Related categories
Siblings:
240 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Sort by:
1 — 50 / 240
  1. Peter Achinstein (2010). Evidence, Explanation, and Realism: Essays in the Philosophy of Science. Oxford University Press.
    The essays in this volume address three fundamental questions in the philosophy of science: What is required for some fact to be evidence for a scientific ...
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Peter Achinstein (2001). The Book of Evidence. Oxford University Press.
    What is required for something to be evidence for a hypothesis? In this fascinating, elegantly written work, distinguished philosopher of science Peter Achinstein explores this question, rejecting typical philosophical and statistical theories of evidence. He claims these theories are much too weak to give scientists what they want--a good reason to believe--and, in some cases, they furnish concepts that mistakenly make all evidential claims a priori. Achinstein introduces four concepts of evidence, defines three of them by reference to "potential" evidence, (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Peter Achinstein (2000). Why Philosophical Theories of Evidence Are (and Ought to Be) Ignored by Scientists. Philosophy of Science 67 (3):192.
    There are two reasons, I claim, scientists do and should ignore standard philosophical theories of objective evidence: (1) Such theories propose concepts that are far too weak to give scientists what they want from evidence, viz., a good reason to believe a hypothesis; and (2) They provide concepts that make the evidential relationship a priori, whereas typically establishing an evidential claim requires empirical investigation.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Marcus P. Adams (2009). Empirical Evidence and the Knowledge-That/Knowledge-How Distinction. Synthese 170 (1):97 - 114.
    In this article I have two primary goals. First, I present two recent views on the distinction between knowledge-that and knowledge-how (Stanley and Williamson, The Journal of Philosophy 98(8):411–444, 2001; Hetherington, Epistemology futures, 2006). I contend that neither of these provides conclusive arguments against the distinction. Second, I discuss studies from neuroscience and experimental psychology that relate to this distinction. Having examined these studies, I then defend a third view that explains certain relevant data from these studies by positing the (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Jonathan E. Adler (1989). Epistemics and the Total Evidence Requirement. Philosophia 19 (2-3):227-243.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. James V. Allen (2001). Inference From Signs: Ancient Debates About the Nature of Evidence. Oxford University Press.
    Original and penetrating, this book investigates of the notion of inference from signs, which played a central role in ancient philosophical and scientific method. It examines an important chapter in ancient epistemology: the debates about the nature of evidence and of the inferences based on it--or signs and sign-inferences as they were called in antiquity. As the first comprehensive treatment of this topic, it fills an important gap in the histories of science and philosophy.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Ben Almassi (2007). Experts, Evidence, and Epistemic Independence. Spontaneous Generations 1 (1):58-66.
    Throughout his work on the rationality of epistemic dependence, John Hardwig makes the striking observation that he believes many things for which he possesses no evidence (1985, 335; 1991, 693; 1994, 83). While he could imagine collecting for himself the relevant evidence for some of his beliefs, the vastness of the world and constraints of time and individual intellect thwart his ability to gather for himself the evidence for all his beliefs. So for many things he believes what others tell (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Horacio Arló-Costa (2006). Review of Sherrilyn Roush, Tracking Truth: Knowledge, Evidence and Science. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2006 (7).
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Alexander Arnold (2013). Some Evidence is False. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (1):165 - 172.
    According to some philosophers who accept a propositional conception of evidence, someone's evidence includes a proposition only if it is true. I argue against this thesis by appealing to the possibility of knowledge from falsehood.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Review author[S.]: Bruce Aune (1996). Haack's Evidence and Inquiry. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (3):627-632.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Andrew Bacon (2014). Giving Your Knowledge Half a Chance. Philosophical Studies (2):1-25.
    One thousand fair causally isolated coins will be independently flipped tomorrow morning and you know this fact. I argue that the probability, conditional on your knowledge, that any coin will land tails is almost 1 if that coin in fact lands tails, and almost 0 if it in fact lands heads. I also show that the coin flips are not probabilistically independent given your knowledge. These results are uncomfortable for those, like Timothy Williamson, who take these probabilities to play a (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Thomas Baldwin & Timothy Smiley (eds.) (2005). Studies in the Philosophy of Logic and Knowledge. Oup/British Academy.
    Questions about knowledge, and about the relation between logic and language, are at the heart of philosophy. Eleven distinguished philosophers from Britain and America contribute papers on such questions. All the contributions are examples of recent philosophy at its best. The first half of the book constitutes a running debate about knowledge, evidence and doubt. The second half tackles questions about logic and its relation to language.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Alexandru Baltag, Bryan Renne & Sonja Smets (2014). The Logic of Justified Belief, Explicit Knowledge, and Conclusive Evidence. Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 165 (1):49-81.
    We present a complete, decidable logic for reasoning about a notion of completely trustworthy evidence and its relations to justifiable belief and knowledge, as well as to their explicit justifications. This logic makes use of a number of evidence-related notions such as availability, admissibility, and “goodness” of a piece of evidence, and is based on an innovative modification of the Fitting semantics for Artemovʼs Justification Logic designed to preempt Gettier-type counterexamples. We combine this with ideas from belief revision and awareness (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Eric Christian Barnes (2008). Evidence and Leverage: Comment on Roush. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (3):549-557.
    provides a sustained and ambitious development of the basic idea that knowledge is true belief that tracks the truth. In this essay, I provide a quick synopsis of Roush's book and offer a substantive discussion of her analysis of scientific evidence. Roush argues that, for e to serve as evidence for h, it should be easier to determine the truth value of e than it is to determine the truth value of h, an ideal she refers to as ‘leverage’. She (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Peter Baumann (2013). Knowledge and Dogmatism. Philosophical Quarterly 63 (250):1-19.
    There is a sceptical puzzle according to which knowledge appears to license an unacceptable kind of dogmatism. Here is a version of the corresponding sceptical argument: (1) If a subject S knows a proposition p, then it is OK for S to ignore all evidence against p as misleading; (2) It is never OK for any subject to ignore any evidence against their beliefs as misleading; (3) Hence, nobody knows anything.I distinguish between different versions of the puzzle (mainly a ‘permissibility’ (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. George Bealer, A Priori Knowledge: Replies to Lycan and Sosa.
    This paper contains replies to comments on the author's paper "A Priori Knowledge and the Scope of Philosophy." Several points in the argument of that paper are given further clarification: the notion of our standard justificatory procedure, the notion of a basic source of evidence, and the doctrine of modal reliabilism. The reliability of intuition is then defended against Lycan's skepticism and a response is given to Lycan's claim that the scope of a priori knowledge does not include philosophically central (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. George Bealer (2000). A Theory of the a Priori. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 81 (1):1–30.
    The topic of a priori knowledge is approached through the theory of evidence. A shortcoming in traditional formulations of moderate rationalism and moderate empiricism is that they fail to explain why rational intuition and phenomenal experience count as basic sources of evidence. This explanatory gap is filled by modal reliabilism -- the theory that there is a qualified modal tie between basic sources of evidence and the truth. This tie to the truth is then explained by the theory of concept (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (13 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. George Bealer (1987). The Philosophical Limits of Scientific Essentialism. Philosophical Perspectives 1:289-365.
    Scientific essentialism is the view that some necessities can be known only with the aid of empirical science. The thesis of the paper is that scientific essentialism does not extend to the central questions of philosophy and that these questions can be answered a priori. The argument is that the evidence required for the defense of scientific essentialism is reliable only if the intuitions required by philosophy to answer its central questions is also reliable. Included is an outline of a (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. William P. Bechtel (forthcoming). The Epistemology of Evidence in Cognitive Neuroscience. In R. Skipper Jr, C. Allen, R. A. Ankeny, C. F. Craver, L. Darden, G. Mikkelson & and R. Richardson (eds.), Philosophy and the Life Sciences: A Reader. Mit Press.
    It is no secret that scientists argue. They argue about theories. But even more, they argue about the evidence for theories. Is the evidence itself trustworthy? This is a bit surprising from the perspective of traditional empiricist accounts of scientific methodology according to which the evidence for scientific theories stems from observation, especially observation with the naked eye. These accounts portray the testing of scientific theories as a matter of comparing the predictions of the theory with the data generated by (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Andrew Bell, John Swenson-Wright & Karin Tybjerg (eds.) (2008). Evidence. Cambridge University Press.
    In this highly accessible book eight distinguished experts from a wide range of disciplines consider the nature and use of evidence in the modern world.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Matthew A. Benton, John Hawthorne & Yoaav Isaacs (forthcoming). Evil and Evidence. Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion.
    The problem of evil is the most prominent argument against the existence of God. Skeptical theists contend that it is not a good argument. Their reasons for this contention vary widely, involving such notions as CORNEA, epistemic appearances, 'gratuitous' evils, 'levering' evidence, and the representativeness of goods. We aim to clarify some confusions about these notions, and also to offer a few new responses to the problem of evil.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Hans Berends (2001). Veritistic Value and the Use of Evidence: A Shortcoming of Goldman's Epistemic Evaluation of Social Practices. Social Epistemology 16 (2):177 – 179.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Alexander Bird (2009). Inductive Knowledge. In D. Pritchard (ed.), Routledge Companion to Epistemology. Routledge.
    The first obstacle that confronts the student of induction is that of defining the subject matter. One initial point is to note that much of the relevant subject matter goes under the description ‘the theory of confirmation’. The distinction is primarily that the study of induction concerns inference, i.e. cases where one takes the conclusion to be established by the evidence, whereas confirmation concerns the weight of evidence, which one may take to be something like the credibility of a hypothesis (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Alexander Bird (2007). Underdetermination and Evidence. In Bradley John Monton (ed.), Images of Empiricism: Essays on Science and Stances, with a Reply From Bas C. Van Fraassen. Oxford University Press.
    I present an argument that encapsulates the view that theory is underdetermined by evidence. I show that if we accept Williamson's equation of evidence and knowledge, then this argument is question-begging. I examine ways of defenders of underdetermination may avoid this criticism. I also relate this argument and my critique to van Fraassen's constructive empiricism.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Alexander Bird (2005). Abductive Knowledge and Holmesian Inference. In Tamar Szabo Gendler John Hawthorne (ed.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology. Oxford University Press. 1--31.
    The usual, comparative, conception of Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE) takes it to be ampliative. In this paper I propose a conception of IBE (‘Holmesian inference’) that takes it to be a species of eliminative induction and hence not ampliative. This avoids several problems for comparative IBE (e.g. how could it be reliable enough to generate knowledge?). My account of Holmesian inference raises the suspicion that it could never be applied, on the grounds that scientific hypotheses are inevitably underdetermined (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. Alexander Bird (2005). Abductive Knowledge and Holmesian Inference. In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology. Oxford University Press. 1--31.
    The usual, comparative, conception of inference to the best explanation (IBE) takes it to be ampliative. In this paper I propose a conception of IBE ('Holmesian inference') that takes it to be a species of eliminative induction and hence not ampliative. This avoids several problems for comparative IBE (for example, how could it be reliable enough to generate knowledge?). My account of Holmesian inference raises the suspicion that it could never be applied, on the grounds that scientific hypotheses are inevitably (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. Alexander Bird (2004). Is Evidence Non-Inferential? Philosophical Quarterly 54 (215):252–265.
    Evidence is often taken to be foundational, in that while other propositions may be inferred from our evidence, evidence propositions are themselves not inferred from anything. I argue that this conception is false, since the non-inferential propositions on which beliefs are ultimately founded may be forgotten or undermined in the course of enquiry.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. John Biro (2014). Clocks, Evidence, and the “Truth-Maker Solution”. Acta Analytica 29 (3):377-381.
    Adrian Heathcote and I agree that a stopped clock does not show—as the adage has it—the right time twice a day, but he thinks, as I do not, that it does show what time it stopped. To think that it does is to treat the position of its hands as evidence of its stopping at the time it did. Add to the justified-true-belief analysis of knowledge the requirement that the evidence on the basis of which the believer is justified be (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. Jessica Brown (2013). Infallibilism, Evidence and Pragmatics. Analysis 73 (4):626-635.
    According to one contemporary formulation of infallibilism, probability 1 infallibilism, if a subject knows that p, then the probability of p on her evidence is 1. To avoid an implausible scepticism about knowledge, probability 1 infallibilism needs to allow that, in a wide range of cases, a proposition can be evidence for itself. However, such infallibilism needs to explain why it is typically infelicitous to cite p as evidence for p itself. I argue that probability 1 infallibilism has no explanation (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (11 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. Jessica Brown (2011). Thought Experiments, Intuitions and Philosophical Evidence. Dialectica 65 (4):493-516.
    What is the nature of the evidence provided by thought experiments in philosophy? For instance, what evidence is provided by the Gettier thought experiment against the JTB theory of knowledge? According to one view, it provides as evidence only a certain psychological proposition, e.g. that it seems to one that the subject in the Gettier case lacks knowledge. On an alternative, nonpsychological view, the Gettier thought experiment provides as evidence the nonpsychological proposition that the subject in the Gettier case lacks (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. Anthony Brueckner (2005). Knowledge, Evidence, and Skepticism According to Williamson. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):436–443.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. John Brunero (2009). Reasons and Evidence One Ought. Ethics 119 (3):538-545.
  33. James Cargile (1996). Evidence and Inquiry by Susan Haack. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (3):621-625.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. Nancy Cartwright (2009). Evidence-Based Policy: What's to Be Done About Relevance? [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 143 (1):127 - 136.
    How can philosophy of science be of more practical use? One thing we can do is provide practicable advice about how to determine when one empirical claim is relevant to the truth of another; i.e., about evidential relevance. This matters especially for evidence-based policy, where advice is thin—and misleading—about how to tell what counts as evidence for policy effectiveness. This paper argues that good efficacy results (as in randomized controlled trials), which are all the rage now, are only a very (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. Albert Casullo (2008). Defeasible a Priori Justification: A Reply to Thurow. Philosophical Quarterly 58 (231):336–343.
    Joshua Thurow offers a defence of the claim that if a belief is defeasible by non-experiential evidence then it is defeasible by experiential evidence. He responds to an objection which I make against this claim, and offers two arguments in support of his own position. I show that Thurow's response misconstrues my objection, and that his supporting arguments fall short of their goal.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36. Roderick M. Chisholm (1973). Empirical Knowledge; Readings From Contemporary Sources. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.,Prentice-Hall.
    Nelson, L. The impossibility of the "Theory of knowledge."--Moore, G. E. Four forms of skepticism.--Lehrer, K. Skepticism & conceptual change.--Quine, W. V. Epistemology naturalized.--Rozeboom, W. W. Why I know so much more than you do.--Price, H. H. Belief and evidence.--Lewis, C. I. The bases of empirical knowledge.--Malcolm, N. The verification argument.--Firth, R. The anatomy of certainty.--Chisholm, R. M. On the nature of empirical evidence.--Meinong, A. Toward an epistemological assessment of memory.--Brandt, R. The epistemological status of memory beliefs.--Malcolm, N. A definition (...)
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. Roderick M. Chisholm (1961). Evidence as Justification. Journal of Philosophy 58 (23):739-748.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. David Christensen (2009). Disagreement as Evidence: The Epistemology of Controversy. Philosophy Compass 4 (5):756-767.
    How much should your confidence in your beliefs be shaken when you learn that others – perhaps 'epistemic peers' who seem as well-qualified as you are – hold beliefs contrary to yours? This article describes motivations that push different philosophers towards opposite answers to this question. It identifies a key theoretical principle that divides current writers on the epistemology of disagreement. It then examines arguments bearing on that principle, and on the wider issue. It ends by describing some outstanding questions (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  39. David Christensen (1983). Glymour on Evidential Relevance. Philosophy of Science 50 (3):471-481.
    Glymour's "bootstrap" account of confirmation is designed to provide an analysis of evidential relevance, which has been a serious problem for hypothetico-deductivism. As set out in Theory and Evidence, however, the "bootstrap" condition allows confirmation in clear cases of evidential irrelevance. The difficulties with Glymour's account seem to be due to a basic feature which it shares with hypothetico-deductive accounts, and which may explain why neither can give a satisfactory analysis of evidential relevance.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  40. Liana Chua, Casey High & Timm Lau (eds.) (2008). How Do We Know?: Evidence, Ethnography, and the Making of Anthropological Knowledge. Cambridge Scholars Pub..
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41. E. J. Coffman, Justification Before Knowledge?
    This paper assesses several prominent recent attacks on the view that epistemic justification is conceptually prior to knowledge. I argue that this view—call it the Received View (RV)—emerges from these attacks unscathed. I start with Timothy Williamson’s two strongest arguments for the claim that all evidence is knowledge (E>K), which impugns RV when combined with the claim that justification depends on evidence. One of Williamson’s arguments assumes a false epistemic closure principle; the other misses some alternative (to E>K) explanations of (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  42. E. J. Coffman (2011). Hiddenness, Evidence, and Idolatry. In Raymond VanArragon & Kelly James Clark (eds.), Evidence and Religious Belief. Oxford University Press.
    In some of the most important recent work in religious epistemology, Paul Moser (2002, 2004, 2008) develops a multifaceted reply to a prominent attack on belief in God—what we’ll call the Hiddenness Argument. This paper raises a number of worries about Moser’s novel treatment of the Hiddenness Argument. After laying out the version of that argument Moser most explicitly engages, we explain the four main elements of Moser’s reply and argue that it stands or falls with two pieces in particular—what (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43. Juan Comesaña & Holly Kantin (2010). Is Evidence Knowledge? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (2):447 - 454.
    We argue that if evidence were knowledge, then there wouldn’t be any Gettier cases, and justification would fail to be closed in egregious ways. But there are Gettier cases, and justification does not fail to be close in egregious ways. Therefore, evidence isn’t knowledge.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  44. Carl Cranor & Kurt Nutting (1990). Scientific and Legal Standards of Statistical Evidence in Toxic Tort and Discrimination Suits. Law and Philosophy 9 (2):115 - 156.
    Many legal disputes turn on scientific, especially statistical, evidence. Traditionally scientists have accepted only that statistical evidence which satisfies a 95 percent (or 99 percent) rule — that is, only evidence which has less than five percent (or one percent) probability of resulting from chance.The rationale for this rule is the reluctance of scientists to accept anything less than the best-supported new knowledge. The rule reflects the internal needs of scientific practice. However, when uncritically adopted as a rule for admitting (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  45. Charles B. Cross (1995). Probability, Evidence, and the Coherence of the Whole Truth. Synthese 103 (2):153 - 170.
    The coherence of the whole truth is a presupposition of any holistic coherence theory of justification that postulates a positive connection between justification and truth, for unless the whole truth is itself systemically coherent there is no reason to look for systemic coherence when deciding whether one is justified in accepting a given body of beliefs as true. This paper develops a formal model of holistic evidential coherence and uses this model to formalize and defend the claim that the whole (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  46. Vincenzo Crupi, Roberto Festa & and Tommaso Mastropasqua (2008). Bayesian Confirmation by Uncertain Evidence: A Reply to Huber [2005]. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (2):201-211.
    Bayesian epistemology postulates a probabilistic analysis of many sorts of ordinary and scientific reasoning. Huber ([2005]) has provided a novel criticism of Bayesianism, whose core argument involves a challenging issue: confirmation by uncertain evidence. In this paper, we argue that under a properly defined Bayesian account of confirmation by uncertain evidence, Huber's criticism fails. By contrast, our discussion will highlight what we take as some new and appealing features of Bayesian confirmation theory. Introduction Uncertain Evidence and Bayesian Confirmation Bayesian Confirmation (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  47. Timothy Joseph Day (1993). Knowledge and Evidence. International Studies in Philosophy 25 (1):98-99.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  48. Keith Derose (2000). Ought We to Follow Our Evidence? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (3):697-706.
    fits our evidence.[1] I will propose some potential counter-examples to test this evidentialist thesis. My main intention in presenting the “counter-examples” is to better understand Feldman’s evidentialism, and evidentialism in general. How are we to understand what our evidence is, how it works, and how are we to understand the phrase “epistemically ought to believe” such that evidentialism might make sense as a plausible thesis in light of the examples? Of course, we may decide that there’s no such way to (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  49. Dylan Dodd (2007). Why Williamson Should Be a Sceptic. Philosophical Quarterly 57 (229):635–649.
    Timothy Williamson's epistemology leads to a fairly radical version of scepticism. According to him, all knowledge is evidence. It follows that if S knows p, the evidential probability for S that p is 1. I explain Williamson's infallibilist account of perceptual knowledge, contrasting it with Peter Klein's, and argue that Klein's account leads to a certain problem which Williamson's can avoid. Williamson can allow that perceptual knowledge is possible and that all knowledge is evidence, while at the same time avoiding (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  50. Mathieu Doucet (2012). Can We Be Self-Deceived About What We Believe? Self-Knowledge, Self-Deception, and Rational Agency. [REVIEW] European Journal of Philosophy 20 (S1):E1-E25.
    Abstract: This paper considers the question of whether it is possible to be mistaken about the content of our first-order intentional states. For proponents of the rational agency model of self-knowledge, such failures might seem very difficult to explain. On this model, the authority of self-knowledge is not based on inference from evidence, but rather originates in our capacity, as rational agents, to shape our beliefs and other intentional states. To believe that one believes that p, on this view, constitutes (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
1 — 50 / 240