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Evidence

Edited by Christopher Michael Cloos (University of California at Santa Barbara)
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Summary

The notion of evidence features importantly in epistemology and philosophy of science. There are three primary questions that a theory of evidence must address. The constitution question asks: What is the nature of evidence? A major divide in answers to the constitution question is between those who think that all evidence is propositional and those who think that some evidence is non-propositional. The possession question asks: When does someone possess a piece of information as evidence? Restrictive views of evidence possession hold that one has as evidence only information that one is consciously entertaining. More inclusive views of evidence possession hold that one’s evidence includes non-occurrent information, such as stored memories. Lastly, a theory of evidence must address the positive support question. In philosophy of science and formal epistemology the positive support question is: When is a hypothesis confirmed by evidence? In contemporary epistemology the positive support question is: When is a belief justified by evidence?

Introductions Encyclopedia entries on evidence include DiFate 2007 and Kelly 2008. Additional overviews of evidence include Conee & Feldman 2008 and Kelly 2008.
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Subcategories:History/traditions: Evidence
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  1. Robert Audi (1999). Self-Evidence. Philosophical Perspectives 13 (s13):205-228.
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  2. Nicanor Pier Giorgio Austriaco (2007). Is Plan B an Abortifacient? A Critical Look at the Scientific Evidence. The National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 7 (4):703-707.
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  3. John Banville (forthcoming). The Book of Evidence (London. Minerva.
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  4. Botkin Jr (1992). Ethics and Evidence. Journal of Clinical Ethics 3 (1):63.
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  5. C. A. Campbell (1960). Self-Evidence. Philosophical Quarterly 10 (39):138-155.
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  6. Nancy Cartwright & Damien Fennell, Should Evidence Be Probable? A Comment on Roush.
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  7. I. Jonathan Cohen (1985). Probability, Objectivity and Evidence. Philosophical Books 26 (4):238-240.
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  8. Norman Coles (1964). Self-Evidence. Analysis 24 (3):58 - 62.
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  9. Earl Conee (2013). Seeming Evidence. In Chris Tucker (ed.), Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism. Oup Usa. 52.
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  10. Felix D'souza (1991). Independent Evidence of Religion. Bijdragen 52 (2):122-138.
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  11. Lorraine Daston (1998). Probability and Evidence. In Daniel Garber & Michael Ayers (eds.), The Cambridge History of Seventeenth-Century Philosophy. Cambridge University Press. 1108--1144.
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  12. Donald Davidson (1991). Three Varieties of Knowledge. In A. Phillips Griffiths (ed.), A. J. Ayer Memorial Essays. New York: Cambridge University Press. 153-166.
    I know, for the most part, what I think, want, and intend, and what my sensations are. In addition, I know a great deal about the world around me. I also sometimes know what goes on in other people's minds. Each of these three kinds of empirical knowledge has its distinctive characteristics. What I know about the contents of my own mind I generally know without investigation or appeal to evidence. There are exceptions, but the primacy of unmediated self-knowledge is (...)
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  13. Martin Dimnik (2001). Igor's Defeat at the Kayala (1185): The Chronicle Evidence. Mediaeval Studies 63 (1):245-282.
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  14. Theodore M. Drange (1998). Nonbelief Vs. Lack of Evidence: Two Atheologlcal Arguments. Philo 1 (1):105-114.
    Here are two atheological arguments, called the “Lack-of-evidence Argument” and “the Argument from Nonbelief” . LEA: Probably, if God were to exist then there would be good objective evidence for that. But there is no good objective evidence for God’s existence. Therefore, probably God does not exist. ANB: Probably, if God were to exist then there would not be many nonbelievers in the world. But there are many nonbelievers in the world. Therefore, probably God does not exist. Reasons are given (...)
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  15. John H. Dreher (1974). Evidence and Justified Belief. Philosophical Studies 25 (6):435 - 439.
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  16. C. J. Ducasse (1965). The Watseka Evidence. World Futures 3 (3):104-108.
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  17. Richard Feldman (1988). Having Evidence. In D. F. Austin (ed.), Philosophical Analysis. Kluwer Academic Publishers. 83--104.
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  18. Branden Fitelson & Richard Feldman (2012). Evidence of Evidence is Not (Necessarily) Evidence. Analysis 72 (1):85-88.
    In this note, I consider various precisifications of the slogan ‘evidence of evidence is evidence’. I provide counter-examples to each of these precisifications (assuming an epistemic probabilistic relevance notion of ‘evidential support’).
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  19. Robert J. Fogelin (1967). Evidence and Meaning. New York, Humanities Press.
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  20. Malcolm R. Forster (2011). Scientific Evidence. In Steven French & Juha Saatsi (eds.), Continuum Companion to the Philosophy of Science. Continuum. 179.
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  21. Steven Gimbel (1999). Peirce Snatching: Towards a More Pragmatic View of Evidence. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 51 (2-3):207-231.
    The running debate between Peter Achinstein and his critics concerning the nature of scientific evidence is misguided as each side attempts to explicate a distinct notion of evidence. Achinstein's approach, however, is valuable in helping to point out a problem with Carnap's statistical relevance model. By claiming an increase in probability to be necessary for evidence, the received view is incapable of accounting for evidence which is statistically irrelevant but explanatorily relevant. A broader view of evidence which can account for (...)
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  22. Anandi Hattiangadi (2010). The Love of Truth. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 41 (4):422-432.
    It is frequently said that belief aims at truth, in an explicitly normative sense—that is, that one ought to believe the proposition that p if, and only if, p is true. This truth norm is frequently invoked to explain why we should seek evidential justification in our beliefs, or why we should try to be rational in our belief formation—it is because we ought to believe the truth that we ought to follow the evidence in belief revision. In this paper, (...)
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  23. Yen-Teh Hsia (1991). Assessing Multiple Beliefs According to One Body of Evidence—Why It May Be Necessary, and How We Might Do It Correctly. In B. Bouchon-Meunier, R. R. Yager & L. A. Zadeh (eds.), Uncertainty in Knowledge Bases. Springer. 68--74.
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  24. L. J. (1973). Probability and Evidence. [REVIEW] Review of Metaphysics 26 (3):523-524.
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  25. John Jackson & Sean Doran (1996). Evidence. In Dennis M. Patterson (ed.), A Companion to Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory. Blackwell Publishers.
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  26. Robin Jeshion (2004). Frege: Evidence for Self-Evidence. Mind 113 (449):131-138.
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  27. Philip Kitcher (2011). On the Very Idea of a Theory of Evidence. In Gregory J. Morgan (ed.), Philosophy of Science Matters: The Philosophy of Peter Achinstein. Oxford University Press. 84.
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  28. Frederick M. Kronz (1992). Carnap and Achinstein on Evidence. Philosophical Studies 67 (2):151 - 167.
    Two notions of evidence are focused on in this essay, Carnap's positive-relevance notion of evidence (1962, pp. 462 ff.), and Achinstein's notion of potential evidence (1978; and 1983, pp. 322–350). Achinstein creates several interesting examples in his attempt to find faults in Carnap's notion of evidence; his motive, ultimately, is to impel us towards potential evidence. The purpose of this essay is to show that positive relevance is significantly more promising than potential evidence with respect to capturing the scientific sense (...)
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  29. Theo A. F. Kuypers (1976). Introductive Probability and the Paradox of Ideal Evidence. Philosophica 17.
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  30. Theo A. F. Kuypers (1976). Introductive Probability and the Paradox of Ideal Evidence. Philosophica 17.
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  31. J. L. (1973). Probability and Evidence. Review of Metaphysics 26 (3):523-524.
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  32. Oliver Leech (2012). Evidence and God. Think 11 (32):53-63.
    For many contemporary atheists a significant justification for their belief is the claim that there is no evidence for the existence of God. They compare the lack of evidence for God to the lack of evidence for such beings as leprechauns and goblins. And they point out that for belief in the non-existence of alleged entities such as these it is not necessary to prove the negative, which would not be possible, but it is sufficient to show that after due (...)
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  33. Robert Leskovar, Rok Kraovec & Igor Jerman (2009). Evidence for Biofield. In Eva Zerovnik, Olga Markič & A. Ule (eds.), Philosophical Insights About Modern Science. Nova Science Publishers, Inc..
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  34. A. F. M. (1980). Theory and Evidence. Review of Metaphysics 34 (1):135-137.
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  35. S. B. McDowell (1992). Fragmentary Evidence. BioScience 42 (2):137-138.
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  36. Donald McQueen (1986). Self-Evidence. Philosophia 16 (1):11-28.
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  37. Donald McQueen (1971). Evidence for Necessary Propositions. Mind 80 (317):56-69.
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  38. Connie Missimer (1995). Where's the Evidence? Inquiry 14 (4):1-18.
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  39. Víctor Manuel Santamaría Navarro (2009). Beliefs: The Will Besieged by the Evidence. Teorema: Revista Internacional de Filosofía 28 (3):131-149.
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  40. Michael P. O'Neil (1985). Propositions and Empirical Evidence. Philosophical Topics 13 (2):213-222.
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  41. S. R. (1966). Evidence and Inference. [REVIEW] Review of Metaphysics 20 (1):164-164.
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  42. Xavier Duprb I. Raventos (1995). New Evidence for the Study of the Urbanism of Tarraco. Proceedings of the British Academy 86:369.
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  43. Sherrilyn Roush (2004). Discussion Note: Positive Relevance Defended. Philosophy of Science 71 (1):110-116.
    This paper addresses two examples due to Peter Achinstein purporting to show that the positive relevance view of evidence is too strong, that is, that evidence need not raise the probability of what it is evidence for. The first example can work only if it makes a false assumption. The second example fails because what Achinstein claims is evidence is redundant with information we already have. Without these examples Achinstein is left without motivation for his account of evidence, which uses (...)
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  44. Ian Rumfitt (2013). Sense and Evidence. The Monist 96 (2):177-204.
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  45. David Rynin (1960). Evidence. Synthese 12 (1):6 - 24.
    We can now see, perhaps, what merits if any this definition has. It ties in the concept of evidence with that of law, and requires us to support our claim that some fact (or statement) is evidence for another by pointing out the science, and within it the law (or what meets the tests of being acceptable as such) whose existence alone justifies us in assuming that a certain conditional statement qualifies as acceptable as nomological. Whoever claims that a certain (...)
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  46. R. S. (1966). Evidence and Inference. Review of Metaphysics 20 (1):164-164.
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  47. Peter H. Salus (1980). What is Evidence Evidence Of? Semiotics:455-465.
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  48. Howard Sankey (2013). How the Epistemic Relativist May Use the Sceptic's Strategy: A Reply to Markus Seidel. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 44 (1):140-144.
    This paper is a response to an objection that Markus Seidel has made to my analysis of epistemic relativism. Seidel argues that the epistemic relativist is unable to base a relativist account of justification on the sceptical problem of the criterion in the way that I have suggested in earlier work. In response to Seidel, I distinguish between weak and strong justification, and argue that all the relativist needs is weak justification. In addition, I explain my reasons for employing the (...)
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  49. David Schum (2011). Classifying Forms and Combinations of Evidence : Necessary in a Science of Evidence. In Philip Dawid, William Twining & Mimi Vasilaki (eds.), Evidence, Inference and Enquiry. Oup/British Academy.
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  50. Peter Simons (2003). Evidence in Favour. In Michael J. Loux & Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics. Oxford University Press. 357.
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