Despite the current popularity of 'Kantian' ethical theory, Kant's applied ethical conclusions receive little respect. Kantians provide a variety of reasons for rejecting Kant's own application of his ethical theory, but the justification repeated perhaps most frequently, with varying degrees of bluntness, is that in arguing for his (allegedly) objectionable results, Kant abuses his theory to rationalize prevailing cultural norms. Against this view, this paper argues that Kant is not guilty of widespread misapplication of his meta-ethical (...) theory. This paper considers a number of applied results contemporary Kantians are eager to rid themselves of and shows how Kant provides support for each of them by considering the crucial concept of personality. Because of the central role this concept plays in Kant's theory and the strength of the support it provides for his conclusions, it will be difficult for any Kantian theory to jettison Kant's unpopular applied ethics without seriously distorting his understanding of the Categorical Imperative. (shrink)

A new, more physically embodied, approach to Christian sexual ethics is introduced, centered around providing an ontological grounding for union in “one flesh/body” at a biological level in an organic teleological striving in the direction of procreation (a striving that need not succeed, e.g., at infertile times). The phenomenology of sexual love requires such an ontological grounding, which grounding in turn implies such doctrines of traditional Christian sexual ethics as the unlawfulness of artificial contraception and homosexual acts, while allowing for (...) Natural Family Planning. What is particularly striking about this approach is that it links the unitive and procreative dimension of the sexual act in such a way that artificial contraception is seen as an attack on the.. (shrink)

The sexual domain is unified only by the phenomenal quality of the occurrence of the desires, activities, and pleasures classed as sexual. There is no conceptual restriction on the range of intentional objects those desires, activities, and pleasures can take. Neither is there good conceptual reason to privilege some sexual desires, activities, or pleasures as paradigmatic. Since the phenomenal quality unifying the sexual domain is not itself morally significant, the morality of sexuality is no different from morality in general. The (...) view that participant consent is morally sufficient in the sexual domain therefore requires the more controversial view that it is morally sufficient in our lives in general. (shrink)