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Epistemology

Edited by Matthew McGrath (University of Missouri, Columbia)
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  1. added 2016-02-11
    James J. Delaney & David Martin (forthcoming). Therapy, Enhancement, and Medicine: Challenges for the Doctor–Patient Relationship and Patient Safety. Journal of Business Ethics.
  2. added 2016-02-11
    Harmen Ghijsen (2016). Norman and Truetemp Revisited Reliabilistically: A Proper Functionalist Defeat Account of Clairvoyance. Episteme 13 (1):89-110.
    The cases of Norman the Clairvoyant and Mr. Truetemp form classic counterexamples to the process reliabilist's claim that reliability is sufficient for prima facie justification. I discuss several ways in which contemporary reliabilists have tried to deal with these counterexamples, and argue that they are all unsuccessful. Instead, I propose that the most promising route lies with an appeal to a specific kind of higher-order defeat that is best cashed out in terms of properly functioning monitoring mechanisms.
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  3. added 2016-02-11
    Duncan Pritchard (2016). Seeing It for Oneself: Perceptual Knowledge, Understanding, and Intellectual Autonomy. Episteme 13 (1):29-42.
    The idea of is explored. It is claimed that there is something epistemically important about acquiring one's knowledge first-hand via active perception rather than second-hand via testimony. Moreover, it is claimed that this kind of active perceptual seeing it for oneself is importantly related to the kind of understanding that is acquired when one possesses a correct and appropriately detailed explanation of how cause and effect are related. In both cases we have a kind of seeing it for oneself which (...)
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  4. added 2016-02-11
    Bram M. K. Vaassen (2016). Basic Beliefs and the Perceptual Learning Problem: A Substantial Challenge for Moderate Foundationalism. Episteme 13 (1):133-149.
    In recent epistemology many philosophers have adhered to a moderate foundationalism according to which some beliefs do not depend on other beliefs for their justification. Reliance on such pervades both internalist and externalist theories of justification. In this article I argue that the phenomenon of perceptual learning expert constitutes a challenge for moderate foundationalists. In order to accommodate perceptual learning cases, the moderate foundationalist will have to characterize the of the expert observer in such a way that it cannot be (...)
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  5. added 2016-02-11
    J. J. Cunningham (2016). Reflective Epistemological Disjunctivism. Episteme 13 (1):111-132.
    It is now common to distinguish Metaphysical from Epistemological Disjunctivism. It is equally common to suggest that it is at least not obvious that the latter requires a commitment to the former: at the very least, a suitable bridge principle will need to be identified which takes one from the former to the latter. This paper identifies a plausible-looking bridge principle that takes one from the version of Epistemological Disjunctivism defended by John McDowell and Duncan Pritchard, which I label Reflective (...)
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  6. added 2016-02-11
    Alan Millar (2016). Perceptual Knowledge and Well-Founded Belief. Episteme 13 (1):43-59.
    Should a philosophical account of perceptual knowledge accord a justificatory role to sensory experiences? This discussion raises problems for an affirmative answer and sets out an alternative account on which justified belief is conceived as well-founded belief and well-foundedness is taken to depend on knowledge. A key part of the discussion draws on a conception of perceptual-recognitional abilities to account for how perception gives rise both to perceptual knowledge and to well-founded belief.
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  7. added 2016-02-11
    Mona Simion (2016). Perception, History and Benefit. Episteme 13 (1):61-76.
    In recent literature, several authors attempt to naturalize epistemic normativity by employing an etiological account of functions. The thought is that epistemic entitlement consists in the normal functioning of our belief-acquisition systems, where the latter acquire the function to reliably deliver true beliefs through a history of biological benefit.
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  8. added 2016-02-11
    Annalisa Coliva (2016). How to Perceive Reasons. Episteme 13 (1):77-88.
    This paper deals with the question whether, and to what extent, perceptions can provide a justification for our empirical beliefs. In particular, it addresses the issue of whether they need to be conceptualized by a subject in order to play a justificatory role. It is argued that the conditions under which a subject can have perceptual representational contents and those under which those representational contents can play a justificatory role differ. The upshot is that perception can provide justification only for (...)
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  9. added 2016-02-10
    Marcoen J. T. F. Cabbolet, An Essay Concerning Human Misunderstanding: Why Observations of Ultrashort-Lived Unstable Particles Cannot Be Claimed.
    The physics literature contains many claims that ultrashort-lived unstable particles have been observed: the use of the word 'observation' is then based on a convention. This paper, however, contends against these observational claims by arguing that existential knowledge of ultrashort-lived unstable particles is beyond the epistemic limit of the scientific method: the argument leans in essence on the JTB-definition of knowledge. Given that an observational claim implies a claim of existential knowledge, it then follows by modus tollens that the observation (...)
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  10. added 2016-02-10
    Tommaso Castellani, Emanuele Pontecorvo & Adriana Valente (forthcoming). Epistemic Consequences of Bibliometrics-Based Evaluation: Insights From the Scientific Community. Social Epistemology:1-22.
    The aim of this paper is to investigate the consequences of the bibliometrics-based evaluation system of scientific production on the contents and methods of sciences. The research has been conducted by means of in-depth interviews to a multi-disciplinary panel of Italian researchers. We discuss the implications of bibliometrics-based evaluation on the choice of the research topic, on the experimental practices, on the dissemination habits. We observe that the validation of the bibliometrics-based evaluation practices relies on the acceptance (...)
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  11. added 2016-02-10
    Stefanie Dach (2014). Realismus a jazyk: Recept podle Sellarse. Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 5 (19).
  12. added 2016-02-10
    Stefanie Dach (2014). Realismus a jazyk: Recept podle Sellarse. Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 5 (19).
  13. added 2016-02-10
    Stefanie Dach (2014). Realismus a jazyk: Recept podle Sellarse. Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 5 (19).
  14. added 2016-02-10
    Ludovico Geymonat (1954). Esigenza critica e resistenze dogmatiche. Nuovi Argomenti (11 giugno 1954).
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  15. added 2016-02-09
    David James Barnett (forthcoming). Perceptual Justification and the Cartesian Theater. Oxford Studies in Epistemology.
    According to a traditional Cartesian epistemology of perception, perception does not provide one with direct knowledge of the external world. Instead, when you look out to see a red wall, what you learn first is not a fact about the color of the wall—i.e., that it is red—but instead a fact about your own visual experience—i.e., that the wall looks red to you. If you are to justifiably believe that the wall is red, you must be in a position to (...)
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  16. added 2016-02-09
    Michael Hannon (forthcoming). Skepticism About Meta-Skepticism: Meditations on Experimental Philosophy. Episteme.
    Drawing on new empirical data, a group of experimental philosophers have argued that one of the most popular and influential forms of skepticism is much less interesting and much less worrisome than philosophers have thought. Contrary to this claim, I argue that this brand of skepticism remains as threatening as ever. My argument also reveals an important limitation of experimental philosophy and sheds light on the way professional philosophers should go about the business of doing philosophy.
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  17. added 2016-02-09
    Michael Hannon (2015). The Importance of Knowledge Ascriptions. Philosophy Compass 10 (12):856-866.
    Knowledge ascriptions of the form ‘S knows that p’ are a central area of research in philosophy. But why do humans think and talk about knowledge? What are knowledge ascriptions for? This article surveys a variety of proposals about the role of knowledge ascriptions and attempts to provide a unified account of these seemingly distinct views.
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  18. added 2016-02-09
    Jonathan Stoltz (2015). Gendun Chöpel on the Status of Madhyamaka: Knowledge, Truth, and Testimony. Journal of Buddhist Philosophy 1:39-57.
  19. added 2016-02-08
    Adam Zweber (forthcoming). Fallibilism, Closure, and Pragmatic Encroachment. Philosophical Studies:1-13.
    I argue that fallibilism, single-premise epistemic closure, and one formulation of the “knowledge-action principle” are inconsistent. I will consider a possible way to avoid this incompatibility, by advocating a pragmatic constraint on belief in general, rather than just knowledge. But I will conclude that this is not a promising option for defusing the problem. I do not argue here for any one way of resolving the inconsistency.
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  20. added 2016-02-08
    Jared Warren (forthcoming). Epistemology Versus Non-Causal Realism. Synthese:1-20.
    This paper formulates a general epistemological argument against what I call non-causal realism, generalizing domain specific arguments by Benacerraf, Field, and others. First I lay out the background to the argument, making a number of distinctions that are sometimes missed in discussions of epistemological arguments against realism. Then I define the target of the argument—non-causal realism—and argue that any non-causal realist theory, no matter the subject matter, cannot be given a reasonable epistemology and so should be rejected. Finally I discuss (...)
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  21. added 2016-02-08
    Peter Hawke (forthcoming). Questions, Topics and Restricted Closure. Philosophical Studies:1-26.
    Single-premise epistemic closure is the principle that: if one is in an evidential position to know that P where P entails Q, then one is in an evidential position to know that Q. In this paper, I defend the viability of opposition to closure. A key task for such an opponent is to precisely formulate a restricted closure principle that remains true to the motivations for abandoning unrestricted closure but does not endorse particularly egregious instances of closure violation. I focus (...)
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  22. added 2016-02-08
    Daniel Star (forthcoming). "From Outside of Ethics" Review, John Gibbons, *The Norm of Belief* (OUP, 2013). [REVIEW] Ethics.
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  23. added 2016-02-08
    Christoph Kelp (2016). Justified Belief: Knowledge First‐Style. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (1).
    Recent knowledge first epistemology features a number of different accounts of justified belief, including a knowledge first reductionism according to which to believe justifiably is to know Sutton (), Littlejohn, Williamson, a knowledge first version of accessibilism Millar () and a knowledge first version of mentalism Bird (). This paper offers a knowledge first version of virtue epistemology and argues that it is preferable to its knowledge first epistemological rivals: only knowledge first virtue epistemology manages to steer clear of a (...)
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  24. added 2016-02-08
    Jared Warren (2016). Trapping the Metasemantic Metaphilosophical Deflationist? Metaphilosophy 47 (1):108-121.
    Some philosophers are metaphilosophical deflationists for metasemantic reasons. These theorists take standard philosophical assertions to be defective in some manner. There are various versions of metasemantic metaphilosophical deflationism, but a trap awaits any global version of it: metasemantics itself is a part of philosophy, so in deflating philosophy these theorists have thereby deflated the foundation of their deflationism. The present article discusses this issue and the prospects for an adequate response to the trap. Contrary to most historical responses, the article (...)
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  25. added 2016-02-08
    W. Scott Cleveland (2012). The Distinctiveness of Intellectual Virtues. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 86:159-169.
    Robert Roberts and Jay Wood criticize St Thomas Aquinas’ distinction between intellectual and moral virtues. They offer three objections to this distinction. They object that intellectual virtues depend on the will in ways that undermine the distinction, that the subject of intellectual virtues is not an intellectual faculty but a whole person, and that some intellectual virtues require that the will act intellectually. They hold that each of these is sufficient to undermine the distinction. I defend Aquinas’ distinction and respond (...)
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  26. added 2016-02-08
    Tero Vaaja (2011). On Certainty, Skepticism and Berkeley's Idealism. SATS 12 (2).
    In this paper, I survey the way Wittgenstein reacts to radical philosophical doubt in his On Certainty.He deems skeptical doubt in some important cases idle, pointless or otherwise negligible. I point out that several passages of On Certainty make it difficult to judge whether Wittgenstein intends to address a skeptic or a metaphysical idealist. Drawing attention to the anti-skeptical nature of Berkeley’s idealism, I go on to argue that the question is far from trivial: rather, it affects the way we (...)
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  27. added 2016-02-07
    Kourken Michaelian (forthcoming). Axel Gelfert: A Critical Introduction to Testimony. [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly:pqv130.
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  28. added 2016-02-07
    Mark Alfano (2014). Extending the Situationist Challenge to Reliabilism About Inference. In Abrol Fairweather & Owen Flanagan (eds.), Virtue Epistemology Naturalized: Bridges between Virtue Epistemology and Philosophy of Science. Synthese Library 103-122.
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  29. added 2016-02-07
    Luis H. Favela (2014). Review of Networks: An Introduction by M. E. J. Newman. [REVIEW] Dynamical Systems Magazine.
    Network theory arguably has its origins in Euler’s (1741) graph theory, which was first developed in the mid-1700s to solve the Königsberg bridge problem. Since then, the basic units of graph theory—vertices and edges—have been utilized by a number of scientific disciplines to describe and analyze a wide variety of phenomena. Mark Newman begins his clear and comprehensive introduction to networks with a sampling of various kinds that have been studied: information networks such as the World Wide Web, biological networks (...)
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  30. added 2016-02-07
    Mark Alfano (2014). Extending the Situationist Challenge to Reliabilism About Inference. In Abrol Fairweather & Owen Flanagan (eds.), Virtue Epistemology Naturalized: Bridges between Virtue Epistemology and Philosophy of Science. Synthese Library 103-122.
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  31. added 2016-02-07
    Mark Alfano (2014). Extending the Situationist Challenge to Reliabilism About Inference. In Abrol Fairweather & Owen Flanagan (eds.), Virtue Epistemology Naturalized: Bridges between Virtue Epistemology and Philosophy of Science. Synthese Library 103-122.
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  32. added 2016-02-07
    Mark Alfano (2014). Extending the Situationist Challenge to Reliabilism About Inference. In Abrol Fairweather & Owen Flanagan (eds.), Virtue Epistemology Naturalized: Bridges between Virtue Epistemology and Philosophy of Science. Synthese Library 103-122.
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  33. added 2016-02-07
    Mark Alfano (2014). Extending the Situationist Challenge to Reliabilism About Inference. In Abrol Fairweather & Owen Flanagan (eds.), Virtue Epistemology Naturalized: Bridges between Virtue Epistemology and Philosophy of Science. Synthese Library 103-122.
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  34. added 2016-02-06
    Andreas Ditter (forthcoming). Why Intellectualism Still Fails. Philosophical Quarterly:pqv115.
    Intellectualism about knowledge-how is the view that knowing how to do something amounts to knowing a fact. The version of intellectualism defended by Jason Stanley and Timothy Williamson holds that knowledge-how is a species of knowledge-wh, i.e., knowledge-where, -when, -who, etc. It draws its major motivation from the uniformity between ascriptions of knowledge-how and ascriptions of knowledge-wh in English, being all infinitival embedded question constructions. My aim in this paper is to challenge intellectualism of this sort. I argue that the (...)
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  35. added 2016-02-06
    Mark Alfano & Gus Skorburg (forthcoming). Extended Knowledge, the Recognition Heuristic, and Epistemic Injustice. In Duncan Pritchard, Jesper Kallestrup, Orestis Palermos & Adam Carter (eds.), Extended Knowledge. Oxford
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  36. added 2016-02-06
    Mark Alfano (2015). Becoming Less Unreasonable: A Reply to Sherman. Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 4 (7):59-62.
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  37. added 2016-02-05
    Daniel Immerman (forthcoming). Sensitivity, Reflective Knowledge, and Skepticism. International Journal for the Study of Skepticism.
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  38. added 2016-02-05
    Peter Murphy (forthcoming). Skeptical Effectiveness: A Reply to Buford and Brueckner. International Journal for the Study of Skepticism.
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  39. added 2016-02-05
    Joshua C. Thurow (forthcoming). Evolutionary Religion, Written by J. L. Schellenberg. International Journal for the Study of Skepticism.
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  40. added 2016-02-05
    Michael D. Burroughs & Deborah Tollefsen (forthcoming). Learning to Listen: Epistemic Injustice and the Child. Episteme:1-19.
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  41. added 2016-02-05
    Aidan McGlynn (forthcoming). Epistemic Entitlement and the Leaching Problem. Episteme:1-14.
  42. added 2016-02-05
    Adrian Ziółkowski (forthcoming). Folk Intuitions and the No-Luck-Thesis. Episteme:1-16.
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  43. added 2016-02-05
    Susan Feldman (forthcoming). The Failure of Frances’s Live Skepticism. International Journal for the Study of Skepticism.
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  44. added 2016-02-05
    Jack C. Lyons (forthcoming). Scepticism and Reliable Belief, Written byJosé L. Zalabardo. International Journal for the Study of Skepticism.
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  45. added 2016-02-05
    Nathan Sheff & Michael P. Lynch (forthcoming). The Knowers in Charge. International Journal for the Study of Skepticism.
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  46. added 2016-02-05
    Patrick Rysiew (forthcoming). Book Review: Assurance: An Austinian View of Knowledge and Knowledge Claims, Written by Krista Lawlor. [REVIEW] International Journal for the Study of Skepticism.
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  47. added 2016-02-05
    Faik Kurtulmus & Gürol Irzik (forthcoming). Justice in the Distribution of Knowledge. Episteme:1-18.
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  48. added 2016-02-05
    Michael W. Hickson (forthcoming). Scepticism in the Eighteenth Century: Enlightenment, Lumières, Aufklärung, Edited by Sébastien Charles and Plinio J. Smith. International Journal for the Study of Skepticism.
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  49. added 2016-02-05
    Karyn L. Freedman (forthcoming). Quasi-Evidentialism: Interests, Justification and Epistemic Virtue. Episteme:1-14.
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  50. added 2016-02-05
    Kunimasa Sato (forthcoming). A Sensitivity to Good Questions: A Virtue-Based Approach to Questioning. Episteme:1-13.
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