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  1. Mark Alfano (ed.) (2015). Current Controversies in Virtue Theory. Routledge.
    Virtue is among the most venerable concepts in philosophy, and has recently seen a major revival. However, new challenges to conceptions of virtue have also arisen. In Current Controversies in Virtue Theory , five pairs of cutting-edge philosophers square off over central topics in virtue theory: the nature of virtue, the connection between virtue and flourishing, the connection between moral and epistemic virtues, the way in which virtues are acquired, and the possibility of attaining virtue. Mark Alfano guides his readers (...)
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  2. Julia Annas (2008). Virtue Ethics and the Charge of Egoism. In Paul Bloomfield (ed.), Morality and Self-Interest. Oxford University Press
    There are problems with egoism as a theory, but what matters here is the point that intuitively ethics is thought to be about the good of others, so that focusing on your own good seems wrong from the start. Virtues are not just character traits, however, since forgetfulness or stubbornness are not virtues. Virtues are character traits which are in some way desirable. Criticism is generally renewed at this point on the grounds that claims about flourishing are now including claims (...)
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  3. Anne Baril (2014). Eudaimonia in Contemporary Virtue Ethics. In Stan van Hooft (ed.), The Handbook of Virtue Ethics. Acumen 17-27.
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  4. Anne Baril (2013). Review of Intelligent Virtue, by Julia Annas. [REVIEW] Mind 122 (485):241-245.
  5. Sandrine Berges (2002). Evil Behaviour and Character: Virtue Ethics Versus Social Psychology. In Diane Medlicott (ed.), Their Deeds were Evil: Understanding Atrocity, Ferocity and Extreme Crime. Rodopi
    Is there such a thing as evil character? Philosophers and social psychologists have cast doubt on the idea that evil behaviour is due to a defect in character formation, which some people have, and some have not. I will argue that their claims are misguided by putting forward the following thesis: evil character traits exist, but they are typically less stable, albeit more prevalent, than good character traits. This is because they typically do not receive the backing of formation, which, (...)
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  6. Lorraine Besser-Jones (2011). The Motivational State of the Virtuous Agent. Philosophical Psychology 25 (1):93 - 108.
    Julia Annas argues that Aristotle's understanding of the phenomenological experience of the virtuous agent corresponds to psychologist Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi's concept of the ?flow,? which is a form of intrinsic motivation. In this paper, I explore whether or not Annas? understanding of virtuous agency is a plausible one. After a thorough analysis of psychological accounts of intrinsic and extrinsic states of motivation, I argue that despite the attractiveness of Annas? understanding of virtuous agency, it is subject to a serious problem: all (...)
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  7. Noell Birondo (2016). Virtue and Prejudice: Giving and Taking Reasons. The Monist 99 (2):212-223.
    The most long-standing criticism of virtue ethics in its traditional, eudaimonistic variety centers on its apparently foundational appeal to nature in order to provide a source of normativity. This paper argues that a failure to appreciate both the giving and taking of reasons in sustaining an ethical outlook can distort a proper understanding of the available options for this traditional version of virtue ethics. To insist only on giving reasons, without also taking (maybe even considering) the reasons provided by others, (...)
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  8. Noell Birondo (2015). Aristotle and the Virtues of Will Power. Southwest Philosophy Review 31 (2):85-94.
    Since the 1970s, at least, and presumably under the influence of the later Wittgenstein, certain advocates of Aristotle’s ethics have insisted that a proper validation of the virtues of character must proceed only from within, or be internal to, the particular evaluative outlook provided by possession of the virtues themselves. The most influential advocate of this line of thinking is arguably John McDowell, although Rosalind Hursthouse and Daniel C. Russell have also more recently embraced it. Here I consider whether a (...)
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  9. Noell Birondo (2015). Aristotelian Eudaimonism and Patriotism. Dialogue and Universalism 25 (2):68-78.
    This paper concerns the prospects for an internal validation of the Aristotelian virtues of character. With respect to the more contentious trait of patriotism, this approach for validating some specific trait of character as a virtue of character provides a plausible and nuanced Aristotelian position that does not fall neatly into any of the categories provided by a recent mapping of the terrain surrounding the issue of patriotism. According to the approach advocated here, patriotism can plausibly, though qualifiedly, be defended (...)
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  10. Stephen Buckle (2002). Aristotle's Republic or, Why Aristotle's Ethics is Not Virtue Ethics. Philosophy 77 (4):565-595.
    Modern virtue ethics is commonly presented as an alternative to Kantian and utilitarian views—to ethics focused on action and obligations—and it invokes Aristotle as a predecessor. This paper argues that the Nichomachean Ethics does not represent virtue ethics thus conceived, because the discussion of the virtues of character there serves a quasi-Platonic psychology: it is an account of how to tame the unruly (non-rational) elements of the human soul so that they can be ruled by reason and the laws it (...)
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  11. T. D. J. Chappell (ed.) (2006). Values and Virtues: Aristotelianism in Contemporary Ethics. Oxford University Press.
    After 25 centuries, Aristotle's influence on our society's moral thinking remains profound and he continues to be a very important contributor to contemporary debates in philosophical ethics. This collection showcases some of the best new writing on the Aristotelian notion of virtue of character, which remains central to much of the most interesting work in ethical theory.
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  12. E. Sonny Elizondo (2016). The Virtues of Happiness: A Theory of the Good Life. [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly 66 (262):181-183.
    A Review of Paul Bloomfield's book _The Virtues of Happiness: A Theory of the Good Life_ (OUP 2014).
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  13. Colin Farrelly (2007). Virtue Ethics and Prenatal Genetic Enhancement. Studies in Ethics, Law, and Technology 1 (1).
    In this paper I argue that the virtue ethics tradition can enhance the moral discourse on the ethics of prenatal genetic enhancements in distinctive and valuable ways. Virtue ethics prescribes we adopt a much more provisional stance on the issue of the moral permissibility of prenatal genetic enhancements. A stance that places great care on differentiating between the different stakes involved with developing different phenotypes in our children and the different possible means (environmental vs. genetic manipulation) available to parents for (...)
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  14. Barbro Fröding (2010). Cognitive Enhancement, Virtue Ethics and the Good Life. Neuroethics 4 (3):1-12.
    This article explores the respective roles that medical and technological cognitive enhancements, on the one hand, and the moral and epistemic virtues traditionally understood, on the other, can play in enabling us to lead the good life. It will be shown that neither the virtues nor cognitive enhancements on their own are likely to enable most people to lead the good life. While the moral and epistemic virtues quite plausibly are both necessary and sufficient for the good life in theory, (...)
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  15. R. Heinaman (2007). Eudaimonia as an Activity in Nicomachean Ethics I. 8-12. Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 33:247-279.
  16. Robert Hull (2005). All About EVE: A Report on Environmental Virtue Ethics Today. Ethics and the Environment 10 (1):89-110.
    : In this paper I examine and assess an important developing trend in environmental ethics, environmental virtue ethics. I begin by providing a thorough survey of influential and representative contributions to environmental virtue ethics. Along with explaining these contributions to environmental virtue ethics I discuss their various strengths and weaknesses. In the second section I explain what I believe an environmental virtue ethic needs to do to complement other perspectives in environmental ethics. Then, using the best aspects of previously published (...)
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  17. Rosalind Hursthouse (1999). Virtue Ethics and Human Nature. Hume Studies 25 (1/2):67-82.
    Hume's disjunctive (useful or agreeable, etc.) account of the grounds of moral approbation of the virtues is wildly--and disastrously--different from the conjunctive account implied by the Aristotelian and Epicurean tradition. It seems that Hume often inclines towards the latter and, thereby, its reliance on the distinctions between the truly useful and agreeable and the merely apparently so, which, in that tradition, are discernible only by the _phronimos<D>. We may regard being the 'good critic' in morals (and, less plausibly, taking up (...)
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  18. Jonathan Jacobs (2013). “Forgiveness and Perfection,”. In David Konstan Charles Grisowld (ed.), Ancient Forgiveness. Cambridge University Press
    A study of the ways Maimonides and Aquinas both borrow from Aristotle and depart from him, in regard to the issue of forgiveness. The paper explicates moral-psychological issues and normative issues, connecting them to the perfectionism of the philosophical anthropology shared by the three thinkers. The theistic commitments of Maimonides and Aquinas ground important departures from Aristotle regarding the possibility of moral change and regarding moral relations between persons.
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  19. Anne Jeffrey (forthcoming). How Aristotelians Can Make Faith a Virtue. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice:1-17.
    Neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics identifies the virtues with the traits the fully virtuous person possesses. Further, it depicts the fully virtuous person as having all the cognitive perfections necessary for possessing practical wisdom. This paper argues that these two theses disqualify faith as trust, as construed on contemporary accounts of faith, as a virtue. For faith’s role as a virtue depends on limitations of its possessor that are incompatible with the psychological profile of the fully virtuous person on the neo-Aristotelian picture. (...)
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  20. Daryl Koehn (1998). Virtue Ethics, the Firm, and Moral Psychology. Business Ethics Quarterly 8 (3):497-513.
    Business ethicists have increasingly used Aristotelian “virtue ethics” to analyze the actions of business people and to explore the question of what the standard of ethical behavior is. These analyses have raised many important issues and opened up new avenuesfor research. But the time has come to examine in some detail possible limitations or weaknesses in virtue ethics. This paper arguesthat Aristotelian virtue ethics is subject to many objections because the psychology implicit within the ethic is not well-suited for analyzing (...)
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  21. Mark LeBar (2015). Virtue and Second-Personal Reasons: A Reply to Cokelet. Ethics 126 (1):162-174.
    In “Two-Level Eudaimonism and Second-Personal Reasons,” Bradford Cokelet argues that we should reject one strategy—one I advanced earlier in this journal—for reconciling a virtue-ethical theoretical framework with that part of our moral experience that has been described as second-personal reasons. Cokelet frames a number of related objections to that strategy, and his concerns are worth taking up. Addressing them provides an opportunity both to revisit and develop the model bruited in my earlier article and to gain additional insight into second-personal (...)
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  22. Mark LeBar (2009). Virtue Ethics and Deontic Constraints. Ethics 119 (4):642-671.
    One important objection to virtue ethical theories is that they apparently must account for the wrongness of a wrong action in terms of a lack of virtue (or presence of vice) in the agent, and not in terms of the effects of the action on its victim. We take such effects to ground deontic constraints on how we may act, and virtue theory appears unable to account for such constraints. I claim, however, that eudaimonist virtue theory can account for wrongness (...)
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  23. David McPherson (2012). To What Extent Must We Go Beyond Neo-Aristotelian Ethical Naturalism? American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 86 (4):627-654.
    In this essay I discuss the limits of recent attempts to develop a neo-Aristotelian virtue ethic on the basis of a commitment to ‘ethical naturalism.’ By ‘ethical naturalism’ I mean the view that ethics can be founded on claims about what it is for human beings to flourish qua member of the human species, which is analogous to what it is for plants and other animals to flourish qua member of their particular species. Drawing on Charles Taylor’s account of ‘strong (...)
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  24. Christian Miller (2015). Russell on Acquiring Virtue. In Alfano Mark (ed.), Current Controversies in Virtue Theory. Routledge 106-117.
    This is a response paper to Daniel Russell's paper in the same volume. I raise some challenges to Russell's model of virtue acquisition which draws extensively on the CAPS model in psychology and on parallels between virtues and skills.
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  25. Christian Miller (2014). The Problem of Character. In van Hooft Stan (ed.), The Handbook of Virtue Ethics. Acumen Publishing 418-429.
    I first summarize the main line of argument used by Harman and Doris against Aristotelian virtue ethics in particular. In section two I present what seems to me to be the most promising response to their argument. Finally in section three I briefly review and assess the other leading responses in the now sizable literature that has developed in this area.
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  26. Christian Miller (2014). The Real Challenge to Virtue Ethics From Psychology. In Snow Nancy & Trivigno Franco (eds.), The Philosophy and Psychology of Virtue: An Empirical Approach to Character and Happiness. Routledge 15-34.
    In section one, I briefly review the Harman/Doris argument and outline the most promising response. Then in section two I develop what I take the real challenge to virtue ethics to be. The final section of the chapter suggests two strategies for beginning to address this challenge.
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  27. Christian Miller (2014). Moral Virtues, Epistemic Virtues, and the Big Five. In Flanagan Owen & Fairweather Abrol (eds.), Naturalizing Virtue. Cambridge University Press 92-117.
    This paper connects work in psychology on the Big Five Model to the recent debate in philosophy on the empirical adequacy of virtue ethics and virtue epistemology.
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  28. Joe Mintoff (2009). In Defense of the Ideal of a Life Plan. Southern Journal of Philosophy 47 (2):159-186.
    Aristotle claims at Eudemian Ethics 1.2 that everyone who can live according to his own choice should adopt some goal for the good life, which he will keep in view in all his actions, for not to have done so is a sign of folly. This is an opinion shared by other ancients as well as some moderns. Others believe, however, that this view is false to the human condition, and provide a number of objections: (1) you can’t plan love; (...)
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  29. Seamus O'Neill (2016). Neera K. Badhwar, Well Being: Happiness in a Worthwhile Life. [REVIEW] Philosophy in Review 36 (2):47-49.
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  30. David S. Oderberg (2000). Moral Theory: A Non-Consequentialist Approach. Blackwell.
    While this is a welcome development, it is also true that the discipline has been dominated by one particular ethical theory, namely consequentialism.
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  31. Daniel C. Russell (2008). That “Ought” Does Not Imply “Right”: Why It Matters for Virtue Ethics. Southern Journal of Philosophy 46 (2):299-315.
    Virtue ethicists sometimes say that a right action is what a virtuous person would do, characteristically, in the circumstances. But some have objected recently that right action cannot be defined as what a virtuous person would do in the circumstances because there are circumstances in which a right action is possible but in which no virtuous person would be found. This objection moves from the premise that a given person ought to do an action that no virtuous person would do, (...)
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  32. Ronald Sandler (2003). The External Goods Approach to Environmental Virtue Ethics. Environmental Ethics 25 (3):279-293.
    If virtue ethics are to provide a legitimate alternative for reasoning about environmental issues, they must meet the same conditions of adequacy as any other environmental ethic. One such condition that most environmental ethicists insist upon is that an adequate environmental ethic provides a theoretical platform for consistent and justified critique of environmentally unsustainable practices and policies. The external goods approach seeks to establish that any genuinely virtuous agent will be disposed to promote ecosystem sustainability on the grounds that ecosystem (...)
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  33. Robert F. J. Seddon (2008). Daniel C. Russell, Practical Intelligence and the Virtues. [REVIEW] Philosophical Writings (38/39).
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  34. David Shaw (2009). Euthanasia and Eudaimonia. Journal of Medical Ethics 35 (9):530-533.
    This paper re-evaluates euthanasia and assisted suicide from the perspective of eudaimonia, the ancient Greek conception of happiness across one’s whole life. It is argued that one cannot be said to have fully flourished or had a truly happy life if one’s death is preceded by a period of unbearable pain or suffering that one cannot avoid without assistance in ending one’s life. While death is to be accepted as part of life, it should not be left to nature to (...)
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  35. N. E. Snow (2007). Review: Burdened Virtues: Virtue Ethics for Liberatory Struggles. [REVIEW] Mind 116 (463):785-789.
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  36. David Solomon (1988). Internal Objections to Virtue Ethics. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 13 (1):428-441.
  37. Lisa Tessman (2009). Feminist Eudaimonism: Eudaimonism as Non-Ideal Theory. In Feminist Ethics and Social and Political Philosophy: Theorizing the Non-Ideal. Springer 47--58.
    This paper considers whether eudaimonism is necessarily an idealizing approach to ethics. I argue, contrary to what is implied by Christine Swanton, that it is not, and I suggest that a non-ideal eudaimonistic virtue ethics can be useful for feminist and critical race theorists. For eudaimonist theorists in the Aristotelian tradition, the claim that one should aim to live virtuously assumes that there will typically be good enough background conditions so that an exercise of the virtues, in conjunction with these (...)
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  38. Lisa Tessman (2005). Burdened Virtues: Virtue Ethics for Liberatory Struggles. Oxford University Press Usa.
    Lisa Tessman's Burdened Virtues is a deeply original and provocative work that engages questions central to feminist theory and practice, from the perspective of Aristotelian ethics. Focused primarily on selves who endure and resist oppression, she addresses the ways in which devastating conditions confronted by these selves both limit and burden their moral goodness, and affect their possibilities of flourishing. She describes two different forms of "moral trouble" prevalent under oppression. The first is that the oppressed self may be morally (...)
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  39. Lisa Tessman (2001). Critical Virtue Ethics: Understanding Oppression as Morally Damaging. In Peggy DesAutels & Joanne Waugh (eds.), Feminists Doing Ethics. Rowman & Littlefield
    A critically revised Aristotelian-based virtue ethics has something potentially useful to offer to those engaged in analyzing oppression and creating liberatory projects. A critical virtue ethics can help clarify one of the ways in which oppression interferes with flourishing; specifically, it helps clarify an aspect of oppression that can be called "moral damage.".
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  40. Christopher Toner (2006). The Self-Centredness Objection to Virtue Ethics. Philosophy 81 (4):595-618.
    Aristotelian virtue ethics is often charged with counseling a self-centred approach to the moral life. Reviewing some influential responses made by defenders of virtue ethics, I argue that none of them goes far enough. I begin my own response by evaluating two common targets of the objection, Aristotle and Aquinas, and based on my findings sketch the outlines of a clearly non-self-centred version of virtue ethics, according to which the ‘center’ is instead located in the agent’s right relation to others (...)
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  41. Liezl van Zyl (2013). Virtue Ethics and Right Action. In Daniel C. Russell (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Virtue Ethics. Cambridge University Press
    A discussion of three virtue -ethical accounts of right action: a qualified-agent account, agent-based account, and a target-centred account.
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  42. Liezl van Zyl (2011). Right Action and the Non-Virtuous Agent. Journal of Applied Philosophy 28 (1):80-92.
    According to qualified-agent virtue ethics, an action is right if and only if it is what a virtuous agent would characteristically do in the circumstances. I discuss two closely related objections to this view, both of which concern the actions of the non-virtuous. The first is that this criterion sometimes gives the wrong result, for in some cases a non-virtuous agent should not do what a virtuous person would characteristically do. A second objection is it altogether fails to apply whenever (...)
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  43. Liezl van Zyl (2011). Qualified-Agent Virtue Ethics. South African Journal of Philosophy 30 (2):219-228.
    Qualified-agent virtue ethics provides an account of right action in terms of the virtuous agent. It has become one of the most popular, but also most frequently criticized versions of virtue ethics. Many of the objections rest on the mistaken assumption that proponents of qualified-agent virtue ethics share the same view when it comes to fundamental questions about the meaning of the term ‘right action’ and the function of an account of right action. My aim in this paper is not (...)
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  44. John R. Williams (2015). Durable Goods: Pleasure, Wealth and Power in the Virtuous Life . By Gerol Petruzella. Pp. 173, New York, NY, Peter Lang, 2013, $76.95. [REVIEW] Heythrop Journal 56 (5):859-560.
  45. Scott Woodcock (2006). Philippa Foot's Virtue Ethics has an Achilles' Heel. Dialogue 45 (3):445-468.
    My aim in this article is to argue that Philippa Foot fails to provide a convincing basis for moral evaluation in her book Natural Goodness. Foot’s proposal fails because her conception of natural goodness and defect in human beings either sanctions prescriptive claims that are clearly objectionable or else it inadvertently begs the question of what constitutes a good human life by tacitly appealing to an independent ethical standpoint to sanitize the theory’s normative implications. Foot’s appeal to natural facts about (...)
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  46. Paul Woodruff (1991). Virtue Ethics and the Appeal to Human Nature. Social Theory and Practice 17 (2):307-335.
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  47. Raymond Aaron Younis (2014). Neuroscience, Virtues, Ethics, Compassion and the Question of Character. In Michael A. Peters & Belsey Tina (eds.), Education and Philosophies of Engagement. PESA 80-92.
    There has been much debate recently about the meaning, place and function of “character” and “character traits” in Virtue Ethics. For example, a number of philosophers have argued recently that Virtue Ethics would be strengthened as a theory by the omission of talk of character traits; recent neuroscientific studies have suggested that there is scope for scepticism about the existence of such traits. I will argue that both approaches are flawed and unconvincing: in brief, the first approach tends to be (...)
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  48. Raymond Aaron Younis (2009). On the End of the 'End of Ethics'. In On the ethical life. Cambridge Scholars 140-165.
  49. Raymond Aaron Younis (2009). Aporia: On Reconstruction, Ethics and the Ethical Life. In On the ethical life. Cambridge Scholars 85-104.
  50. Raymond Aaron Younis (2009). On the Ethical Life. In On the ethical life. Cambridge Scholars 1-15.