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  1. Arif Ahmed, A Quantum Mechanical Argument Against Causal Decision Theory.
    The paper argues that on three out of five possible hypotheses about the Stern-Gerlach experiment we can construct novel and comparatively realistic decision problems on which (a) Causal decision Theory and Evidential Decision Theory conflict (b) Causal Decision Theory and Quantum Mechanics conflict. It concludes that Causal Decision Theory is false.
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  2. Arif Ahmed (forthcoming). Infallibility in the Newcomb Problem. Erkenntnis:1-13.
    It is intuitively attractive to think that it makes a difference in Newcomb’s problem whether or not the predictor is infallible, in the sense of being certainly actually correct. This paper argues that that view (A) is irrational and (B) manifests a well-documented cognitive illusion.
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  3. Arif Ahmed (2010). Causation and Decision. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 110 (2pt2):111-131.
    Sophisticated ‘tickle’-style defences of Evidential Decision Theory take your motivational state to screen off your act from any state that is causally independent of it, thus ensuring that EDT and CDT converge. That leads to unacceptable instability in cases in which the correct action is obvious. We need a more liberal conception of what the agent controls. It follows that an ordinary deliberator should sometimes consider the past and not only the future to be subject to her present choice.
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  4. Arif Ahmed (2005). Evidential Decision Theory and Medical Newcomb Problems. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (2):191-198.
    has offered evidential decision theorists a defence against the charge that they make unintuitive recommendations for cases like Newcomb's Problem. He says that when conditional probabilities are assessed from the agent's point of view, evidential decision theory makes the same recommendation as intuition. I argue that calculating the probabilities in Price's way leads to no recommendation. It condemns the agent to perpetual oscillation between different options. Price's Argument Instability Objections Conclusion.
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  5. Helen Beebee, Peter Menzies & Christopher Hitchcock (eds.) (2009). The Oxford Handbook of Causation. Oxford University Press.
    Causation is a central topic in many areas of philosophy, including metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of mind, ethics, history of philosophy, and philosophy ...
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  6. Ethan D. Bolker (2000). An Existence Theorem for the Logic of Decision. Philosophy of Science 67 (3):17.
    In this paper I discuss some of the mathematics behind an often quoted existence theorem from Richard Jeffrey's The Logic of Decision (Jeffrey 1990) in order to pose several new questions about the meaning and value of that mathematics for decision theory.
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  7. Dorothy Edgington (2011). Conditionals, Causation, and Decision. Analytic Philosophy 52 (2):75-87.
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  8. Ellery Eells (1989). The Popcorn Problem: Sobel on Evidential Decision Theory and Deliberation-Probability Dynamics. Synthese 81 (1):9 - 20.
    I defend evidential decision theory and the theory of deliberation-probability dynamics from a recent criticism advanced by Jordan Howard Sobel. I argue that his alleged counterexample to the theories, called the Popcorn Problem is not a genuine counterexample.
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  9. Ellery Eells & Elliott Sober (1986). Common Causes and Decision Theory. Philosophy of Science 53 (2):223-245.
    One of us (Eells 1982) has defended traditional evidential decision theory against prima facie Newcomb counterexamples by assuming that a common cause forms a conjunctive fork with its joint effects. In this paper, the evidential theory is defended without this assumption. The suggested rationale shows that the theory's assumptions are not about the nature of causality, but about the nature of rational deliberation. These presuppositions are weak enough for the argument to count as a strong justification of the evidential theory.
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  10. James Franklin, Mark Burgman, Scott Sisson & J. K. Martin (2008). Evaluating Extreme Risks in Invasion Ecology: Learning From Banking Compliance. Diversity and Distributions 14:581-591.
    methods that have shown promise for improving extreme risk analysis, particularly for assessing the risks of invasive pests and pathogens associated with international trade. We describe the legally inspired regulatory regime for banks, where these methods have been brought to bear on extreme ‘operational risks’. We argue that an ‘advocacy model’ similar to that used in the Basel II compliance regime for bank operational risks and to a lesser extent in biosecurity import risk analyses is ideal for permitting the diversity (...)
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  11. Johan E. Gustafsson (2011). A Note in Defence of Ratificationism. Erkenntnis 75 (1):147–150.
    Andy Egan argues that neither evidential nor causal decision theory gives the intuitively right recommendation in the cases The Smoking Lesion, The Psychopath Button, and The Three-Option Smoking Lesion. Furthermore, Egan argues that we cannot avoid these problems by any kind of ratificationism. This paper develops a new version of ratificationism that gives the right recommendations. Thus, the new proposal has an advantage over evidential and casual decision theory and standard ratificationist evidential decision theory.
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  12. Daniel Hunter & Reed Richter (1978). Counterfactuals and Newcomb's Paradox. Synthese 39 (2):249 - 261.
    In their development of causal decision theory, Allan Gibbard and William Harper advocate a particular method for calculating the expected utility of an action, a method based upon the probabilities of certain counterfactuals. Gibbard and Harper then employ their method to support a two-box solution to Newcomb’s paradox. This paper argues against some of Gibbard and Harper’s key claims concerning the truth-values and probabilities of counterfactuals involved in expected utility calculations, thereby disputing their analysis of Newcomb’s Paradox. If we are (...)
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  13. Frank Jackson & Robert Pargetter (1983). Where the Tickle Defence Goes Wrong. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (3):295 – 299.
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  14. Richard Jeffrey (1992). Probability Kinematics and Causality. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1992:365 - 373.
    Making up your mind can include making up your mind about how to change your mind. Here a suggestion for coding imputations of influence into the kinematics of judgmental probabilities is applied to the treatment of Newcomb problems in The Logic of Decision framework. The suggestion is that what identifies you as treating judgmental probabilistic covariance of X and Y as measuring an influence of X on Y is constancy of your probabilities for values of Y conditionally on values of (...)
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  15. Richard Jeffrey (1983). The Logic of Decision. University of Chicago Press.
    "Frederic Schick, Journal of Philosophy This book uses elementary logical and mathematical means to philosophical end: elucidation of the notions of subjective ...
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  16. Richard Jeffrey (1981). The Logic of Decision Defended. Synthese 48 (3):473 - 492.
    The approach to decision theory floated in my 1965 book is reviewed (I), challenged in various related ways (II–V) and defended, firstad hoc (II–IV) and then by a general argument of Ellery Ells's (VI). Finally, causal decision theory (in a version sketched in VII) is exhibited as a special case of my 1965 theory, according to the Eellsian argument.
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  17. Richard C. Jeffrey (1992). Probability and the Art of Judgment. Cambridge University Press.
    Richard Jeffrey is beyond dispute one of the most distinguished and influential philosophers working in the field of decision theory and the theory of knowledge. His work is distinctive in showing the interplay of epistemological concerns with probability and utility theory. Not only has he made use of standard probabilistic and decision theoretic tools to clarify concepts of evidential support and informed choice, he has also proposed significant modifications of the standard Bayesian position in order that it provide a better (...)
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  18. James M. Joyce (2000). Why We Still Need the Logic of Decision. Philosophy of Science 67 (3):13.
    In The Logic of Decision Richard Jeffrey defends a version of expected utility theory that advises agents to choose acts with an eye to securing evidence for thinking that desirable results will ensue. Proponents of "causal" decision theory have argued that Jeffrey's account is inadequate because it fails to properly discriminate the causal features of acts from their merely evidential properties. Jeffrey's approach has also been criticized on the grounds that it makes it impossible to extract a unique probability/utility representation (...)
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  19. Phyllis Kirstin McKay (2007). Freedom, Fiction and Evidential Decision Theory. Erkenntnis 66 (3):393 - 407.
    This paper argues against evidential decision-theory, by showing that the newest responses to its biggest current problem – the medical Newcomb problems – don’t work. The latest approach is described, and the arguments of two main proponents of it – Huw Price and CR Hitchcock – clearly distinguished and examined. It is argued that since neither new defence is successful, causation remains essential to understanding means-end agency.
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  20. Christopher J. G. Meacham (2010). Binding and its Consequences. Philosophical Studies 149 (1):49-71.
    In “Bayesianism, Infinite Decisions, and Binding”, Arntzenius et al. (Mind 113:251–283, 2004 ) present cases in which agents who cannot bind themselves are driven by standard decision theory to choose sequences of actions with disastrous consequences. They defend standard decision theory by arguing that if a decision rule leads agents to disaster only when they cannot bind themselves, this should not be taken to be a mark against the decision rule. I show that this claim has surprising implications for a (...)
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  21. Huw Price (1991). Agency and Probabilistic Causality. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 42 (2):157-176.
    Probabilistic accounts of causality have long had trouble with ‘spurious’ evidential correlations. Such correlations are also central to the case for causal decision theory—the argument that evidential decision theory is inadequate to cope with certain sorts of decision problem. However, there are now several strong defences of the evidential theory. Here I present what I regard as the best defence, and apply it to the probabilistic approach to causality. I argue that provided a probabilistic theory appeals to the notions of (...)
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  22. Huw Price (1986). Against Causal Decision Theory. Synthese 67 (2):195 - 212.
    Proponents of causal decision theories argue that classical Bayesian decision theory (BDT) gives the wrong advice in certain types of cases, of which the clearest and commonest are the medical Newcomb problems. I defend BDT, invoking a familiar principle of statistical inference to show that in such cases a free agent cannot take the contemplated action to be probabilistically relevant to its causes (so that BDT gives the right answer). I argue that my defence does better than those of Ellery (...)
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  23. Huw Price & Brad Weslake (2009). The Time-Asymmetry of Causation. In Helen Beebee, Peter Menzies & Christopher Hitchcock (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Causation. Oxford University Press.
    One of the most striking features of causation is that causes typically precede their effects – the causal arrow is strongly aligned with the temporal arrow. Why should this be so? We offer an opinionated guide to this problem, and to the solutions currently on offer. We conclude that the most promising strategy is to begin with the de facto asymmetry of human deliberation, characterised in epistemic terms, and to build out from there. More than any rival, this subjectivist approach (...)
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  24. Nicholas Rescher & Alan Ross Anderson (eds.) (1966). The Logic of Decision and Action. Pittsburgh]University of Pittsburgh Press.
    The four main essays in this volume investigate new sectors of the theory of decision, preference, act-characteristics, and action analysis.
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  25. Reed Richter (1984). Rationality Revisited. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62 (4):392 – 403.
    This paper looks at a dispute decision theory about how best to characterize expected utility maximization and express the logic of rational choice. Where A1, … , An are actions open to some particular agent, and S1, … , Sn are mutually exclusive states of the world such that the agent knows at least one of which obtains, does the logic of rational choice require an agent to consider the conditional probability of choice Ai given that some state Si obtains, (...)
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  26. Michael J. Shaffer (2009). Decision Theory, Intelligent Planning and Counterfactuals. Minds and Machines 19 (1):61-92.
    The ontology of decision theory has been subject to considerable debate in the past, and discussion of just how we ought to view decision problems has revealed more than one interesting problem, as well as suggested some novel modifications of classical decision theory. In this paper it will be argued that Bayesian, or evidential, decision-theoretic characterizations of decision situations fail to adequately account for knowledge concerning the causal connections between acts, states, and outcomes in decision situations, and so they are (...)
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  27. David Shaw & David Conway (2010). Pascal’s Wager, Infective Endocarditis and the “No-Lose” Philosophy in Medicine. Heart 96 (1):15-18.
    Doctors and dentists have traditionally used antibiotic prophylaxis in certain patient groups in order to prevent infective endocarditis (IE). New guidelines, however, suggest that the risk to patients from using antibiotics is higher than the risk from IE. This paper analyses the relative risks of prescribing and not prescribing antibiotic prophylaxis against the background of Pascal’s Wager, the infamous assertion that it is better to believe in God regardless of evidence, because of the prospective benefits should He exist. Many doctors (...)
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  28. Peter Slezak (2006). Demons, Deceivers And Liars: Newcomb's Malin Génie. [REVIEW] Theory and Decision 61 (3):277-303.
    A fully adequate solution to Newcomb’s Problem (Nozick 1969) should reveal the source of its extraordinary elusiveness and persistent intractability. Recently, a few accounts have independently sought to meet this criterion of adequacy by exposing the underlying source of the problem’s profound puzzlement. Thus, Sorensen (1987), Slezak (1998), Priest (2002) and Maitzen and Wilson (2003) share the ‘no box’ view according to which the very idea that there is a right choice is misconceived since the problem is ill-formed or incoherent (...)
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  29. Jordan Howard Sobel (1988). Defenses and Conservative Revisions of Evidential Decision Theories: Metatickles and Ratificationism. Synthese 75 (1):107 - 131.
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  30. Jordan Howard Sobel (1986). Notes on Decision Theory: Old Wine in New Bottles. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64 (4):407 – 437.
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  31. Carl Wagner, Jeffrey Conditioning and External Bayesianity.
    Abstract. Suppose that several individuals who have separately assessed prior probability distributions over a set of possible states of the world wish to pool their individual distributions into a single group distribution, while taking into account jointly perceived new evidence. They have the option of (i) first updating their individual priors and then pooling the resulting posteriors or (ii) first pooling their priors and then updating the resulting group prior. If the pooling method that they employ is such that they (...)
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  32. David Wallace (2010). Diachronic Rationality and Prediction-Based Games. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 110 (3pt3):243-266.
    I explore the debate about causal versus evidential decision theory, and its recent developments in the work of Andy Egan, through the method of some simple games based on agents' predictions of each other's actions. My main focus is on the requirement for rational agents to act in a way which is consistent over time and its implications for such games and their more realistic cousins.
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  33. Ralph Wedgwood (2011). Gandalf's Solution to the Newcomb Problem. Synthese (14):1-33.
    This article proposes a new theory of rational decision, distinct from both causal decision theory (CDT) and evidential decision theory (EDT). First, some intuitive counterexamples to CDT and EDT are presented. Then the motivation for the new theory is given: the correct theory of rational decision will resemble CDT in that it will not be sensitive to any comparisons of absolute levels of value across different states of nature, but only to comparisons of the differences in value between the available (...)
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