Evidence, Misc Edited by Christopher Cloos (San Jose State University)

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  • Peter Achinstein (1996). Swimming in Evidence: A Reply to Maher. Philosophy of Science 63 (2):175-182.
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  • Peter Achinstein (1995). Are Empirical Evidence Claims a Priori? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46 (4):447-473.
    An a priori thesis about evidence, defended by many, states that the only empirical fact that can affect the truth of an objective evidence claim of the form ‘e is evidence for h’ (or ‘e confirms h to degree r’) is the truth of e; all other considerations are a priori. By examining cases involving evidential flaws, I challange this claim and defend an empirical concept of evidence. In accordance with such a concept, whether, and the extent to which, e, (...)
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  • Peter Achinstein (1994). Stronger Evidence. Philosophy of Science 61 (3):329-350.
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  • Joseph Agassi (1970). Positive Evidence in Science and Technology. Philosophy of Science 37 (2):261-270.
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  • Nathan Ballantyne & E. J. Coffman, Uniqueness and Equal Weight.
    Two theses are central to recent work on the epistemology of disagreement: Equal Weight (‘EW’): In cases of epistemic peer disagreement, one should give equal weight to the attitude of a peer and to one’s own attitude.1 Uniqueness (‘U’): For any given proposition and total body of evidence, some doxastic attitude is the one the evidence makes rational (justifies) toward that proposition.
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  • William H. Baumer (1964). Evidence and Ideal Evidence. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 24 (4):567-572.
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  • F. C. Benenson (1984). Probability, Objectivity, and Evidence. Routledge & K. Paul.
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  • Alexander Bird (2004). Is Evidence Non-Inferential? Philosophical Quarterly 54 (215):252–265.
    Evidence is often taken to be foundational, in that while other propositions may be inferred from our evidence, evidence propositions are themselves not inferred from anything. I argue that this conception is false, since the non-inferential propositions on which beliefs are ultimately founded may be forgotten or undermined in the course of enquiry.
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  • Anthony Robert Booth (2006). Can There Be Epistemic Reasons for Action? Grazer Philosophische Studien 73 (1):133-144.
    In this paper I consider whether there can be such things as epistemic reasons for action. I consider three arguments to the contrary and argue that none are successful, being either somewhat question-begging or too strong by ruling out what most epistemologists think is a necessary feature of epistemic justification, namely the epistemic basing relation. I end by suggesting a "non-cognitivist" model of epistemic reasons that makes room for there being epistemic reasons for action and suggest that this model may (...)
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  • B. Brewer, Robust Evidence and Secure Evidence Claims.
    Many philosophers have claimed that evidence for a theory is better when multiple independent tests yield the same result, i.e., when experimental results are robust. Little has been said about the grounds on which such a claim rests, however. The present essay presents an analysis of the evidential value of robustness that rests on the fallibility of assumptions about the reliability of testing procedures and a distinction between the strength of evidence and the security of an evidence claim. Robustness can (...)
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  • Matthew J. Brown, Inquiry, Evidence, and Experiment: The ``Experimenter's Regress'' Dissolved.
    Contemporary ways of understanding of science, especially in the philosophy of science, are beset by overly abstract and formal models of evidence. In such models, the only interesting feature of evidence is that it has a one-way ``support'' relation to hypotheses, theories, causal claims, etc. These models create a variety of practical and philosophical problems, one prominent example being the experimenter's regress. According to the experimenter's regress, good evidence is produced by good techniques, but which techniques are good is only (...)
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  • Greg N. Carlson (1983). Logical Form: Types of Evidence. Linguistics and Philosophy 6 (3).
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  • Paul Draper (1992). God and Perceptual Evidence. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 32 (3).
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  • Ellery Eells & Branden Fitelson (2000). Measuring Confirmation and Evidence. Journal of Philosophy 97 (12):663-672.
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  • Roderick Firth (1956). II. Ultimate Evidence. Journal of Philosophy 53 (23):732-739.
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  • Patrick Forber (2009). Spandrels and a Pervasive Problem of Evidence. Biology and Philosophy 24 (2).
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  • Malcolm R. Forster (2006). Counterexamples to a Likelihood Theory of Evidence. Minds and Machines 16 (3).
    The likelihood theory of evidence (LTE) says, roughly, that all the information relevant to the bearing of data on hypotheses (or models) is contained in the likelihoods. There exist counterexamples in which one can tell which of two hypotheses is true from the full data, but not from the likelihoods alone. These examples suggest that some forms of scientific reasoning, such as the consilience of inductions (Whewell, 1858. In Novum organon renovatum (Part II of the 3rd ed.). The philosophy of (...)
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  • Steven Gimbel (2004). Restoring Ambiguity to Achinstein's Account of Evidence. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55 (2).
    , Peter Achinstein argues against the long-standing claim that ‘evidence’ is ambiguous in possessing a sense of confirming evidence and a sense of supporting evidence. He argues that explications of supporting evidence will necessarily violate his contentions that evidence is a discontinuous ‘threshold concept’ and that any philosophical account of supporting evidence will be too weak to be useful to working scientists. But an account of supporting evidence may be formulated which includes Achinstein's notion of epistemic thresholds that finds examples (...)
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  • Clark Glymour (1975). Relevant Evidence. Journal of Philosophy 72 (14):403-426.
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  • Leon J. Goldstein (1962). Evidence and Events in History. Philosophy of Science 29 (2):175-194.
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  • Paul Horwich (1982). Probability and Evidence. Cambridge University Press.
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  • Mortimer R. Kadish (1951). Evidence and Decision. Journal of Philosophy 48 (8):229-242.
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  • Mortimer R. Kadish (1949). A Note on the Grounds of Evidence. Journal of Philosophy 46 (8):229-243.
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  • Stephen Kearns & Daniel Star (2009). Reasons as Evidence. Oxford Studies in Metaethics 4.
    In this paper, we argue for a particular informative and unified analysis of normative reasons. According to this analysis, a fact F is a reason to act in a certain way just in case it is evidence that one ought to act in that way. Similarly, F is a reason to believe a certain proposition just in case it is evidence for the truth of this proposition. Putting the relatively uncontroversial claim about reasons for belief to one side, we present (...)
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  • Stephen Kearns & Daniel Star (2008). Reasons: Explanations or Evidence? Ethics 119 (1).
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  • Klaas J. Kraay (2007). Absence of Evidence and Evidence of Absence. Faith and Philosophy 24:202-227.
    I defend the first premise of William Rowe’s well-known arguments from evil against influential criticisms due to William Alston. I next suggest that the central inference in Rowe’s arguments is best understood to move from the claim that we have an absence of evidence of a satisfactory theodicy to the claim that we have evidence of absence of such a theodicy. I endorse the view which holds that this move succeeds only if it is reasonable to believe that (roughly) if (...)
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  • Henry E. Kyburg Jr (2006). Belief, Evidence, and Conditioning. Philosophy of Science 73 (1):42-65.
    Since Ramsey, much discussion of the relation between probability and belief has taken for granted that there are degrees of belief, i.e., that there is a real-valued function, B, that characterizes the degree of belief that an agent has in each statement of his language. It is then supposed that B is a probability. It is then often supposed that as the agent accumulates evidence, this function should be updated by conditioning: BE(·) should be B(·E)/B(E). Probability is also important in (...)
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  • Helen E. Longino (1979). Evidence and Hypothesis: An Analysis of Evidential Relations. Philosophy of Science 46 (1):35-56.
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  • Patrick Maher (1990). Why Scientists Gather Evidence. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 41 (1):103-119.
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  • Michael Martin (1984). Does the Evidence Confirm Theism More Than Naturalism? International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 16 (3).
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  • Deborah G. Mayo (1991). Novel Evidence and Severe Tests. Philosophy of Science 58 (4):523-552.
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  • Bradley Monton (2006). God, Fine-Tuning, and the Problem of Old Evidence. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (2).
    The fundamental constants that are involved in the laws of physics which describe our universe are finely tuned for life, in the sense that if some of the constants had slightly different values life could not exist. Some people hold that this provides evidence for the existence of God. I will present a probabilistic version of this fine-tuning argument which is stronger than all other versions in the literature. Nevertheless, I will show that one can have reasonable opinions such that (...)
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  • Eleonora Montuschi (2009). Questions of Evidence in Evidence-Based Policy. Axiomathes 19 (4).
    Evidence-based approaches to policy-making are growing in popularity. A generally embraced view is that with the appropriate evidence at hand, decision and policy making will be optimal, legitimate and publicly accountable. In practice, however, evidence-based policy making is constrained by a variety of problems of evidence. Some of these problems will be explored in this article, in the context of the debates on evidence from which they originate. It is argued that the source of much disagreement might be a failure (...)
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  • Greg Novack (2007). Does Evidential Variety Depend on How the Evidence is Described? Philosophy of Science 74 (5).
    The Variety of Evidence Thesis (VET) says that (ceteris paribus) the more diverse (or varied) of two bodies of evidence is the more confirmatory of a hypothesis H. Two recent types of Bayesian explication of VET account for the intuitive force of VET by defining variety as some function of the probabilities of the propositions which collectively constitute a body of evidence. I show that these two accounts of VET are not tracking a meaningful property of bodies of evidence, but (...)
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  • Rod O'Donnell (1992). Keynes's Weight of Argument and Popper's Paradox of Ideal Evidence. Philosophy of Science 59 (1):44-52.
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  • S. Okasha (2000). Holism About Meaning and About Evidence: In Defence of W. V. Quine. Erkenntnis 52 (1):39-61.
    Holistic claims about evidence are a commonplace inthe philosophy of science; holistic claims aboutmeaning are a commonplace in the philosophy oflanguage. W. V. Quine has advocated both types ofholism, and argued for an intimate link between thetwo. Semantic holism may be inferred from theconjunction of confirmation holism andverificationism, he maintains. But in their recentbook Holism: a Shopper's Guide, Jerry Fodor andErnest Lepore (1992) claim that this inference isfallacious. In what follows, I defend Quine's argumentfor semantic holism from Fodor and Lepore'smulti-pronged (...)
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  • K. P. (2003). Theory-Ladenness of Evidence: A Case Study From History of Chemistry. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 34 (2):351-368.
    This paper attempts to argue for the theory-ladenness of evidence. It does so by employing and analysing an episode from the history of eighteenth century chemistry. It delineates attempts by Joseph Priestley and Antoine Lavoisier to construct entirely different kinds of evidence for and against a particular hypothesis from a set of agreed upon observations or (raw) data. Based on an augmented version of a distinction, drawn by J. Bogen and J. Woodward, between data and phenomena it is shown that (...)
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  • Walter B. Pitkin (1906). A Problem of Evidence in Radical Empiricism. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 3 (24):645-650.
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  • Hilary Putnam (2001). When "Evidence Transcendence" is Not Malign: A Reply to Crispin Wright. Journal of Philosophy 98 (11):594-600.
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  • Nicholas Rescher (1958). A Theory of Evidence. Philosophy of Science 25 (1):83-94.
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  • Philip Blair Rice (1943). Feelings as Evidence. Journal of Philosophy 40 (20):552-557.
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  • Olivier Rieppel (2009). 'Total Evidence' in Phylogenetic Systematics. Biology and Philosophy 24 (5).
    Taking its clues from Popperian philosophy of science, cladistics adopted a number of assumptions of the empiricist tradition. These include the identification of a dichotomy between observation reports and theoretical statements and its subsequent abandonment on the basis of the insight that all observation reports are theory-laden. The neglect of the ‘context of discovery’, which is the step of theory (hypothesis) generation. The emphasis on coherentism in the ‘context of justification’, which is the step of evaluation of the relative merits (...)
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  • George N. Schlesinger (1987). Theism and Evidence. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 21 (3).
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  • Ferdinand Schoeman (1987). Cohen on Inductive Probability and the Law of Evidence. Philosophy of Science 54 (1):76-91.
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  • T. Kermit Scott (1969). Ockham on Evidence, Necessity, and Intuition. Journal of the History of Philosophy 7 (1).
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  • Nicholas Silins (2005). Deception and Evidence. Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):375–404.
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  • Michael P. Smith & John McLean (1978). Toward a Causal Theory of Evidence. Journal of Philosophy 75 (8):424-433.
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  • Elliott Sober (1989). Independent Evidence About a Common Cause. Philosophy of Science 56 (2):275-287.
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  • Kent Staley, Two Ways to Rule Out Error: Severity and Security.
    I contrast two modes of error-elimination relevant to evaluating evidence in accounts that emphasize frequentist reliability. The contrast corresponds to that between the use of of a reliable inference procedure and the critical scrutiny of a procedure with regard to its reliability, in light of what is and is not known about the setting in which the procedure is used. I propose a notion of security as a category of evidential assessment for the latter. In statistical settings, robustness theory and (...)
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  • Kent W. Staley, Agency and Objectivity in the Search for the Top Quark.
    From the perspective of Mayo’s error statistical theory of evidence, I explore problems and prospects for an account of the objectivity of scientific evidence. A recent proposal by Peter Achinstein provides the starting point. I consider a challenge to this proposal arising from the role of agents in carrying out the testing procedures that are central to the error statistical theory. Achinstein’s objective concept of unrelativized potential evidence initially resolves these difficulties, only to give way to a deeper incompatibility between (...)
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