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Summary De re modality concerns the modal properties that an object has in virtue of itself. This contrasts with de dicto modality, which concerns modal properties that are merely "said of" an object. More formally: De dicto: Necessarily, some x is such that it is F.  De re: Some x is such that it is necessarily F. The essence of an entity in contemporary metaphysics is generally regarded as being constituted by the entity's de re modal properties. For instance, if we consider it necessary for John to be human, then this is part of John's essence. Different varieties of essentialism can be distinguished by the kind of de re modal properties in question. If we debate whether it is necessary for John to have the very parents that he actually has, we are debating origins essentialism. It should also be noted that essences may be individual or general. John's essence is an individual essence, and it may be essential for John to belong to the (natural) kind human. But we can also ask what is essential for the kind, e.g. whether humans are essentially rational. In that case we are concerned with the general essence of humans. Essentialism about species is a good example of a debate concerning general essences. Essences are commonly considered to be synonymous with de re modal properties, following the work of Kripke and others. However, the more traditional view, following Aristotle, may in fact be that essence is ontologically prior to modality. Recently, such non-modal accounts of essence have been defended in the literature, with one suggestion being that essence should be explicated via real definition.
Key works The most influential modern contributions are no doubt Kripke 1980, and Putnam 1975 which reintroduced essentialism into metaphysics. Quine's classic critique (Quine 1953) of De Re Modality was largely undermined by the contributions of Kripke and Putnam, but Marcus 1967 and Hintikka 1970 should also be mentioned. Wiggins 1980, Plantinga 1992, and Salmon 2005 are also classics. One important application of essentialism is counterpart theory, e.g. Lewis 1968. The secondary literature on different aspects of the topic is enormous, but recent, often cited contributions include Bealer 1987, Shalkowski 1994, Ellis 2001, Della Rocca 2002, LaPorte 2004, Paul 2006, Mackie 2006, and Devitt 2008. Non-modal accounts of essence have been gaining popularity, especially due to the work of Kit Fine (e.g. Fine 1994). Other recent works in this tradition include Paul 2006Oderberg 2007, Lowe 2008, Tahko 2009, Correia 2012, Dumsday 2012, and Vaidya 2010.
Introductions Robertson 2008, Cameron 2010, Roca-Royes 2011, Roca-Royes 2011.
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Subcategories:See also:History/traditions: Essentialism and De Re Modality
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Counterpart Theory
  1. Andrew Bacon (forthcoming). Representing Counterparts. Australasian Journal of Logic.
    This paper presents and motivates a counterpart theoretic semantics for quantifi ed modal logic based on a fleshed out account of Lewis's notion of a `possibility.' According to the account a possibility consists of a world and some haecceitistic information about how each possible individual gets represented de re. A semantics for quanti ed modal logic based on evaluating formulae at possibilities is developed. It is shown that this framework naturally accommodates an actuality operator, addressing recent objections to counterpart theory, (...)
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  2. Lynne Rudder Baker (1985). Was Leibniz Entitled to Possible Worlds? Canadian Journal of Philosophy 15 (1):57-74.
    Leibniz has enjoyed a prominent place in the history of thought about possible worlds.' I shall argue that on the feading interpretation of Leibniz's account of contingency — an ingenious interpretation with ample textual support — possible worlds may be invoked by Leibniz only on pain of inconsistency. Leibnizian contingency, as reconstructed in detail by Robert C. Sleigh, Jr.,z will be shown to preclude propositions with different truth-values in different possible worlds.
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  3. Derek Ball (2011). Property Identities and Modal Arguments. Philosophers' Imprint 11 (13).
    Physicalists about the mind are committed to claims about property identities. Following Kripke's well-known discussion, modal arguments have emerged as major threats to such claims. This paper argues that modal arguments can be resisted by adopting a counterpart theoretic account of modal claims, and in particular modal claims involving properties. Thus physicalists have a powerful motive to adopt non-Kripkean accounts of the metaphysics of modality and the semantics of modal expressions.
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  4. Joseph A. Baltimore (2014). Modal Realism, Counterpart Theory, and Unactualized Possibilities. Metaphysica 15 (1):209–217.
    It is a commonsense thesis that unactualized possibilities are not parts of actuality. To keep his modal realism in line with this thesis, David Lewis employed his indexical account of the term “actual.” I argue that the addition of counterpart theory to Lewis’s modal realism undermines his strategy for respecting the commonsense thesis. The case made here also reveals a problem for Lewis’s attempt to avoid haecceitism.
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  5. Elizabeth Barnes (2009). Indeterminacy, Identity and Counterparts: Evans Reconsidered. Synthese 168 (1):81 - 96.
    In this paper I argue that Gareth Evans’ famous proof of the impossibility of de re indeterminate identity fails on a counterpart-theoretic interpretation of the determinacy operators. I attempt to motivate a counterpart-theoretic reading of the determinacy operators and then show that, understood counterpart-theoretically, Evans’ argument is straightforwardly invalid.
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  6. Gordon Belot (1995). New Work for Counterpart Theorists: Determinism. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46 (2):185-195.
    Recently Carolyn Brighouse and Jeremy Butterfield have argued that David Lewis's counterpart theory makes it possible both to believe in the reality of spacetime points and to consider general relativity to be a deterministic theory, thus avoiding the ‘hole argument’ of John Earman and John Norton. Butterfield's argument relies on Lewis's own counterpart-theoretic analysis of determinism. In this paper, I argue that this analysis is inadequate. This leaves a gap in the Butterfield–Brighouse defence against the hole argument.
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  7. Steffen Borge (2006). Counterpart Theory and the Argument From Modal Concerns. Theoria 72 (4):269-285.
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  8. Andrea Borghini (2005). Counterpart Theory Vindicated: A Reply to Merricks. Dialectica 59 (1):67–73.
    The paper shows – contra what has been argued by Trenton Merricks – that counterpart theory, when conjoined with composition as identity, does not entail mereological essentialism. What Merrick’s argument overlooks is that contingent identity is but one of the effects of grounding identity across possible worlds on similarity.
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  9. Todd Buras (2006). Counterpart Theory, Natural Properties, and Essentialism. Journal of Philosophy 103 (1):27-42.
    David Lewis advised essentialists to judge his counterpart theory a false friend. He also argued that counterpart theory needs natural properties. This essay argues that natural properties are all essentialists need to find a true friend in counterpart theory. Section one explains why Lewis takes counterpart theory to be anti-essentialist and why he thinks it needs natural properties. Section two establishes the connection between the natural properties counterpart theory needs and the essentialist consequences Lewis disavows. Section three answers two objections: (...)
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  10. Joseph Chiari (1973). The Necessity of Being. New York,Gordian Press.
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  11. Robert C. Coburn (1986). Individual Essences and Possible Worlds. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 11 (1):165-183.
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  12. E. Conee (2011). Modal Realism, Counterpart Theory, and the Possibility of Multiversal Rectitude. Analysis 71 (4):680-684.
    Jim Stone has argued that a multiversal version of Modal Realism together with Counterpart Theory cannot account for a certain intuitive possibility. Roughly, it is the possibility that all free moral choices of a certain sort are the right choices in all cases in the multiverse. The present work offers an explanation of how the metaphysics in question can account for the intuitive possibility in question.
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  13. Sam Cowling (2012). Haecceitism for Modal Realists. Erkenntnis 77 (3):399-417.
    In this paper, I examine the putative incompatibility of three theses: (1) Haecceitism, according to which some maximal possibilities differ solely in terms of the non-qualitative or de re possibilities they include; (2) Modal correspondence, according to which each maximal possibility is identical with a unique possible world; (3) Counterpart theory, according to which de re modality is analyzed in terms of counterpart relations between individuals. After showing how the modal realism defended by David Lewis resolves this incompatibility by rejecting (...)
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  14. M. J. Cresswell (2004). Adequacy Conditions for Counterpart Theory. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (1):28 – 41.
    David Lewis's modal realism claims that nothing can exist in more than one world or time, and that statements about how something would have been are to be analysed in terms of its counterpart . I first explain why the counterpart relation depends on de re modal statements in an intensional language, so that intuitive properties of similarity relations cannot be used to show that the counterpart relation is not an equivalence relation. I then look at test sentences in (the (...)
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  15. M. J. Cresswell (2004). Adequacy Conditions for Counterpart Theory. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (1):28 – 41.
    David Lewis's modal realism claims that nothing can exist in more than one world or time, and that statements about how something would have been are to be analysed in terms of its counterpart . I first explain why the counterpart relation depends on de re modal statements in an intensional language, so that intuitive properties of similarity relations cannot be used to show that the counterpart relation is not an equivalence relation. I then look at test sentences in (the (...)
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  16. M. J. Cresswell (2004). Adequacy Conditions for Counterpart Theory. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (1):28 – 41.
    David Lewis's modal realism claims that nothing can exist in more than one world or time, and that statements about how something would have been are to be analysed in terms of its counterpart . I first explain why the counterpart relation depends on de re modal statements in an intensional language, so that intuitive properties of similarity relations cannot be used to show that the counterpart relation is not an equivalence relation. I then look at test sentences in (the (...)
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  17. George Djukic (2004). Do Four-Dimensionalists Have to Be Counterpart Theorists? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (2):292 – 311.
    In 'Four-Dimensional Objects' Peter van Inwagen gives two arguments for the claim that proponents of four-dimensionalism have to be counterpart theorists. Recently Jack Copeland, Heather Dyke, and Diane Proudfoot, echoing in part points made by Mark Heller in this journal in 1993, have sought to rebut one of van Inwagen's arguments. In this paper I shall criticize their discussion and by implication certain points made by Heller. In so doing I shall also rebut a possible objection to van Inwagen's second (...)
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  18. Cian Dorr, How to Be a Modal Realist.
    This paper investigates the form a modal realist analysis of possibility and necessity should take. It concludes that according to the best version of modal realism, the notion of a world plays no role in the analysis of modal claims. All contingent claims contain some de re element; the effect of modal operators on these elements is described by a counterpart theory which takes the same form whether the de re reference is to a world or to something else. This (...)
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  19. Cian Dorr (2005). Propositions and Counterpart Theory. Analysis 65 (3):210–218.
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  20. Antony Eagle (2007). Reply to Stone on Counterpart Theory and Four-Dimensionalism. Analysis 67 (2):159 - 162.
    Recently, Jim Stone has argued that counterpart theory is incompatible with the existence of temporal parts. I demonstrate that there is no such incompatibility.
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  21. Andy Egan (2004). Second-Order Predication and the Metaphysics of Properties. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (1):48 – 66.
    Problems about the accidental properties of properties motivate us--force us, I think--not to identify properties with the sets of their instances. If we identify them instead with functions from worlds to extensions, we get a theory of properties that is neutral with respect to disputes over counterpart theory, and we avoid a problem for Lewis's theory of events. Similar problems about the temporary properties of properties motivate us--though this time they probably don't force us--to give up this theory as well, (...)
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  22. Delia Graff Fara (2012). Possibility Relative to a Sortal. In Karen Bennett & Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, volume 7. Oxford University Press.
    This paper is an informal presentation of the ideas presented formally in (”Relative-Sameness Counterpart Theory”. Relative-sameness relations -- such as being the same person as -- are like David Lewis’s “counterpart” relations in the following respects: (i) they may hold over time or across worlds between objects that aren’t cross-time or cross-world identical (I propose), and (ii) there are a multiplicity of them, different ones of which may be variously invoked in different contexts. They differ from his counterpart relations, however, (...)
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  23. Delia Graff Fara (2012). 1. Possibility Relative to a Sortal. Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 7:1.
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  24. Delia Graff Fara (2009). Dear Haecceitism. Erkenntnis 70 (3):285 - 297.
    If a counterpart theorist's understanding of the counterpart relation precludes haecceitist differences between possible worlds, as David Lewis's does, how can he admit haecceitist possibilities, as Lewis wants to? Lewis (Philosophical Review 3-32, 1983; On the Plurality of Worlds, 1986) devised what he called a 'cheap substitute for haecceitism,' which would allow for haecceitist possibilities while preserving the counterpart relation as a purely qualitative one. The solution involved lifting an earlier (Journal of Philosophy 65(5): 113-126, 1968; 68(7): 203-211, 1971) ban (...)
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  25. Delia Graff Fara (2009). Dear Haecceitism. Erkenntnis 70 (3):285–297.
    If a counterpart theorist’s understanding of the counterpart relation precludes haecceitist differences between possible worlds, as David Lewis’s does, how can he admit haecceitist possibilities, as Lewis wants to? Lewis (Philosophical Review 3–32, 1983; On the Plurality of Worlds, 1986) devised what he called a ‘cheap substitute for haecceitism,’ which would allow for haecceitist possibilities while preserving the counterpart relation as a purely qualitative one. The solution involved lifting an earlier (Journal of Philosophy 65(5):113–126, 1968; 68(7):203–211, 1971) ban on there (...)
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  26. Delia Graff Fara (2008). Relative-Sameness Counterpart Theory. Review of Symbolic Logic 1 (2):167-189.
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  27. Delia Graff Fara (2008). Relative-Sameness Counterpart Theory. Review of Symbolic Logic 1 (2):167-189.
    Here I propose a coherent way of preserving the identity of material objects with the matter that constitutes them. The presentation is formal, and intended for RSL. An informal presentation is in preliminary draft! -/- Relative-sameness relations—such as being the same person as—are like David Lewis's "counterpart" relations in the following respects: (i) they may hold between objects that aren't identical (I propose), and (ii) there are a multiplicity of them, different ones of which may be variously invoked in different (...)
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  28. Michael Fara & Timothy Williamson (2005). Counterparts and Actuality. Mind 114 (453):1-30.
    Many philosophers, following David Lewis, believe that we should look to counterpart theory, not quantified modal logic, as a means of understanding modal discourse. We argue that this is a mistake. Significant parts of modal discourse involve either implicit or explicit reference to what is actually the case, raising the question of how talk about actuality is to be represented counterpart-theoretically. By considering possible modifications of Lewis's counterpart theory, including actual modifications due to Graeme Forbes and Murali Ramachandran, we argue (...)
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  29. Fred Feldman (1971). Counterparts. Journal of Philosophy 68 (13):406-409.
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  30. Graeme Forbes (1983). Thisness and Vagueness. Synthese 54 (2):235-259.
    This paper is about two puzzles, or two versions of a single puzzle, which deserve to be called paradoxes, and develops some apparatus in terms of which the apparently conflicting principles which generate the puzzles can be rendered consistent. However, the apparatus itself is somewhat controversial: the puzzles are modal ones, and the resolution to be advocated requires the adoption of a counterpart theoretic semantics of essentially the kind proposed by David Lewis, which in turn requires qualified rejection of certain (...)
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  31. Graeme Forbes (1982). Canonical Counterpart Theory. Analysis 42 (1):33 - 37.
    In a recent article in Analysis, Graeme Hunter and William Seager (1981) attempt to rescue counterpart theory (CT) from some objections of Hazen 1979. They see these objections as arising from ‘uncritical use of the translation scheme originally proposed by Lewis’, and intend to meet them by refraining from use of that scheme. But they do not offer a new scheme; they say ‘…it is no more necessary to have one to capture the sense of modal idiom than it is (...)
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  32. Allen Hazen (2012). 2. Reflections on Counterpart Theory. Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 7:41.
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  33. Allen Hazen (1979). Counterpart-Theoretic Semantics for Modal Logic. Journal of Philosophy 76 (6):319-338.
  34. Mark Heller (2005). Anti-Essentialism and Counterpart Theory. The Monist 88 (4):600-618.
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  35. Robert Kraut (1980). The Metaphysics of Counterpart Theory. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 58 (2):150 – 157.
    The technical apparatus of modal semantics--Possible worlds, World-Lines, Counterparts, Etc.--Continues to arouse suspicion among philosophers of various persuasions. A way to dispel at least some of the suspicion is to provide a naturalistic interpretation of the semantical machinery. My goal here is precisely that. More specifically, I provide a behavioristically acceptable interpretation of david lewis' counterpart theory. Reference to worlds and counterparts is construed in sober, Quinean terms. The result is a "metalinguistic" construal of counterpart semantics, And thus, Of modality. (...)
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  36. Simon Langford (2005). Three-Dimensionalism and Counterpart Theory. Analysis 65 (288):321–325.
    Jim Stone argues that one cannot combine three-dimensionalism with counterpart theory. This paper argues to the contrary.
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  37. David Lewis (1993). Counterpart Theory, Quantified Modal Logic, and Extra Argument Places. Analysis 53 (2):69-71.
  38. David Lewis (1971). Counterparts of Persons and Their Bodies. Journal of Philosophy 68 (7):203-211.
  39. David K. Lewis (1968). Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic. Journal of Philosophy 65 (5):113-126.
  40. Dan Marshall, Counterpart Theory and the Problem of Actuality (Talk).
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  41. Michael McGlone, The Humphrey Objection and the Problem of De Re Modality.
    In this paper I consider Saul Kripke’s famous Humphrey objection to David Lewis’s views on de re modality and argue that responses to this objection currently on the market fail to mitigate its force in any significant way.
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  42. Trenton Merricks (2003). The End of Counterpart Theory. Journal of Philosophy 100 (10):521 - 549.
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  43. Trenton Merricks (1999). Composition as Identity, Mereological Essentialism, and Counterpart Theory. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (2):192 – 195.
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  44. Ulrich Meyer (2013). Counterpart Theory and the Actuality Operator. Mind 122 (485):27-42.
    Fara and Williamson (Mind, 2005) argue that counterpart theory is unable to account for modal claims that use an actuality operator. This paper argues otherwise. Rather than provide a different counterpart translation of the actuality operator itself, the solution presented here starts out with a quantified modal logic in which the actuality operator is redundant, and then translates the sentences of this logic into claims of counterpart theory.
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  45. Michael Morreau (2010). It Simply Does Not Add Up: Trouble with Overall Similarity. Journal of Philosophy 107 (9):469-490.
    Comparative overall similarity lies at the basis of a lot of recent metaphysics and epistemology. It is a poor foundation. Overall similarity is supposed to be an aggregate of similarities and differences in various respects. But there is no good way of combining them all.
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  46. Bryan Norton (1976). Is Counterpart Theory Inadequate? Journal of Philosophical Logic 5 (1):79 - 89.
    Counterpart theorists need not posit the counterpart relation in addition to the identity relations as an Additional relation relating objects across possible worlds. Identity can be viewed as a relation applicable to individuals within possible worlds, while the counterpart relation replaces identity in translations of ordinary utterances which correlate individuals in different possible worlds and, hence, in all modal utterances. CT is, in other words, a theory of modal discourse — it proposes a way of understanding all modal predications. As (...)
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  47. Murali Ramachandran (2008). Kripkean Counterpart Theory. Polish Journal of Philosophy 2 (2):89-106.
    David Lewis’s counterpart-theoretic semantics for quantified modal logic is motivated originally by worries about identifying objects across possible worlds; the counterpart relation is grounded more cautiously on comparative similarity. The possibility of contingent identity is an unsought -- and in some eyes, unwelcome -- consequence of this approach. In this paper I motivate a Kripkean counterpart theory by way of defending the prior, pre-theoretical, coherence of contingent directness. Contingent identity follows for free. The theory is Kripkean in that the counterpart (...)
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  48. Murali Ramachandran (1998). Sortal Modal Logic and Counterpart Theory. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (4):553 – 565.
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  49. Murali Ramachandran (1990). Contingent Identity in Counterpart Theory. Analysis 50 (3):163-166.
    A slight modification to the translation scheme for David Lewis's counterpart theory I put forward in 'An Alternative Translation Scheme for Counterpart Theory' (Analysis 49.3 (1989)) is proposed. The motivation for this change is that it makes for a more plausible account of contingent identity. In particular, contingent identity is accommodated without admitting the contingency of self-identity.
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  50. Adam Rigoni & Richmond H. Thomason (2012). The Logic of Counterpart Theory with Actuality. Journal of Philosophical Logic (1):1-31.
    It has been claimed that counterpart theory cannot support a theory of actuality without rendering obviously invalid formulas valid or obviously valid formulas invalid. We argue that these claims are not based on logical flaws of counterpart theory itself, but point to the lack of appropriate devices in first-order logic for “remembering” the values of variables. We formulate a mildly dynamic version of first-order logic with appropriate memory devices and show how to base a version of counterpart theory with actuality (...)
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