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Epistemology

Edited by Matthew McGrath (University of Missouri, Columbia)
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  1. added 2015-07-01
    Nathaniel Sharadin (forthcoming). A Partial Defense of Permissivism. Ratio.
    Permissivism is the view that sometimes an agent’s total evidential state entails both that she is epistemically permitted to believe that P and that she is epistemically permitted to believe that Q, where P and Q are contradictories. Uniqueness is the denial of Permissivism. Permissivism has recently come under attack on several fronts. If these attacks are successful, then we may be forced to accept an unwelcome asymmetry between epistemic and practical rationality. In this essay I clarify the debate by (...)
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  2. added 2015-07-01
    Anna Giustina & Uriah Kriegel (forthcoming). Phenomenal Knowledge, Introspection, and Inner Awareness. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7.
    Phenomenal beliefs are beliefs about the phenomenal properties of one's concurrent conscious states. It is an article of commonsense that such beliefs tend to be justified. Philosophers have been less convinced. It is sometimes claimed that phenomenal beliefs are not on the whole justified, on the grounds that (i) they are typically based on introspection and (ii) introspection is often unreliable. Here we argue against (ii). Central to our case is a pair of distinctions: one between what we call fact-introspection (...)
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  3. added 2015-07-01
    Abelard Podgorski (forthcoming). A Reply to the Synchronist. Mind.
    On the face of it, in ordinary practices of rational assessment, we criticize agents both for the combinations of attitudes, like belief, desire, and intention, that they possess at particular times, and for the ways that they behave cognitively over time, by forming, reconsidering, and updating those attitudes. Accordingly, philosophers have proposed norms of rationality that are synchronic - concerned fundamentally with our individual time-slices, and diachronic - concerned with our temporally extended behaviour. Recently, however, a number of philosophers have (...)
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  4. added 2015-06-30
    Daniele Bertini (forthcoming). Una proposta per la caratterizzazione della credenza religiosa. Dialegesthai. Rivista Telematica di Filosofia 2015.
    My paper challenges the externalist mainstream assumptions towards the understanding of religious beliefs (i.e., reliabilism by W.Alston, the warrant belief approach by A.Plantinga, the neowittgensteinian analysis of doxastic systems). According to such assumptions, religious beliefs should be evaluated rational in terms of the same doxastic standard giving justification for ordinary factual beliefs. Moving from the empiricist intuition that the kind of content of belief matters to the form of belief and the justification practices for it, I argue for the claim (...)
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  5. added 2015-06-30
    Christopher G. Lucas & Charles Kemp (forthcoming). An Improved Probabilistic Account of Counterfactual Reasoning. Psychological Review.
    When people want to identify the causes of an event, assign credit or blame, or learn from their mistakes, they often reflect on how things could have gone differently. In this kind of reasoning, one considers a counterfactual world in which some events are different from their real-world counterparts and considers what else would have changed. Researchers have recently proposed several probabilistic models that aim to capture how people do (or should) reason about counterfactuals. We present a new model and (...)
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  6. added 2015-06-30
    Andrew Reisner (forthcoming). Peer Disagreement, Rational Requirements, and Evidence of Evidence as Evidence Against. In Martin Grajner & Pedro Schmechtig (eds.), Epistemic Reasons, Epistemic Norms, Epistemic Goals. De Gruyter.
    This paper addresses an ambiguity in some of the literature on rational peer disagreement about the use of the term 'rational', which is used to describe a variety of normative statuses related to reasons, justification, and reasoning. The paper considers what the upshot of (believed) peer disagreement is for the rationality, as understood in its regimented use within the current literature on theoretical reason, i.e. as a system of relations amongst doxastic states. It is argued that (believed) peer disagreement has (...)
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  7. added 2015-06-30
    Shari Stone-Mediatore (2013). Attending to Others: Simone Weil and Epistemic Pluralism Shari Stone-Mediatore. Philosophical Topics 41 (2):79-95.
    Since the 1980s, feminist epistemologists have traced the cultural biases that have denied epistemic value to certain epistemic styles and agents while they have explored ways to reclaim the devalued epistemic modes--including more practical, emotionally invested, and community-situated modes of knowing--that many of us have found to be meaningful ways of engaging the world. At the same time, feminist critics have sought not merely to reverse received epistemic hierarchies but to explore more pluralistic epistemologies that appreciate as well as examine (...)
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  8. added 2015-06-29
    Igal Kvart, A Short Outline of the Indicativity Theory of Knowledge.
    Abstract In this paper I present a short outline of an Indicativity Theory of Knowledge, for the cases of Perceptual Knowledge and Knowledge by Memory. I explain the main rationale for a token-indicativity approach, and how it is fleshed out precisely in terms of chances. I elaborate on the account of the value of knowledge it provides, and what that value is. I explain why, given the rationale of conceiving Knowledge as token indicativity, separate sub-accounts in terms of chances should (...)
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  9. added 2015-06-29
    Daniel Whiting (2015). Knowledge is Not Belief for Sufficient (Objective and Subjective) Reason. Logos and Episteme 6:237-243.
    Mark Schroeder has recently proposed a new analysis of knowledge. I examine that analysis and show that it fails. More specifically, I show that it faces a problem all too familiar from the post-Gettier literature, namely, that it is delivers the wrong verdict in fake barn cases.
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  10. added 2015-06-27
    Jochen Briesen (forthcoming). Epistemic Consequentialism: Its Relation to Ethical Consequentialism and the Truth-Indication Principle. In P. Schmechtig & M. Grajner (eds.), Epistemic Reasons, Norms, and Goals.
    Consequentialist positions in philosophy spell out normative notions by recourse to final aims. Hedonistic versions of ethical consequentialism spell out what is morally right/justified via recourse to the aim of increasing pleasure and decreasing pain. Veritistic versions of epistemic consequentialism spell out what is epistemically right/justified via recourse to the aim of increasing the number of true beliefs and decreasing the number of false ones. Even though these theories are in many respects structurally analogous, there are also interesting disanalogies. For (...)
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  11. added 2015-06-26
    Igal Kvart, Action-Directed Pragmatics Secures Semantically Autonomous Knowledge.
    In the past couple of decades, there were a few major attempts to establish the thesis of pragmatic infringement – that a significant pragmatic ingredient figures significantly in the truth-conditions for knowledge-ascriptions. As candidates, epistemic contextualism and Relativism flaunted conversational standards, and Stanley's SSI promoted stakes. These conceptions were propelled first and foremost by obviously pragmatic examples of knowledge ascriptions that seem to require a pragmatic component in the truth-conditions of knowledge ascriptions in order to be accounted for. However, if (...)
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  12. added 2015-06-26
    Igal Kvart, Abstract: Cognitive Risk Bias and the Threat to the Semantics of Knowledge Ascriptions.
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  13. added 2015-06-26
    David Bourget (forthcoming). The Role of Consciousness in Grasping and Understanding. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    One sometimes believes that P without grasping that P. For example, a complete achromat might believe that ripe tomatoes are red without grasping this fact. My aim in this paper is to shed light on the difference between merely believing a fact or proposition and grasping it. I focus on two possible theories of grasping: the inferential theory, which explains grasping in terms of inferential role, and the phenomenal theory, which explains grasping in terms of phenomenal consciousness. I argue that (...)
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  14. added 2015-06-25
    Susanna Rinard (forthcoming). No Exception for Belief. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    This paper defends a principle I call Equal Treatment, according to which the rationality of a belief is determined in precisely the same way as the rationality of any other state. For example, if wearing a raincoat is rational just in case doing so maximizes expected value, then believing some proposition P is rational just in case doing so maximizes expected value. This contrasts with the popular view that the rationality of belief is determined by evidential support. It also contrasts (...)
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  15. added 2015-06-22
    Luca Moretti, Problems of Wright's Entitlement Theory.
    I am concerned with Crispin Wright (2004, 2008, 2012 and 2014)’s entitlement theory, according to which (1) we have non-evidential justification for accepting propositions of a general type, which Wright calls cornerstones, and (2) this non-evidential justification for cornerstones can secure evidential justification for believing many other propositions––those we take to be true on the grounds of ordinary evidence. I initially focus on Wright’s strategic entitlement, which is one of the types of entitlement that Wright has described in more detail. (...)
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  16. added 2015-06-22
    Ahmad Reza Hemmati Moghaddam (forthcoming). Epistemic Contextualism, Unarticulated Constituents and Hidden Variables. Dialogue.
    Epistemic contextualism was devised mainly to provide a solution to the problem of skepticism based on a thesis about the truth conditions of knowledge attributing sentences. In this paper, I’ll examine two possible semantic bases of epistemic contextualism i.e., (i) the epistemic standard is an unarticulated constituent, (ii) the epistemic standard is a hidden variable. After showing that the unarticulated constituent thesis is incompatible with epistemic contextualism, I’ll argue that the hidden variable account remains unconvincing. My aim in this paper (...)
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  17. added 2015-06-21
    Nathaniel Sharadin (forthcoming). Nothing but the Evidential Considerations? Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
    A number of philosophers have claimed that non-evidential considerations cannot play a role in doxastic deliberation as motivating reasons to believe a proposition. This claim, interesting in its own right, naturally lends itself to use in a range of arguments for a wide array of substantive philosophical theses. I argue, by way of a counterexample, that the claim to which all these arguments appeal is false. I then consider and reply to seven objections to my counterexample. Finally, as a way (...)
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  18. added 2015-06-20
    Ulf Hlobil (forthcoming). Anti-Normativism Evaluated. International Journal of Philosophical Studies:1-20.
    I argue that recent attempts to show that meaning and content are not normative fail. The two most important arguments anti-normativists have presented are what I call the ‘argument from constitution’ and the ‘argument from guidance’. Both of these arguments suffer from the same basic problem: they overlook the possibility of focusing on assessability by norms, rather than compliance with norms or guidance by norms. Moreover, I argue that the anti-normativists arguments fail even if we ignore this basic problem. Thus, (...)
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  19. added 2015-06-19
    Katri Huutoniemi (forthcoming). Interdisciplinarity as Academic Accountability: Prospects for Quality Control Across Disciplinary Boundaries. Social Epistemology:1-23.
    Two major science policy issues are the integration of knowledge across academic disciplines and the accountability of science to society. Instead of adding new or external criteria for research evaluation, I argue, these goals can be pursued by subjecting disciplinary priorities and procedures to broader scrutiny from the rest of academia. From a social epistemological perspective, the paper discusses interdisciplinarity as a mode of epistemic accountability across disciplinary boundaries, which promises to make academia more than the sum of its disciplinary (...)
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  20. added 2015-06-19
    Lee John Whittington (forthcoming). Luck, Knowledge and Value. Synthese:1-19.
    In a recent set of publications Ballantyne :485–503, 2011, Synthese 185:319–334, 2012, Synthese 91:1391–1407, 2013) argues that luck does not have a significant role in understanding the concept of knowledge. The problem, Ballantyne argues, lies in what is commonly thought to be a necessary condition for luck—a significance or value condition :385–398, 2007; Lackey, in Austral J Philos 86:255–267, 2008, Ballantyne, in Can J Philos 41:485–503, 2011). For an event, like forming a true belief, to be lucky then it must (...)
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  21. added 2015-06-19
    Duncan Pritchard (forthcoming). Engel on Pragmatic Encroachment and Epistemic Value. Synthese:1-10.
    I discuss Engel’s critique of pragmatic encroachment in epistemology and his related discussion of epistemic value. While I am sympathetic to Engel’s remarks on the former, I think he makes a crucial misstep when he relates this discussion to the latter topic. The goal of this paper is to offer a better articulation of the relationship between these two epistemological issues, with the ultimate goal of lending further support to Engel’s scepticism about pragmatic encroachment in epistemology. As we will see, (...)
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  22. added 2015-06-19
    Bence Nanay (2015). Experimental Philosophy and Naturalism. In E. Fischer & J. Collins (eds.), Experimental Philosophy, Rationalism and Naturalism. Rethinking Philosophical Method. Routledge. 222-239.
    The aim of this paper is to argue that there has been some mismatch between the naturalist rhetoric of experimental philosophy and its actual practice: experimental philosophy is not necessarily, and not even paradigmatically, a naturalistic enterprise. To substantiate this claim, a case study is given for what genuinely naturalist experimental philosophy would look like.
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  23. added 2015-06-18
    Jana Samland & Michael Waldmann (forthcoming). Highlighting the Causal Meaning of Causal Test Questions in Contexts of Norm Violations. Proceedings of the Cognitive Science Society.
    Experiments have shown that prescriptive norms often influence causal inferences. The reason for this effect is still not clear. One problem of the studies is that the term ‘cause’ in the test questions is ambiguous and can refer to both the causal mechanism and the agent’s accountability. Possibly subjects interpreted the causal test question as a request to assess accountability rather than causality. Scenarios that put more stress on the causal mechanism should therefore yield no norm effect. Consequently, Experiment 1 (...)
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  24. added 2015-06-18
    Martin Smith (forthcoming). The Cost of Treating Knowledge as a Mental State. In A. Carter, E. Gordon & B. Jarvis (eds.), Knowledge First, Approaches to Epistemology and Mind. Oxford University Press.
    My concern in this paper is with the claim that knowledge is a mental state – a claim that Williamson places front and centre in Knowledge and Its Limits. While I am not by any means convinced that the claim is false, I do think it carries certain costs that have not been widely appreciated. One source of resistance to this claim derives from internalism about the mental – the view, roughly speaking, that one’s mental states are determined by one’s (...)
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  25. added 2015-06-18
    Susan Dieleman, María G. Navarro & Elisabeth Simbürger (forthcoming). Social Epistemology as Public Philosophy. In James H. Collier (ed.), The Future of Social Epistemology. A Collective Vision. Rowman & Littlefield International.
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  26. added 2015-06-17
    Jake Chandler (forthcoming). Preservation, Commutativity and Modus Ponens: Two Recent Triviality Results. Mind.
    In a recent pair of publications, Richard Bradley has offered two novel no-go theorems involving the principle of ‘Preservation’ for conditionals, which guarantees that one’s prior conditional beliefs will exhibit a certain degree of inertia in the face of a change in one’s non-conditional beliefs. -/- We first note that Bradley’s original discussions of these results—in which he finds motivation for rejecting Preservation, first in a principle of ‘Commutativity’, then in a doxastic analogue of the rule of Modus Ponens—are problematic (...)
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  27. added 2015-06-17
    Joachim Horvath (forthcoming). Conceptual Analysis and Natural Kinds: The Case of Knowledge. Synthese:1-18.
    There is a line of reasoning in metaepistemology that is congenial to naturalism and hard to resist, yet ultimately misguided: that knowledge might be a natural kind, and that this would undermine the use of conceptual analysis in the theory of knowledge. In this paper, I first bring out various problems with Hilary Kornblith’s argument from the causal–explanatory indispensability of knowledge to the natural kindhood of knowledge. I then criticize the argument from the natural kindhood of knowledge against the method (...)
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  28. added 2015-06-17
    Daniel A. Wilkenfeld, Dillon Plunkett & Tania Lombrozo (forthcoming). Depth and Deference: When and Why We Attribute Understanding. Philosophical Studies:1-21.
    Four experiments investigate the folk concept of “understanding,” in particular when and why it is deployed differently from the concept of knowledge. We argue for the positions that people have higher demands with respect to explanatory depth when it comes to attributing understanding, and that this is true, in part, because understanding attributions play a functional role in identifying experts who should be heeded with respect to the general field in question. These claims are supported by our findings that people (...)
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  29. added 2015-06-17
    Alison Hills (2015). Understanding Why. Noûs 49 (2):n/a-n/a.
    I argue that understanding why p involves a kind of intellectual know how and differsfrom both knowledge that p and knowledge why p (as they are standardly understood).I argue that understanding, in this sense, is valuable.
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  30. added 2015-06-16
    Ray Scott Percival (1995). Science Evolving. [REVIEW] Nature 376 (6536):131-132.
    MICHAEL Ruse aims to describe what scientists actually do in their research and how they arrive at their theories — a mixed bag of false starts, fallacious reasoning, the cultivation of followers, the marketing of ideas and so on. His approach, evolutionary naturalism, rejects the traditional distinction between the normative and the descriptive analysis of science. For him the path of discovery to, say, Darwin's theory of natural selection makes a difference to the theory itself, whereas for the normative analyst (...)
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  31. added 2015-06-15
    Ray Scott Percival (2012). The Necessity of Exosomatic Knowledge for Civilization and a Revision to Our Epistemology. In Norbert-Bertrand Barbe (ed.), LE NÉANT DANS LA PENSÉE CONTEMPORAINE. 136-150.
    The traditional conception of knowledge is justified, true belief. This located knowledge within the person's mind. I argue that due to the explosive growth of what I like to call "exosomatic knowledge," knowledge outside the mind, the traditional conception has outlived its relevance. On the other hand, Karl Popper's (1934) Falsificationism, with its emphasis on the objective character of knowledge, is not only a sounder, but also a more appropriate theory of knowledge for understanding the nature and growth of civilization. (...)
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  32. added 2015-06-15
    Ray Scott Percival (2012). THE NECESSITY OF EXOSOMATIC KNOWLEDGE FOR CIVILIZATION AND A REVISION TO OUR EPISTEMOLOGY. In Norbert-Bertrand Barbe (ed.), LE NÉANT DANS LA PENSÉE CONTEMPORAINE. 136-150.
    The traditional conception of knowledge is justified, true belief. This located knowledge within the person's mind. I argue that due to the explosive growth of what I like to call "exosomatic knowledge," knowledge outside the mind, the traditional conception has outlived its relevance. On the other hand, Karl Popper's (1934) Falsificationism, with its emphasis on the objective character of knowledge, is not only a sounder, but also a more appropriate theory of knowledge for understanding the nature and growth of civilization. (...)
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  33. added 2015-06-15
    Ray Scott Percival (2012). THE NECESSITY OF EXOSOMATIC KNOWLEDGE FOR CIVILIZATION AND A REVISION TO OUR EPISTEMOLOGY. In Norbert-Bertrand Barbe (ed.), LE NÉANT DANS LA PENSÉE CONTEMPORAINE. 136-150.
    The traditional conception of knowledge is justified, true belief. This located knowledge within the person's mind. I argue that due to the explosive growth of what I like to call "exosomatic knowledge," knowledge outside the mind, the traditional conception has outlived its relevance. On the other hand, Karl Popper's (1934) Falsificationism, with its emphasis on the objective character of knowledge, is not only a sounder, but also a more appropriate theory of knowledge for understanding the nature and growth of civilization. (...)
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  34. added 2015-06-14
    Ray Scott Percival (2015). Descartes' Model of Mind. In Robin L. Cautin & Scott O. Lilienfeld (eds.), The Encyclopedia of Clinical Psychology.
    Rene Descartes (1596 – 1650) is considered the founder of modern philosophy. Profoundly influenced by the new physics and astronomy of Kepler and Galileo, Descartes was a scientist and mathematician whose most long-lasting contributions in science were the invention of Cartesian coordinates, the application of algebra to geometry, and the discovery of the law of refraction, what we now call Snell’s law.His most important books on philosophy were The discourse on method(1637) and The meditations(1642). Descartes’ writings display an exemplary degree (...)
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  35. added 2015-06-12
    Ralph Wedgwood (forthcoming). Internalism Re-Explained. In Julien Dutant (ed.), The New Evil Demon Problem. Oxford University Press.
    Internalism is the thesis that whether or not an attitude (such as a belief or an intention) or a mental event (such as a judgment or a decision) counts as justified or rational is determined purely by what is going on in the thinker's mind at (or immediately before) the relevant time. This essay gives an explanation for why this sort of internalism is true. (In this way, it gives a restatement, in a revised form, of the kind of explanation (...)
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  36. added 2015-06-11
    Ralph Wedgwood (2015). An Inferentialist Conception of the A Priori. Oxford Studies in Epistemology 5:295–314.
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  37. added 2015-06-10
    Matthew Braddock (forthcoming). Debunking Arguments From Insensitivity. International Journal for the Study of Skepticism.
    Heightened awareness of the origins of our moral judgments pushes many in the direction of moral skepticism, in the direction of thinking we are unjustified in holding our moral judgments on a realist understanding of the moral truths. A classic debunking argument fleshes out this worry: the best explanation of our moral judgments does not appeal to their truth, so we are unjustified in holding our moral judgments. But it is unclear how to get from the explanatory premise to the (...)
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  38. added 2015-06-10
    Robert M. Ellis (2015). Middle Way Philosophy 4: The Integration of Belief. Lulu.
    This fourth volume of the Middle Way Philosophy series uses cognitive psychology and balanced sceptical philosophy to explain both how we get stuck in dogmas, and how provisionality is possible. It is argued that we can make progress both in avoiding delusions and developing wisdom not by finding ‘truth’ or employing ‘rationality’, but rather through awareness of our assumptions. We need not ultimately true beliefs (as is often assumed), but judgements that are more adequate to each new set of conditions. (...)
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  39. added 2015-06-08
    Christoph Jäger (forthcoming). Epistemic Authority, Preemptive Reasons, and Understanding. Episteme.
    One of the key tenets of Linda Zagzebski’s book "Epistemic Authority: A Theory of Trust, Authority, and Autonomy in Belief" (2012) is the Preemption Thesis for epistemic authority. It says that, when an agent learns that an epistemic authority believes that p, the epistemically rational response for her is to adopt the authority’s belief and to replace all of her previous reasons relevant to whether p by the reason that the authority believes that p. I argue that such a “Hobbesian (...)
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  40. added 2015-06-07
    Alcibiades Malapi-Nelson (2013). Book Review: Steve Fuller, Humanity 2.0:What It Means to Be Human Past, Present and Future. [REVIEW] International Sociology Review of Books 28 (2):240-247.
    Sociology professor Steve Fuller’s latest book deals with contemporary treatments of the notion of ‘the human’, with an eye set on its future developments, anchored on disruptively pervasive technologies that are already being felt. A contextual account of its historical unfolding is provided, so that the reader can locate the evolution of the notion within the bigger setting of the evolving philosophical landscape in the West.
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  41. added 2015-06-06
    Luca Moretti & Tomoji Shogenji (forthcoming). Skepticism and Epistemic Closure: Two Bayesian Accounts. International Journal for the Study of Skepticism.
    This paper considers two novel Bayesian responses to a well-known skeptical paradox. The paradox consists of three intuitions: first, given appropriate sense experience, we have justification for accepting the relevant proposition about the external world; second, we have justification for expanding the body of accepted propositions through known entailment; third, we do not have justification for accepting that we are not disembodied souls in an immaterial world deceived by an evil demon. The first response we consider rejects the third intuition (...)
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  42. added 2015-06-05
    Supriyo Chakraborty, The Problem of Epistemological Existence of ‘I’.
    According to the western philosophical schools, knowledge is indefinable and there is no such existence of knowledge which can be observed or make any sense in human mind. But with the same aspect, it was accepted as “knowing in the same of knowing how”.
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  43. added 2015-06-05
    Anastasia Philippa Scrutton (forthcoming). Why Not Believe in an Evil God? Pragmatic Encroachment and Some Implications for Philosophy of Religion. Religious Studies.
    Pointing to broad symmetries between the idea that God is omniscient, omnipotent and all-good, and the idea that God is omniscient, omnipotent but all-evil, the evil-God challenge raises the question of why theists should prefer one over the other. I respond to this challenge by drawing on a recent theory in epistemology, pragmatic encroachment, which asserts that practical considerations can alter the epistemic status of beliefs. I then explore some of the implications of my argument for how we do philosophy (...)
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  44. added 2015-06-05
    Thomas Boyer-Kassem & Cyrille Imbert (forthcoming). Scientific Collaboration: Do Two Heads Need to Be More Than Twice Better Than One? Philosophy of Science.
    Epistemic accounts of scientific collaboration usually assume that, one way or another, two heads really are more than twice better than one. We show that this hypothesis is unduly strong. We present a deliberately crude model with unfavorable hypotheses. We show that, even then, when the priority rule is applied, large differences in successfulness can emerge from small differences in efficiency, with sometimes increasing marginal returns. We emphasize that success is sensitive to the structure of competing communities. Our results suggest (...)
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  45. added 2015-06-05
    Tomas Bogardus (forthcoming). Only All Naturalists Should Worry About Only One Evolutionary Debunking Argument. Ethics.
    Do the facts of evolution generate an epistemic challenge to moral realism? Some think so, and many “evolutionary debunking arguments” have been discussed in the recent literature. But they are all murky right where it counts most: exactly which epistemic principle is meant to take us from evolutionary considerations to the skeptical conclusion? Here, I will identify several distinct species of evolutionary debunking argument in the literature, each one of which relies on a distinct epistemic principle. Drawing on recent work (...)
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  46. added 2015-06-05
    Alexander Hyun & Eric Sampson (2014). On Believing the Error Theory. Journal of Philosophy 111 (11):631-640.
    In his recent article entitled ‘Can We Believe the Error Theory?’ Bart Streumer argues that it is impossible (for anyone, anywhere) to believe the error theory. This might sound like a problem for the error theory, but Streumer argues that it is not. He argues that the un-believability of the error theory offers a way for error theorists to respond to several objections commonly made against the view. In this paper, we respond to Streumer’s arguments. In particular, in sections 2-4, (...)
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  47. added 2015-06-04
    Timothy Lane (forthcoming). Rationality and its Contexts. In Hung T. W. & Lane T. J. (eds.), Rationality: Constraints and Contexts. Elsevier.
  48. added 2015-06-03
    Maria Brincker (2015). The Aesthetic Stance - on the Conditions and Consequences of Becoming a Beholder. In Alfonsina Scarinzi (ed.), Aesthetics and the Embodied Mind: Beyond Art Theory and the Cartesian Mind-Body Dichotomy. Springer. 117-138.
    What does it mean to be an aesthetic beholder? Is it different than simply being a perceiver? Most theories of aesthetic perception focus on 1) features of the perceived object and its presentation or 2) on psychological evaluative or emotional responses and intentions of perceiver and artist. In this chapter I propose that we need to look at the process of engaged perception itself, and further that this temporal process of be- coming a beholder must be understood in its embodied, (...)
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  49. added 2015-05-28
    Andrew Peet (forthcoming). Testimony and the Epistemic Uncertainty of Interpretation. Philosophical Studies:1-22.
    In the epistemology of testimony it is often assumed that audiences are able to reliably recover asserted contents. In the philosophy of language this claim is contentious. This paper outlines one problem concerning the recovery of asserted contents , and argues that it prevents audiences from gaining testimonial knowledge in a range of cases . The recovery problem, in essence, is simply that due to the collective epistemic limitations of the speaker and audience speakers will, in certain cases, be insensitive (...)
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  50. added 2015-05-27
    Ori Freiman (2014). Towards the Epistemology of the Internet of Things: Techno-Epistemology and Ethical Considerations Through the Prism of Trust. International Review of Information Ethics 22:6-22.
    This paper discusses the epistemology of the Internet of Things [IoT] by focusing on the topic of trust. It presents various frameworks of trust, and argues that the ethical framework of trust is what constitutes our responsibility to reveal desired norms and standards and embed them in other frameworks of trust. The first section briefly presents the IoT and scrutinizes the scarce philosophical work that has been done on this subject so far. The second section suggests that the field of (...)
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