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Epistemology

Edited by Matthew McGrath (University of Missouri, Columbia)
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  1. added 2016-08-30
    Luis R. G. Oliveira (forthcoming). Deontological Evidentialism, Wide-Scope, and Privileged Values. Philosophical Studies.
    Deontological Evidentialism (DE) is the claim that we ought to form and maintain our beliefs in accordance with our evidence. In this paper, I criticize two arguments in its defense. I begin by discussing Berit Brogaard's (2014) use of the distinction between narrow-scope and wide-scope requirements against W.K. Clifford's moral defense of (DE). I then use this very distinction against a defense of (DE) inspired by Stephen Grimm's (2009) more recent claims about the moral source of epistemic normativity. I use (...)
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  2. added 2016-08-30
    Ernest Sosa (2016). Replies. In Bahr Amrei & Seidel Markus (eds.), Ernest Sosa. Targeting His Philosophy. Springer 135-146.
    For me the two-day workshop was an excellent experience. It was very good to be reminded of all those issues that I had grappled with so intensely in earlier years, and I very much appreciated the opportunity to think about them again and to try to put them in perspective with the stimulus of the critical teams’ focused attention. I am very pleased and grateful for the intense attention and challenge to my views, and for the excellent comments. I will (...)
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  3. added 2016-08-30
    Douglas Campbell (2016). Why We Shouldn't Reason Classically, and the Implications for Artificial Intelligence. In C. Vincent Müller (ed.), Computing and Philosophy: Selected Papers From Iacap 2014. Springer International Publishing 151--165.
    In this paper I argue that human beings should reason, not in accordance with classical logic, but in accordance with a weaker ‘reticent logic’. I characterize reticent logic, and then show that arguments for the existence of fundamental Gödelian limitations on artificial intelligence are undermined by the idea that we should reason reticently, not classically.
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  4. added 2016-08-30
    Ernest Sosa (2016). Knowledge in Action. In Bahr Amrei & Seidel Markus (eds.), Ernest Sosa. Targeting His Philosophy. Springer 1-13.
    It is argued that knowledge is a form of action. It is a kind of successful attempt to attain the truth. The success must avoid a particular sort of “epistemic luck”. It must derive from competence rather than luck. Knowledge, then, is a judgment or belief that aims at truth and attains accuracy not by luck but through the agent’s cognitive adroitness, so that the attainment is apt. A higher grade of knowledge then requires that the agent attain aptly not (...)
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  5. added 2016-08-30
    Markus Seidel & Alexander Thinius (2016). A Snowslide of Entities. Does Sosa's Existential Relativism Provide a Barrier Against Being Buried? In Bahr Amrei & Seidel Markus (eds.), Ernest Sosa. Targeting His Philosophy. Springer 101-118.
    This paper discusses Sosa’s via media between existential relativism and absolutism. We discuss three implications of Sosa’s account which require some further clarification. First, we distinguish three alternative readings of Sosa’s account – the indexicalist, the homonymist and the (proper) relativist reading – and argue that they differ with respect to two crucial points: (a) they lead to different analyses of the lack of disagreement in existential discourse, and (b) they differ with respect to the question of whether conceptual schemes (...)
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  6. added 2016-08-30
    Amrei Bahr & Markus Seidel (eds.) (2016). Ernest Sosa. Targeting His Philosophy. Springer.
    This volume provides the reader with exclusive insights into Ernest Sosa’s latest ideas as well as main aspects of his philosophical work of the last 50 years. Ernest Sosa, one of the most distinguished contemporary philosophers, is best known for his ground-breaking work in epistemology, and has also contributed greatly to metaphysics, metaphilosophy and philosophy of language.
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  7. added 2016-08-30
    Alberto Pasquinelli (1953). La sociologia del neopositivismo. Scritti di Sociologia E Politica in Onore di Luigi Sturzo 3:31-50.
  8. added 2016-08-29
    Cameron Boult (forthcoming). Knowledge and Attributability. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
    A prominent objection to the so-called ‘knowledge norm of belief’ is that it is too demanding or too strong. The objection is commonly framed in terms of the idea that there is a tight connection between norm violation and the appropriateness of criticism or blame. In this paper I do two things. First, I argue that this way of motivating the objection leads to an impasse in the epistemic norms debate. It leads to an impasse when knowledge normers invoke excuses (...)
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  9. added 2016-08-29
    Cédric Paternotte (forthcoming). The Fragility of Common Knowledge. Erkenntnis:1-22.
    Ordinary common knowledge is formally expressed by strong probabilistic common belief. How strong exactly? The question can be answered by drawing from the similar equivalence, recently explored, between plain and probabilistic individual beliefs. I argue that such a move entails that common knowledge displays a double fragility: as a description of a collective state and as a phenomenon, because it can respectively disappear as group size increases, or more worryingly as the epistemic context changes. I argue that despite this latter (...)
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  10. added 2016-08-27
    Alison Wylie (1988). Methodological Essentialism: Comments on 'Philosophy, Sex, and Feminism' by de Sousa and Morgan. Atlantis 13 (2).
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  11. added 2016-08-26
    A. K. Flowerree (forthcoming). Agency of Belief and Intention. Synthese:1-22.
    In this paper, I argue for a conditional parity thesis: if we are agents with respect to our intentions, we are agents with respect to our beliefs. In the final section, I motivate a categorical version of the parity thesis: we are agents with respect to belief and intention. My aim in this paper is to show that there is no unique challenge facing epistemic agency that is not also facing agency with respect to intention. My thesis is ambitious on (...)
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  12. added 2016-08-26
    Roberto Fumagalli (2016). Why We Cannot Learn From Minimal Models. Erkenntnis 81 (3):433-455.
    Philosophers of science have developed several accounts of how consideration of scientific models can prompt learning about real-world targets. In recent years, various authors advocated the thesis that consideration of so-called minimal models can prompt learning about such targets. In this paper, I draw on the philosophical literature on scientific modelling and on widely cited illustrations from economics and biology to argue that this thesis fails to withstand scrutiny. More specifically, I criticize leading proponents of such thesis for failing to (...)
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  13. added 2016-08-25
    Paul Silva (forthcoming). How Doxastic Justification Helps Us Solve the Puzzle of Misleading Higher-Order Evidence. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
    Certain plausible evidential requirements and coherence requirements on rationality seem to yield dilemmas of rationality (in a specific, objectionable sense) when put together with the possibility of misleading higher-order evidence. Epistemologists have often taken such dilemmas to be evidence that we’re working with some false principle. In what follows I show how one can jointly endorse an evidential requirement, a coherence requirement, and the possibility of misleading higher-order evidence without running afoul of dilemmas of rationality. The trick lies in observing (...)
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  14. added 2016-08-24
    Neil Van Leeuwen (forthcoming). Do Religious "Beliefs" Respond to Evidence? Philosophical Explorations.
    Some examples suggest that religious credences (or “beliefs”) respond to evidence. Other examples suggest they are wildly unresponsive. So the examples taken together suggest there is a puzzle about whether descriptive religious attitudes respond to evidence or not. I argue for a solution to this puzzle according to which religious credences are characteristically not responsive to evidence; that is, they do not tend to be extinguished by evidence contrary to them. And when they appear to be responsive, it is because (...)
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  15. added 2016-08-23
    J. Adam Carter (forthcoming). Virtuous Insightfulness. Episteme.
    Insight often strikes us blind; when we aren’t expecting it, we suddenly see a connection that previously eluded us—a kind of ‘Aha!’ experience. People with a propensity to such experiences are regarded as insightful, and insightfulness is a paradigmatic intellectual virtue. What’s not clear, however, is just what it is in virtue of which being such that these experiences tend to happen to one renders one intellectually virtuous. This paper draws from both virtue epistemology as well as empirical work on (...)
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  16. added 2016-08-23
    María G. Navarro (2016). A Principled Standpoint: A Reply to Sandra Harding. Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 8:17-23.
    Take the strong rhetoric! This expression comes to mind as we set in order the ideas and impressions prompted by Sandra Harding’s “An Organic Logic of Research: A Response to Posey and Navarro”.
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  17. added 2016-08-23
    Filipe Martone (2016). Singular Reference Without Singular Thought. Manuscrito 39 (1).
    In this paper I challenge the widespread assumption that the conditions for singular reference are more or less the same as the conditions for singular thought. I claim that we refer singularly to things without thinking singularly about them more often than it is usually believed. I first argue that we should take the idea that singular thought is non-descriptive thought very seriously. If we do that, it seems that we cannot be so liberal about what counts as acquaintance; only (...)
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  18. added 2016-08-22
    Jack C. Lyons (forthcoming). Unconscious Evidence. Philosophical Issues 26.
    Can beliefs that are not consciously formulated serve as part of an agent’s evidence for other beliefs? A common view says no, any belief that is psychologically immediate is also epistemically immediate. I argue that some unconscious beliefs can serve as evidence, but other unconscious beliefs cannot. Person-level beliefs can serve as evidence, but subpersonal beliefs cannot. I try to clarify the nature of the personal/subpersonal distinction and to show how my proposal illuminates various epistemological problems and provides a principled (...)
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  19. added 2016-08-22
    Jack C. Lyons (forthcoming). What We Talk About When We Talk About Epistemic Justification. Inquiry:1-22.
    Stewart Cohen argues that much contemporary epistemological theorizing is hampered by the fact that ‘epistemic justification’ is a term of art and one that is never given any serious explication in a non-tendentious, theory-neutral way. He suggests that epistemologists are therefore better off theorizing in terms of rationality, rather than in terms of ‘epistemic justification’. Against this, I argue that even if the term ‘epistemic justification’ is not broadly known, the concept it picks out is quite familiar, and partly because (...)
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  20. added 2016-08-22
    Piotr Kozak (2016). Sztuka i myśl. Wydawnictwo Fundacji Na Rzecz Myślenia Im. Barbary Skargi.
    W pracy Sztuka i myśl staram się argumentować, że sztuka jest formą myślenia. Rozumiem przez to, po pierwsze, że możemy o sztuce myśleć jako o pewnej klasie operacji pojęciowych, gdzie operacje pojęciowe należy interpretować jako bezpośrednie rozpoznawania poprawności realizacji danej dyspozycji poznawczej lub praktycznej. Po drugie, argumentuję, że sztukę możemy rozumieć jako pewien sposób widzenia i myślenia. Twierdzę, że sztuka ukazuje to, w jaki sposób możemy widzieć i myśleć o danych przedstawieniach, mówiąc ściślej, sztuka wyznacza reguły i pojęcia, za pomocą (...)
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  21. added 2016-08-22
    Piotr Kozak (2015). Co to jest myślenie? Pojęcia, sądy, percepcja w perspektywie kantowskiej. Wydawnictwo Scholar.
    W Co to jest myślenie? staram się za pomocą narzędzi dostarczonych przez filozofię Kanta rozjaśnić problem związku między percepcją a pojęciami, który ujmuję pod postacią tzw. problemu kierowania się regułą. Argumentuję, po pierwsze, że możemy pod pewnym względem utożsamiać myślenie i percepcję, a sam problem kierowania się regułą oddalić jako wynik źle postawionego zagadnienia badawczego. Po drugie, wskazuję na to, że warunkiem możliwości kierowania się regułą jest umiejętność odróżniania reguł istotnych i nieistotnych. Brak tej ostatniej umiejętności Kant nazywa głupotą. -/- (...)
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  22. added 2016-08-21
    Seungbae Park (forthcoming). Problems with Using Evolutionary Theory in Philosophy. Axiomathes:1-12.
    Does science move toward truths? Are present scientific theories (approximately) true? Should we invoke truths to explain the success of science? Do our cognitive faculties track truths? Some philosophers say yes, while others say no, to these questions. Interestingly, both groups use the same scientific theory, viz., evolutionary theory, to defend their positions. I argue that it begs the question for the former group to do so because their positive answers imply that evolutionary theory is warranted, whereas it is self-defeating (...)
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  23. added 2016-08-21
    Renée Bilodeau (2001). Croyance et justification. Cahiers de Philosophie de L’Université de Caen 37:153-165.
    Cet article se propose de montrer que l’éthique de la croyance, si elle permet de clarifier certains problèmes épistémiques, a le tort d’être utilisée à des fins pour lesquelles le réseau conceptuel de l’éthique est inadéquat. Dans ce but, je présente d’abord la thèse de la divergence et les arguments qui militent en sa faveur. J’indique ensuite pourquoi ces arguments ne sont pas concluants en examinant de plus près les rapports existant entre raisons épistémiques et raisons pratiques. Cette discussion se (...)
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  24. added 2016-08-19
    Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (forthcoming). Epistemic Instrumentalism, Permissibility, and Reasons for Belief. In Conor McHugh, Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting (eds.), Normativity: Epistemic and Practical. Oxford University Press
    Epistemic instrumentalists seek to understand the normativity of epistemic norms on the model practical instrumental norms governing the relation between aims and means. Non-instrumentalists often object that this commits instrumentalists to implausible epistemic assessments. I argue that this objection presupposes an implausibly strong interpretation of epistemic norms. Once we realize that epistemic norms should be understood in terms of permissibility rather than obligation, and that evidence only occasionally provide normative reasons for belief, an instrumentalist account becomes available that delivers the (...)
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  25. added 2016-08-19
    Nicola Mößner (2010). Wie wirklich ist die Wirklichkeit. Wissenschaftliche Fotografien als Daten. In Richard Heinrich, Elisabeth Nemeth & Wolfram Pichler (eds.), Bild und Bildlichkeit in Philosophie, Wissenschaft und Kunst (Image and Imaging in Philosophy, Science, and the Arts), Papers of the 33 rd International Wittgenstein Symposium. Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society 216-219.
    Fotografien können als paradigmatische Instanzen des Bildbegriffs aufgefasst werden. Sie finden umfangreiche Verwendung in den Wissenschaften. Die kausale Relation zum abgebildeten Objekt sowie die vermeintliche Ähnlichkeit des Bildes mit seinem Gegenstand scheinen ihren Gebrauch als Belege im Forschungsprozess zu legitimieren. Anhand einer Fallstudie zur Oberflächenerfassung des Planeten Mars mit Hilfe einer digitalen Spezialkamera soll in diesem Beitrag untersucht werden, inwiefern Fotografien der Status eines wissenschaftlichen Datums tatsächlich zugesprochen werden kann oder nicht.
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  26. added 2016-08-18
    Santiago Echeverri (forthcoming). How to Undercut Radical Skepticism. Philosophical Studies:1-23.
    Radical skepticism relies on the hypothesis that one could be completely cut off from the external world. In this paper, I argue that this hypothesis can be rationally motivated by means of a conceivability argument. Subsequently, I submit that this conceivability argument does not furnish a good reason to believe that one could be completely cut off from the external world. To this end, I show that we cannot adequately conceive scenarios that verify the radical skeptical hypothesis. Attempts to do (...)
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  27. added 2016-08-18
    Francois-Igor Pris (forthcoming). The Gettier Cases as the Cases of "Epistemic Gap". NB Философская Мысль (Russian).
  28. added 2016-08-18
    Borys Jastrzębski (2016). The Number of Moons Is Not a Number. Towards a Comprehensive Linguistic Approach to Frege's Commitment Puzzle. Filozofia Nauki 25 (2).
    Comprehensive Linguistic Approach to Frege's Commitment Puzzle There is a puzzle, noticed by Frege, about inferences from sentences like (F1) "Jupiter has four moons" to sentences like (F2) "The number of moons of Jupiter is four". They seem to be truth-conditionally equivalent but, apparently, they say something about completely different things. (F1) seems to be about moons, while (F2) about numbers. This phenomenon raises several puzzles about semantics, syntax, and is one of main tools of easy ontology. Recently, new linguistic (...)
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  29. added 2016-08-18
    Gennady Shkliarevsky (2007). The Paradox of Observing, Autopoiesis, and the Future of Social Sciences. Systems Research and Behavioral Science 24 (3):323-32.
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  30. added 2016-08-17
    David Rose (forthcoming). Folk Intuitions of Actual Causation: A Two-Pronged Debunking Explanation. Philosophical Studies:1-39.
    How do we determine whether some candidate causal factor is an actual cause of some particular outcome? Many philosophers have wanted a view of actual causation which fits with folk intuitions of actual causation and those who wish to depart from folk intuitions of actual causation are often charged with the task of providing a plausible account of just how and where the folk have gone wrong. In this paper, I provide a range of empirical evidence aimed at showing just (...)
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  31. added 2016-08-16
    Jorge Balladares (2013). Una racionalidad emergente en la educación. Sophia: Colección de Filosofía de la Educación 14.
    Is it possible to think about an education that responds to contemporary needs? Is there a new way to think for an emerging education? This paper invites the reader to reflect philosophically about the educational challenges from a new emerging rationality. Besides the logic and instrumental reason of Modernity, the emerging rationality appears in education as an inclusive, colloquial and integrative new way to think.
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  32. added 2016-08-15
    Karen Frost-Arnold (forthcoming). Social Media, Trust, and the Epistemology of Prejudice. Social Epistemology:1-19.
    Ignorance of one’s privileges and prejudices is an epistemic problem. While the sources of ignorance of privilege and prejudice are increasingly understood, less clarity exists about how to remedy ignorance. In fact, the various causes of ignorance can seem so powerful, various, and mutually reinforcing that studying the epistemology of ignorance can inspire pessimism about combatting socially constructed ignorance. I argue that this pessimism is unwarranted. The testimony of members of oppressed groups can often help members of privileged groups overcome (...)
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  33. added 2016-08-15
    Cameron Boult (forthcoming). Epistemic Conditions on "Ought": E=K as a Case Study. Acta Analytica:1-22.
    In The Norm of Belief, John Gibbons claims that there is a “natural reaction” to the general idea that one can be normatively required to Ø when that requirement is in some sense outside of one’s first person perspective or inaccessible to one. The reaction amounts to the claim that this isn’t possible. Whether this is a natural or intuitive idea or not, it is difficult to articulate exactly why we might think it is correct. To do so, we need (...)
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  34. added 2016-08-15
    Thomas Mulligan (forthcoming). A Note on the Epistemology of Disagreement and Politics. Political Theory.
    Martin Ebeling argues that a popular theory in the epistemology of disagreement--conciliationism--supports an egalitarian approach to politics. This view is mistaken for two reasons. First, even if political parties have the epistemic value that Ebeling claims, voters should not regard each other as epistemic peers--which conciliationism requires that they do. The American electorate is strikingly heterogeneous in both its knowledgeability and its rationality, and so the necessary epistemic parity relation does not hold. Second, for technical reasons, the beliefs that a (...)
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  35. added 2016-08-15
    Berit Brogaard & Elijah Chudnoff (forthcoming). Consciousness and Knowledge. In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness. Oxford
    This chapter focuses on the relationship between consciousness and knowledge, and in particular on the role perceptual consciousness might play in justifying beliefs about the external world. We outline a version of phenomenal dogmatism according to which perceptual experiences immediately, prima facie justify certain select parts of their content, and do so in virtue of their having a distinctive phenomenology with respect to those contents. Along the way we take up various issues in connection with this core theme, including the (...)
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  36. added 2016-08-15
    Barbara Applebaum (2016). “Listening Silence” and Its Discursive Effects. Educational Theory 66 (3):389-404.
    While researchers have studied how white silence protects white innocence and white ignorance, in this essay Barbara Applebaum explores a form of white silence that she refers to as “listening silence” in which silence protects white innocence but does not necessarily promote resistance to learning. White listening silence can appear to be a constructive pedagogical tool for teaching white students about their implication in the perpetuation of racism. The truth of white students' listening may make it seem as if silence (...)
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  37. added 2016-08-15
    Marzia Milazzo (2016). On White Ignorance, White Shame, and Other Pitfalls in Critical Philosophy of Race. Journal of Applied Philosophy 33 (3).
    This article examines Samantha Vice's essay ‘How Do I Live in This Strange Place?’, which sparked a storm of controversy in South Africa, as a starting point for interrogating understandings of whiteness and racism that are dominant in critical philosophy of race. I argue that a significant body of philosophical scholarship on whiteness in general and by white scholars in particular obfuscates the structural dimension of racism. The moralisation of racism that often permeates philosophical scholarship reproduces colourblind logics, which provide (...)
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  38. added 2016-08-15
    Federico Luzzi (2016). Testimonial Injustice Without Credibility Deficit. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 5 (2).
    Miranda Fricker has influentially discussed testimonial injustice: the injustice done to a speaker S by a hearer H when H gives S less-than-merited credibility. Here, I explore the prospects for a novel form of testimonial injustice, where H affords S due credibility, that is, the amount of credibility S deserves. I present two kinds of cases intended to illustrate this category, and argue that there is presumptive reason to think that testimonial injustice with due credibility exists. I show that if (...)
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  39. added 2016-08-15
    Elizabeth Beaumont (2016). Gender Justice V. The “Invisible Hand” of Gender Bias in Law and Society. Hypatia 31 (3):668-686.
    How does so much gender inequality endure in an era when many laws and policies endorse principles of gender equality? This essay examines this dilemma by considering Susan Moller Okin's criticism of “false gender neutrality,” research on implicit bias, and the shifting relation of gender bias to American law. I argue that these are crucial elements of the modern cycle of gender inequality, enabling it to operate through a perverse “invisible-hand” mechanism. This framework helps convey how underlying gender bias influences (...)
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  40. added 2016-08-15
    Christoph Kelp (2016). Justified Belief: Knowledge First‐Style. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (1):79-100.
    Recent knowledge first epistemology features a number of different accounts of justified belief, including a knowledge first reductionism according to which to believe justifiably is to know Sutton (), Littlejohn, Williamson, a knowledge first version of accessibilism Millar () and a knowledge first version of mentalism Bird (). This paper offers a knowledge first version of virtue epistemology and argues that it is preferable to its knowledge first epistemological rivals: only knowledge first virtue epistemology manages to steer clear of a (...)
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  41. added 2016-08-14
    Kevin Lynch (forthcoming). The Myth of the Intuitive: Experimental Philosophy and Philosophical Method, by Max Deutsch (MIT Press, 2015). [REVIEW] Philosophical Psychology:1-3.
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  42. added 2016-08-14
    Henry Clarke (2016). Wiggins on Practical Knowledge. Disputatio 8 (42):113-124.
    Wiggins’ (2012) argument against propositional accounts of knowing how is based on a development of some considerations taken from Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. Aristotle argued that the knowledge needed for participation in an ethos cannot be codified in propositional form so as to let it be imparted to someone who did not already have it. This is because any putative codification would be incomplete, and require that knowledge in order to extend it to novel cases. On a reasonable interpretation of his (...)
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  43. added 2016-08-13
    Sofia Liberman & Roberto López Olmedo (forthcoming). Psychological Meaning of “Coauthorship” Among Scientists Using the Natural Semantic Networks Technique. Social Epistemology:1-19.
    The purpose of this study is to determine the psychological meaning of coauthorship for a group of scientists, based on the assumption that the meaning of a concept is related to experience on “how a person behaves in a situation, depending on what the situation signifies to him”. The semantic meaning provides for an interpretation of action in beliefs, goals and intentions, following the idea that semantic meaning is a basis for inferring intentions to perform action. We used the Natural (...)
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  44. added 2016-08-13
    Andrew Moon (forthcoming). Recent Work in Reformed Epistemology. Philosophy Compass.
    Reformed epistemology, roughly, is the thesis that religious belief can be rational without argument. After providing some background, I present Plantinga’s defense of reformed epistemology and its influence on religious debunking arguments. I then discuss three objections to Plantinga’s arguments that arise from the following topics: skeptical theism, cognitive science of religion, and basicality. I then show how reformed epistemology has recently been undergirded by a number of epistemological theories, including phenomenal conservatism and virtue epistemology. I end by noting that (...)
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  45. added 2016-08-12
    Nicola Mößner & Alfred Nordmann (forthcoming). Reasoning in Measurement. Routledge.
    This collection offers a new understanding of the epistemology of measurement. The interdisciplinary volume explores how measurements are produced, for example, in astronomy and seismology, in studies of human sexuality and ecology, in brain imaging and intelligence testing. It considers photography as a measurement technology and Henry David Thoreau's poetic measures as closing the gap between mind and world. -/- By focusing on measurements as the hard-won results of conceptual as well as technical operations the authors of the book no (...)
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  46. added 2016-08-11
    Kirk Lougheed & Robert Mark Simpson (forthcoming). Indirect Epistemic Reasons and Religious Belief. Religious Studies:1-19.
    If believing P will result in epistemically good outcomes, does this generate an epistemic reason to believe P, or just a pragmatic reason? Conceiving of such reasons as epistemic reasons seems to lead to absurdity, e.g. by allowing that someone can rationally hold beliefs that conflict with her assessment of her evidence’s probative force. We explain how this and other intuitively unwelcome results can be avoided. We also suggest a positive case for conceiving of such reasons as epistemic reasons, namely, (...)
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  47. added 2016-08-11
    Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (forthcoming). Fictional Persuasion and the Nature of Belief. In Ema Sullivan-Bissett, Helen Bradley & Paul Noordhof (eds.), Art and the Nature of Belief. Oxford University Press
    Psychological studies on fictional persuasion demonstrate that being engaged with fiction systematically affects our beliefs about the real world, in ways that seem insensitive to the truth. This threatens to undermine the widely accepted view that beliefs are essentially regulated in ways that tend to ensure their truth, and may tempt various non-doxastic interpretations of the belief-seeming attitudes we form as a result of engaging with fiction. I evaluate this threat, and argue that it is benign. Even if the relevant (...)
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  48. added 2016-08-09
    Michael R. Starks, The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language as Revealed in the Writings of Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle.
    I provide a critical survey of some of the major findings of Wittgenstein and Searle on the logical structure of intentionality (mind, language, behavior), taking as my starting point Wittgenstein’s fundamental discovery –that all truly ‘philosophical’ problems are the same—confusions about how to use language in a particular context, and so all solutions are the same—looking at how language can be used in the context at issue so that its truth conditions (Conditions of Satisfaction or COS) are clear. The basic (...)
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  49. added 2016-08-09
    Thomas Raleigh (forthcoming). Another Argument Against Uniqueness. Philosophical Quarterly.
    I present an argument against the thesis of Uniqueness and in favour of Permissivism. Counterexamples to Uniqueness are provided, based on ‘Safespot’ propositions – i.e. a proposition that is guaranteed to be true provided the subject adopts a certain attitude towards it. The argument relies on a plausible principle: (roughly stated) If S knows that her believing p would be a true belief, then it is rationally permitted for S to believe p. One motivation for denying this principle – viz. (...)
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  50. added 2016-08-09
    Cecilea Mun (forthcoming). The Rationalities of Emotion. Phenomenology and Mind.
    I argue that emotions are not only rational in-themselves, strictly speaking, but they are also instrumentally rational, epistemically rational, and evaluatively rational. I begin with a discussion of what it means for emotions to be rational or irrational in-themselves, which includes the derivation of a criterion for the ontological rationality of emotions (CORe): For emotion or an emotion there exists some normative standard that is given by what emotion or an emotion is against which our emotional responses can be judged (...)
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