. On the other hand, even if it is true, it is too (...)
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  41. added 2016-04-17
    Guido Melchior (2016). Easy Knowledge, Closure Failure, or Skepticism: A Trilemma. Metaphilosophy 47 (2):214-232.
    This article aims to provide a structural analysis of the problems related to the easy knowledge problem. The easy knowledge problem is well known. If we accept that we can have basic knowledge via a source without having any prior knowledge about the reliability or accuracy of this source, then we can acquire knowledge about the reliability or accuracy of this source too easily via information delivered by the source. Rejecting any kind of basic knowledge, however, leads into an infinite (...)
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  42. added 2016-04-16
    Katalin Farkas (forthcoming). Practical Know-Wh. Noûs.
    The central and paradigmatic cases of knowledge discussed in philosophy involve the possession of truth. Is there in addition a distinct type of practical knowledge, which does not aim at the truth? This question is often approached through asking whether states attributed by “know-how” locutions are distinct from states attributed by “know-that”. This paper argues that the question of practical knowledge can be raised not only about some cases of “know-how” attributions, but also about some cases of so-called “know-wh” attributions; (...)
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  43. added 2016-04-16
    Michael Caie (forthcoming). Agreement Theorems for Self-Locating Belief. Review of Symbolic Logic.
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  44. added 2016-04-15
    Brian Weatherson (forthcoming). Reply to Eaton and Pickvance. Philosophical Studies:1-3.
    David Eaton and Timothy Pickvance argued that interest-relative invariantism has a surprising and interesting consequence. They take this consequence to be so implausible that it refutes interest-relative invariantism. But in fact it is a consequence that any theory of knowledge that has the resources to explain familiar puzzles must have.
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  45. added 2016-04-15
    Andrew P. Carlin (forthcoming). On Some Limits of Interdisciplinarity. Social Epistemology:1-19.
    This paper examines the use of “literature” in research projects in Sociology and Library & Information Science and proposes that there are some limits to the programme of interdisciplinarity. The loci of considerations are found in literature review sections of published articles. “The literature” is an arbitrary term that refers to recognized and relevant collections of work according to context. Associating aspects of disciplinary work such as concepts, methods and writings, with Wes Sharrock’s ethnomethodological notion of “ownership”, affords analysis of (...)
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  46. added 2016-04-14
    Jan Forsman (2015). Tahto ja arvostelmasta pidättäytyminen Descartesin filosofiassa. Ajatus 72:15-51.
    Artikkelissa otan kantaa niin sanottuun voluntarismikiistaan Descartesin tahdon käsitykseen ja arvostelmateoriaan liittyen kannattaen epäsuoraa voluntarismia. Käsittelen erityisesti kysymystä voiko tahdolla Descartesin mukaan olla suora kontrolli ihmisen arvostelmasta pidättäytymiseen?Pitkään vallassa olleen tulkintasuuntauksen mukaan Descartesin käsityksessä tahdolla on kyky vaikuttaa doksastisiin tiloihin suoraan, pelkällä tahdon aktilla. Tätä kutsutaan suoraksi voluntarismiksi ja se tarkoittaa lyhyesti sanottuna sitä, että meillä on kyky hyväksyä, olla hyväksymättä sekä pidättäytyä arvostelemasta täysin tahdonvaraisesti. Tässä tekstissä kannatan kuitenkin epäsuoraa voluntarismia: tahto kykenee vaikuttamaan doksastiseen tilaan epäsuorasti vaikuttamalla uskomuksen muodostamisen (...)
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  47. added 2016-04-14
    Karel Leyva (2009). Los presupuestos teóricos de la Epistemología Compleja. A Parte Rei: Revista de Filosofía 61:01-18.
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  48. added 2016-04-13
    Will Fleisher (forthcoming). Virtuous Distinctions. Synthese:1-31.
    Virtue epistemology has been divided into two camps: reliabilists and responsibilists. This division has been attributed in part to a focus on different types of virtues, viz., faculty virtues and character virtues. I will argue that this distinction is unhelpful, and that we should carve up the theoretical terrain differently. Making several better distinctions among virtues will show us two important things. First, that responsibilists and reliabilists are actually engaged in different, complementary projects; and second, that certain responsibilist critiques of (...)
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  49. added 2016-04-13
    James H. Collier (2016). Introduction. Social Epistemology 30 (3):227-228.
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  50. added 2016-04-12
    Brian Kim & Anubav Vasudevan (forthcoming). How to Expect a Surprising Exam. Synthese.
    In this paper, we provide a Bayesian analysis of the well-known surprise exam paradox. Central to our analysis is a probabilistic account of what it means for the student to accept the teacher's announcement that he will receive a surprise exam. According to this account, the student can be said to have accepted the teacher's announcement provided he adopts a subjective probability distribution relative to which he expects to receive the exam on a day on which he expects not to (...)
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