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  1. Peter Achinstein (2010). Evidence, Explanation, and Realism: Essays in the Philosophy of Science. Oxford University Press.
    The essays in this volume address three fundamental questions in the philosophy of science: What is required for some fact to be evidence for a scientific ...
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  2. Peter Achinstein (2004). A Challenge to Positive Relevance Theorists: Reply to Roush. Philosophy of Science 71 (4):521-524.
    Recently in this journal Sherrilyn Roush (2004) defends positive relevance as a necessary (albeit not a sufficient) condition for evidence by rejecting two of the counterexamples from my earlier (2001) work. In this reply I argue that Roush's critique is not successful.
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  3. Peter Achinstein (2001). The Book of Evidence. Oxford University Press.
    What is required for something to be evidence for a hypothesis? In this fascinating, elegantly written work, distinguished philosopher of science Peter Achinstein explores this question, rejecting typical philosophical and statistical theories of evidence. He claims these theories are much too weak to give scientists what they want--a good reason to believe--and, in some cases, they furnish concepts that mistakenly make all evidential claims a priori. Achinstein introduces four concepts of evidence, defines three of them by reference to "potential" evidence, (...)
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  4. Peter Achinstein (1996). Swimming in Evidence: A Reply to Maher. Philosophy of Science 63 (2):175-182.
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  5. Peter Achinstein (1995). Are Empirical Evidence Claims a Priori? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46 (4):447-473.
    An a priori thesis about evidence, defended by many, states that the only empirical fact that can affect the truth of an objective evidence claim of the form ‘e is evidence for h’ (or ‘e confirms h to degree r’) is the truth of e; all other considerations are a priori. By examining cases involving evidential flaws, I challange this claim and defend an empirical concept of evidence. In accordance with such a concept, whether, and the extent to which, e, (...)
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  6. Peter Achinstein (1994). Stronger Evidence. Philosophy of Science 61 (3):329-350.
    According to a standard account of evidence, one piece of information is stronger evidence for an hypothesis than is another iff the probability of the hypothesis on the one is greater than it is on the other. This condition, I argue, is neither necessary nor sufficient because various factors can strengthen the evidence for an hypothesis without increasing (and even decreasing) its probability. Contrary to what probabilists claim, I show that this obtains even if a probability function can take these (...)
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  7. Joseph Agassi (1970). Positive Evidence in Science and Technology. Philosophy of Science 37 (2):261-270.
    If the problem of induction were soluble, it should be solved inductively: by observing how scientists observe, etc. The fact is that scientific research is successful, and the real question is, will it be so in future? If there is a formula of induction by which success is achieved, then by this formula we can say, as long as it will be used science will succeed. If there is no formula it looks as if future success in scientific research is (...)
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  8. Nathan Ballantyne & E. J. Coffman (2011). Uniqueness, Evidence, and Rationality. Philosophers' Imprint 11 (18).
    Two theses figure centrally in work on the epistemology of disagreement: Equal Weight (‘EW’) and Uniqueness (‘U’). According to EW, you should give precisely as much weight to the attitude of a disagreeing epistemic peer as you give to your own attitude. U has it that, for any given proposition and total body of evidence, some doxastic attitude is the one the evidence makes rational (justifies) toward that proposition. Although EW has received considerable discussion, the case for U has not (...)
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  9. Eric Christian Barnes (2008). Review: Review Article: Evidence and Leverage: Comment on Roush. [REVIEW] British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (3):549 - 557.
    Sherrilyn Roush's Tracking Truth provides a sustained and ambitious development of the basic idea that knowledge is true belief that tracks the truth. In this essay, I provide a quick synopsis of Roush's book and offer a substantive discussion of her analysis of scientific evidence. Roush argues that, for e to serve as evidence for h, it should be easier to determine the truth value of e than it is to determine the truth value of h, an ideal she refers (...)
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  10. William H. Baumer (1964). Evidence and Ideal Evidence. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 24 (4):567-572.
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  11. F. C. Benenson (1984). Probability, Objectivity, and Evidence. Routledge & K. Paul.
    INTRODUCTION I should begin by warning the reader that many of the views presented in this book are decidedly unfashionable; the theory of probability I ...
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  12. Gregor Betz (2010). Besprechung von ‘Zum methodologischen Wert von Vorhersagen’ von Cornelis Menke. [REVIEW] DZPhil 58:329-332.
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  13. Chandidas Bhattacharya (1987). Can There Be Empirical Evidence for General Truth? Journal of Indian Philosophy 15 (4):333-347.
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  14. Alexander Bird (2004). Is Evidence Non-Inferential? Philosophical Quarterly 54 (215):252–265.
    Evidence is often taken to be foundational, in that while other propositions may be inferred from our evidence, evidence propositions are themselves not inferred from anything. I argue that this conception is false, since the non-inferential propositions on which beliefs are ultimately founded may be forgotten or undermined in the course of enquiry.
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  15. Anthony Robert Booth (2009). Motivating Epistemic Reasons for Action. Grazer Philosophische Studien 78 (1):265 - 271.
    Rowbottom (2008) has recently challenged my definition of epistemic reasons for action and has offered an alternative account. In this paper, I argue that less than giving an 'alternative' definition, Rowbottom has offered an additional condition to my original account. I argue, further, that such an extra condition is unnecessary, i.e. that the arguments designed to motivate it do not go through.
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  16. Anthony Robert Booth (2006). Can There Be Epistemic Reasons for Action? Grazer Philosophische Studien 73 (1):133-144.
    In this paper I consider whether there can be such things as epistemic reasons for action. I consider three arguments to the contrary and argue that none are successful, being either somewhat question-begging or too strong by ruling out what most epistemologists think is a necessary feature of epistemic justification, namely the epistemic basing relation. I end by suggesting a "non-cognitivist" model of epistemic reasons that makes room for there being epistemic reasons for action and suggest that this model may (...)
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  17. Peter Brössel (forthcoming). Keynes’s Coefficient of Dependence Revisited. Erkenntnis.
    Probabilistic dependence and independence are among the key concepts of Bayesian epistemology. This paper focuses on the study of one specific quantitative notion of probabilistic dependence. More specifically, section 1 introduces Keynes’s coefficient of dependence and shows how it is related to pivotal aspects of scientific reasoning such as confirmation, coherence, the explanatory and unificatory power of theories, and the diversity of evidence. The intimate connection between Keynes’s coefficient of dependence and scientific reasoning raises the question of how Keynes’s coefficient (...)
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  18. Peter Brössel, Anna-Maria A. Eder & Franz Huber (2013). Evidential Support and Instrumental Rationality. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (2):279-300.
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  19. Matthew J. Brown, Inquiry, Evidence, and Experiment: The ``Experimenter's Regress'' Dissolved.
    Contemporary ways of understanding of science, especially in the philosophy of science, are beset by overly abstract and formal models of evidence. In such models, the only interesting feature of evidence is that it has a one-way ``support'' relation to hypotheses, theories, causal claims, etc. These models create a variety of practical and philosophical problems, one prominent example being the experimenter's regress. According to the experimenter's regress, good evidence is produced by good techniques, but which techniques are good is only (...)
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  20. Lara Buchak (2010). Instrumental Rationality, Epistemic Rationality, and Evidence-Gathering. Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):85-120.
  21. Greg N. Carlson (1983). Logical Form: Types of Evidence. [REVIEW] Linguistics and Philosophy 6 (3):295 - 317.
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  22. Nancy Cartwright (2006). Well‐Ordered Science: Evidence for Use. Philosophy of Science 73 (5):981-990.
    This article agrees with Philip Kitcher that we should aim for a well-ordered science, one that answers the right questions in the right ways. Crucial to this is to address questions of use: Which scientific account is right for which system in which circumstances? This is a difficult question: evidence that may support a scientific claim in one context may not support it in another. Drawing on examples in physics and other sciences, this article argues that work on the warrant (...)
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  23. Nancy Cartwright & Jacob Stegenga (2011). A Theory of Evidence for Evidence-Based Policy. In Philip Dawid, William Twining & Mimi Vasilaki (eds.), Evidence, Inference and Enquiry. Oup/British Academy. 291.
  24. Wallace L. Chafe & Johanna Nichols (eds.) (1986). Evidentiality: The Linguistic Coding of Epistemology. Ablex Pub. Corp..
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  25. David Christensen (2010). Higher-Order Evidence. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):185-215.
    Sometimes we get evidence of our own epistemic malfunction. This can come from finding out we’re fatigued, or have been drugged, or that other competent and well-informed thinkers disagree with our beliefs. This sort of evidence seems to seems to behave differently from ordinary evidence about the world. In particular, getting such evidence can put agents in a position where the most rational response involves violating some epistemic ideal.
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  26. David Christensen (1990). The Irrelevance of Bootstrapping. Philosophy of Science 57 (4):644-662.
    The main appeal of the currently popular "bootstrap" account of confirmation developed by Clark Glymour is that it seems to provide an account of evidential relevance. This account has, however, had severe problems; and Glymour has revised his original account in an attempt to solve them. I argue that this attempt fails completely, and that any similar modifications must also fail. If the problems can be solved, it will only be by radical revisions which involve jettisoning bootstrapping's basic approach to (...)
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  27. Nevin Climenhaga (2013). A Problem for the Alternative Difference Measure of Confirmation. Philosophical Studies 164 (3):643-651.
    Among Bayesian confirmation theorists, several quantitative measures of the degree to which an evidential proposition E confirms a hypothesis H have been proposed. According to one popular recent measure, s, the degree to which E confirms H is a function of the equation P(H|E) − P(H|~E). A consequence of s is that when we have two evidential propositions, E1 and E2, such that P(H|E1) = P(H|E2), and P(H|~E1) ≠ P(H|~E2), the confirmation afforded to H by E1 does not equal the (...)
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  28. Victor DiFate, Evidence. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  29. Paul Draper (1992). God and Perceptual Evidence. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 32 (3):149 - 165.
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  30. Ellery Eells & Branden Fitelson (2000). Measuring Confirmation and Evidence. Journal of Philosophy 97 (12):663-672.
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  31. Roderick Firth (1956). II. Ultimate Evidence. Journal of Philosophy 53 (23):732-739.
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  32. Patrick Forber (2009). Spandrels and a Pervasive Problem of Evidence. Biology and Philosophy 24 (2):247-266.
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  33. Malcolm R. Forster (2006). Counterexamples to a Likelihood Theory of Evidence. Minds and Machines 16 (3):319-338.
    The likelihood theory of evidence (LTE) says, roughly, that all the information relevant to the bearing of data on hypotheses (or models) is contained in the likelihoods. There exist counterexamples in which one can tell which of two hypotheses is true from the full data, but not from the likelihoods alone. These examples suggest that some forms of scientific reasoning, such as the consilience of inductions (Whewell, 1858. In Novum organon renovatum (Part II of the 3rd ed.). The philosophy of (...)
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  34. Steven Gimbel (2004). Restoring Ambiguity to Achinstein's Account of Evidence. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55 (2):269-285.
    , Peter Achinstein argues against the long-standing claim that ‘evidence’ is ambiguous in possessing a sense of confirming evidence and a sense of supporting evidence. He argues that explications of supporting evidence will necessarily violate his contentions that evidence is a discontinuous ‘threshold concept’ and that any philosophical account of supporting evidence will be too weak to be useful to working scientists. But an account of supporting evidence may be formulated which includes Achinstein's notion of epistemic thresholds that finds examples (...)
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  35. Clark Glymour (1975). Relevant Evidence. Journal of Philosophy 72 (14):403-426.
    S CIENTISTS often claim that an experiment or observation tests certain hypotheses within a complex theory but not others. Relativity theorists, for example, are unanimous in the judgment that measurements of the gravitational red shift do not test the field equations of general relativity; psychoanalysts sometimes complain that experimental tests of Freudian theory are at best tests of rather peripheral hypotheses; astronomers do not regard observations of the positions of a single planet as a test of Kepler's third law, even (...)
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  36. Leon J. Goldstein (1962). Evidence and Events in History. Philosophy of Science 29 (2):175-194.
    The first part of the paper distinguishes between a real past which has nothing to do with historical events and an historical past made up of hypothetical events introduced for the purpose of explaining historical evidence. Attention is next paid to those so-called ancillary historical disciplines which study historical evidence, and it is noted that the historical event is brought in to explain the particular constellation of different kinds of historical evidence which are judged to belong together. The problem of (...)
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  37. Richard Gott (2003). Understanding and Using Scientific Evidence: How to Critically Evaluate Data. Sage.
    The basic understanding which underlies scientific evidence - ideas such as the structure of experiments, causality, repeatability, validity and reliability- is not straightforward. But these ideas are needed to judge evidence in school science, in physics or chemistry or biology or psychology, in undergraduate science, and in understanding everyday issues to do with science. It is essential to be able to be critical of scientific evidence. The authors clearly set out the principles of investigation so that the reader will be (...)
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  38. Steven Gross & Jennifer Culbertson (2011). Revisited Linguistic Intuitions. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 62 (3):639-656.
    Michael Devitt ([2006a], [2006b]) argues that, insofar as linguists possess better theories about language than non-linguists, their linguistic intuitions are more reliable. ( Culbertson and Gross [2009] ) presented empirical evidence contrary to this claim. Devitt ([2010]) replies that, in part because we overemphasize the distinction between acceptability and grammaticality, we misunderstand linguists’ claims, fall into inconsistency, and fail to see how our empirical results can be squared with his position. We reply in this note. Inter alia we argue that (...)
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  39. Gilbert Harman (1980). Reasoning and Evidence One Does Not Possess1. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5 (1):163-182.
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  40. Paul Horwich (1982). Probability and Evidence. Cambridge University Press.
    Methodology Introduction This book is about scientific knowledge, particularly the concept of evidence. Its purpose is to explore scientific methodology in ...
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  41. K. Hutchison (1999). What Are Conditional Probabilities Conditional Upon? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 50 (4):665-695.
    This paper rejects a traditional epistemic interpretation of conditional probability. Suppose some chance process produces outcomes X, Y,..., with probabilities P(X), P(Y),... If later observation reveals that outcome Y has in fact been achieved, then the probability of outcome X cannot normally be revised to P(X|Y) ['P&Y)/P(Y)]. This can only be done in exceptional circumstances - when more than just knowledge of Y-ness has been attained. The primary reason for this is that the weight of a piece of evidence varies (...)
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  42. Mortimer R. Kadish (1951). Evidence and Decision. Journal of Philosophy 48 (8):229-242.
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  43. Mortimer R. Kadish (1949). A Note on the Grounds of Evidence. Journal of Philosophy 46 (8):229-243.
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  44. Stephen Kearns & Daniel Star (2013). Reasons, Facts‐About‐Evidence, and Indirect Evidence. Analytic Philosophy 54 (2):237-243.
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  45. Stephen Kearns & Daniel Star (2013). Weighing Reasons. Journal of Moral Philosophy 10 (1):70-86.
  46. Stephen Kearns & Daniel Star (2011). On Good Advice: A Reply to McNaughton and Rawling. Analysis 71 (3):506-508.
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  47. Stephen Kearns & Daniel Star (2009). Reasons as Evidence. Oxford Studies in Metaethics 4:215-42.
    In this paper, we argue for a particular informative and unified analysis of normative reasons. According to this analysis, a fact F is a reason to act in a certain way just in case it is evidence that one ought to act in that way. Similarly, F is a reason to believe a certain proposition just in case it is evidence for the truth of this proposition. Putting the relatively uncontroversial claim about reasons for belief to one side, we present (...)
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  48. Stephen Kearns & Daniel Star (2008). Reasons: Explanations or Evidence? Ethics 119 (1):31-56.
  49. Roger Kerry, Thor Eirik Eriksen, Svein Anders Noer Lie, Stephen Mumford & Rani Lill Anjum (2012). Causation and Evidence-Based Practive - an Ontological Review. Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice 18 (5):1006-1012.
    We claim that if a complete philosophy of evidence-based practice is intended, then attention to the nature of causation in health science is necessary. We identify how health science currently conceptualises causation by the way it prioritises some research methods over others. We then show how the current understanding of what causation is serves to constrain scientific progress. An alternative account of causation is offered. This is one of dispositionalism. We claim that by understanding causation from a dispositionalist stance, many (...)
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  50. Hannu Tapani Klami (2000). Law and Truth: A Theory of Evidence. Finnish Academy of Science and Letters.
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