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Epistemology

Edited by Matthew McGrath (University of Missouri, Columbia)
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  1. added 2015-05-04
    Andrew Reisner (forthcoming). Pragmatic Reasons for Belief. In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Normativity and Reasons. Oxford University Press.
    This is a discussion of the state of discussion on pragmatic reasons for belief.
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  2. added 2015-05-03
    Gerhard F. Nuffer (2004). Information, Belief, and Possibility. Dissertation, University of Michigan
    According to a plausible picture of information, to acquire information is to rule out possibilities. What is the nature of these possibilities? The most natural answer---that they are possible states of the world---seems to be refuted by the existence of informative truths that are necessary, and so don't rule out any real possibilities. This seems to show that informational contents cannot be identified with the real possibilities they eliminate. Real possibilities, it seems, are too coarse-grained to do the work of (...)
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  3. added 2015-04-29
    P. Roger Turner (forthcoming). More On Religious Exclusivism: A Reply to Richard Feldman. Faith and Philosophy.
    In his “Plantinga on Exclusivisim,” Richard Feldman argues that Alvin Plantinga, in an earlier paper, has not sufficiently addressed a particular problem for the religious exclusivist. The particular problem that Feldman thinks Plantinga has failed sufficiently to address is the problem of epistemic peer disagreement—that is, disagreement between two (or more) equally competent thinkers who share equally good reasons for, and are in equally good epistemic situations regarding, their contradictory beliefs—in matters of religious belief. To demonstrate that Plantinga has so (...)
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  4. added 2015-04-28
    Susanna Schellenberg (forthcoming). Phenomenal Evidence and Factive Evidence. Philosophical Studies.
  5. added 2015-04-27
    Kevin Reuter, Lara Kirfel, Raphael van Riel & Luca Barlassina (2014). The Good, the Bad, and the Timely: How Temporal Order and Moral Judgment Influence Causal Selection. Frontiers in Psychology 5:1-10.
    Causal selection is the cognitive process through which one or more elements in a complex causal structure are singled out as actual causes of a certain effect. In this paper, we report on an experiment in which we investigated the role of moral and temporal factors in causal selection. Our results are as follows. First, when presented with a temporal chain in which two human agents perform the same action one after the other, subjects tend to judge the later agent (...)
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  6. added 2015-04-26
    Boaz Miller (forthcoming). “Trust Me—I’M a Public Intellectual”: Margaret Atwood’s and David Suzuki’s Social Epistemologies of Climate Science. In Michael Keren & Richard Hawkins‎ (eds.), Speaking Power to Truth: Knowledge and the Public Intellectual in a Changing World‎. Athabasca University Press‎.
    Margaret Atwood and David Suzuki are two of the most prominent Canadian public ‎intellectuals ‎involved in the global warming debate. They both argue that anthropogenic global ‎warming is ‎occurring, warn against its grave consequences, and urge governments and the ‎public to take ‎immediate, decisive, extensive, and profound measures to prevent it. They differ, ‎however, in the ‎reasons and evidence they provide in support of their position. While Suzuki ‎stresses the scientific ‎evidence in favour of the global warming theory and the (...)
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  7. added 2015-04-25
    Allan Hazlett (2014). A Critical Introduction to Skepticism. Bloomsbury.
    Skepticism remains a central and defining issue in epistemology, and in the wider tradition of Western philosophy. To better understand the contemporary position of this important philosophical subject, Allan Hazlett introduces a range of topics, including: -/- • Ancient skepticism • skeptical arguments in the work of Hume and Descartes • Cartesian skepticism in contemporary epistemology • anti-skeptical strategies, including Mooreanism, nonclosure, and contextualism • additional varieties of skepticism • the practical consequences of Cartesian skepticism -/- Presenting a comprehensive survey (...)
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  8. added 2015-04-25
    Crispin Wright (1991). Scepticism and Dreaming: Imploding the Demon. Mind 100 (1):87-116.
  9. added 2015-04-24
    J. ComesaÑa (2009). Seguridad y sueños en la epistemología de Sosa. Teorema 28 (1).
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  10. added 2015-04-22
    Logan Paul Gage (forthcoming). Phenomenal Conservatism and the Subject's Perspective Objection. Acta Analytica.
    For some years now, Michael Bergmann has urged a dilemma against internalist theories of epistemic justification. For reasons I explain below, some epistemologists have thought that perhaps Michael Huemer’s principle of Phenomenal Conservatism (PC) can split the horns of Bergmann’s Dilemma. Bergmann has recently argued, however, that PC must inevitably, like all other internalist views, fall prey to his dilemma. In this paper, I explain the nature of Bergmann’s Dilemma and his reasons for thinking PC cannot escape it before arguing (...)
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  11. added 2015-04-21
    Evert W. Beth (1960). Observations au sujet du raisonnement indirect. Logique Et Analyse 3 (11):166.
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  12. added 2015-04-20
    Ian M. Church (forthcoming). 50 Years of Gettier: A New Direction in Religious Epistemology? Journal of Analytic Theology.
    In this paper, I lend credence to the move toward non-reductive religious epistemology by highlighting the systematic failings of Alvin Plantinga’s seminal, religious epistemology when it comes to surmounting the Gettier Problem. Taking Plantinga’s account as archetypal, I argue that we have systematic reasons to believe that no reductive theory of knowledge (religious or otherwise) can viably surmount the Gettier Problem, that the future of religious epistemology lies in non-reductive models of knowledge.
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  13. added 2015-04-20
    David Christensen (2014). Disagreement and Public Controversy. In Jennifer Lackey (ed.), Essays in Collective Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
    One of Mill’s main arguments for free speech springs from taking disagreement as an epistemically valuable resource for fallible thinkers. Contemporary conciliationist treatments of disagreement spring from the same motivation, but end up seeing the epistemic implications of disagreement quite differently. Conciliationism also encounters complexities when transposed from the 2-person toy examples featured in the literature to the public disagreements among groups that give the issue much of its urgency. Group disagreements turn out to be in some ways more powerful (...)
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  14. added 2015-04-20
    J. J. Acero (2011). Cuestiones de teoría del conocimiento. [REVIEW] Teorema 30 (2).
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  15. added 2015-04-20
    David Evans (1993). Christopher Hookway "Scepticism". International Journal of Philosophical Studies:366.
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  16. added 2015-04-20
    David Berlinski (1990). Knowing, Knowledge, Known. Logique Et Analyse 33 (29):3.
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  17. added 2015-04-18
    Scott Stapleford (2015). Epistemic Value Monism and the Swamping Problem. Ratio 28 (2).
    Many deontologists explain the epistemic value of justification in terms of its instrumental role in promoting truth – the original source of value in the epistemic domain. The swamping problem for truth monism appears to make this position indefensible, at least for those monists who maintain the superiority of knowledge to merely true belief. I propose a new solution to the swamping problem that allows monists to maintain the greater epistemic value of knowledge over merely true belief. My trick is (...)
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  18. added 2015-04-18
    K. Ajdukiewicz (1959). La notion de rationalité des méthodes d'inférence faillibles. Logique Et Analyse 2 (5):3.
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  19. added 2015-04-17
    Dennis Whitcomb, Heather Battaly, Jason Baehr & Daniel Howard-Snyder, Intellectual Humility: Owning Our Limitations.
    What is intellectual humility? In this essay, we aim to answer this question by (i) assessing several contemporary accounts of intellectual humility, (ii) developing our own account, (iii) offering two reasons for our account, and (iv) meeting two objections and solving one puzzle.
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  20. added 2015-04-17
    Hilary Kornblith (forthcoming). The Role of Reasons in Epistemology. Episteme:1-15.
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  21. added 2015-04-14
    Jeremy Fantl (forthcoming). Human Knowledge/Human Knowers: Comments on Michael Williams' “What's so Special About Human Knowledge? Episteme:1-5.
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  22. added 2015-04-14
    Liran Shia Gordon (2015). Reconstructing Aquinas's Process of Abstraction. Heythrop Journal 56 (3):n/a-n/a.
    Aquinas’s process of abstraction of the particular thing into a universal concept is of pivotal importance for grounding his philosophy and theology in a natural framework. Much has been said and written regarding Aquinas’s doctrine of abstraction, yet recent studies still consider it to be ‘nothing more than a kind of magic.’ This problematic claim is not without foundation, for in trying to understand exactly how this process works, we are constantly faced with an unbridgeable abyss and the repeated vague (...)
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  23. added 2015-04-13
    Richard Bosley (1993). On Knowing That One Knows the Logic of Skepticism and Theory.
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  24. added 2015-04-13
    Michael A. Bishop (1990). Naturalizing the Philosophy of Science. Dissertation, University of California, San Diego
    Normative apriorist philosophers of science build purely normative a priori reconstructions of science, whereas descriptive naturalists eliminate the normative elements of the philosophy of science in favor of purely descriptive endeavors. I hope to exhibit the virtues of an alternative approach that appreciates both the normative and the natural in the philosophy of science. ;Theory ladenness. Some philosophers claim that a plausible view about how our visual systems work either undermines or facilitates our ability to rationally adjudicate between competing theories (...)
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  25. added 2015-04-13
    Lorraine Code (1988). Alvin I. Goldman, Epistemology and Cognition. [REVIEW] Philosophy in Review 8:398-401.
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  26. added 2015-04-12
    Bryan Frances (forthcoming). Rationally Held 'P, but I Fully Believe ~P and I Am Not Equivocating'. Philosophical Studies:1-5.
    One of Moore’s Paradoxical sentence types is ‘P, but I believe ~P’. Mooreans have assumed that all tokens of that sentence type are absurd in some way: epistemically, pragmatically, semantically, or assertively. And then they proceed to debate what the absurdity really is. I argue that if one has the appropriate philosophical views, then one can rationally assert tokens of that sentence type, and one can be epistemically reasonable in the corresponding belief as well.
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  27. added 2015-04-12
    Laurence Bonjour (1985). Paul Ziff, Epistemic Analysis: A Coherence Theory of Knowledge. [REVIEW] Philosophy in Review 5:410-412.
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  28. added 2015-04-12
    Ballard Ballard (1949). ERKMEISTER'S The Basis and Structure of Knowledge. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 10:140.
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  29. added 2015-04-11
    Jeremy Fantl (2013). A Defense of Dogmatism. Oxford Studies in Epistemology 4:34-57.
    Dogmatism is the view that it is often legitimate to flatly dismiss counterarguments to a belief: your belief can count as knowledge even if you can’t figure out what’s wrong with the counterargument. Hume defended a version of dogmatism restricted to testimony in favor of miracles. Moore defended a dogmatism restricted to arguments for skepticism. In this paper it is argued that Hume’s and Moore’s dogmatisms should be generalized to all controversial matters. Dogmatism about controversial matters is true if you (...)
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  30. added 2015-04-10
    Alex Worsnip (forthcoming). Possibly False Knowledge. Journal of Philosophy.
    Many epistemologists call themselves ‘fallibilists’. But many philosophers of language hold that the meaning of epistemic usages of ‘possible’ ensures a close knowledge-(epistemic) possibility link (KPL): a subject’s utterance of ‘it’s possible that not-p’ is true only if the subject does not know that p. This seems to suggest that whatever the core insight behind fallibilism is, it can’t be that a subject could have knowledge which is, for them, possibly false. I argue that, on the contrary, subjects can have (...)
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  31. added 2015-04-10
    Max Baker-Hytch & Matthew A. Benton (forthcoming). Defeatism Defeated. Philosophical Perspectives.
    Many epistemologists are enamored with a defeat condition on knowledge. In this paper we present some implementation problems for defeatism, understood along either internalist or externalist lines. We then propose that one who accepts a knowledge norm of belief, according to which one ought to believe only what one knows, can explain away much of the motivation for defeatism. This is an important result, because on the one hand it respects the plausibility of the intuitions about defeat shared by many (...)
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  32. added 2015-04-09
    Samuel A. Taylor (forthcoming). What Seemings Seem to Be. Episteme.
    According to Phenomenal Conservatism (PC), if it seems to a subject S that P, S thereby has some degree of (defeasible) justification for believing P. But what is it for P to seem true? Answering this question is vital for assessing what role (if any) such states can play. Many have appeared to adopt a kind of non-reductionism that construes seemings as intentional states which cannot be reduced to more familiar mental states like beliefs or sensations. In this paper I (...)
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  33. added 2015-04-08
    Facundo M. Alonso (forthcoming). Reasons for Reliance. Ethics.
    Philosophers have in general offered only a partial view of the normative grounds of reliance. Some maintain that either one of evidence or of pragmatic considerations has a normative bearing on reliance, but are silent about whether the other kind of consideration has such a bearing on it as well. Others assert that both kinds of considerations have a normative bearing on reliance, but sidestep the question of what their relative normative bearing is. My aim in this article is to (...)
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  34. added 2015-04-08
    David Löwenstein (2015). Analoge Argumente und Analogieargumente. In Anna Wehofsits, David Löwenstein, Dirk Koppelberg & Gregor Betz (eds.), Weiter Denken - Über Philosophie, Wissenschaft Und Religion. De Gruyter. 105-124.
    Analogien lassen sich aus unserem vernünftigen Nachdenken und Argumentieren kaum wegdenken. Ganz zurecht stellen sie eines der klassischen Themen der Argumentationstheorie dar. Doch wie genau sollte die argumentative Rolle von Analogien in Argumentrekonstruktionen dargestellt werden? Das ist die Leitfrage dieses Beitrags. Zunächst wird mit Michael Dummetts Schach-Analogie ein prominentes Beispiel dargestellt und eine genauere Charakterisierung des Analogiebegriffs vorgeschlagen. Danach wird die gängigste Rekonstruktionsform von Analogien diskutiert, das Analogieargument, und in einigen Punkten verfeinert. Vor diesem Hintergrund schlägt der Beitrag eine zweite, (...)
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  35. added 2015-04-08
    Matthew Congdon (2015). Epistemic Injustice in the Space of Reasons. Episteme 12 (1):75-93.
    In this paper, I make explicit some implicit commitments to realism and conceptualism in recent work in social epistemology exemplified by Miranda Fricker and Charles Mills. I offer a survey of recent writings at the intersection of social epistemology, feminism, and critical race theory, showing that commitments to realism and conceptualism are at once implied yet undertheorized in the existing literature. I go on to offer an explicit defense of these commitments by drawing from the epistemological framework of John McDowell, (...)
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  36. added 2015-04-07
    Neil McDonnell, The Deviance in Deviant Causal Chains.
    Causal theories of action, perception and knowledge are each beset by problems of so-called ‘deviant’ causal chains. For each such theory, counterexamples are formed using odd or co-incidental causal chains to establish that the theory is committed to unpalatable claims about some intentional action, about a case of veridical perception or about the acquisition of genuine knowledge. In this paper I will argue that three well-known examples of a deviant causal chain have something in common: they each violate Yablos proportionality (...)
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  37. added 2015-04-07
    Moti Mizrahi (forthcoming). A Theory of Argumentation. [REVIEW] Metascience:1-4.
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  38. added 2015-04-06
    Richard Raatzsch (unknown). A Note On Knowing And Having Thought To Know. Conceptus 91:33-40.
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  39. added 2015-04-06
    Joe Milburn (forthcoming). Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology as Religious Epistemology: A Response to Bobier. Philosophia:1-8.
    In a recent paper, Christopher Bobier has argued that Duncan Pritchard’s Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology cannot account for knowledge that we have through Divine Revelation. This gives philosophers who believe that Divine Revelation can be source of knowledge reason to reject ALVE. Bobier’s arguments are specifically against ALVE, but they serve as arguments against all sorts of virtue epistemologies. In this paper then, I will critically examine Bobier’s argument, and contend that virtue epistemologies are compatible with knowledge through Divine Revelation.
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  40. added 2015-04-06
    T. Boyer, C. Mayo-Wilson & M. Weisberg (eds.) (forthcoming). Scientific Collaboration and Collective Knowledge.
  41. added 2015-04-06
    Jason Megill (forthcoming). Fitch’s Paradox and the Existence of an Omniscient Being. In Miroslaw Szatkowski (ed.), God, Truth and Other Enigmas. 77 – 91.
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  42. added 2015-04-06
    Joshua Stuchlik (forthcoming). Epistemological Disjunctivism and Easy Knowledge. Synthese:1-19.
    Stewart Cohen argues that basic knowledge is problematic, as it implies that subjects can acquire knowledge or justified beliefs about certain matters in ways that are supposedly too easy. Cohen raises two versions of the problem of easy knowledge, one involving the principle of closure and the other track-record style bootstrapping reasoning. In this paper I confront the problem of easy knowledge from the perspective of epistemological disjunctivism about perception. I argue that disjunctivism can do a better job than dogmatism (...)
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  43. added 2015-04-06
    Michael Brady & Miranda Fricker (eds.) (forthcoming). The Epistemic Life of Groups.
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  44. added 2015-04-06
    Michael Bergmann & Brett Brett Coppenger (eds.) (forthcoming). Traditional Epistemic Internalism. Oxford University Press.
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  45. added 2015-04-06
    Peter Baumann (forthcoming). Epistemic Contrastivism, Knowledge and Practical Reasoning. Erkenntnis:1-10.
    Epistemic contrastivism is the view that knowledge is a ternary relation between a person, a proposition and a set of contrast propositions. This view is in tension with widely shared accounts of practical reasoning: be it the claim that knowledge of the premises is necessary for acceptable practical reasoning based on them or sufficient for the acceptability of the use of the premises in practical reasoning, or be it the claim that there is a looser connection between knowledge and practical (...)
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  46. added 2015-04-06
    Pierre Le Morvan (forthcoming). On the Ignorance, Knowledge, and Nature of Propositions. Synthese:1-16.
    Deploying distinctions between ignorance of \ and ignorance that \ , and between knowledge of \ and knowledge that \ , I address a question that has hitherto received little attention, namely: what is it to have knowledge of propositions? I then provide a taxonomy of ontological conceptions of the nature of propositions, and explore several of their interesting epistemological implications.
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  47. added 2015-04-06
    Abdi Sanati & Michalis Kyratsous (forthcoming). Epistemic Injustice in Assessment of Delusions. Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice:n/a-n/a.
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  48. added 2015-04-06
    Jesús Navarro (forthcoming). No Achievement Beyond Intention. Synthese:1-31.
    According to robust versions of virtue epistemology, the reason why knowledge is incompatible with certain kinds of luck is that justified true beliefs must be achieved by the agent . In a recent set of papers, Pritchard has challenged these sorts of views, advancing different arguments against them. I confront one of them here, which is constructed upon scenarios affected by environmental luck, such as the fake barn cases. My objection to Pritchard differs from those offered until now by Carter (...)
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  49. added 2015-04-06
    Robert C. Roberts & Ryan West (forthcoming). Natural Epistemic Defects and Corrective Virtues. Synthese:1-20.
    Cognitive psychologists have uncovered a number of natural tendencies to systematic errors in thinking. This paper proposes some ways that intellectual character virtues might help correct these sources of epistemic unreliability. We begin with an overview of some insights from recent work in dual-process cognitive psychology regarding ‘biases and heuristics’, and argue that the dozens of hazards the psychologists catalogue arise from combinations and specifications of a small handful of more basic patterns of thinking. We expound four of these, and (...)
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  50. added 2015-04-06
    Berit Brogaard (forthcoming). Ignorance and Incompetence. In Rik Peels and Martijn Blaauw (ed.), Igorance. Cambridge University Press.
    On an initially plausible view of ignorance, ignorance is equivalent to the lack or absence of knowledge-that. I argue that this view is incorrect, as lack of sufficient justification for one's true belief or lack of belief doesn't necessarily amount to ignorance. My argument rests on linguistic considerations of common uses of 'ignorant' and its cognates. The phrase 'is ignorant of', I argue, functions differently grammatically and semantically from the phrase 'does not know', when the latter is used propositionally. 'Is (...)
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