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Siblings:History/traditions: Ethical Egoism
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  1. Judith Andre (2013). Open Hope as a Civic Virtue. Social Philosophy Today 29:89-100.
    Hope as a virtue is an acquired disposition, shaped by reflection; as a civic virtue it must serve the good of the community. Ernst Bloch and Lord Buddha offer help in constructing such a virtue. Using a taxonomy developed by Darren Webb I distinguish open hope from goal-oriented hope, and use each thinker to develop the former. Bloch and Buddha are very different (and notoriously obscure; I do not attempt an exegesis). But they share a metaphysics of change, foundational for (...)
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  2. Julia Annas (2008). Virtue Ethics and the Charge of Egoism. In Paul Bloomfield (ed.), Morality and Self-Interest. Oxford University Press.
  3. Kurt Baier (1990). Egoism. In Peter Singer (ed.), A Companion to Ethics. Wiley-Blackwell.
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  4. Kurt Baier (1973). Ethical Egoism and Interpersonal Compatibility. Philosophical Studies 24 (6):357-368.
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  5. Alfred Barratt (1877). The `Suppression' of Egoism. Mind 2 (6):167-186.
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  6. R. Bass (2006). Ayn Rand, by Tibor Machan. [REVIEW] Journal of Libertarian Studies 20 (2):95-101.
    Tibor Machan's _Ayn Rand_ aims to provide an introduction to Ayn Rand’s thought for “a broader readership who may have heard of Rand but not examined her ideas in detail”. . . . He portrays himself as an admirer, but not as a true believer who supposes that Rand can think no wrong. In addition to sympathetically discussing her views, he tries also to respectfully assess criticisms of those views. His position is not one of unqualified endorsement, but rather one (...)
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  7. Robert H. Bass (2006). Defending the Argument. Journal of Ayn Rand Studies 7 (2):371-381.
    In "Egoism versus Rights," I argued that egoism is incompatible with rights. Here, I respond to two critics of that argument.
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  8. Robert H. Bass (2006). Egoism Versus Rights. Journal of Ayn Rand Studies 7 (2):329-349.
    I develop an argument that key theses from Ayn Rand's ethics and political philosophy are incompatible with one another. Her ethical egoism is not compatible with her rights theory. Though Rand's version of rights theory is libertarian, the argument does not depend upon any claims peculiar to her theory, but would apply to the (in)compatibility of ethical egoism and almost any plausible rights theory.
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  9. Benjamin Bayer, Metaethical Problems for Ethical Egoism, Reconsidered.
    Until recently it has been conventional to assume that ethical egoism is "ethical" is name, alone, and that no account that considers one's own interests as the standard of moral obligation could count as seriously "ethical." In recent years, however, philosophers have shown increasing respect for more sophisticated forms of ethical egoism which attempt to define self-interest in enriched terms characterizing self-interest as human flourishing in both material and psychological dimensions. But philosophers are still skeptical that any conception of self-interest (...)
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  10. Paul Bloomfield (ed.) (2008). Morality and Self-Interest. Oxford University Press.
    The volume will act as a useful collection of scholarship by top figures, and as a resource and course book on an important topic.
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  11. Richard Brandt (1972). Rationality, Egoism, and Morality. Journal of Philosophy 64 (20):681-697.
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  12. David O. Brink, Handout #8: Normative Authority and Metaphysical Egoism.
    Doubts about the adequacy of appeals to impartial practical reason give those with rationalist sympathies reason to explore the metaphysical, and not merely strategic, reconciliation of prudence and altruism contained in metaphysical egoism. Even if we recognize impartial practical reason, the supremacy of moral demands may depend upon the plausibility of metaphysical egoism. For as long as we recognize the demands of prudence, the conflict between altruism and prudence will threaten altruism's supremacy. We might consider one version of metaphysical egoism (...)
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  13. David O. Brink (1997). Self-Love and Altruism. Social Philosophy and Policy 14 (1):122-157.
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  14. C. D. Broad (1942). Certain Features in Moore's Ethical Doctrines. In P. A. Schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy of G. E. Moore. Evanston and Chicago.
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  15. J. A. Brunton (1956). Egoism and Morality. Philosophical Quarterly 6 (25):289-303.
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  16. Keith Burgess-Jackson (2013). Taking Egoism Seriously. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (3):529-542.
    Though utilitarianism is far from being universally accepted in the philosophical community, it is taken seriously and treated respectfully. Its critics do not dismiss it out of hand; they do not misrepresent it; they do not belittle or disparage its proponents. They allow the theory to be articulated, developed, and defended from criticism, even if they go on to reject the modified versions. Ethical egoism, a longstanding rival of utilitarianism, is treated very differently. It is said to be “refuted” by (...)
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  17. George R. Carlson (1990). Pain and the Quantum Leap to Agent-Neutral Value. Ethics 100 (2):363-367.
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  18. George R. Carlson (1988). Parfit, Sidgwick, and Divided Reason. Philosophia 18 (2-3):247-252.
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  19. George R. Carlson (1979). Beliefs, Wants and Ethical Egoism. Philosophia 9 (1):9-20.
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  20. George R. Carlson (1977). Egoism and Internalism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 55 (2):139 – 141.
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  21. Ruth Chang (2001). Review: Two Conceptions of Reasons for Action. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (2):447 - 453.
    On a ‘comparative’ conception of practical reasons, reasons are like ‘weights’ that can make an action more or less rational. Bernard Gert adopts instead a ‘toggle’ conception of practical reasons: something counts as a reason just in case it alone can make some or other otherwise irrational action rational. I suggest that Gert’s conception suffers from various defects, and that his motivation for adopting this conception – his central claim that actions can be rational without there being reasons for them (...)
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  22. Michael Cholbi (2011). The Moral Conversion of Rational Egoists. Social Theory and Practice 37 (4):533-556.
    One principal challenge to the rationalist thesis that the demands of morality are requirements of rationality has been that posed by the "rational egoist." In attempting to answer's the egoist's challenge, some rationalists have supposed that an adequate reply must take the form of a deductive argument that "converts" the egoist by showing that her position is contradictory, arbitrary, or violates some precept that defines practical rationality as such. Here I argue (a) that such rationalist replies will fail to persuade (...)
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  23. Chong Kim Chong (1992). Ethical Egoism and the Moral Point of View. Journal of Value Inquiry 26 (1):23-36.
    Interpretations of ethical egoism as advocating the unconstrained harming of others, or as an absurd meta-ethical definition of morality, are unwarranted. The social definition of morality provided by, e.g., William Frankena, fails to rule out egoism. Instead, it forms the background against which egoism develops as a possible, normative position. Examples from "The Immoralist" and "Zorba the Greek" illustrate this possibility.
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  24. Roger Crisp (1990). Sidgwick and Self-Interest. Utilitas 2 (02):267-.
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  25. Helen Cullyer (2006). Review of Tara Smith, Ayn Rand's Normative Ethics: The Virtuous Egoist. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2006 (11).
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  26. J. Dancy (ed.) (1997). Reading Parfit. Blackwell.
  27. Charles B. Daniels (1972). A Note on Ethical Egoism. Philosophical Studies 23 (6):418 - 420.
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  28. Colin Davies (1975). Egoism and Consistency. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 53 (1):19 – 27.
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  29. Roger Donway (1969). Can Egoists Be Consistent? Ethics 80 (1):50-52.
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  30. Abraham Edel (1937). Two Traditions in the Refutation of Egoism. Journal of Philosophy 34 (23):617-628.
    TO the egoist the ultimate justification of his acts lies in their being conducive of his personal interest. This refusal to submit his own interests to any moral test beyond themselves in their interrelations and prospects of fulfillment makes the egoist the object of fierce attack. The non-egoist is supposed to be always ready to question the ultimacy of his own interests. Even where he pursues them, it is because on some other basis-general happiness or duty or anything else-he thinks (...)
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  31. William K. Frankena (2000). The Methods of Ethics, Edition 7, Page 92, Note. Utilitas 12 (03):278-.
    This essay, one of the last that Frankena wrote, provides a scrupulously detailed exploration of the various possible meanings of one of Sidgwick's most famous footnotes in the Methods Long intrigued by what Sidgwick had in mind when he said that he would explain how it came about that for moderns it is not tautologous to claim that one's own good is one's only reasonable ultimate end, Frankena uses this note as a point of departure for a penetrating review of (...)
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  32. David P. Gauthier (1970). Morality and Rational Self-Interest. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.,Prentice-Hall.
    Reason, egoism, and utilitarianism, by H. Sidgwick.--Is egoism reasonable? By G. E. Moore.--Ultimate principles and ethical egoism, by B. Medlin.--In defense of egoism, by J. Kalin.--Virtuous affections and self-love, by F. Hutcheson.--Our obligation to virtue, by D. Hume.--Duty and interest, by H. A. Prichard.--The natural condition of mankind and the laws of nature, by T. Hobbes.--Why should we be moral? By K. Baier.--Morality and advantage, by D. P. Gauthier.--Bibliographical essay (p. 181-184).
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  33. Jyl Gentzler (2012). How Should I Be? A Defense of Platonic Rational Egoism. European Journal of Philosophy 20 (4):n/a-n/a.
    There has been a long tradition of interpreting Plato as a rational egoist. Over the past few decades, however, some scholars have challenged this reading. While Rational Egoism appeals to many ordinary folk, in sophisticated philosophical circles it has fallen out of favor as a general and complete account of the nature of reasons for action. I argue that while the theory of practical rationality that is often equated with rational egoism—a view that I call ‘Simple-Minded Rational Egoism'—is neither plausible (...)
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  34. W. D. Glasgow (1971). Ethical Egoism Again. Ethics 82 (1):65-71.
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  35. Richard Baxter Hall (1976). Carlson on Ethical Egoism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 54 (1):72 – 74.
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  36. Jonathan Harrison (1995). Ethical Egoism, Utilitarianism and the Fallacy of Pragmatic Inconsistency. Argumentation 9 (4):595-609.
    In this paper I shall consider the difficulty for Ethical Egoism, Act Utilitarianism and later what I shall call Cumulative Effect Utilitarianism, that they both commit the fallacy of pragmatic inconsistency. I shall distinguish various forms of the fallacy of pragmatic inconsistency; in particular I shall distinguish between the fallacy of direct and indirect pragmatic inconsistency, and shall argue that though both Ethical Egoism and Act Utilitarianism probably commit both, Cumulative Effect Utilitarianism does not.
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  37. Alison Hills (2010/2012). The Beloved Self: Morality and the Challenge From Egoism. Oxford University Press.
    The Beloved Self is about the holy grail of moral philosophy, an argument against egoism that proves that we all have reasons to be moral. Part One introduces three different versions of egoism. Part Two looks at attempts to prove that egoism is false, and shows that even the more modest arguments that do not try to answer the egoist in her own terms seem to fail. But in part Three, Hills defends morality and develops a new problem for egoism, (...)
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  38. Michael Huemer, Critique of "the Objectivist Ethics&Quot;.
    The following responds to "The Objectivist Ethics" by Ayn Rand. I assume the reader is familiar with it. I begin with a general overview of what is wrong with it. I follow this with a set of more detailed comments, which make a paragraph-by-paragraph examination of her statements in the essay. The latter also elaborates further some of the points made in the overview.
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  39. Michael Huemer (2004). Rejoinder to Michael Young: Egoism and Prudent Predation. Journal of Ayn Rand Studies 5 (2):457 - 468.
    Huemer responds to Michael Young's argument that an ethical egoist should not embrace prudent predation because accepting a principle of prudent predation has serious negative consequences over and above the consequences of individual predatory acts. In addition, he addresses the advantages Young claims for an agent-relative conception of value over an agent-neutral one. He finds that the agent-relative conception does not clearly have any of the advantages Young names, and that some paradigmatic uses of the concept of value are agent-neutral.
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  40. Michael Huemer (2002). Is Benevolent Egoism Coherent? Journal of Ayn Rand Studies 3 (2):259 - 288.
    Michael Huemer argues that there is a tension between two principles putatively essential to Rand's ethics: the principle of egoism, which states that the only reason for doing (or not doing) anything is that it will serve (or frustrate) one's own interests; and the principle that one must not sacrifice others. Huemer considers several arguments that Rand offers for the second principle but finds that each involves either implausible empirical assumptions or assumptions that conflict with egoism. Huemer suggests that Rand (...)
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  41. Lester H. Hunt (1999). Flourishing Egoism. Social Philosophy and Policy 16 (01):72-.
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  42. Jesse Kalin (1971). Baier's Refutation of Ethical Egoism. Philosophical Studies 22 (5-6):74 - 78.
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  43. R. Mayhew (2008). Ayn Rand's Normative Ethics: The Virtuous Egoist - by Tara Smith. Philosophical Books 49 (1):56-57.
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  44. Terrance C. McConnell (1978). The Argument From Psychological Egoism to Ethical Egoism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 56 (1):41-47.
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  45. Joe Mintoff (2006). Could an Egoist Be a Friend? American Philosophical Quarterly 43 (2):101 - 118.
    Being a friend makes our lives better, but it seems this consideration cannot guide our pursuit of friendship, lest this mean we are not true friends and that our lives are not made better. The aim of this paper is to show how, appearances notwithstanding, being a true friend is consistent with having one's own happiness as one's ultimate end. Aristotle's idea that friends are other selves, and recent accounts of practical reason, show how (i) one's acting as a friend (...)
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  46. Alexander Moseley, Egoism. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    In philosophy, egoism is the theory that one’s self is, or should be, the motivation and the goal of one’s own action. Egoism has two variants, descriptive or normative. The descriptive (or positive) variant conceives egoism as a factual description of human affairs. That is, people are motivated by their own interests and desires, and they cannot be described otherwise. The normative variant proposes that people should be so motivated, regardless of what presently motivates their behavior. Altruism is the opposite (...)
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  47. Thomas Nagel (1970). The Possibility of Altruism. Oxford Clarendon Press.
    Just as there are rational requirements on thought, there are rational requirements on action. This book defends a conception of ethics, and a related conception of human nature, according to which altruism is included among the basic rational requirements on desire and action. Altruism itself depends on the recognition of the reality of other persons, and on the equivalent capacity to regard oneself as merely one individual among many.
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  48. Kai Nielsen (1972). Ethical Egoism and Rational Action. Journal of Philosophy 64 (20):698-700.
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  49. Kai Nielsen (1959). Egoism in Ethics. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 19 (4):502-510.
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  50. Robert G. Olson (1961). Ethical Egoism and Social Welfare. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 21 (4):528-536.
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