Bookmark and Share
Metaphysics > Time > Temporal Ontology > Eternalism

Eternalism

Edited by Sam Baron
Assistant editor: James Darcy (University of Otago)
About this topic
Key works

Mellor 1998 offers a book length defense of the eternalist model of time and discusses many of the issues and arguments surrounding the view. For early defenders of the view see Williams 1951, which offers the prototype argument for eternalism or the manifold/block universe, and Taylor 1955, which emphasizes the lack of clear difference between time and space. Putnam 1967 and Rietdijk 1966 advocate for an eternalist model of time based on the special theory of relativity, and Smart 1963 holds that eternalism results from dropping our pre-scientific, anthropocentric view of the world. Sider 2001 argues effectively for eternalism in the midst of a book length defense of a perdurance theory of persistence.
Introductions Good introductions include Rea 2003 and Markosian 2010

Show all references
Related categories
Jobs in this area
Part-time, Temporary Philosophy Instructor
Adjunct Faculty
2013-2014 Faculty Positions
Jobs from PhilJobs
Siblings:
104 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Sort by:
1 — 100 / 104
  1. Marcus Arvan (2013). A New Theory of Free Will. Philosophical Forum 44 (1):1-48.
    This paper shows that several live philosophical and scientific hypotheses – including the holographic principle and multiverse theory in quantum physics, and eternalism and mind-body dualism in philosophy – jointly imply an audacious new theory of free will. This new theory, "Libertarian Compatibilism", holds that the physical world is an eternally existing array of two-dimensional information – a vast number of possible pasts, presents, and futures – and the mind a nonphysical entity or set of properties that "read" that physical (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Helen Beebee & Michael Rush (2003). Non-Paradoxical Multi-Location. Analysis 63 (4):311–317.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Nuel Belnap, Two Moves Take Newtonian Determinism to Branching Space-Times.
    “Branching space-times” (BST) is intended as a representation of objective, event-based indeterminism. As such, BST exhibits both a spatio-temporal aspect and an indeterministic “modal” aspect of alternative possible historical courses of events. An essential feature of BST is that it can also represent spatial or space-like relationships as part of its (more or less) relativistic theory of spatio-temporal relations; this ability is essential for the representation of local (in contrast with “global”) indeterminism. This essay indicates how BST might be seen (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Jiri Benovsky (2009). Eternalist Theories of Persistence Through Time: Where the Differences Really Lie. Axiomathes 19 (1).
    The eternalist endurantist and perdurantist theories of persistence through time come in various versions, namely the two versions of perdurantism: the worm view and the stage view , and the two versions of endurantism: indexicalism and adverbialism . Using as a starting point the instructive case of what is depicted by photographs, I will examine these four views, and compare them, with some interesting results. Notably, we will see that two traditional enemies—the perdurantist worm view and the endurantist theories—are (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Jiri Benovsky (2006). Persistence Through Time and Across Possible Worlds. Ontos Verlag.
    How do ordinary objects persist through time and across possible worlds ? How do they manage to have their temporal and modal properties ? These are the questions adressed in this book which is a "guided tour of theories of persistence". The book is divided in two parts. In the first, the two traditional accounts of persistence through time (endurantism and perdurantism) are combined with presentism and eternalism to yield four different views, and their variants. The resulting views are then (...)
    $107.73 used   $110.12 new   $110.15 direct from Amazon   Amazon page
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Katherine Brading, Presentism as an Empirical Hypothesis.
    Within philosophy of physics it is broadly accepted that presentism as an empirical hypothesis has been falsified by the development of special relativity. In this paper, I identify and reject an assumption common to both presentists and advocates of the block universe, and then offer an alternative version of presentism that does not begin from spatiotemporal structure, which is an empirical hypothesis, and which has yet to be falsified. I fear that labelling it “presentism” dooms the view, but I don’t (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Katherine Brading, Physically Locating the Present: A Case of Reading Physics as a Contribution to Philosophy.
    In this paper I argue that reading history of physics as a contribution to history of philosophy is important for contemporary philosophy of physics. My argument centers around a particular case: special relativity versus presentism. By means of resources drawn from reading aspects of Newton's work as contributions to philosophy, I argue that there is in physics an alternative way to approach what we mean by "present" such that (without adding any preferred foliation or anything like that) presentism remains an (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Ben Bradley, Eternalism and Death's Badness Syracuse University.
    Suppose that at the moment of death, a person goes out of existence.1 This has been thought to pose a problem for the idea that death is bad for its victim. But what exactly is the problem? Harry Silverstein says the problem stems from the truth of the “Values Connect with Feelings” thesis (VCF), according to which it must be possible for someone to have feelings about a thing in order for that thing to be bad for that person (2000, (...)
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Ben Bradley (2010). Eternalism and Death's Badness. In Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O'Rourke & Harry Silverstein (eds.), Time and Identity. Mit Press.
    $23.95 used   $26.21 new   $28.05 direct from Amazon   (collection)   Amazon page
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Mikel Burley (2008). The B-Theory of Time and the Fear of Death. Polish Journal of Philosophy 2 (2):21-38.
    This paper discusses Robin Le Poidevin’s proposal that a commitment to the B-theory of time provides a reason to relinquish the fear of death. After outlining Le Poidevin’s views on time and death, I analyze the specific passages in which he makes his proposal, giving close attention to the claim that, for the B-theorist, one’s life is “eternally real.” I distinguish two possible interpretations of this claim, which I call alethic eternalism and ontic eternalism respectively, and argue, with reference to (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. J. Butterfield (1984). Seeing the Present. Mind 93 (370):161-176.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Jeremy Butterfield (1984). Prior's Conception Of Time. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 84:193-209.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. William Bynoe, Temporal Scattering.
    I show that the Eternalist faces a trilemma. Given their theory of time, three claims are each very plausible, yet together form an inconsistent triad. Denying any one of these claims will have significant consequences for how they can conceive of the material realm. I urge that the best strategy is to deny the first claim, and show that this would have a significant consequence: Perdurantism is false.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Craig Callender, Time's Ontic Voltage.
    Philosophy of time, as practiced throughout the last hundred years, is both language- and existence-obsessed. It is language-obsessed in the sense that the primary venue for attacking questions about the nature of time—in sharp contrast to the primary venue for questions about space—has been philosophy of language. Although other areas of philosophy have long recognized that there is a yawning gap between language and the world, the message is spreading slowly in philosophy of time.[1] Since twentieth-century analytic philosophy as a (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Roberto Ciuni, Giuliano Torrengo & Kristie Miller (eds.) (forthcoming). New Papers on the Present: Focus on Presentism.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Rob Clifton & Mark Hogarth (1995). The Definability of Objective Becoming in Minkowski Spacetime. Synthese 103 (3):355 - 387.
    In his recent article On Relativity Theory and Openness of the Future (1991), Howard Stein proves not only that one can define an objective becoming relation in Minkowski spacetime, but that there is only one possible definition available if one accepts certain natural assumptions about what it is for becoming to occur and for it to be objective. Stein uses the definition supplied by his proof to refute an argument due to Rietdijk (1966, 1976), Putnam (1967) and Maxwell (1985, 1988) (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. William L. Craig (1996). Timelessness and Creation. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (4):646 – 656.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. William Lane Craig (1997). In Defense of the Kalam Cosmological Argument. Faith and Philosophy 14 (2):236-247.
    Graham Oppy’s attempt to show that the critiques of the kalam cosmological argument offered by Griinbaum, Davies, and Hawking are successful is predicated upon a misunderstanding of the nature of defeaters in rational belief. Neither Grunbaum nor Oppy succeed in showing an incoherence in the Christian doctrine of creation. Oppy’s attempts to rehabilitate Davies’s critique founders on spurious counter-examples and unsubstantiated claims. Oppy’s defense of Hawking’s critique fails to allay suspicions about the reality of imaginary time and finally results in (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. William Lane Craig (1997). On the Argument for Divine Timelessness From the Incompleteness of Temporal Life. Heythrop Journal 38 (2):165–171.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Richard Cross (1997). Duns Scotus on Eternity and Timelessness. Faith and Philosophy 14 (1):3-25.
    Scotus consistently holds that eternity is to be understood as timelessness. In his early Lectura, he criticizes Aquinas’ account of eternity on the grounds that (1) it entails collapsing past and future into the present, and (2) it entails a B-theory of time, according to which past, present and future are all ontologically on a par with each other. Scotus later comes to accept something like Aquinas’ account of God’s timelessness and the B-theory of time which it entails. Scotus also (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Dennis Geert Bernardus Johan Dieks (ed.) (2006). The Ontology of Spacetime. Elsevier.
    This book contains selected papers from the First International Conference on the Ontology of Spacetime. Its fourteen chapters address two main questions: first, what is the current status of the substantivalism/relationalism debate, and second, what about the prospects of presentism and becoming within present-day physics and its philosophy? The overall tenor of the four chapters of the book’s first part is that the prospects of spacetime substantivalism are bleak, although different possible positions remain with respect to the ontological status of (...)
    $129.72 used   $130.14 new   $145.67 direct from Amazon   Amazon page
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Mauro Dorato (forthcoming). Presentism/Eternalism and Endurantism/Perdurantism: Why the Unsubstantiality of the First Debate Implies That of the Second1. Philosophia Naturalis.
    The main claim that I want to defend in this paper is that the there are logical equivalences between eternalism and perdurantism on the one hand and presentism and endurantism on the other. By “logical equivalence” I mean that one position is entailed and entails the other. As a consequence of this equivalence, it becomes important to inquire into the question whether the dispute between endurantists and perdurantists is authentic, given that Savitt (2006) Dolev (2006) and Dorato (2006) have cast (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Mauro Dorato, Putnam on Time and Special Relativity: A Long Journey From Ontology to Ethics.
    1. Abstract: In this paper I discuss Putnam’s view on time and the special theory of relativity. I first locate Putnam’s philosophical approach within a more general framework, essentially making reference to Sellar’s distinction between the scientific image and the manifest image of the world. I then reconstruct Putnam’s argument in favour of the reality of the future and the determinateness of truth-value for future tense sentences (Putnam 1967) by showing that it is based on three premises that generate a (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Mauro Dorato, The Irrelevance of the Presentist/Eternalist Debate for the Ontology of Minkowski Spacetime.
    In this paper I argue that the debate between the so-called “presentists” – according to whom only the present is real – and the “eternalists”, according to whom past present and future are equally real, has no ontological significance. In particular, once we carefully distinguish between a tensed and a tenseless sense of existence, it is difficult to find a single ontological claim on which the two parties could disagree. Since the choice of using a tense or a tenseless language (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Bradley Harris Dowden (2009). The Metaphysics of Time: A Dialogue. Rowman & Littlefield.
    Introduction -- Fatalism, free will, and foreknowledge -- Mind, the metric, and conventionality -- Time travel and backward causation -- Time's origin, and relationism vs. substantivalism -- McTaggart, tensed facts, and time's flow -- Presentism, the block universe, and perduring objects -- The arrow of time -- Zeno's paradoxes and supertasks.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. Heather Dyke (2003). Review of Katherine Hawley, How Things Persist. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2003 (1).
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. John Earman (2008). Reassessing the Prospects for a Growing Block Model of the Universe. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 22 (2):135 – 164.
    Although C. D. Broad's notion of Becoming has received a fair amount of attention in the philosophy-of-time literature, there are no serious attempts to show how to replace the standard 'block' spacetime models by models that are more congenial to Broad's idea that the sum total of existence is continuously increased by Becoming or the coming into existence of events. In the Newtonian setting Broad-type models can be constructed in a cheating fashion by starting with a Newtonian block model, carving (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. Michael Esfeld, The Impact of Science on Metaphysics and its Limits.
    The paper argues for three theses: (1) Metaphysics depends on science as a source of knowledge. Our current scientific theories commit us to certain metaphysical claims. (2) As far as science is concerned, it is sufficient to spell these claims out in such a way that they amount to a parsimonious ontology. That ontology, however, creates a gap between our experience and the scientific view of the world. (3) In order to avoid that gap and to achieve a complete and (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. Michael Esfeld, The Impact of Science on Metaphysics and its Limits.
    The paper argues for three theses: (1) Metaphysics depends on science as a source of knowledge. Our current scientific theories commit us to certain metaphysical claims. (2) As far as science is concerned, it is sufficient to spell these claims out in such a way that they amount to a parsimonious ontology. That ontology, however, creates a gap between our experience and the scientific view of the world. (3) In order to avoid that gap and to achieve a complete and (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. Paul Fitzgerald (1985). Stump and Kretzmann on Time and Eternity. Journal of Philosophy 82 (5):260-269.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. Robert Francescotti (2008). Endurance and Discernibility. Metaphysica 9 (2):193-204.
    How can an object remain the same, numerically identical, while undergoing change? This is a worry for endurantists, who hold that for any stages, x and y, of a persisting object, x is numerically identical with y. Endurantists might try to avoid the problem of change by insisting that all properties are temporally anchored. It is argued here that while this strategy helps in many cases, it does not help in all. A type of case is presented in which a (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. Gilbert Fulmer (1980). Understanding Time Travel. Southwestern Journal of Philosophy 11 (1):151-156.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. Ian Gibson, Time, Objects, and Identity.
    This is a copy of my DPhil thesis, the abstract for which is as follows: The first third of this thesis argues for a B-theoretic conception of time according to which all times exist equally and the present is in no way privileged. I distinguish "ontological" A-theories from "non-ontological" ones, arguing that the latter are experientially unmotivated and barely coherent. With regard to the former, I focus mainly on presentism. After some remarks on how to formulate this (and eternalism) non-trivially, (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. Torrengo Giuliano (forthcoming). "The Grounding Problem and Presentist Explanations". Synthese.
    Opponents of presentism have often argued that the presentist has difficulty in accounting for what makes (presently) true past-tensed propositions (TptP) true in a way that is compatible with her metaphysical view of time and reality. The problem is quite general and concerns not only strong truth-maker principles, but also the requirement that truth be grounded in reality. In order to meet the challenge, presentists have proposed many peculiar present aspects of the world as grounds for truths concerning the past, (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. Mariusz Grygianiec (2009). Teoria części czasowych – tezy i argumentacje. Filozofia Nauki 4.
    In the paper the most popular arguments in favour of the doctrine of temporal parts are presented and analysed. The author discusses the following arguments: (i) from analogy; (ii) from ontological parsimony; (iii) from intrinsic change; (iv) from mereological change; (v) against presentism; (vi) from time travel; (vii) from vagueness; (viii) from coincidence. The main aim of the paper is to show - in the light of examined arguments - that the 3D-ism/4D-ism equivalence thesis might be treated as a well-founded (...)
    No categories
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36. Mariusz Grygianiec (2007). 'Four-Dimensionalism' - analiza i interpretacja. Filozofia Nauki 1.
    There are several faces of Four-Dimensionalism. Sometimes 4D-ism is formulated as the thesis that the material world is composed of spatial as well as temporal parts. Another version of 4D-ism states that persisting objects are extended over time in the same way that they are extended over space. Some Four-Dimensionalists defend the thesis that all objects persist by perduring i.e. by having different temporal parts at different times. Sometimes 4D-ism means the same as eternalism - the thesis that past and (...)
    No categories
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. Steven D. Hales (2010). No Time Travel for Presentists. Logos and Episteme 1 (2):353-360.
    In the present paper, I offer a new argument to show that presentism about time is incompatible with time travel. Time travel requires leaving the present, which, under presentism, contains all of reality. Therefore to leave the present moment is to leave reality entirely; i.e. to go out of existence. Presentist “time travel” is therefore best seen as a form of suicide, not as a mode of transportation. Eternalists about time do not face the same difficulty, and time travel is (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. Steven D. Hales & Timothy A. Johnson (2003). Endurantism, Perdurantism and Special Relativity. Philosophical Quarterly 53 (213):524–539.
    There are two main theories about the persistence of objects through time: endurantism and perdurantism. Endurantists hold that objects are three-dimensional, have only spatial parts, and wholly exist at each moment of their existence. Perdurantists hold that objects are four-dimensional, have temporal parts, and only partly exist at each moment of their existence. In this paper we argue that endurantism is poorly suited to describe the persistence of objects in a world governed by Special Relativity, and can accommodate a relativistic (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  39. Tobias Hansson Wahlberg (2009). Endurance Per Se in B-Time. Metaphysica 10 (2):175-183.
    Three arguments for the conclusion that objects cannot endure in B-time even if they remain intrinsically unchanged are examined: Carter and Hestevolds enduring-objects-as-universals argument (American Philosophical Quarterly 31(4):269-283, 1994) and Barker and Dowe's paradox 1 and paradox 2 (Analysis 63(2):106-114, 2003, Analysis 65(1):69-74, 2005). All three are shown to fail.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  40. Tobias Hansson Wahlberg (2009). Objects in Time: Studies of Persistence in B-Time. Dissertation, Lund University
    This thesis is about the conceptualization of persistence of physical, middle-sized objects within the theoretical framework of the revisionary ‘B-theory’ of time. According to the B-theory, time does not flow, but is an extended and inherently directed fourth dimension along which the history of the universe is ‘laid out’ once and for all. It is a widespread view among philosophers that if we accept the B-theory, the commonsensical ‘endurance theory’ of persistence will have to be rejected. The endurance theory says (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41. Tobias Hansson (2007). The Problem(s) of Change Revisited. Dialectica 61 (2):265–274.
    Two recurrent arguments levelled against the view that enduring objects survive change are examined within the framework of the B-theory of time: the argument from Leibniz's Law and the argument from Instantiation of Incompatible Properties. Both arguments are shown to be question-begging and hence unsuccessful.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  42. Seiichi Hatano (1963/1988). Time and Eternity. Greenwood Press.
    $106.52 used   Amazon page
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43. John Hawthorne & Theodore Sider (2002). Locations. Philosophical Topics 30 (1):53-76.
    Think of “locations” very abstractly, as positions in a space, any space. Temporal locations are positions in time; spatial locations are positions in (physical) space; particulars are locations in quality space. Should we reify locations? Are locations entities? Spatiotemporal relation- alists say there are no such things as spatiotemporal locations; the fundamental spatial and temporal facts involve no locations as objects, only the instantiation of spatial and temporal relations. The denial of locations in quality space is the bundle theory, according (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  44. Allan Hazlett (2011). How the Past Depends on the Future. Ratio 24 (2):167-175.
    It is often said that, according to common sense, there is a fundamental asymmetry between the past and future; namely, that the past is closed and the future is open. Eternalism in the ontology of time is often seen as conflicting with common sense on this point. Here I argue against the claim that common sense is committed to this fundamental asymmetry between the past and the future, on the grounds that facts about the past often depend on facts about (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  45. Chris Heathwood (2007). On What Will Be: Reply to Westphal. Erkenntnis 67 (1):137 - 142.
    Jonathan Westphal's recent paper attempts to reconcile the view that propositions about the future can be true or false now with the idea that the future cannot now be real. I attempt to show that Westphal's proposal is either unoriginal or unsatisfying. It is unoriginal if it is just the well-known eternalist solution. It is unsatisfying if it is instead making use of a peculiar, tensed truthmaking principle.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  46. Chris Heathwood (2005). The Real Price of the Dead Past: A Reply to Forrest and to Braddon-Mitchell. Analysis 65 (287):249–251.
    Non-presentist A-theories of time (such as the growing block theory and the moving spotlight theory) seem unacceptable because they invite skepticism about whether one exists in the present. To avoid this absurd implication, Peter Forrest appeals to the "Past is Dead hypothesis," according to which only beings in the objective present are conscious. We know we're present because we know we're conscious, and only present beings can be conscious. I argue that the dead past hypothesis undercuts the main reason for (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  47. Mark Hinchliff (2010). The Identity of the Past. In Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O'Rourke & Harry Silverstein (eds.), Time and Identity. Mit Press.
    $23.95 used   $26.21 new   $28.05 direct from Amazon   (collection)   Amazon page
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  48. Ingvar Johansson (2010). Review: Tobias Hansson Wahlberg, Objects in Time. Studies of Persistence in B-Time (2009). [REVIEW] Metaphysica 11 (1):93-94.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  49. Robert Kilwardby (1987). On Time and Imagination =. Published for the British Academy by the Oxford University Press.
    The second volume in this series devoted to the writings of the English Dominican Robert Kilwardby, this work presents the Latin text of two Oxford treatises from the 1250s--one on time, the other on imagination. The treatise on time discusses its reality, connection with change, unity and beginning, the instant and time's relationship to eternity; the one on imagination examines the way imagery is acquired, retained and transmitted, and the relation between heart and head in the workings of common sense.
    $84.34 used   $195.04 new   Amazon page
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  50. K. Koslicki (2003). Four-Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time. Philosophical Review 112 (1):110-113.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  51. Delmas Lewis (1988). Eternity, Time and Timelessness. Faith and Philosophy 5 (1):72-86.
    In this paper I argue that the classic concept of eternity, as it is presented in Boethius, Anselm and Aquinas, must be understood to involve not only the claim that all temporal things are epistemically present to God, but also the claim that all temporal things areexistentially present to God insofar as they coexist timelessly in the eternal present. I further argue that the concept of eternity requires a tenseless view of time. If this is correct then the existence of (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  52. Lawrence B. Lombard (2010). Time for a Change : A Polemic Against the Presentism/Eternalism Debate. In Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O'Rourke & Harry Silverstein (eds.), Time and Identity. Mit Press.
    $23.95 used   $26.21 new   $28.05 direct from Amazon   (collection)   Amazon page
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  53. Lawrence B. Lombard (2006). Scope Fallacies and the “Decisive Objection” Against Endurance. Philosophia 34 (4):441-452.
    From time to time, the idea that enduring things can change has been challenged. The latest challenge has come in the form of what David Lewis has called a “decisive objection”, which claims to deduce a contradiction from the idea that enduring things change with respect to their temporary intrinsics, when that idea is combined with eternalism. It is my aim in this paper to explain why I think that no argument has yet appeared that deduces a contradiction from a (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  54. Lawrence B. Lombard (2003). The Lowe Road to the Problem of Temporary Intrinsics. Philosophical Studies 112 (2):163 - 185.
    It has been argued that there is a problem oftemporary intrinsics, the problem of explaininghow it is possible for things to possesssuccessively contrary properties, if a certaintheory about time, ``eternalism'', is true. Inthis paper, I consider whether there really issuch a problem and survey some standardsolutions to it. I argue for one of them, onewhich has been offered by Mark Johnston andPeter van Inwagen, and which I call the``exemplification-solution''''. I consider avariant on that solution offered by E.J. Lowe(and Sally Haslanger), (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  55. Ned Markosian, 1 Introduction.
    Theodore Sider’s Four-Dimensionalism1 is a well-organized and clearly written book that is chock-full of important arguments. Both friends and foes of the views defended by Sider will benefit enormously from careful study of the book. I am going to focus on just two of Sider’s many arguments for Four-Dimensionalism: his argument from vagueness, which I take to be the most important and powerful argument in the book, and his argument from time travel, which I find to be the funnest to (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  56. Ned Markosian (2010). Time. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Discussions of the nature of time, and of various issues related to time, have always featured prominently in philosophy, but they have been especially important since the beginning of the 20th Century. This article contains a brief overview of some of the main topics in the philosophy of time — Fatalism; Reductionism and Platonism with respect to time; the topology of time; McTaggart's arguments; The A Theory and The B Theory; Presentism, Eternalism, and The Growing Universe Theory; time travel; and (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  57. Ned Markosian (1994). The 3d/4d Controversy and Non-Present Objects. Philosophical Papers 23 (3):243-249.
    Worlds, Lewis says this: Let us say that something persists iff, somehow or other, it exists at various times; this is the neutral word. Something perdures iff it persists by having different temporal parts, or stages, at different times, though no one part of it is wholly present at more than one time; whereas it endures iff it persists by being wholly present at more than one time. Perdurance corresponds to the way a road persists through space; part of it (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  58. Nicholas Maxwell (2006). Special Relativity, Time, Probabilism, and Ultimate Reality. In D. Dieks (ed.), The Ontology of Spacetime. Elsevier, B. V.
    McTaggart distinguished two conceptions of time: the A-series, according to which events are either past, present or future; and the B-series, according to which events are merely earlier or later than other events. Elsewhere, I have argued that these two views, ostensibly about the nature of time, need to be reinterpreted as two views about the nature of the universe. According to the so-called A-theory, the universe is three dimensional, with a past and future; according to the B-theory, the universe (...)
    $129.72 used   $130.14 new   $145.67 direct from Amazon   (collection)   Amazon page
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  59. D. H. Mellor (1998). Real Time Ii. Routledge.
    Real Time II extends and evolves D.H. Mellor's classic exploration of the philosophy of time, Real Time . This wholly new book answers such basic metaphysical questions about time as: how do past, present and future differ, how are time and space related, what is change, is time travel possible? His Real Time dominated the philosophy of time for fifteen years. This book will do the same for the next twenty years.
    $23.00 used   $34.01 new   $37.04 direct from Amazon   Amazon page
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  60. D. H. Mellor (1981). Real Time. Cambridge University Press.
    This is a study of the nature of time. In it, redeploying an argument first presented by McTaggart, the author argues that although time itself is real, tense is not. He accounts for the appearance of the reality of tense - our sense of the passage of time, and the fact that our experience occurs in the present - by showing how time is indispensable as a condition of action. Time itself is further analysed, and Dr Mellor gives answers to (...)
    $20.64 used   $106.60 new   Amazon page
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  61. Ulrich Meyer (2002). Prior and the Platonist. Analysis 62 (3):211–216.
    The aim of this paper is to draw attention to a conflict between two popular views about time: Arthur Prior’s proposal for treating tense on the model of modal logic, and the ‘Platonic’ thesis that some objects (God, forms, universals, or numbers) exist eternally.1 I will argue that anyone who accepts the former ought to reject the latter.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  62. Kristie Miller (2009). Ought a Four-Dimensionalist to Believe in Temporal Parts? Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (4):pp. 619-646.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  63. Bradley Monton (2011). Prolegomena to Any Future Physics-Based Metaphysics. In Jon Kvanvig (ed.), Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion Volume III.
    Metaphysicians sometimes appeal to physics to establish claims about the fundamental nature of the world. But given the current state of inquiry in physics, where there are two most fundamental theories that are incompatible, such arguments of physics-based metaphysics are problematic. I support this line of thought by focussing on two sorts of problematic arguments, special-relativity-based arguments against presentism and big-bang-based arguments in favor of the existence of God. I am not arguing that physics-based metaphysics can’t be done; I am (...)
    $14.25 used   $14.28 new   $31.50 direct from Amazon   (collection)   Amazon page
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  64. M. Joshua Mozersky (forthcoming). Time, Language and Ontology: The World From the B-Theoretic Perspective. Springer.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  65. M. Joshua Mozersky (2008). Bourne-Again Presentism. In L. Nathan Oaklander (ed.), The Philosophy of Time: Critical Concepts in Philosophy. Routledge.
    $1156.62 new   $1315.00 direct from Amazon   $1442.95 used   (collection)   Amazon page
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  66. C. W. K. Mundle (1967). The Space-Time World. Mind 76 (302):264-269.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  67. Harold Noonan (forthcoming). Presentism and Eternalism. Erkenntnis.
    How is the debate between presentism and eternalism to be characterized? It is usual to suggest that this debate about time is analogous to the debate between the actualist and the possibilist about modality. I think that this suggestion is right. In what follows I pursue the analogy more strictly than is usual and offer a characterization of what is at the core of the dispute between presentists and eternalists that may be immune to worries often raised about the substantiality (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  68. Eric T. Olson (2006). Temporal Parts and Timeless Parthood. Noûs 40 (4):738-752.
    What is a temporal part? Most accounts explain it in terms of timeless parthood: a thing's having a part without temporal qualification. Some find this hard to understand, and thus find the view that persisting things have temporal parts—four-dimensionalism—unintelligible. T. Sider offers to help by defining temporal parthood in terms of a thing's having a part at a time. I argue that no such account can capture the notion of a temporal part that figures in orthodox four-dimensionalism: temporal parts must (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (18 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  69. Michael Pelczar (forthcoming). Presentism, Eternalism, and Phenomenal Change. Synthese.
    Normally, when we notice a change taking place, our conscious experience has a corresponding quality of phenomenal change . Here it is argued that one’s experience can have this quality at or during a time when there is no change in which phenomenal properties one instantiates. This undermines a number of otherwise forceful arguments against leading metaphysical theories of change, but also requires these theories to construe change as a secondary quality, akin to color.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  70. Daniel Peterson & Michael Silberstein (2010). Relativity of Simultaneity and Eternalism: In Defense of Blockworld. In Vesselin Petkov (ed.), Space, Time, and Spacetime: Physical and Philosophical Implications of Minkowski's Unification of Space and Time. Springer.
    Ever since the now infamous comments made by Hermann Minkowski in 1908 concerning the proper way to view space-time, the debate has raged as to whether or not the universe should be viewed as a four-dimensional, unified whole wherein the past, present, and future are equally real or whether the views espoused by the possibilists, historicists, and presentists regarding the unreality of the future (and, for presentists, the past) are best. Now, a century after Minkowski’s proposed blockworld first sparked debate, (...)
    $105.61 new   $105.86 used   $179.00 direct from Amazon   (collection)   Amazon page
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  71. Vesselin Petkov (ed.) (2010). Space, Time, and Spacetime: Physical and Philosophical Implications of Minkowski's Unification of Space and Time. Springer.
    This volume is dedicated to the centennial anniversary of Minkowski's discovery of spacetime.
    $105.61 new   $105.86 used   $179.00 direct from Amazon   Amazon page
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  72. Jeremy Pierce (2010). It Doesn't Matter What We Do: From Metaphysics to Ethics in Lost's Time Travel. In Sharon Kaye (ed.), The Ultimate Lost and Philosophy: Think Together, Die Alone. Wiley/Blackwell.
    $1.73 used   $2.98 new   $12.47 direct from Amazon   (collection)   Amazon page
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  73. Sean Enda Power (2013). Perceiving External Things and the Time-Lag Argument. European Journal of Philosophy 21 (1):94-117.
    : We seem to directly perceive external things. But can we? According to the time-lag argument, we cannot. What we directly perceive happens now. There is a time-lag between our perceptions and the external things we seem to directly perceive; these external things happen in the past; thus, what we directly perceive must be something else, for example, sense-data, and we can only at best indirectly perceive other things. This paper examines the time-lag argument given contemporary metaphysics. I argue that (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  74. Sean Enda Power (2012). The Metaphysics of the 'Specious' Present. Erkenntnis 77 (1):121-132.
    The doctrine of the specious present, that we perceive or, at least, seem to perceive a period of time is often taken to be an obvious claim about perception. Yet, it also seems just as commonly rejected as being incoherent. In this paper, following a distinction between three conceptions of the specious present, it is argued that the incoherence is due to hidden metaphysical assumptions about perception and time. It is argued that for those who do not hold such assumptions, (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  75. Simon Prosser (2013). Passage and Perception. Noûs 47 (1):69-84.
    I shall refer to all theories according to which time passes (including dynamic versions of presentism, ‘growing block’ theories, ‘shrinking tree’ theories, and so on) under the umbrella term ‘A-theory’, and I shall use the term ‘B-theory’ in the standard way to refer to the theory according to which time does not pass, and although events are ordered in time there is no objective present time.1 Many philosophers, both A- and B-theorists, have agreed that in experience we are, or at (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  76. Alexander R. Pruss (2008). Toner on Judgment and Eternalism. Faith and Philosophy 25 (3):317-321.
    Patrick Toner has argued that eternalism, the doctrine that all times are ontologically on par, conflicts with the Catholic view of judgment as based on the state of the soul at death. For, he holds, it is arbitrary that judgment should be based on what happened at some particular time, unless, as presentism holds, that time is the only that really exists. I shall argue that his argument fails because the eternalist can say that judgment is simultaneous with the state (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  77. Hilary Putnam (1967). Time and Physical Geometry. Journal of Philosophy 64 (8):240-247.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  78. Michael C. Rea (2003). Four-Dimensionalism. In Michael J. Loux & Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics. Oxford University Press.
    This article characterizes the varieties of four-dimensionalism and provides a critical overview of the main arguments in support of it.
    $39.52 used   $48.28 new   $53.78 direct from Amazon   (collection)   Amazon page
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  79. C. W. Rietdijk (1966). A Rigorous Proof of Determinism Derived From the Special Theory of Relativity. Philosophy of Science 33 (4):341-344.
    A proof is given that there does not exist an event, that is not already in the past for some possible distant observer at the (our) moment that the latter is "now" for us. Such event is as "legally" past for that distant observer as is the moment five minutes ago on the sun for us (irrespective of the circumstance that the light of the sun cannot reach us in a period of five minutes). Only an extreme positivism: "that which (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  80. Katherin Rogers (2009). Back to Eternalism. Faith and Philosophy 26 (3):320-338.
    Against my interpretation, Brian Leftow argues that Anselm of Canterbury held a presentist theory of time, and that presentism can be reconciled with Anselm’s commitments concerning divine omnipotence and omniscience. I respond, focusing mainly on two issues. First, it is difficult to understand the presentist theory which Leftow attributes to Anselm. I articulate my puzzlement in a way that I hope moves the discussion forward. Second, Leftow’s examples to demonstrate that presentism can be reconciled with Anselm’s understanding of the divine (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  81. Katherin A. Rogers (2007). Anselmian Eternalism. Faith and Philosophy 24 (1):3-27.
    Anselm holds that God is timeless, time is tenseless, and humans have libertarian freedom. This combination of commitments is largely undefended incontemporary philosophy of religion. Here I explain Anselmian eternalism with its entailment of tenseless time, offer reasons for accepting it, and defend it against criticisms from William Hasker and other Open Theists. I argue that the tenseless view is coherent, that God’s eternal omniscience is consistent with libertarian freedom, that being eternal greatly enhances divine sovereignty, and that the Anselmian (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  82. Katherin A. Rogers (2007). Anselmian Eternalism: The Presence of a Timeless God. Faith and Philosophy 24 (1):3-27.
    Anselm holds that God is timeless, time is tenseless, and humans have libertarian freedom. This combination of commitments is largely undefended incontemporary philosophy of religion. Here I explain Anselmian eternalism with its entailment of tenseless time, offer reasons for accepting it, and defend it against criticisms from William Hasker and other Open Theists. I argue that the tenseless view is coherent, that God’s eternal omniscience is consistent with libertarian freedom, that being eternal greatly enhances divine sovereignty, and that the Anselmian (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  83. Katherin A. Rogers (2007). The Necessity of the Present and Anselm's Eternalist Response to the Problem of Theological Fatalism. Religious Studies 43 (1):25-47.
    It is often argued that the eternalist solution to the freedom/foreknowledge dilemma fails. If God's knowledge of your choices is eternally fixed, your choices are necessary and cannot be free. Anselm of Canterbury proposes an eternalist view which entails that all of time is equally real and truly present to God. God's knowledge of your choices entails only a ‘consequent’ necessity which does not conflict with libertarian freedom. I argue this by showing that if consequent necessity does conflict with libertarian (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  84. Steven Savitt, Presentism and Eternalism in Perspective.
    The distinction between presentism and eternalism is usually sought in some formula like ‘Only presently existing things exist’ or ‘Past, present, and future events are equally real’. I argue that ambiguities in the copula prevent these slogans from distinguishing significant opposed positions. I suggest in addition that one can find a series of significant distinctions if one takes spacetime structure into account. These presentisms and eternalisms are not contradictory. They are complementary elements of a complete naturalistic philosophy of time.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  85. Brian J. Shanley (1997). Eternal Knowledge of the Temporal in Aquinas. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 71 (2):197-224.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  86. Theodore Sider (2006). Quantifiers and Temporal Ontology. Mind 115 (457):75-97.
    Eternalists say that non-present entities (for instance dinosaurs) exist; presentists say that they do not. But some sceptics deny that this debate is genuine, claiming that presentists simply represent eternalists' quantifiers over non-present entities in different notation. This scepticism may be refuted on purely logical grounds: one of the leading candidate ‘presentist quantifiers’ over non-present things has the inferential role of a quantifier. The dispute over whether non-present objects exist is as genuine and non-verbal as the dispute over whether there (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  87. Theodore Sider (2004). Review: Précis of "Four-Dimensionalism". [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (3):642 - 647.
    This is an overview of my book, Four-Dimensionalism. The spatiotemporal metaphysics of Russell, Smart, Quine and Lewis is a blend of separable components concerning time, persistence, mereology, and even semantics, unified by the theme that space and time are analogous: eternalism (past and future objects are just as real as current objects); the reducibility of tense (tensed utterances have tenseless truth conditions; 'now' is an indexical); four-dimensionalism: temporal parts exist; unrestricted composition (all objects, however scattered, have a mereological sum, or (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  88. Theodore Sider (2001). Four Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time. Oxford University Press.
    Four-Dimensionalism defends the thesis that the material world is composed of temporal as well as spatial parts. This defense includes a novel account of persistence over time, new arguments in favour of the four-dimensional ontology, and responses to the challenges four-dimensionalism faces." "Theodore Sider pays particular attention to the philosophy of time, including a strong series of arguments against presentism, the thesis that only the present is real. Arguments offered in favour of four-dimensionalism include novel arguments based on time travel, (...)
    $21.39 used   $26.10 new   $33.51 direct from Amazon   Amazon page
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  89. Bradford Skow (2012). Why Does Time Pass? Noûs 46 (2):223-242.
    According to the moving spotlight theory of time, the property of being present moves from earlier times to later times, like a spotlight shone on spacetime by God. In more detail, the theory has three components. First, it is a version of eternalism: all times, past present and future, exist. (Here I use “exist” in its tenseless sense.) Second, it is a version of the A-theory of time: there are nonrelative facts about which times are past, which time is present, (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  90. Bradford Skow (2009). Relativity and the Moving Spotlight. Journal of Philosophy 106 (12):666-678.
    A standard objection to the moving spotlight theory of time is that it is incompatible with special relativity. I show how to formulate the moving spotlight theory so that it is perfectly compatible with special relativity. There is no need to re-interpret the physics or add to it a notion of absolute simultaneity.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  91. J. J. C. Smart (1981). The Reality of the Future. Philosophia 10 (3-4):141-150.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  92. J. J. C. Smart (1963). Philosophy And Scientific Realism. Humanities Press.
    $123.91 new   $132.41 used   $155.00 direct from Amazon   Amazon page
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  93. Quentin Smith (1989). A New Typology of Temporal and Atemporal Permanence. Noûs 23 (3):307-330.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  94. Tom Stoneham (2009). Time and Truth: The Presentism-Eternalism Debate. Philosophy 84 (2):201-218.
    There are many questions we can ask about time, but perhaps the most fundamental is whether there are metaphysically interesting differences between past, present and future events. An eternalist believes in a block universe: past, present and future events are all on an equal footing. A gradualist believes in a growing block: he agress with the eternalist about the past and the present but not about the future. A presentist believes that what is present has a special status. My first (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  95. Jonathan Tallant (2008). What is It to “B” a Relation? Synthese 162 (1):117 - 132.
    The purpose of this paper is two fold: first, I look to show Oaklander’s (The ontology of time. New York: Prometheus Books, 2004) theory of time to be false. Second, I show that the only way to salvage the B-theory is via the adopting of the causal theory of time, and allying this to Oaklander’s claim that tense is to be eliminated. I then raise some concerns with the causal theory of time. My conclusion is that, if one adopts eternalism, (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  96. Richard Taylor (1955). Spatial and Temporal Analogies and the Concept of Identity. Journal of Philosophy 52 (22):599-612.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  97. Patrick Toner (2005). Divine Judgment and the Nature of Time. Faith and Philosophy 22 (3):316-329.
    Many Christians believe that persons who, at the moment of death, are in rebellion from God, are damned, while those in right relationship with Godare saved. This is what, for instance, the Catholic teaching regarding the fate of those who die in mortal sin amounts to. In this paper, I argue that this “last moment view” is incompatible with a popular theory of time known as eternalism, according to which all times are equally real. If that’s right, then those who (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  98. Giuliano Torrengo (2012). Time and Simple Existence. Metaphysica 13 (2):125-130.
    Sceptics about substantial disputes in ontology often argue that when two philosophers seem to disagree on a quantified claim, they are actually equivocating on the notion of existence that they are using. When temporal elements play a central role, as in the debate between presentists and eternalists, the hypothesis of an equivocation with respect to existence acquires more plausibility. However, the anti-sceptic can still argue that this hypothesis is unjustified.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  99. Christian W.¨Uthrich, Demarcating Presentism.
    This paper argues that recent arguments to the effect that the debate between presentism and eternalism lacks any metaphysical substance ultimately fail, although important lessons can be gleaned from them in how to formulate a non-vacuous version of presentism. It suggests that presentism can best be characterized in the context of spacetime theories. The resulting position is an ersatzist version of presentism that admits merely non-present entities as abstracta deprived of physical existence. Ersatzist presentism both escapes the charges of triviality (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  100. Ryan Wasserman (2010). Teaching & Learning Guide For: The Problem of Change. Philosophy Compass 5 (3):283-286.
    Our world is a world of change. Children are born and grow into adults. Material possessions rust and decay with age and ultimately perish. Yet scepticism about change is as old as philosophy itself. Heraclitus, for example, argued that nothing could survive the replacement of parts, so that it is impossible to step into the same river twice. Zeno argued that motion is paradoxical, so that nothing can alter its location. Parmenides and his followers went even further, arguing that the (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
1 — 100 / 104
BibTeX / EndNote / RIS / etc
Export this page:
Restrictions




Viewing options


Open Category Editor
Off-campus access
Using PhilPapers from home?

Click here to configure this browser for off-campus access.

Monitor this page
Be alerted of all new items appearing on this page. Choose how you want to monitor it:

Email   RSS feed
About PhilPapers
General Editors:
David Bourget (London)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)

Area Editors:
Anthony Beavers
David Bourget
Berit Brogaard
Margaret Cameron
David Chalmers
Gabriele Contessa
Rafael De Clercq
Catarina Dutilh Novaes
Pablo Gilabert
Hans Halvorson
Jonathan Ichikawa
Jonathan Kvanvig
Øystein Linnebo
JeeLoo Liu
Paul Livingston
Brandon Look
Michiru Nagatsu
Susana Nuccetelli
Gualtiero Piccinini
Darrell Rowbottom
Constantine Sandis
Jonathan Schaffer
Thomas Senor
Robin Smith
Robert Sparrow
Daniel Star
Jussi Suikkanen
Lynne Tirrell
John Simpson Wilkins

Other editors
Contact us
Learn more about PhilPapers





Applied ethicsEpistemologyHistory of Western PhilosophyMeta-ethicsMetaphysicsNormative ethics
Philosophy of biologyPhilosophy of languagePhilosophy of mindPhilosophy of religionScience Logic and MathematicsMore ...
Home | New books and articles | Bibliographies | Philosophy journals | Discussions | The Categorization Project | About PhilPapers | API | Contact us

Hosted by The Institute of Philosophy, School of Advanced Study, University of London
This site uses Google Analytics (see our terms & conditions for details regarding the privacy implications).

Use of this site is subject to terms & conditions.
All rights reserved by David Bourget and David Chalmers

Page generated Wed May 22 06:47:57 2013 - Hash code: ZoUscikGEvO0/P2w+TvM1g