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Epistemology

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  1. added 2014-10-21
    Mikkel Gerken (2014). Outsourced Cognition. Philosophical Issues 24 (1):127-158.
    Recent developments in technologically enabled social cognition call for a rethinking of many aspects of human cognition. According to the hypothesis of extended cognition, we must revise our psychological categories by eliminating allegedly superficial distinctions between internal cognition and external processes. As an alternative to this proposal, I outline a hypothesis of outsourced cognition which seeks to respect distinctions that are operative in both folk psychology and the social and cognitive sciences. According to this hypothesis, the cognitive states and processes (...)
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  2. added 2014-10-21
    Frank J. Hoffman (2013). “Knowledge and Ethics in Early Buddhism” (Zao Qi Fo Jiao Zhong De Dao De). In Li Lian (ed.), Fo Jiao Yu Dang Dai Wen Hua Jian She Xue Shu Yan Tao Hui Lun Wen Ji (The Collected Papers of "Buddhism and Contemporary Cultural Construction" Conference, Xi'an, China). Northwest University Press (Shi Bei Daxue).
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  3. added 2014-10-21
    Frank J. Hoffman (1990). “Zasto se budizam ne moze opovrgnuti?”. “Zasto Se budizKulture Istoka (Beograd, Yugoslavia) (Broj. 23).
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  4. added 2014-10-20
    Italo Testa (2012). Scepsis and Scepticism. In De Laurentis Allegra & Edwards Jeffrey (eds.), The Bloomsbury Companion to Hegel. Bloomsbury/Continuum (2012). Bloomsbury. 273-278.
    Hegel's philosophy aims at responding to the questions raised by modern scepticism concerning the accessibility of the external world, of other minds, and of one's own mind. A key-role in Hegel's argumentative strategy against modern scepticism is played here by Hegel's theory of recognition. Recognition mediates the constitution of individual self-consciousness and intersubjectivity: self-knowledge is not logically independent of the awareness of other minds. At the same time, recognition institutes the possibility of objective reference to the world. In this way, (...)
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  5. added 2014-10-20
    Hilla Jacobson-Horowitz (2010). . Normativity Without Reflectivity: On the Beliefs and Desires of Non-Reflective Creatures. Philosophical Psychology 23:75-93.
    The view (held, e.g., by Davidson) that the having of beliefs and desires presupposes the having of reflective capacities is sometimes supported by appealing to the idea that the concept of belief is a concept of a mental state which involves a normative aspect: beliefs can be “successful” or “unsuccessful” from the perspective of their possessors, and sometimes discarded in light of their “failure.” This naturally invites the idea that believers must be capable of reflecting on their beliefs. Desires presuppose (...)
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  6. added 2014-10-20
    Italo Testa (2010). La natura del riconoscimento. Riconoscimento naturale e autocoscienza sociale in Hegel. Mimesis.
    My research takes as its guiding thread the statement from Hegel's lectures on the philosophy of spirit of 1805-06, that «cognition is recognition[Erkennen ist Anerkennen]». In this perspective I delineate, first, the consequences of this position for Hegel's epistemology, in particular with reference to the question of skepticism. Then, I show in what sense the recognitive conception of knowledge makes it possible for Hegel to comprehend unitarily, on one hand, cognition as exercise of natural capacities and cognition as exercise of (...)
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  7. added 2014-10-16
    Theodore J. Everett (forthcoming). Peer Disagreement and Two Principles of Rational Belief. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-14.
    This paper presents a new solution to the problem of peer disagreement that distinguishes two principles of rational belief, here called probability and autonomy. When we discover that we disagree with peers, there is one sense in which we rationally ought to suspend belief, and another in which we rationally ought to retain our original belief. In the first sense, we aim to believe what is most probably true according to our total evidence, including testimony from peers and authorities. In (...)
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  8. added 2014-10-15
    Peter L. Samuelson, Matthew J. Jarvinen, Thomas B. Paulus, Ian M. Church, Sam A. Hardy & Justin L. Barrett (forthcoming). Implicit Theories of Intellectual Virtues and Vices: A Focus on Intellectual Humility. Journal of Positive Psychology.
    The study of intellectual humility is still in its early stages and issues of definition and measurement are only now being explored. To inform and guide the process of defining and measuring this important intellectual virtue, we conducted a series of studies into the implicit theory – or ‘folk’ understanding – of an intellectually humble person, a wise person, and an intellectually arrogant person. In Study 1, 350 adults used a free-listing procedure to generate a list of descriptors, one for (...)
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  9. added 2014-10-14
    Moti Mizrahi (forthcoming). Three Arguments Against the Expertise Defense. Metaphilosophy.
    Experimental philosophers have challenged friends of the expertise defense to show that (a) the intuitive judgments of professional philosophers are different from the intuitive judgments of non-philosophers, and (b) the intuitive judgments of professional philosophers are better than the intuitive judgments of non-philosophers, in ways that are relevant to the truth or falsity of such judgments. Friends of the expertise defense have responded by arguing that the burden of proof lies with experimental philosophers. In this paper, I sketch three arguments (...)
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  10. added 2014-10-13
    Timothy Lane & Georg Northoff (forthcoming). Is Depressive Rumination Rational? In T. W. Hung (ed.), Reason and Rationality. Elsevier.
    Most mental disorders affect only a small segment of the population. On the reasonable assumption that minds or brains are prone to occasional malfunction, these disorders do not seem to pose distinctive explanatory problems. Depression, however, because it is so prevalent and costly, poses a conundrum that some try to explain by characterizing it as an adaptation—a trait that exists because it performed fitness-enhancing functions in ancestral populations. Heretofore, proposed evolutionary explanations of depression did not focus on thought processes; instead, (...)
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  11. added 2014-10-11
    Helen De Cruz (2014). Where Philosophical Intuitions Come From. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-17.
    Intuitions play a central role in analytic philosophy, but their psychological basis is little understood. This paper provides an empirically-informed, psychological char- acterization of philosophical intuitions. Drawing on McCauley’s distinction between maturational and practiced naturalness, I argue that philosophical intuitions originate from several early-developed, specialized domains of core knowledge (maturational naturalness). Eliciting and deploying such intuitions in argumentative contexts is the domain of philosophical expertise, thus philosophical intuitions are also practiced nat- ural. This characterization has implications for the evidential value (...)
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  12. added 2014-10-09
    Matthew A. Benton (2014). Knowledge Norms. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy:0-00.
    Encyclopedia entry covering the growing literature on the Knowledge Norm of Assertion (and its rivals), the Knowledge Norm of Action (and pragmatic encroachment), the Knowledge Norm of Belief, and the Knowledge Norm of Disagreement.
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  13. added 2014-10-09
    Steven D. Hales & Jennifer Adrienne Johnson (2014). Luck Attributions and Cognitive Bias. Metaphilosophy 45 (4-5):509-528.
    Philosophers have developed three theories of luck: the probability theory, the modal theory, and the control theory. To help assess these theories, we conducted an empirical investigation of luck attributions. We created eight putative luck scenarios and framed each in either a positive or a negative light. Furthermore, we placed the critical luck event at the beginning, middle, or end of the scenario to see if the location of the event influenced luck attributions. We found that attributions of luckiness were (...)
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  14. added 2014-10-07
    Matthew A. Benton, John Hawthorne & Yoaav Isaacs (forthcoming). Evil and Evidence. Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion.
    The problem of evil is the most prominent argument against the existence of God. Skeptical theists contend that it is not a good argument. Their reasons for this contention vary widely, involving such notions as CORNEA, epistemic appearances, 'gratuitous' evils, 'levering' evidence, and the representativeness of goods. We aim to clarify some confusions about these notions, and also to offer a few new responses to the problem of evil.
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  15. added 2014-10-06
    Rik Peels (forthcoming). Believing at Will Is Possible. Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
    There are convincing counter-examples to the widely accepted thesis that we cannot believe at will. For, it seems possible that the truth of a proposition depend on whether or not one believes it. I call such scenarios cases of Truth Depends on Belief (TDB) and argue that they meet the main criteria for believing at will that we find in the literature. I reply to five objections that one might level against the thesis that TDB cases show that believing at (...)
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  16. added 2014-10-03
    Adam Elga & Agustin Rayo, Fragmentation and Information Access.
    In order to predict and explain behavior, one cannot specify the mental state of an agent merely by saying what information she possesses. Instead one must specify what information is available to an agent relative to various purposes. Specifying mental states in this way allows us to accommodate cases of imperfect recall, cognitive accomplishments involved in logical deduction, the mental states of confused or fragmented subjects, and the difference between propositional knowledge and know-how .
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  17. added 2014-10-01
    Anil Gomes (forthcoming). Skepticism About Other Minds. In Diego Machuca & Baron Reed (eds.), Skepticism: From Antiquity to the Present. Bloomsbury.
    In this paper I distinguish two ways of raising a sceptical problem of others' minds: via a problem concerning the possibility of error or via a problem concerning sources of knowledge. I give some reason to think that the second problem raises a more interesting problem in accounting for our knowledge of others’ minds and consider proposed solutions to the problem.
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  18. added 2014-09-30
    Howard Sankey (forthcoming). Scepticism, Relativism and a Naturalistic Particularism. Social Epistemology.
    This paper presents a particularist and naturalist response to epistemic relativism. The response is based on an analysis of the source of epistemic relativism, according to which epistemic relativism is closely related to Pyrrhonian scepticism. The paper starts with a characterization of epistemic relativism. Such relativism is explicitly distinguished from epistemological contextualism. Next the paper presents an argument for epistemic relativism that is based on the Pyrrhonian problem of the criterion. It then considers a response to the problem of the (...)
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  19. added 2014-09-29
    Alison Bailey, The Unlevel Knowing Field: An Engagement with Kristie Dotson's Third-Order Epistemic Oppression. Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 3, No. 10.
    My engagement with Dotson’s essay begins with an overview of first- and second-order epistemic exclusions. I develop the concept of an "unlevel knowing field." I use examples from the epistemic injustice literature, and some of my own, to highlight the important distinction she makes between reducible and irreducible forms of epistemic oppression. Next, I turn my attention to her account of third-order epistemic exclusions. I offer a brief explanation of why her sketch of at this level makes an important contribution (...)
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  20. added 2014-09-28
    Elijah Chudnoff (forthcoming). Moral Perception: High-Level Perception or Low-Level Intuition? In Thiemo Breyer & Christopher Gutland (eds.), Phenomenology of Thinking.
    Here are four examples of “seeing.” You see that something green is wriggling. You see that an iguana is in distress. You see that someone is wrongfully harming an iguana. You see that torturing animals is wrong. The first is an example of low-level perception. You visually represent color and motion. The second is an example of high-level perception. You visually represent kind properties and mental properties. The third is an example of moral perception. You have an impression of moral (...)
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  21. added 2014-09-26
    Martin Smith (forthcoming). Evidential Incomparability and the Principle of Indifference. Erkenntnis:1-12.
    The Principle of Indifference (POI) was once regarded as a linchpin of probabilistic reasoning, but has now fallen into disrepute as a result of the so-called problem of multiple of partitions. In ‘Evidential symmetry and mushy credence’ Roger White suggests that we have been too quick to jettison this principle and argues that the problem of multiple partitions rests on a mistake. In this paper I will criticise White’s attempt to revive POI. In so doing, I will argue that what (...)
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  22. added 2014-09-26
    Paul Faulkner (2014). The Moral Obligations of Trust. :1-14.
    The moral obligations of trust. . ???aop.label???. doi: 10.1080/13869795.2014.942228.
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  23. added 2014-09-25
    Spencer Phillips Hey (forthcoming). Robust and Discordant Evidence: Methodological Lessons From Clinical Research. Philosophy of Science 2014.
    The concordance of results that are “robust” across multiple scientific modalities is widely considered to play a critical role in the epistemology of science. But what should we make of those cases where such multi-modal evidence is discordant? Stegenga (2012) has recently argued that robustness is “worse than useless” in these cases, and suggests that “different kinds of evidence cannot be combined in a coherent way.” In this essay, I respond to this critique and illustrate the critical methodological role that (...)
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  24. added 2014-09-23
    Gregory Wheeler (2014). Defeat Reconsidered and Repaired. The Reasoner 8 (2):15-15.
  25. added 2014-09-21
    Moti Mizrahi (2014). Phenomenal Conservatism and Self-Defeat Arguments: A Reply to Huemer. Logos and Episteme 5 (3):343-350.
    In this paper, I respond to Michael Huemer’s reply to my objection against Phenomenal Conservatism (PC). I have argued that Huemer’s Self-defeat Argument for PC does not favor PC over competing theories of basic propositional justification, since analogous self-defeat arguments can be constructed for competing theories. Huemer responds that such analogous self-defeat arguments are unsound. In this paper, I argue that Huemer’s reply does not save his Self-defeat Argument for PC from my original objection.
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  26. added 2014-09-20
    Lisa Warenski (2014). When Is True Belief Knowledge? By Richard Foley. [REVIEW] Mind 123 (491):894-98.
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  27. added 2014-09-20
    Moritz Cordes & Friedrich Reinmuth, Ein Redehandlungskalkül: Folgern in einer Sprache. XXII. Deutscher Kongress für Philosophie.
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  28. added 2014-09-20
    Moritz Cordes, Jens Glatzer, Friedrich Reinmuth & Geo Siegwart (2010). Deduktive Begründung. Zu einem Explikationsvorschlag von Reinhard Kleinknecht. Conceptus. Zeitschrift Fur Philosophie Salzburg 39 (95):31-60.
    In his paper "Deduktive Begründung und deduktive Ableitung" Reinhard Kleinknecht offers an explication of the concepts of deduetive reason and deductive argument respectively. To this end, he provides seven conditions that he sees as individually necessary and jointly sufficient for being a deductive reason. We argue that some of his conditions are far too restrictive and that his concept of deductive argument is therefore to narrow to capture the usual practice of deductively establishing propositions as true. We also show that (...)
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  29. added 2014-09-18
    Friedrich Reinmuth (2014). Logische Rekonstruktion. Ein hermeneutischer Traktat. Dissertation, University of Greifswald
    The thesis aims at a methodological reflection of logical reconstruction and tries to develop this method in detail, especially with regard to the reconstruction of natural language arguments. First, the groundwork for the thesis is laid by presenting and, where necessary, adapting its foundations with regard to the philosophy of language and the theory of argument. Subsequently, logical reconstruction, especially the logical reconstruction of arguments, is presented as a hermeneutic method and as a tool for the application of (formal) logic (...)
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  30. added 2014-09-17
    Weng Hong Tang (forthcoming). Reliability Theories of Justified Credence. Mind.
    Reliabilists hold that a belief is doxastically justified if and only if it is caused by a reliable process. But since such a process is one that tends to produce a high ratio of true to false beliefs, reliabilism is on the face of it applicable to binary beliefs, but not to degrees of confidence or credences. For while (binary) beliefs admit of truth or falsity, the same cannot be said of credences in general. A natural question now arises: can (...)
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  31. added 2014-09-15
    Gunnar Björnsson (forthcoming). Disagreement, Correctness, and the Evidence for Metaethical Absolutism. In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics. Oxford.
    Metaethical absolutism is the view that moral concepts have non-relative satisfaction conditions that are constant across judges and their particular beliefs, attitudes, and cultural embedding. If it is correct, there is an important sense in which parties of moral disputes are concerned to get the same things right, such that their disputes can be settled by the facts. If it is not correct, as various forms of relativism and non-cognitivism imply, such coordination of concerns will be limited. The most influential (...)
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  32. added 2014-09-12
    James Andow (forthcoming). A Semantic Solution to the Problem with Aesthetic Testimony. Acta Analytica:1-8.
    There is something peculiar about aesthetic testimony. It seems more difficult to gain knowledge of aesthetic properties based solely upon aesthetic testimony than it is in the case of other types of property. In this paper, I argue that we can provide an adequate explanation at the level of the semantics of aesthetic language, without defending any substantive thesis in epistemology or about aesthetic value/judgement. If aesthetic predicates are given a non-invariantist semantics, we can explain the supposed peculiar difficulty with (...)
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  33. added 2014-09-12
    Stephen Wright (2014). Sincerity and Transmission. Ratio 27 (3).
    According to some theories of testimonial knowledge, testimony can allow you, as a knowing speaker, to transmit your knowledge to me. A question in the epistemology of testimony concerns whether or not the acquisition of testimonial knowledge depends on the speaker's testimony being sincere. In this paper, I outline two notions of sincerity and argue that, construed in a certain way, transmission theorists should endorse the claim that the acquisition of testimonial knowledge requires sincerity.
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  34. added 2014-09-10
    Annabelle Lever (forthcoming). Democracy and Folk Eistemology: A Reply to Talisse. Critical Review of Social and Political Philosophy.
    According to Robert Talisse, ‘we have sufficient epistemological reasons to be democrats’ and these reasons support democracy even when we are tempted to doubt the legitimacy of democratic government. As epistemic agents, we care about the truth of our beliefs, and have reasons to want to live in an environment conducive to forming and acting on true, rather than false, beliefs. Democracy, Talisse argues, is the best means to provide such an environment. Hence, he concludes that epistemic agency, correctly understood, (...)
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  35. added 2014-09-10
    Timothy Lane & Owen Flanagan (forthcoming). Neuroexistentialism, Eudaimonics, and Positive Illusions. In Byron Kaldis (ed.), Mind and Society: Cognitive Science Meets the Philosophy of the Social Sciences. SYNTHESE Philosophy Library Studies in Epistemology, Logic, Methodology, & Philosophy of Science. Springer Science+Business.
    There is a distinctive form of existential anxiety, neuroexistential anxiety, which derives from the way in which contemporary neuroscience provides copious amounts of evidence to underscore the Darwinian message—we are animals, nothing more. One response to this 21st century existentialism is to promote Eudaimonics, a version of ethical naturalism that is committed to promoting fruitful interaction between ethical inquiry and science, most notably psychology and neuroscience. We argue that philosophical reflection on human nature and social life reveals that while working (...)
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  36. added 2014-09-09
    Selim Berker, Coherentism Via Graphs.
    Once upon a time, coherentism was the dominant response to the regress problem in epistemology, but in recent decades the view has fallen into disrepute: now almost everyone is a foundationalist (with a few infinitists sprinkled here and there). In this paper, I sketch a new way of thinking about coherentism, and show how it avoids many of the problems often thought fatal for the view, including the isolation objection, worries over circularity, and concerns that the concept of coherence is (...)
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  37. added 2014-09-07
    Peter Blouw, Wesley Buckwalter & John Turri, Gettier Cases: A Taxonomy.
    The term “Gettier Case” is a technical term frequently applied to a wide array of thought experiments in contemporary epistemology. What do these cases have in common? It is said that they all involve a justified true belief which, intuitively, is not knowledge, due to a form of luck called “Gettiering.” While this very broad characterization suffices for some purposes, it masks radical diversity. We argue that the extent of this diversity merits abandoning the notion of a “Gettier case” in (...)
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  38. added 2014-09-06
    Clayton Littlejohn, Stop Making Sense? A Puzzle About Epistemic Rationality.
    In this paper, I discuss a puzzle about epistemic rationality. It seems plausible that it's rational to believe a proposition if you have sufficient evidential support for it. It seems plausible that our first-order and higher-order attitudes ought to match. It seems rather unfortunate that these two claims are in tension with one another. I'll look at three ways of trying to resolve this tension and argue that the best way to do this is to accept the controversial fixed-point thesis (...)
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  39. added 2014-09-06
    Brian Kim (forthcoming). The Locality and Globality of Instrumental Rationality: The Normative Significance of Preference Reversals. Synthese.
    When we ask a decision maker to express her preferences, it is typically assumed that we are eliciting a pre-existing set of preferences. However, empirical research has suggested that our preferences are often constructed on the fly for the decision problem at hand. This paper explores the ramifications of this empirical research for our understanding of instrumental rationality. First, I argue that these results pose serious challenges for the traditional decision-theoretic view of instrumental rationality, which demands global coherence amongst all (...)
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  40. added 2014-09-06
    Michael Baurmann (2014). Meinungsdynamiken in fundamentalistischen Gruppen: Erklärungshypothesen auf der Basis von Simulationsmodellen. Analyse Und Kritik 36:61-102.
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  41. added 2014-09-06
    Gregor Betz, Michael Baurmann & Rainer Cramm (2013). Is Epistemic Trust of Veritistic Value? Ethics and Politics 15:25-41.
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  42. added 2014-09-04
    Laureano Luna (forthcoming). Minds Vs. Machines. On Saka's Basic Blindspot Theorem. Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence.
    Under the name of ‘Basic Blindspot Theorem’, Paul Saka has proposed in the special issue on mind and paradox of this journal a Gödelian argument to the effect that no cognitive system can be complete and correct. We show that while the argument is successful as regards mechanical and formal systems, it may fail with respect to minds, so contributing to draw a boundary between the former and the latter. The existence of such a boundary may lend support to Saka’s (...)
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  43. added 2014-09-03
    Thomas Mulligan (forthcoming). Disagreement, Peerhood, and Three Paradoxes of Conciliationism. Synthese:1-12.
    Conciliatory theories of disagreement require that one lower one’s confidence in a belief in the face of disagreement from an epistemic peer. One question about which people might disagree is who should qualify as an epistemic peer and who should not. But when putative epistemic peers disagree about epistemic peerhood itself, then Conciliationism makes contradictory demands and paradoxes arise.
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  44. added 2014-09-03
    Clayton Littlejohn (forthcoming). Pritchard's Reasons. Journal of Philosophical Research.
    My contribution to the author meets critics discussion of Pritchard's _Epistemological Disjunctivism_. In this paper, I examine some of the possible motivations for epistemological disjunctivism and look at some of the costs associated with the view. While Pritchard's view seems to be that our visual beliefs constitute knowledge because they're based on reasons, I argue that the claim that visual beliefs are based on reasons or evidence hasn't been sufficiently motivated. In the end I suggest that we'll get all the (...)
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  45. added 2014-09-02
    T. Parent, The Empirical Case Against Infallibilism.
    Philosophers and psychologists generally hold that, in light of the empirical data, a subject lacks infallible access to her own mental states. However, while subjects certainly are fallible in some ways, I show that the data fails to discredit that a subject has infallible access to her own occurrent thoughts and judgments. This is argued, first, by revisiting the empirical studies, and carefully scrutinizing what is shown exactly. Second, I argue that if the data were interpreted to rule out all (...)
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  46. added 2014-09-02
    T. Parent, Neo-Sellarsian Metaphilosophy.
    Science often conflicts with our everyday experience. For instance, we typically assume the existence of agency, norms, etc.—yet such things are absent from scientific theory. For Sellars, philosophy’s aim is to resolve these discrepancies between the “manifest” and “scientific” images. However, some might protest that philosophers should not “negotiate” ontology with science—the scientific image should instead claim hegemony. I defend the Sellarsian by arguing that we are simply unable to jettison central parts of the “manifest image.” That is so, even (...)
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  47. added 2014-09-02
    Kenneth Boyd (forthcoming). Assertion, Practical Reasoning, and Epistemic Separabilism. Philosophical Studies:1-21.
    I argue here for a view I call epistemic separabilism (ES), which states that there are two different ways we can be evaluated epistemically when we assert a proposition or treat a proposition as a reason for acting: one in terms of whether we have adhered to or violated the relevant epistemic norm, and another in terms of how epistemically well-positioned we are towards the fact that we have either adhered to or violated said norm. ES has been appealed to (...)
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  48. added 2014-09-02
    Moti Mizrahi (2014). Are Seemings Trustworthy? A Reply to Piazza. The Reasoner 8 (9):100-101.
    I reply to Piazza's objection to my reductio against phenomenal conservatism.
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  49. added 2014-09-02
    Aidan McGlynn (2014). Knowledge FIrst? Palgrave Macmillian.
    According to a tradition reaching back to Plato, questions about the nature of knowledge are to be answered by offering an analysis in terms of truth, belief, justification, and other factors presumed to be in some sense more basic than knowledge itself. In light of the apparent failure of this approach, knowledge first philosophy instead takes knowledge as the starting point in epistemology and related areas of the philosophies of language and mind. Knowledge cannot be analyzed in the traditional sense, (...)
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  50. added 2014-09-02
    Aidan McGlynn (2014). On Epistemic Alchemy. In Dylan Dodd Elia Zardini (ed.), Scepticism and Perceptual Justification. Oxford University Press. 173-189.
    Crispin Wright has proposed that one has entitlements to accept certain propositions that play a foundational role within one’s body of belief. Such an entitlement is a kind of warrant that does not require the possessor to have acquired evidence speaking in favor of the proposition in question. The proposal allows Wright to concede much of the force of the most powerful arguments for scepticism, while avoiding the truly sceptical conclusion that one lacks warrant for most of one’s beliefs. Here (...)
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