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  1. A. Ahmed (2009). Rigidity and Essentiality: Reply to Gomez-Torrente. Mind 118 (469):121-133.
    Mario Gómez-Torrente (2006) says that whilst theoretical identifications (e.g. 'All lightning is electrical discharge') do not entail their own necessitations, they do entail the necessitation of a weaker statement. And he claims that this weaker entailment serves Kripke's purposes as well as the stronger one would have. I argue that this is false. Section 1 says what the weaker entailment is; section 2 says why it matters. Section 3 argues that the entailment identified at section 1 does not meet the (...)
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  2. Mahrad Almotahari (2014). Metalinguistic Negation and Metaphysical Affirmation. Philosophical Studies 167 (3):497-517.
    In a series of articles, Fine (Monist 83:357–361, 2000; Mind 112:195–234, 2003; Mind 115:1059–1082, 2006) presents some highly compelling objections to monism, the doctrine that spatially coincident objects are identical. His objections rely on Leibniz’s Law and linguistic environments that appear to be immune to the standard charge of non-transparency and substitution failure. In this paper, I respond to Fine’s objections on behalf of the monist. Following Schnieder (Philosophical Quarterly 56:39–54, 2006), I observe that arguments from Leibniz’s Law are valid (...)
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  3. Rani Lill Anjum, Svein Anders Noer Lie & Stephen Mumford, Dispositions and Ethics.
    What is the connection between dispositions and ethics? Some might think very little and those who are interested in dispositions tend to be metaphysicians whose interests are far from value. However, we argue in this paper that dispositions and dispositionality are central to ethics, indeed a precondition. Ethics rests on a number of notions that are either dispositional in nature or involve real dispositions or powers at work. We argue for a dispositional account of value that offers an alternative to (...)
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  4. Margaret Atherton (1984). The Inessentiality of Lockean Essences. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 14 (2):277 - 293.
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  5. Tom Baldwin (1984). Lowe on Modalities de Re. Mind 93 (370):252-255.
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  6. Tomasz Bigaj (2014). In Defense of an Essentialist Approach to Ontic Structural Realism. Methode: Analytic Perspective 3 (4):1-24.
    This paper offers a new perspective on the metaphysical doctrine of non-eliminative ontic structural realism by interpreting the relation of ontic dependence in terms of counterfactual identification rather than in terms of numerical identity/distinctness.
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  7. G. Bonetti (1985). The Theory of Reference and the Science That Reveals the Essences. Verifiche: Rivista Trimestrale di Scienze Umane 14 (4):383-402.
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  8. F. K. C. (1975). The Nature of Necessity. Review of Metaphysics 28 (4):762-763.
  9. W. R. Carter (2004). Reflections on Non-Naturalized Necessity. Philo 7 (2):156-162.
    Modal properties are notorious epistemic trouble-makers. That theme is very much at the heart of Michael Rea’s thesis that the Discovery Problem (roughly, the problem of explaining how we know when ascriptions of modal properties are true) has no naturalistic resolution. That might encourage the thought that supernaturalism will somehow resolve the problem. This paper argues that supernaturalism is unlikely to offer a solution of the Discovery Problem.
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  10. Hugh S. Chandler (1986). Sources of Essence. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 11 (1):379-389.
    Almost everyone believes in modality de dicto. Necessarily, puppies are young dogs. The necessity here derives from the meaning of “puppy.” The term means young dog. Essentialism is belief in a more exotic sort of modality, one that does not derive from meaning in this direct and simple way. In the first two sections of this paper, I consider indexical and nonindexical kind terms and the sort of modality applicable to each. In the last section, I consider individuals and proper (...)
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  11. Hugh S. Chandler (1966). Essence and Accident. Analysis 6 (6):77-81.
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  12. Sheldon M. Cohen (1973). Analyticity and Real Essences. New Scholasticism 47 (1):68-75.
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  13. M. Corrado (1974). Plantinga on necessity De Re. Logique Et Analyse 17 (67):445.
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  14. M. J. Cresswell (1997). A Note on de Re Modalities. Logique Et Analyse 158:147-153.
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  15. Marian David (2009). Defending Existentialism? In M. Reicher (ed.), States of Affairs. Ontos Verlag. 167--209.
    This paper is concerned with a popular view about the nature of propositions, commonly known as the Russellian view of propositions. Alvin Plantinga has dubbed it, or more precisely, a crucial consequence of it, Existentialism, and in his paper “On Existentialism” (1983) he has presented a forceful argument intended as a reductio of this view. In what follows, I describe the main relevant ingredients of the Russellian view of propositions and states of affairs. I present a relatively simple response Russellians (...)
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  16. Louis deRosset (2009). Production and Necessity. Philosophical Review 118 (2):153-181.
    A major source of latter-day skepticism about necessity is the work of David Hume. Hume is widely taken to have endorsed the Humean claim : there are no necessary connections between distinct existences. The Humean claim is defended on the grounds that necessary connections between wholly distinct things would be mysterious and inexplicable. Philosophers deploy this claim in the service of a wide variety of philosophical projects. But Saul Kripke has argued that it is false. According to Kripke, there are (...)
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  17. Crawford L. Elder (2001). Can Contrariety Be Reduced to Contradiction? Croatian Journal of Philosophy 1 (1):1-4.
    Can an ontology which treats properties as really out there in the world be combined vvith the view that necessity is not out there? What about the necessity by which redness excludes greenness, or weighing 8 kg excludes weighing 6 kg? Armstrong, who combines property realism with logical atomism, argues that such exclusions reflect just the trivial necessity that a whole cannot be any of its proper parts. Buthis argument fails for colors themselves and for other cases of contrary properties. (...)
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  18. Delia Graff Fara (2012). Possibility Relative to a Sortal. In Karen Bennett & Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, volume 7. Oxford University Press.
    This paper is an informal presentation of the ideas presented formally in (”Relative-Sameness Counterpart Theory”. Relative-sameness relations -- such as being the same person as -- are like David Lewis’s “counterpart” relations in the following respects: (i) they may hold over time or across worlds between objects that aren’t cross-time or cross-world identical (I propose), and (ii) there are a multiplicity of them, different ones of which may be variously invoked in different contexts. They differ from his counterpart relations, however, (...)
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  19. Kit Fine (2003). The Non-Identity of a Material Thing and its Matter. Mind 112 (446):195-234.
    There is a well-known argument from Leibniz's Law for the view that coincident material things may be distinct. For given that they differ in their properties, then how can they be the same? However, many philosophers have suggested that this apparent difference in properties is the product of a linguistic illusion; there is just one thing out there, but different sorts or guises under which it may be described. I attempt to show that this ‘opacity’ defence has intolerable consequences for (...)
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  20. Sharon Ford (2012). Objects, Discreteness, and Pure Power Theories: George Molnar’s Critique of Sydney Shoemaker’s Causal Theory of Properties. [REVIEW] Metaphysica 13 (2):195-215.
    Sydney Shoemaker’s causal theory of properties is an important starting place for some contemporary metaphysical perspectives concerning the nature of properties. In this paper, I discuss the causal and intrinsic criteria that Shoemaker stipulates for the identity of genuine properties and relations, and address George Molnar’s criticism that holding both criteria presents an unbridgeable hypothesis in the causal theory of properties. The causal criterion requires that properties and relations contribute to the causal powers of objects if they are to be (...)
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  21. Sharon R. Ford (2007). An Analysis of Properties in John Heil’s "From an Ontological Point of View". In G. Romano & Malatesti (eds.), From an Ontological Point of View, Swif Philosophy of Mind Review, Symposium. Swif Philosophy of Mind Review.
    In this paper I argue that the requirement for the qualitative is theory-dependent, determined by the fundamental assumptions built into the ontology. John Heil’s qualitative, in its role as individuator of objects and powers, is required only by a theory that posits a world of distinct objects or powers. Does Heil’s ‘deep’ view of the world, such that there is only one powerful object require the qualitative as individuator of objects and powers? The answer depends on whether it is possible (...)
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  22. Philippe Gagnon (2012). Remarques Sur le Projet Essentialiste de Brian Ellis En Philosophie de la Nature. Eikasia. Revista de Filosofía 43 (March):61-94.
  23. Allan Gibbard (1975). Contingent Identity. Journal of Philosophical Logic 4 (2):187-222.
    Identities formed with proper names may be contingent. this claim is made first through an example. the paper then develops a theory of the semantics of concrete things, with contingent identity as a consequence. this general theory lets concrete things be made up canonically from fundamental physical entities. it includes theories of proper names, variables, cross-world identity with respect to a sortal, and modal and dispositional properties. the theory, it is argued, is coherent and superior to its rivals, in that (...)
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  24. Jules Girardi (1961). Description des Essences Et Ontologie (Suite Et Fin). Revue Philosophique De Louvain 59 (64):640-671.
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  25. Mario Gómez-Torrente (2004). Beyond Rigidity? Essentialist Predication and the Rigidity of General Terms (¿Más Allá de la Rigidez? La Predicatión Esencialista y la Rigidez de Los Términos Generales). Critica 36 (108):37 - 54.
    I offer a brief formal exploration of a certain natural extension of the notion of rigidity to predicates, the notion of an essentialist predicate. I show that, under reasonable assumptions, true "identification sentences" involving essentialist predicates (such as 'Cats are animals') are necessary, and hence that the notion of essentiality is formally analogous in this respect to the notion of singular term rigidity. /// El artículo hace una breve exploración formal de una extensión natural de la noción de rigidez a (...)
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  26. Toby Handfield (2008). Humean Dispositionalism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (1):113-126.
    Humean metaphysics is characterized by a rejection of necessary connections between distinct existences. Dispositionalists claim that there are basic causal powers. The existence of such properties is widely held to be incompatible with the Humean rejection of necessary connections. In this paper I present a novel theory of causal powers that vindicates the dispositionalist claim that causal powers are basic, without embracing brute necessary connections. The key assumptions of the theory are that there are natural types of causal processes, and (...)
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  27. Michael Hymers (2008). How Things Might Have Been: Individuals, Kinds, and Essential Properties - by Penelope Mackie. Philosophical Books 49 (1):67-68.
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  28. Ross Inman (2014). De Re Essentialism, Species, and Modal Ambiguity. Metaphysica 15 (1).
    I offer a concise critique of a recurring line of reasoning advanced by Joseph LaPorte and Samir Okasha that all modern species concepts render the view that biological organisms essentially belong to their species empirically untenable. The argument, I claim, trades on a crucial modal ambiguity that collapses the de re/de dicto distinction. Contra their claim that the continued adherence of such a view on behalf of contemporary metaphysicians stems from the latter’s ignorance of developments in modern biology, the modal (...)
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  29. Peter Van Inwagen & E. J. Lowe (1996). Why Is There Anything at All? Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 70:95 - 120.
  30. Eugene Kelly (1994). Essences. Aletheia 6.
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  31. John D. Kronen (1991). Essentialism Old and New. Modern Schoolman 68 (2):123-151.
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  32. John Kronen & Joy Laine (2012). Realism and Essentialism in the Nyāya Darśana. International Philosophical Quarterly 52 (3):315-333.
    Philosophers affiliated with the Nyāya school of classical Indian philosophy developed an impressive species of realism. Nyāya philosophers defended direct realism in holding that we perceive bodies, not just their qualities or mental images of their qualities. This sort of realism has been out of favor for centuries in the West and faces a number of problems that the Nyāya knew and answered in a sophisticated way. Rather than focus on the Nyāya defense of direct realism, we focus on the (...)
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  33. Peter Lamarque (2001). Aesthetic Essentialism. In Emily Brady & Jerrold Levinson (eds.), Aesthetic Concepts: Essays After Sibley. Oxford University Press. 100--122.
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  34. Peter James Loptson (1972). Cartesian Essentialism. Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh
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  35. E. J. Lowe (2007). Review: How Things Might Have Been: Individuals, Kinds, and Essential Properties. [REVIEW] Mind 116 (463):762-766.
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  36. E. J. Lowe (1985). Reply to Baldwin on de Re Modalities. Mind 94 (373):101-103.
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  37. William G. Lycan & Stewart Shapiro (1986). Actuality and Essence. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 11 (1):343-377.
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  38. J. L. Mackie (1974). De What Re is de Re Modality? Journal of Philosophy 71 (16):551-561.
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  39. Ari Maunu (2005). Generalist Transworld Identitism (or, Identity Through Possible Worlds Without Nonqualitative Thisnesses). Logique Et Analyse 48 (189-192):151-158.
    A certain argument has been given in the literature to the effect that generalism (the view that all facts about all possible worlds can (in principle) be given in general terms, that is, without resorting to nonqualitative thisnesses) excludes transworld identitism (the view that there are numerical identities through possible worlds). It follows from this argument, among other things, that transworld identitism entails Scotistic haecceitism (acceptance of nonqualitative thisnesses), and that generalists subscribing to de reism (the view that there are (...)
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  40. Kris Mcdaniel (2014). Metaphysics, History, Phenomenology. Res Philosophica 91 (3):339-365.
    There are three interconnected goals of this paper. The first is to articulate and motivate a view of the methodology for doing metaphysics that is broadly phenomenological in the sense of Husserl circa the Logical Investigations. The second is to articulate an argument for the importance of studying the history of philosophy when doing metaphysics that is in accordance with this methodology. The third is to confront this methodology with a series of objections and determine how well it fares in (...)
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  41. Michael McGlone (2010). Essentialist arguments against descriptivism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (4):443-462.
    This paper considers Kripke's (1972, 1980) modal arguments against descriptivism about proper names, the descriptivist reply that the meaning of a name is given by a description involving the modifier ‘actually’, and Kit Fine's (1994) distinction between necessary and essential attributes. It explains how Kripke's modal arguments can be recast in essentialist terms by appealing to Fine's distinction, and it argues that the resulting essentialist arguments are immune to the abovementioned descriptivist reply to the original modal arguments.
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  42. Stephen K. McLeod (2001). Modality and Anti-Metaphysics. Ashgate.
    Modality and Anti-Metaphysics critically examines the most prominent approaches to modality among analytic philosophers in the twentieth century, including essentialism. Defending both the project of metaphysics and the essentialist position that metaphysical modality is conceptually and ontologically primitive, Stephen McLeod argues that the logical positivists did not succeed in banishing metaphysical modality from their own theoretical apparatus and he offers an original defence of metaphysics against their advocacy of its elimination. -/- Seeking to assuage the sceptical worries which underlie modal (...)
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  43. Adam Murray & Jessica M. Wilson (2012). Relativized Metaphysical Modality. In Karen Bennett & Dean Zimmerman (eds.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics. Oxford University Press. 189.
    It is commonly supposed that metaphysical modal claims are to be evaluated with respect to a single domain of possible worlds: a claim is metaphysically necessary just in case it is true in every possible world, and metaphysically possible just in case it is true in some possible world. We argue that the standard understanding is incorrect; rather, whether a given claim is metaphysically necessary or possible is relative to which world is indicatively actual. We motivate our view by attention (...)
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  44. Linda Nicholson (1997). The Question of Essentialism. In Linda J. Nicholson (ed.), The Second Wave: A Reader in Feminist Theory. Routledge. 319--20.
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  45. Daniel Nolan (2009). Modality. In John Shand (ed.), Central Issues of Philosophy. Wiley-Blackwell. 95--106.
  46. Daniel Nolan (2007). Review: Modality. [REVIEW] Mind 116 (461):187-190.
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  47. Ulrich Nortmann (2002). Warum Man Essentialist Sein Kann – Eine Logische Konstruktion Im Schnittfeld Von Sprache, Ontologie Und Naturwissenschaft. Erkenntnis 57 (1):1-39.
    Essentialism is, on the one hand, anchored with considerable firmness in a common sense picture of the world. On the other hand, it was dismissed for logico-philosophical reasons by a scientifically minded theorist like Quine. ``New essentialists'' like Kripke did engage in very profitable theorizing on an essentialist basis, but made no significant effort to investigate the prospects of imparting to an essentialist metaphysics a solid foundation within a scientific world view. These foundational prospects are the concern of the article. (...)
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  48. Bryan G. Norton (1980). De Re Modality, Generic Essences, and Science. Philosophia 9 (2):167-186.
    I have taken the traditional problem of the seeming interdependence of identity concepts and essentialistic concepts and the attendant difficulties with circularity as a starting point in my consideration of recent attempts to provide accounts ofde re essences. Having distinguished between theories of individual and generic essences, I have shown how a linguistic device based upon a new approach to referring expressions has, perhaps, provided some advance in the understanding of individualde re essences. I have argued that, however efficacious these (...)
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  49. L. A. Paul (2006). In Defense of Essentialism. Philosophical Perspectives 20 (1):333–372.
    If an object has a property essentially, it has that property in every possible world according to which it exists.2 If an object has a property accidentally, it does not have that property in every possible world according to which it exists. Claims about an object’s essential or accidental properties are de re modal claims, and essential and accidental properties are de re modal properties. Take an object’s modal profile to specify its essential properties and the range of its accidental (...)
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  50. Alvin Plantinga (2003). Essays in the Metaphysics of Modality. Oxford University Press.
    Perhaps no one has done more in the last 30 years to advance thinking in the metaphysics of modality than has Alvin Plantinga. Collected here are some of his most important essays on this influential subject. Dating back from the late 1960's to the present, they chronicle the development of Plantinga's thoughts about some of the most fundamental issues in metaphysics: what is the nature of abstract objects like possible worlds, properties, propositions, and such phenomena? Are there possible but non-actual (...)
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