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  1. A. Albertsen & C. Knight (forthcoming). A Framework for Luck Egalitarianism in Health and Healthcare. Journal of Medical Ethics.
    Several attempts have been made to apply the choice-sensitive theory of distributive justice, luck egalitarianism, in the context of health and healthcare. This article presents a framework for this discussion by highlighting different normative decisions to be made in such an application, some of the objections to which luck egalitarians must provide answers and some of the practical implications associated with applying such an approach in the real world. It is argued that luck egalitarians should address distributions of health rather (...)
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  2. Andreas Albertsen & Sören Flinch Midtgaard (2014). Unjust Equalities. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (2):335-346.
    In the luck egalitarian literature, one influential formulation of luck egalitarianism does not specify whether equalities that do not reflect people’s equivalent exercises of responsibility are bad with regard to inequality. This equivocation gives rise to two competing versions of luck egalitarianism: asymmetrical and symmetrical luck egalitarianism. According to the former, while inequalities due to luck are unjust, equalities due to luck are not necessarily so. The latter view, by contrast, affirms the undesirability of equalities as well as inequalities insofar (...)
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  3. Martin Marchman Andersen (2014). What Does Society Owe Me If I Am Responsible for Being Worse Off? Journal of Applied Philosophy 31 (1).
    Luck egalitarians need to address the question of cost-responsibility: If an individual is responsible for being worse off than others, then what benefits, if any, is that individual uniquely cost-responsible for? By applying luck egalitarianism to justice in health I discuss different answers to this question inspired by two different interpretations of luck egalitarianism, namely ‘standard luck egalitarianism’ and ‘all luck egalitarianism’, respectively. Even though I argue that the latter is more plausible than the former, I ultimately suggest and defend (...)
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  4. Richard Arneson (2011). Luck Egalitarianism–A Primer. In Carl Knight & Zofia Stemplowska (eds.), Responsibility and Distributive Justice. Oxford University Press. 24--50.
  5. Richard Arneson, Egalitarianism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  6. Richard Arneson (2004). Luck Egalitarianism Interpretated and Defended. Philosophical Topics 32 (1/2):1-20.
    In recent years some moral philosophers and political theorists, who have come to be called “luck egalitarians,” have urged that the essence of social justice is the moral imperative to improve the condition of people who suffer from simple bad luck. Prominent theorists who have attracted the luck egalitarian label include Ronald Dworkin, G. A. Cohen, and John Roemer.1 Larry Temkin should also be included in this group, as should Thomas Nagel at the time that he wrote Equality and Partiality.2 (...)
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  7. Richard Arneson, Rethinking Luck Egalitarianism and Unacceptable Inequalities.
    Even a cursory glance around the contemporary world shows that some people lead miserable lives, and some people are far worse off than others. The first fact is surely morally undesirable. What should we say about the second? Inequalities in people’s condition might be thought morally objectionable because they are bad in themselves or because they lead to other bads, or for both reasons combined. The last section of this essay explores what to say about inequalities that are instrumentally bad. (...)
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  8. Richard Arneson, Egalitarianism and Responsibility.
    Richard J. Arneson May, 1999 The problem of social justice can arise in the absence of social interaction. This point emerges directly from an important passage in John Rawls’s A Theory of Justice where he is arguing for an opposed conclusion. Rawls argues that the primary subject of justice is the basic structure of society, the way that major social institutions work together to “determine the division of advantages from social cooperation.” He writes, “The basic structure is the primary subject (...)
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  9. Richard J. Arneson (2000). Luck Egalitarianism and Prioritarianism. Ethics 110 (2):339-349.
    In her recent, provocative essay “What Is the Point of Equality?”, Elizabeth Anderson argues against a common ideal of egalitarian justice that she calls “luck egalitarianism” and in favor of an approach she calls “democratic equality.”1 According to the luck egalitarian, the aim of justice as equality is to eliminate so far as is possible the impact on people’s lives of bad luck that falls on them through no fault or choice of their own. In the ideal luck egalitarian society, (...)
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  10. Richard J. Arneson (1999). Egalitarianism and Responsibility. Journal of Ethics 3 (3):225-247.
    This essay examines several possible rationales for the egalitarian judgment that justice requires better-off individuals to help those who are worse off even in the absence of social interaction. These rationales include equality (everyone should enjoy the same level of benefits), moral meritocracy (each should get benefits according to her responsibility or deservingness), the threshold of sufficiency (each should be assured a minimally decent quality of life), prioritarianism (a function of benefits to individuals should be maximized that gives priority to (...)
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  11. Richard J. Arneson (1997). Egalitarianism and the Undeserving Poor. Journal of Political Philosophy 5 (4):327–350.
    Recently in the U.S. a near-consensus has formed around the idea that it would be desirable to "end welfare as we know it," in the words of President Bill Clinton.1 In this context, the term "welfare" does not refer to the entire panoply of welfare state provision including government sponsored old age pensions, government provided medical care for the elderly, unemployment benefits for workers who have lost their jobs without being fired for cause, or aid to the disabled. "Welfare" in (...)
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  12. Alison Bailey (2001). Taking Responsibility for Community Violence. In Peggy DesAutels & JoAnne Waugh (eds.), FEMINISTS DOING ETHICS.
    This article examines the responses of two communities to hate crimes in their cities. In particular it explores how community understandings of responsibility shape collective responses to hate crimes. I use the case of Bridesberg, Pennsylvania to explore how anti-racist work is restricted by backward-looking conceptions of moral responsibility (e.g. being responsible). Using recent writings in feminist ethics.(1) I argue for a forward-looking notion that advocates an active view: taking responsibility for attitudes and behaviors that foster climates in which hate (...)
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  13. Linda Barclay (2009). Egalitarianism and Responsibility in the Genetic Future. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 34 (2):119-134.
    Recent discussions of genetic enhancement have argued that unregulated access to genetic enhancement technology will have a mainly negative impact on equality, a development that an egalitarian approach to distributive justice should be concerned with and seek to address. I argue that the extent to which egalitarians should be concerned about unequal access to genetic enhancement therapies has been overplayed. Many of the genetic differences that exist between people, including those that arise from differential access to genetic enhancement technology, are (...)
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  14. Thom Brooks (ed.) (2011). Ethics and Moral Philosophy. Brill.
    Ethics and moral philosophy is an area of particular interest today. This book brings together some of the most important essays in this area.
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  15. A. W. Cappelen (2005). Responsibility in Health Care: A Liberal Egalitarian Approach. Journal of Medical Ethics 31 (8):476-480.
    Lifestyle diseases constitute an increasing proportion of health problems and this trend is likely to continue. A better understanding of the responsibility argument is important for the assessment of policies aimed at meeting this challenge. Holding individuals accountable for their choices in the context of health care is, however, controversial. There are powerful arguments both for and against such policies. In this article the main arguments for and the traditional arguments against the use of individual responsibility as a criterion for (...)
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  16. Alexander W. Cappelen & Bertil Tungodden (2006). A Liberal Egalitarian Paradox. Economics and Philosophy 22 (3):393-408.
    A liberal egalitarian theory of justice seeks to combine the values of equality, personal freedom, and personal responsibility. It is considered a much more promising position than strict egalitarianism, because it supposedly provides a fairness argument for inequalities reflecting differences in choice. However, we show that it is inherently difficult to fulfill this ambition. We present a liberal egalitarian paradox which shows that there does not exist any robust reward system that satisfies a minimal egalitarian and a minimal liberal requirement. (...)
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  17. Michael L. Corrado (2001). Egalitarianism and the Problem of Tort Liability. Noûs 35 (s1):388-419.
    Is the negligence standard in accident law acceptable to the egalitarian? The egalitarian - the egalitarian who would compensate only losses for which the actor was not responsible - cannot accept either a system of strict liability for all accidents or a system of social insurance for all accidents. A system of tort law acceptable to the responsibility - egalitarian must be a system based on negligence. But what will negligence mean? A negligence system in which the notion of reasonableness (...)
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  18. Kenneth M. Ehrenberg (1999). Social Structure and Responsibility. Loyola Poverty Law Journal 5:1-26.
    We now live in a world with unprecedented possibilities. Technology is quickly reaching the point at which it will be within our grasp to cure any ailment: medical, psychological, or social. Yet we are already falling behind in the curative use of our newfound abilities. With our new technologies we have it within our means to feed the world and to eradicate sicknesses common only in developing countries. However, the use of these *2 abilities is governed by a social system (...)
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  19. Gideon Elford (2013). Equality of Opportunity and Other-Affecting Choice: Why Luck Egalitarianism Does Not Require Brute Luck Equality. [REVIEW] Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (1):139-149.
    The luck egalitarian view famously maintains that inequalities in individuals’ circumstances are unfair or unjust, whereas inequalities traceable to individuals’ own responsible choices are fair or just. On this basis, the distinction between so-called brute luck and option luck has been seen as central to luck egalitarianism. Luck egalitarianism is interpreted, by advocates and opponents alike, as a view that condemns inequalities in brute luck but permits inequalities in option luck. It is also thought to be expressed in terms of (...)
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  20. Gideon Elford (2012). Men Who Would Be Kings. Social Theory and Practice 38 (2):193-212.
    The luck egalitarian view famously maintains that inequalities in individuals' circumstances are unfair, whereas inequalities traceable to individuals' own responsible choices are fair. There is, however, an important question about the inequality justifying power of responsible choice where choices are made in circumstances of existing unfair inequality. This paper considers a luck egalitarian answer to this question which holds that individuals are fairly held liable for disadvantages resulting from their choices unless that disadvantage would have been avoided under circumstances of (...)
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  21. N. Eyal (2012). Why Treat Noncompliant Patients? Beyond the Decent Minimum Account. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 36 (6):572-588.
    Patients’ medical conditions can result from their own avoidable risk taking. Some lung diseases result from avoidable smoking and some traffic accidents result from victims’ reckless driving. Although in many nonmedical areas we hold people responsible for taking risks they could avoid, it is normally harsh and inappropriate to deny patients care because they risked needing it. Why? A popular account is that protecting everyone’s "decent minimum," their basic needs, matters more than the benefits of holding people accountable. This account (...)
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  22. Nir Eyal (2006). Egalitarian Justice and Innocent Choice. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 2 (1).
    This article argues that, in its standard formulation, luck-egalitarianism is false. In particular, I show that disadvantages that result from perfectly free choice can constitute egalitarian injustice. I also propose a modified formulation of luck-egalitarianism that would withstand my criticism. One merit of the modification is that it helps us to reconcile widespread intuitions about distributive justice with equally widespread intuitions about punitive justice.
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  23. David Fagelson (1999). Rights And Duties. Law And Inequality 17 (1):171.
  24. Timothy Hinton (2002). Choice and Luck in Recent Egalitarian Thought. Philosophical Papers 31 (2):145-167.
    Abstract Contemporary egalitarians often appeal to a distinction between inequalities issuing from choice as opposed to those stemming from brute luck. Inequalities of the second kind, they say, ought to be redressed, while those of the former may be allowed to stand. In this paper, I scrutinize the role played by the notion of brute luck in Ronald Dworkin's theory of equality. My intention is to show that Dworkin seeks to occupy what turns out to be an untenable middle position. (...)
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  25. Keith Hyams (2013). Equality, Responsibility, and the Balance of Interests. Journal of Social Philosophy 44 (4):392-401.
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  26. Akira Inoue, Responsibility for Inequalities.
    This paper aims to specify the precise conditions under which an agent is responsible for inequalities. Admittedly, the careful examination of the conditions in question has been the main focus of contemporary egalitarianism. As a matter of fact, contemporary political philosophers take responsibility to be a core conception which in principle justifies inequalities. In particular, they tend to flesh out the conception of responsibility in terms of choice, in such a way that we should hold individuals responsible for chosen inequalities (...)
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  27. Douglas Kellner (2005). Problems with Responsibility: Why Luck Egalitarians Should Have Abandonned the Attempt to Reconcile Equality with Responsibility. Contemporary Political Theory 4 (4):431-450.
  28. Carl Knight (2013). Benefiting From Injustice and Brute Luck. Social Theory and Practice 39 (4):581-598.
    Many political philosophers maintain that beneficiaries of injustice are under special obligations to assist victims of injustice. However, the examples favoured by those who endorse this view equally support an alternative luck egalitarian view, which holds that special obligations should be assigned to those with good brute luck. From this perspective the distinguishing features of the benefiting view are (1) its silence on the question of whether to allocate special obligations to assist the brute luck worse off to those who (...)
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  29. Carl Knight (2013). Luck Egalitarianism. Philosophy Compass 8 (10):924-934.
    Luck egalitarianism is a family of egalitarian theories of distributive justice that aim to counteract the distributive effects of luck. This article explains luck egalitarianism's main ideas, and the debates that have accompanied its rise to prominence. There are two main parts to the discussion. The first part sets out three key moves in the influential early statements of Dworkin, Arneson, and Cohen: the brute luck/option luck distinction, the specification of brute luck in everyday or theoretical terms and the specification (...)
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  30. Carl Knight (2013). Egalitarian Justice and Expected Value. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (5):1061-1073.
    According to all-luck egalitarianism, the differential distributive effects of both brute luck, which defines the outcome of risks which are not deliberately taken, and option luck, which defines the outcome of deliberate gambles, are unjust. Exactly how to correct the effects of option luck is, however, a complex issue. This article argues that (a) option luck should be neutralized not just by correcting luck among gamblers, but among the community as a whole, because it would be unfair for gamblers as (...)
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  31. Carl Knight (2012). In Defence of Global Egalitarianism. Journal of Global Ethics 8 (1):107-116.
    This essay argues that David Miller's criticisms of global egalitarianism do not undermine the view where it is stated in one of its stronger, luck egalitarian forms. The claim that global egalitarianism cannot specify a metric of justice which is broad enough to exclude spurious claims for redistribution, but precise enough to appropriately value different kinds of advantage, implicitly assumes that cultural understandings are the only legitimate way of identifying what counts as advantage. But that is an assumption always or (...)
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  32. Carl Knight (2012). Distributive Luck. South African Journal of Philosophy 31 (2):541-559.
    This article explores the Rawlsian goal of ensuring that distributions are not influenced by the morally arbitrary. It does so by bringing discussions of distributive justice into contact with the debate over moral luck initiated by Williams and Nagel. Rawls’ own justice as fairness appears to be incompatible with the arbitrariness commitment, as it creates some equalities arbitrarily. A major rival, Dworkin’s version of brute luck egalitarianism, aims to be continuous with ordinary ethics, and so is (a) sensitive to non-philosophical (...)
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  33. Carl Knight (2011). Inequality, Avoidability, and Healthcare. Iyyun 60:72-88.
    This review article of Shlomi Segall's Health, Luck, and Justice (Princeton University Press, 2010) addresses three issues: first, Segall’s claim that luck egalitarianism, properly construed, does not object to brute luck equality; second, Segall’s claim that brute luck is properly construed as the outcome of actions that it would have been unreasonable to expect the agent to avoid; and third, Segall’s account of healthcare and criticism of rival views. On the first two issues, a more conventional form of luck egalitarianism (...)
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  34. Carl Knight (2011). Responsibility, Desert, and Justice. In Carl Knight & Zofia Stemplowska (eds.), Responsibility and Distributive Justice. Oxford University Press.
    This chapter identifies three contrasts between responsibility-sensitive justice and desert-sensitive justice. First, while responsibility may be appraised on prudential or moral grounds, it is argued that desert is necessarily moral. As moral appraisal is much more plausible, responsibility-sensitive justice is only attractive in one of its two formulations. Second, strict responsibility sensitivity does not compensate for all forms of bad brute luck, and forms of responsibility-sensitive justice like luck egalitarianism that provide such compensation do so by appealing to independent moral (...)
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  35. Carl Knight (2010). Justice and the Grey Box of Responsibility. Theoria 57 (124):86-112.
    Even where an act appears to be responsible, and satisfies all the conditions for responsibility laid down by society, the response to it may be unjust where that appearance is false, and where those conditions are insufficient. This paper argues that those who want to place considerations of responsibility at the centre of distributive and criminal justice ought to take this concern seriously. The common strategy of relying on what Susan Hurley describes as a 'black box of responsibility' has the (...)
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  36. Carl Knight (2009). Luck Egalitarianism: Equality, Responsibility, and Justice. Edinburgh University Press.
    How should we decide which inequalities between people are justified, and which are unjustified? One answer is that such inequalities are only justified where there is a corresponding variation in responsible action or choice on the part of the persons concerned. This view, which has become known as 'luck egalitarianism', has come to occupy a central place in recent debates about distributive justice. This book is the first full length treatment of this significant development in contemporary political philosophy. Each of (...)
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  37. Carl Knight (2009). Egalitarian Justice and Valuational Judgment. Journal of Moral Philosophy 6 (4):482-498.
    Contemporary discussions of egalitarian justice have often focused on the issue of expensive taste. G.A. Cohen has recently abandoned the view that all chosen disadvantages are non-compensable, now maintaining that chosen expensive judgmental tastes—those endorsed by valuational judgment—are compensable as it is unreasonable to expect persons not to develop them. But chosen expensive brute taste—the main type of non-compensable expensive taste on the new scheme—cannot be described in such a way that there is a normative difference between it and chosen (...)
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  38. Carl Knight (2008). A Pluralistic Approach to Global Poverty. Review of International Studies 34 (4):713-33.
    A large proportion of humankind today lives in avoidable poverty. This article examines whether affluent individuals and governments have moral duties to change this situation. It is maintained that an alternative to the familiar accounts of transdomestic distributive justice and personal ethics put forward by writers such as Peter Singer, John Rawls, and Thomas Pogge is required, since each of these accounts fails to reflect the full range of relevant considerations. A better account would give some weight to overall utility, (...)
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  39. Carl Knight (2006). The Metaphysical Case for Luck Egalitarianism. Social Theory and Practice 32 (2):173-189.
    Some critics of luck egalitarianism have suggested that its reference to responsibility leaves it either assuming metaphysical libertarianism or (in the inevitable absence of a resolution of the free will problem) practically impotent. This paper argues that luck egalitarianism need not fall into either trap. It may in fact be sensitive to the possibility that libertarianism is false, and would not be undermined were this the case. Here luck egalitarianism actually fares better than outcome egalitarianism, which assumes, in just the (...)
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  40. Carl Knight (2005). In Defence of Luck Egalitarianism. Res Publica 11 (1):1-10.
    This paper considers issues raised by Elizabeth Anderson's recent critique of the position she terms luck egalitarianism. It is maintained that luck egalitarianism, once clarified and elaborated in certain regards, remains the strongest egalitarian stance. Anderson's arguments that luck egalitarians abandon both the negligent and prudent dependent caretakers fails to account for the moderate positions open to luck egalitarians and overemphasizes their commitment to unregulated market choices. The claim that luck egalitarianism insults citizens by redistributing on the grounds of paternalistic (...)
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  41. Carl Knight & Zofia Stemplowska Carl (2011). Responsibility and Distributive Justice: An Introduction. In Carl Knight & Zofia Stemplowska (eds.), Responsibility and Distributive Justice. Oxford University Press.
    This introductory chapter provides an overview of the recent debate about responsibility and distributive justice. It traces the recent philosophical focus on distributive justice to John Rawls and examines two arguments in his work which might be taken to contain the seeds of the focus on responsibility in later theories of distributive justice. It examines Ronald Dworkin's ‘equality of resources’, the ‘luck egalitarianism’ of Richard Arneson and G. A. Cohen, as well as the criticisms of their work put forward by (...)
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  42. Carl Knight & Roger Knight (2012). Equality and Information. Ethical Perspectives 19 (3):469-499.
    Traditional outcome-orientated egalitarian principles require access to information about the size of individual holdings. Recent egalitarian political theory has sought to accommodate considerations of responsibility. Such a move may seem problematic, in that a new informational burden is thereby introduced, with no apparent decrease in the existing burden. This article uses a simple model with simulated data to examine the extent to which outcome egalitarianism and responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism (‘luck egalitarianism’) can be accurately applied where information is incomplete or erroneous. It (...)
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  43. Carl Knight & Zofia Stemploska (eds.) (2011). Justice and Responsibility. Oxford University Press.
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  44. Carl Knight & Zofia Stemplowska (eds.) (2011). Responsibility and Distributive Justice. Oxford University Press.
    Under what conditions are people responsible for their choices and the outcomes of those choices? How could such conditions be fostered by liberal societies? Should what people are due as a matter of justice depend on what they are responsible for? For example, how far should healthcare provision depend on patients' past choices? What values would be realized and which hampered by making justice sensitive to responsibility? Would it give people what they deserve? Would it advance or hinder equality? The (...)
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  45. Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen (2005). Hurley on Egalitarianism and the Luck-Neutralizing Aim. Politics, Philosophy and Economics 4 (2):249-265.
    s admirable new book, Justice, Luck, and Knowledge , brings together recent developments in the fields of responsibility and egalitarian justice. This article focuses on Hurley’s critique of luck-neutralizing egalitarianism. The article concludes that the bad-luck-neutralizing aim serves better as a justificatory basis for egalitarianism than the more general luck-neutralizing aim. Since the former does not simply assume that we should aim for equality, Hurley has not demonstrated (nor indeed does she claim to have shown) that this concern cannot form (...)
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  46. Matthew Lister (2012). Review of Carl Knight, Luck Egalitarianism. [REVIEW] Journal of Moral Philosophy 9 (1):127-30.
  47. Ryan Long (2011). The Incompleteness of Luck Egalitarianism. Social Philosophy Today 27:87-96.
    Luck egalitarianism makes a fundamental distinction between inequalities for which agents are responsible and inequalities stemming from luck. I give several reasons to find luck egalitarianism a compelling view of distributive justice. I then argue that it is an incomplete theory of equality. Luck egalitarianism lacks the normative resources to achieve its ends. It is unable to specify the prior conditions under which persons are situated equivalently such that their choices can bear this tremendous weight. This means that luck egalitarians (...)
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  48. Jeremy Moss (2007). Against Fairness: Egalitarianism and Responsibility. [REVIEW] Journal of Value Inquiry 41 (2-4):309-324.
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  49. Arthur Ripstein, Justice and Responsibility.
    My aim in this paper is to consider the conception of responsibility that is appropriate to the enforcement of standards of justice, both distributive and corrective. I will defend what I will call a reciprocity conception of responsibility, which supposes that responsibility must be understood in terms of norms governing what people are entitled to expect of each other. If I have sole responsibility to look out for myself, or for some interests of yours, then I am not entitled to (...)
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  50. David T. Risser (2003). The Moral Problem of Nonvoting. Journal of Social Philosophy 34 (3):348–363.
    The meaning and moral implications of voting and nonvoting in a representative democracy are outlined and discussed. A conception of voting as a forward-looking, conditional shared responsibility is developed and defended. This conception reflects an understanding of democratic politics in which the supreme strategic advantage is power to affect "the conflict of conflicts", that is, the ability to influence the shape and content of the dominant political agenda. This conception is also shown to support a consequentialist approach to distributive justice (...)
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