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Epistemology

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  1. added 2014-11-20
    Clayton Littlejohn, A Note Concerning Conciliationism and Self-Defeat: A Reply to Matheson.
    A reply to Matheson on conciliationism and the self-defeat objection. I argue that the problems that Matheson discusses derive from his evidentialist assumptions, not from conciliationism.
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  2. added 2014-11-20
    Franz Dietrich, Christian List & Richard Bradley, A Unified Characterization of Belief-Revision Rules.
    This paper characterizes several belief-revision rules in a unified framework: Bayesian revision upon learning some event, Jeffrey revision upon learning new probabilities of some events, Adams revision upon learning some new conditional probabilities, and 'dual-Jeffrey' revision upon learning a new conditional probability function. Despite their differences, these revision rules can be characterized in terms of the same two axioms: responsiveness, which requires that revised beliefs incorporate what has been learnt, and conservativeness, which requires that beliefs on which the learnt input (...)
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  3. added 2014-11-19
    M. Seidel (forthcoming). Changing Society by Scientific Investigations? The Unexpected Shared Ground Between Early Sociology of Knowledge and the Vienna Circle. Foundations of Science:1-12.
    In this paper, I show that there are important but hitherto unnoticed similarities between key figures of the Vienna Circle and early defenders of sociology of knowledge. The similarities regard their stance on potential implications of the study of science for political and societal issues. I argue that notably Otto Neurath and Karl Mannheim are concerned with proposing a genuine political philosophy of science that is remarkably different from today’s emerging interest in the relation between science and society in philosophy (...)
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  4. added 2014-11-19
    Martin Montminy & Wes Skolits (2014). Defending the Coherence of Epistemic Contextualism. Episteme 11 (3).
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  5. added 2014-11-18
    Kevin Reuter, Lara Kirfel, Raphael Van Riel & Luca Barlassina (2014). The Good, the Bad, and the Timely: How Temporal Order and Moral Judgment Influence Causal Selection. Frontiers in Psychology 5:1-10.
    Causal selection is the cognitive process through which one or more elements in a complex causal structure are singled out as actual causes of a certain effect. In this paper, we report on an experiment in which we investigated the role of moral and temporal factors in causal selection. Our results are as follows. First, when presented with a temporal chain in which two human agents perform the same action one after the other, subjects tend to judge the later agent (...)
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  6. added 2014-11-17
    Diego E. Machuca (forthcoming). Again on Sextus on Persuasiveness and Equipollence. Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie.
    This paper engages with Svavar Svavarsson’s recent essay, “Sextus Empiricus on Persuasiveness and Equipollence,” arguing against both (i) his interpretation of whether two rival arguments appear equipollent to the Pyrrhonist because he himself is equally persuaded by both of them, and (ii) his interpretation of the way in which the argument from possible disagreement is supposed to induce suspension of judgment in the Pyrrhonist. In so doing, I aim to dispel some serious misunderstandings regarding key aspects of the Pyrrhonist’s skeptical (...)
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  7. added 2014-11-16
    Souran Mardini (2013). The Threshold of Ignorance. Murat Center.
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  8. added 2014-11-15
    Jose L. Zalabardo (2014). Inference and Scepticism. In Elia Zardini & Dylan Dodd (eds.), Scepticism and Perceptual Justification. Oxford University Press.
    I focus on a family of inferences that are intuitively incapable of producing knowledge of their conclusions, although they appear to satisfy sufficient conditions for inferential knowledge postulated by plausible epistemological theories. They include Moorean inferences and inductive-bootstrapping inferences. I provide an account of why these inferences are not capable of producing knowledge. I argue that the reason why these inferences fail to produce knowledge of their conclusions is that inferential knowledge requires that the subject is more likely to believe (...)
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  9. added 2014-11-15
    Jose L. Zalabardo (2014). Replies to My Critics. Teorema 33 (3):181-202.
    Replies to contributions to a symposium on the book, Scepticism and Reliable Belief.
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  10. added 2014-11-15
    Jose L. Zalabardo (2014). Precis of Scepticism and Reliable Belief. Teorema 33 (3):88-91.
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  11. added 2014-11-13
    Fabrice Teroni (2014). Emotions et connaissance. In Jean-Marie Chevalier Benoît Gautier (ed.), Connaître: Questions de philosophie contemporaine. Ithaque.
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  12. added 2014-11-12
    Jose L. Zalabardo (forthcoming). Epistemic Disjunctivism and the Evidential Problem. Analysis.
    I argue that Epistemic Disjunctivism doesn’t sustain a successful anti-sceptical strategy. I contend, in particular, that the treatment of scepticism that Duncan Pritchard puts forward on behalf of Epistemic Disjunctivism is unsatisfactory.
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  13. added 2014-11-11
    Jeff Dunn (forthcoming). Reliability for Degrees of Belief. Philosophical Studies:1-24.
    We often evaluate belief-forming processes, agents, or entire belief states for reliability. This is normally done with the assumption that beliefs are all-or-nothing. How does such evaluation go when we’re considering beliefs that come in degrees? I consider a natural answer to this question that focuses on the degree of truth-possession had by a set of beliefs. I argue that this natural proposal is inadequate, but for an interesting reason. When we are dealing with all-or-nothing belief, high reliability leads to (...)
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  14. added 2014-11-11
    Jeffrey Dunn (2014). Inferential Evidence. American Philosophical Quarterly 51 (3):203-213.
    Consider: -/- The Evidence Question: When, and under what conditions does an agent have proposition E as evidence (at t)? -/- Timothy Williamson's (2000) answer to this question is the well-known E = K thesis: -/- E = K: E is a member of S's evidence set at t iff S knows E at t. -/- I will argue that this answer is inconsistent with the version of Bayesianism that Williamson advocates. This is because E = K allows an agent (...)
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  15. added 2014-11-11
    Lisa Bortolotti (2014). The Epistemic Innocence of Motivated Delusions. Consciousness and Cognition.
    Delusions are defined as irrational beliefs that compromise good functioning. However, in the empirical literature, delusions have been found to have some psychological benefits. One proposal is that some delusions defuse negative emotions and protect one from low self-esteem by allowing motivational influences on belief formation. In this paper I focus on delusions that have been construed as playing a defensive function (motivated delusions) and argue that some of their psychological benefits can convert into epistemic ones. Notwithstanding their epistemic costs, (...)
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  16. added 2014-11-11
    Pedro Karczmarczyk, Gassmann Carlos, Acosta Jazmín Anahí, Rivera Silvia, Cuervo Sola Manuel, Torrano Andrea & Abeijón Matías (2013). Aproximaciones a la epistemología francesa. In Karczmarczyk Pedro (ed.), Estudios de epistemología, X. Instituto de epistemología, Universidad Nacional de Tucumán. 1-164.
    Aproximaciones a la escuela francesa de epistemología Los problemas que dominan a la epistemología pueden contextualizarse históricamente como una forma de racionalidad filosófica. La filosofía se ha presentado a lo largo de la historia como un discurso en el que sus diversos componentes (metafísica, ontología, gnoseología, ética, lógica, etc.) se mostraron unidos en el molde de la ?unidad del saber?. En este marco unitario alguna de las formas del saber filosófico detenta usualmente una posición dominante. El énfasis colocado en la (...)
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  17. added 2014-11-10
    Pedro Karczmarczyk (2013). La ruptura epsitemológica de Bachelard a Balibar y Pêcheux. Estudios de Epistemología 10:09-33.
    Resumen: En el presente trabajo intentaremos analizar cierta serie o tradi-ción de reflexiones sobre el conocimiento científico que lo caracteri-zan por su discontinuidad en relación al conocimiento ordinario osentido común. El origen de esta serie puede localizarse en la obrade Gaston Bachelard y su peculiar estudio de los actos epistemológicoscon los que se rompe con el pasado en una disciplina científica. Estosactos contrastan con lo que este autor califica como el “mitocontinuista” del empirismo. Esta posición será apropiada porAlthusser y desarrollada (...)
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  18. added 2014-11-10
    Pedro Karczmarczyk (2007). El problema del límite según Hegel. Revista Eletrônica Estudos Hegelianos 4 (6):1-20.
    Resumen: En este trabajo examino la concepción hegeliana del límite intentando clarificar sus principales características.Comienzo ubicando la filosofía hegeliana en el contexto filosófico más general del idealismo alemán, entendiendoeste movimiento como aquel comprometido en el proyecto de proporcionar una deducción trascendental de loabsoluto. Dado este contexto, procedo a examinar las críticas de Hegel a a la filosofía de Kant, principalmente en la“introducción a la Fenomenología del espíritu . El artículo concluye evaluando la adecuación de la elucidación deltratamiento hegeliano del problema (...)
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  19. added 2014-11-09
    Pedro Karczmarczyk (2013). Wittgenstein, Winch, Kripkenstein y la posibilidad de la crítica. Cuadernos de Filosofía 30:07-37.
    The present paper deals with the consequences Kripke’s interpretation of Wittgenstein’s private language argument has for political and social thought. We will show this is particularly important because it challenges the framework where ordinarily is located the discussion of the political and social relevance of Wittgenstein’s thought. Classical discussion has been concerned mainly with the role of communitary agreement, its relativistic or conservative consequences, the room for criticism and disagreement that it leaves, etc. We discern in classical reading a commitment (...)
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  20. added 2014-11-05
    Valeria Giardino (2014). Geometria, ragionamento e scommesse. In University of Urbino © Isonomia – Epistemologica (ed.), Mettere a fuoco il mondo. 36-46.
    Poiché i miei interessi di ricerca si concentrano sul rapporto tra spazio e rappresentazione, nel presente articolo commenterò un lavoro di Achille C. Varzi pubblicato nel 2008 e intitolato, nella sua versione italiana, «Configurazioni, regole e inferenze». Accennerò anche a un secondo articolo scritto da Varzi e Massimo Warglien e pubblicato nel 2003, intitolato «The Geometry of Negation». Mi rivolgerò poi alla psicologia sperimentale, collegando alcuni aspetti delle osservazioni di Varzi a un articolo di Johnson- Laird del 2005 intitolato «The (...)
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  21. added 2014-11-05
    John Corcoran (2007). 2007. Notes on the Founding of Logics and Metalogic: Aristotle, Boole, and Tarski. Eds. C. Martínez Et Al. Current Topics in Logic and Analytic Philosophy / Temas Actuales de Lógica y Filosofía Analítica. Imprenta Univeridade Santiago de Compostela. In C. Martínez (ed.), Current Topics in Logic and Analytic Philosophy /. 145-178.
  22. added 2014-11-04
    Charles B. Cross (forthcoming). A Logical Transmission Principle for Conclusive Reasons. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-18.
    Dretske's conclusive reasons account of knowledge is designed to explain how epistemic closure can fail when the evidence for a belief does not transmit to some of that belief's logical consequences. Critics of Dretske dispute the argument against closure while joining Dretske in writing off transmission. This paper shows that, in the most widely accepted system for counterfactual logic (David Lewis's system VC), conclusive reasons are governed by an informative, non-trivial, logical transmission principle. If r is a conclusive reason for (...)
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  23. added 2014-11-04
    Peter L. Samuelson, Matthew J. Jarvinen, Thomas B. Paulus, Ian M. Church, Sam A. Hardy & Justin L. Barrett (forthcoming). Implicit Theories of Intellectual Virtues and Vices: A Focus on Intellectual Humility. Journal of Positive Psychology.
    The study of intellectual humility is still in its early stages and issues of definition and measurement are only now being explored. To inform and guide the process of defining and measuring this important intellectual virtue, we conducted a series of studies into the implicit theory – or ‘folk’ understanding – of an intellectually humble person, a wise person, and an intellectually arrogant person. In Study 1, 350 adults used a free-listing procedure to generate a list of descriptors, one for (...)
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  24. added 2014-11-04
    Robin McKenna (forthcoming). Knowledge Ascriptions, Edited by Jessica Brown and Mikkel Gerken. [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly.
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  25. added 2014-11-04
    Robin McKenna (forthcoming). Epistemic Contextualism Defended. Synthese.
    Epistemic contextualists think that the extension of the expression ‘knows’ (and its cognates) depends on and varies with the context of utterance. In the last 15 years or so this view has faced intense criticism. This paper focuses on two sorts of objections. The first are what I call the ‘linguistic objections’, which purport to show that the best available linguistic evidence suggests that ‘knows’ is not context-sensitive. The second is what I call the ‘disagreement problem’, which concerns the behaviour (...)
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  26. added 2014-11-04
    Michael J. Shaffer (forthcoming). Approximate Truth, Quasi-Factivity and Evidence. Acta Analytica.
    The main question addressed in this paper is whether some false sentences can constitute evidence for the truth of other propositions. In this paper it is argued that there are good reasons to suspect that at least some false propositions can (at least some times) constitute evidence for the truth of certain other contingent propositions. The paper also introduces a novel condition concerning propositions that constitute evidence that explains a ubiquitous evidential practice and it contains a defense of a particular (...)
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  27. added 2014-11-01
    Yongqun He, Sirarat Sarntivijai, Yu Lin, Zuoshuang Xiang, Abra Guo, Shelley Zhang, Desikan Jagannathan, Luca Toldo, Cui Tao & Barry Smith (2014). OAE: The Ontology of Adverse Events. Journal of Biomedical Semantics 5 (29).
    A medical intervention is a medical procedure or application intended to relieve or prevent illness or injury. Examples of medical interventions include vaccination and drug administration. After a medical intervention, adverse events (AEs) may occur which lie outside the intended consequences of the intervention. The representation and analysis of AEs are critical to the improvement of public health. Description: The Ontology of Adverse Events (OAE), previously named Adverse Event Ontology (AEO), is a community-driven ontology developed to standardize and integrate data (...)
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  28. added 2014-10-31
    Amir Dastmalchian, Islam, Science, and Cognitive-Propositionalism. Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective.
  29. added 2014-10-28
    John Corcoran (2014). INVESTIGATING KNOWLEDGE AND OPINION. In A. Buchsbaum A. Koslow (ed.), The Road to Universal Logic. Vol. I. SPRINGER. 95-126.
    This work treats the correlative concepts knowledge and opinion, in various senses. In all senses of ‘knowledge’ and ‘opinion’, a belief known to be true is knowledge; a belief not known to be true is opinion. In this sense of ‘belief’, a belief is a proposition thought to be true—perhaps, but not necessarily, known to be true. All knowledge is truth. Some but not all opinion is truth. Every proposition known to be true is believed to be true. Some but (...)
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  30. added 2014-10-26
    Leszek Wroński (forthcoming). Reichenbach's Paradise. De Gruyter Open.
    Since its introduction by Hans Reichenbach, many philosophers have claimed to refute the idea – known as the common cause principle – that any surprising correlation between any two factors that do not directly influence one another is due to some common cause. For example, falsity of the principle is frequently inferred from falsifiability of Bell’s inequalities. The author demonstrates, however, that the situation is not so straightforward. There is more than one version of the principle formulated with the use (...)
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  31. added 2014-10-25
    Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (forthcoming). The Epistemology of the Precautionary Principle: Two Puzzles Resolved. Erkenntnis.
    In a recent paper in this journal (forthcoming), Carter and Peterson raise two distinctly epistemological puzzles that arise for anyone aspiring to defend the precautionary principle. The first puzzle trades on an application of epistemic contextualism to the precautionary principle; the second puzzle concerns the compatibility of the precautionary principle with the de minimis rule. I argue that neither puzzle should worry defenders of the precautionary principle. The first puzzle can be shown to be an instance of the familiar but (...)
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  32. added 2014-10-25
    J. Adam Carter & S. Orestis Palermos (forthcoming). Epistemic Internalism, Content Externalism and the Subjective/Objective Justification Distinction. American Philosophical Quarterly.
    Two arguments against the compatibility of epistemic internalism and content externalism are considered. Both arguments are shown to fail, because they equivocate on the concept of justification involved in their premises. To spell out the involved equivocation, a distinction between subjective and objective justification is introduced, which can also be independently motivated on the basis of a wide range of thought experiments to be found in the mainstream literature on epistemology. The subjective/objective justification distinction is also ideally suited for providing (...)
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  33. added 2014-10-25
    Yair Levy (2014). Money Pumps, Diachronic and Synchronic. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy:XX.
    The Money Pump argument is designed to demonstrate the irrational flaw of having cyclic preferences, by showing how the irrational agent is vulnerable to exploitation. The argument faces some longstanding objections, which point out how one may avoid the threat of exploitation without resolving the associated irrationality. Recently a new, synchronic version of Money Pump has been put forward which promises to undercut those standard objections. However, I argue that the synchronic Money Pump cannot deliver on its promise: parallel objections (...)
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  34. added 2014-10-23
    Timothy Perrine (2014). Against Kornblith Against Reflective Knowledge. Logos and Episteme 5 (3):351-360.
    In On Reflection, Hilary Kornblith criticizes Sosa’s distinction between animal and reflective knowledge. His two chief criticisms are that reflective knowledge is not superior to animal knowledge and that Sosa’s distinction does not identify two kinds of knowledge. I argue that Sosa can successfully avoid both of these charges.
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  35. added 2014-10-21
    Mikkel Gerken (2014). Outsourced Cognition. Philosophical Issues 24 (1):127-158.
    Recent developments in technologically enabled social cognition call for a rethinking of many aspects of human cognition. According to the hypothesis of extended cognition, we must revise our psychological categories by eliminating allegedly superficial distinctions between internal cognition and external processes. As an alternative to this proposal, I outline a hypothesis of outsourced cognition which seeks to respect distinctions that are operative in both folk psychology and the social and cognitive sciences. According to this hypothesis, the cognitive states and processes (...)
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  36. added 2014-10-21
    Frank J. Hoffman (2013). “Knowledge and Ethics in Early Buddhism” (Zao Qi Fo Jiao Zhong De Dao De). In Li Lian (ed.), Fo Jiao Yu Dang Dai Wen Hua Jian She Xue Shu Yan Tao Hui Lun Wen Ji (The Collected Papers of "Buddhism and Contemporary Cultural Construction" Conference, Xi'an, China). Northwest University Press (Shi Bei Daxue).
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  37. added 2014-10-21
    Frank J. Hoffman (1990). “Zasto se budizam ne moze opovrgnuti?”. “Zasto Se budizKulture Istoka (Beograd, Yugoslavia) (Broj. 23).
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  38. added 2014-10-20
    Italo Testa (2012). Scepsis and Scepticism. In De Laurentis Allegra & Edwards Jeffrey (eds.), The Bloomsbury Companion to Hegel. Bloomsbury/Continuum (2012). Bloomsbury. 273-278.
    Hegel's philosophy aims at responding to the questions raised by modern scepticism concerning the accessibility of the external world, of other minds, and of one's own mind. A key-role in Hegel's argumentative strategy against modern scepticism is played here by Hegel's theory of recognition. Recognition mediates the constitution of individual self-consciousness and intersubjectivity: self-knowledge is not logically independent of the awareness of other minds. At the same time, recognition institutes the possibility of objective reference to the world. In this way, (...)
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  39. added 2014-10-20
    Hilla Jacobson-Horowitz (2010). . Normativity Without Reflectivity: On the Beliefs and Desires of Non-Reflective Creatures. Philosophical Psychology 23:75-93.
    The view (held, e.g., by Davidson) that the having of beliefs and desires presupposes the having of reflective capacities is sometimes supported by appealing to the idea that the concept of belief is a concept of a mental state which involves a normative aspect: beliefs can be “successful” or “unsuccessful” from the perspective of their possessors, and sometimes discarded in light of their “failure.” This naturally invites the idea that believers must be capable of reflecting on their beliefs. Desires presuppose (...)
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  40. added 2014-10-20
    Italo Testa (2010). La natura del riconoscimento. Riconoscimento naturale e autocoscienza sociale in Hegel. Mimesis.
    My research takes as its guiding thread the statement from Hegel's lectures on the philosophy of spirit of 1805-06, that «cognition is recognition[Erkennen ist Anerkennen]». In this perspective I delineate, first, the consequences of this position for Hegel's epistemology, in particular with reference to the question of skepticism. Then, I show in what sense the recognitive conception of knowledge makes it possible for Hegel to comprehend unitarily, on one hand, cognition as exercise of natural capacities and cognition as exercise of (...)
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  41. added 2014-10-16
    Theodore J. Everett (forthcoming). Peer Disagreement and Two Principles of Rational Belief. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-14.
    This paper presents a new solution to the problem of peer disagreement that distinguishes two principles of rational belief, here called probability and autonomy. When we discover that we disagree with peers, there is one sense in which we rationally ought to suspend belief, and another in which we rationally ought to retain our original belief. In the first sense, we aim to believe what is most probably true according to our total evidence, including testimony from peers and authorities. In (...)
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  42. added 2014-10-14
    Moti Mizrahi (forthcoming). Three Arguments Against the Expertise Defense. Metaphilosophy.
    Experimental philosophers have challenged friends of the expertise defense to show that (a) the intuitive judgments of professional philosophers are different from the intuitive judgments of non-philosophers, and (b) the intuitive judgments of professional philosophers are better than the intuitive judgments of non-philosophers, in ways that are relevant to the truth or falsity of such judgments. Friends of the expertise defense have responded by arguing that the burden of proof lies with experimental philosophers. In this paper, I sketch three arguments (...)
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  43. added 2014-10-13
    Timothy Lane & Georg Northoff (forthcoming). Is Depressive Rumination Rational? In T. W. Hung (ed.), Reason and Rationality. Elsevier.
    Most mental disorders affect only a small segment of the population. On the reasonable assumption that minds or brains are prone to occasional malfunction, these disorders do not seem to pose distinctive explanatory problems. Depression, however, because it is so prevalent and costly, poses a conundrum that some try to explain by characterizing it as an adaptation—a trait that exists because it performed fitness-enhancing functions in ancestral populations. Heretofore, proposed evolutionary explanations of depression did not focus on thought processes; instead, (...)
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  44. added 2014-10-11
    Helen De Cruz (2014). Where Philosophical Intuitions Come From. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-17.
    Intuitions play a central role in analytic philosophy, but their psychological basis is little understood. This paper provides an empirically-informed, psychological char- acterization of philosophical intuitions. Drawing on McCauley’s distinction between maturational and practiced naturalness, I argue that philosophical intuitions originate from several early-developed, specialized domains of core knowledge (maturational naturalness). Eliciting and deploying such intuitions in argumentative contexts is the domain of philosophical expertise, thus philosophical intuitions are also practiced nat- ural. This characterization has implications for the evidential value (...)
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  45. added 2014-10-09
    Steven D. Hales & Jennifer Adrienne Johnson (2014). Luck Attributions and Cognitive Bias. Metaphilosophy 45 (4-5):509-528.
    Philosophers have developed three theories of luck: the probability theory, the modal theory, and the control theory. To help assess these theories, we conducted an empirical investigation of luck attributions. We created eight putative luck scenarios and framed each in either a positive or a negative light. Furthermore, we placed the critical luck event at the beginning, middle, or end of the scenario to see if the location of the event influenced luck attributions. We found that attributions of luckiness were (...)
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  46. added 2014-10-09
    Matthew A. Benton (2014). Knowledge Norms. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy:0-00.
    Encyclopedia entry covering the growing literature on the Knowledge Norm of Assertion (and its rivals), the Knowledge Norm of Action (and pragmatic encroachment), the Knowledge Norm of Belief, and the Knowledge Norm of Disagreement.
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  47. added 2014-10-06
    Rik Peels (forthcoming). Believing at Will is Possible. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-18.
    There are convincing counter-examples to the widely accepted thesis that we cannot believe at will. For it seems possible that the truth of a proposition depend on whether or not one believes it. I call such scenarios cases of Truth Depends on Belief (TDB) and I argue that they meet the main criteria for believing at will that we find in the literature. I reply to five objections that one might level against the thesis that TDB cases show that believing (...)
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  48. added 2014-10-03
    Adam Elga & Agustin Rayo, Fragmentation and Information Access.
    In order to predict and explain behavior, one cannot specify the mental state of an agent merely by saying what information she possesses. Instead one must specify what information is available to an agent relative to various purposes. Specifying mental states in this way allows us to accommodate cases of imperfect recall, cognitive accomplishments involved in logical deduction, the mental states of confused or fragmented subjects, and the difference between propositional knowledge and know-how .
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  49. added 2014-10-01
    Anil Gomes (forthcoming). Skepticism About Other Minds. In Diego Machuca & Baron Reed (eds.), Skepticism: From Antiquity to the Present. Bloomsbury.
    In this paper I distinguish two ways of raising a sceptical problem of others' minds: via a problem concerning the possibility of error or via a problem concerning sources of knowledge. I give some reason to think that the second problem raises a more interesting problem in accounting for our knowledge of others’ minds and consider proposed solutions to the problem.
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  50. added 2014-09-30
    Howard Sankey (forthcoming). Scepticism, Relativism and a Naturalistic Particularism. Social Epistemology.
    This paper presents a particularist and naturalist response to epistemic relativism. The response is based on an analysis of the source of epistemic relativism, according to which epistemic relativism is closely related to Pyrrhonian scepticism. The paper starts with a characterization of epistemic relativism. Such relativism is explicitly distinguished from epistemological contextualism. Next the paper presents an argument for epistemic relativism that is based on the Pyrrhonian problem of the criterion. It then considers a response to the problem of the (...)
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