About this topic
Summary Evidentialism in its broadest construal is the thesis that only evidential concerns are relevant to whether belief is epistemically appropriate (as opposed to, say, morally appropriate).  A common objection is that this counts as epistemically justified the beliefs of those who are, say, slothful in their evidence gathering or who ignore evidence because, say, they are racists of some sort.  Evidentialists reply that this confuses moral and prudential evaluations with epistemic evaluations. Since evidentialism is an account of the epistemic "ought", some object to limiting epistemic normatively in this way. Some will hold to value monism, arguing that there is only one epistemic norm but that it is some other desideratum like truth or knowledge, others will suggest value pluralism, saying at least that epistemic normatively is not limited to evidential considerations. Another objection to evidentialism is that it is a mere platitude.  Evidentialists reply by trying to flesh out the platitude with an account of evidence.  Many evidentialists prefer a traditional broadly empiricist notion of evidence as consisting in experiences or perhaps the propositional contents of experiences.  Others argue for more stringent restriction of evidence to facts or known facts.  
Key works Feldman & Conee 1985 began the contemporary discussion, with Conee & Feldman 2004 being the locus classicus.  Dougherty 2011 expands the conversation.  As defended in Conee & Feldman 2004, evidentialism is a supervenience thesis: any two possible individuals alike in respect of evidence are alike in respects of what they ought to believe.  Feldman 2000 argues that this epistemic use of "ought" is exhausted by reference to evidence.  DeRose, in Derose 2000, argues against this. Following most traditional epistemologists, Conee & Feldman 2004 take basic evidence to consist in experiences.  Williamson 2000, argues that evidence is all and only one's knowledge.  Conee & Feldman 2008 reply briefly.  Dougherty 2011 puts pressure on Conee & Feldman 2008 to engage more with Williamson.  Dougherty & Rysiew 2013 engages multi-exchange debate with Williamson. A common objection to evidentialism comes from connections between epistemic justification and epistemic responsibility are logically related (identical, even). Feldman & Conee 1985 reply that this objection confuses moral and prudential considerations with epistemic considerations.  Still, Baehr 2009 (anthologized in Dougherty 2011 along with replies by Conee and Feldman) presses the point.  Dougherty 2012 defends the confusion reply. 
Introductions Both Conee & Feldman 2004 and Dougherty 2011 have helpful introductions.  
  Show all references
Related categories
Siblings:See also:
91 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Sort by:
1 — 50 / 91
  1. Robert Merrihew Adams (1987). Berkeley and Epistemology. In Ernest Sosa (ed.), Essays on the Philosophy of George Berkeley. D. Reidel.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Scott F. Aikin (2008). Evidentialism and James' Argument From Friendship. Southwest Philosophy Review 24 (1):173-180.
    William James' main argument in “The Will to Believe” against evidentialism is that there are facts that cannot come to be without a preliminary faith in their coming. James primarily makes this case with the argument from friendship. I will critically present James' argument from friendship and show that the argument does not yield a counter-example to evidentialism and is in the end unsound.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Scott F. Aikin (2006). Contrastive Self-Attribution of Belief. Social Epistemology 20 (1):93 – 103.
    A common argument for evidentialism is that the norms of assertion, specifically those bearing on warrant and assertability, regulate belief. On this assertoric model of belief, a constitutive condition for belief is that the believing subject take her belief to be supported by sufficient evidence. An equally common source of resistance to these arguments is the plausibility of cases in which a speaker, despite the fact that she lacks warrant to assert that p, nevertheless attributes to herself the belief that (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Scott F. Aikin (2006). Modest Evidentialism. International Philosophical Quarterly 46 (3):327-343.
    Evidentialism is the view that subjects should believe neither more than nor contrary to what their current evidence supports. I will critically present two arguments for the view. A common source of resistance to evidentialism is that there are intuitive cases where subjects should believe contrary to their evidence. I will present modest evidentialism as the view that subjects should believe in accord with what their evidence supports, but that this norm may be overridden under certain conditions. As such, a (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. David J. Alexander (2013). The Problem of Respecting Higher-Order Doubt. Philosophers' Imprint 13 (18).
    This paper argues that higher-order doubt generates an epistemic dilemma. One has a higher-order doubt with regards to P insofar as one justifiably withholds belief as to what attitude towards P is justified. That is, one justifiably withholds belief as to whether one is justified in believing, disbelieving, or withholding belief in P. Using the resources provided by Richard Feldman’s recent discussion of how to respect one’s evidence, I argue that if one has a higher-order doubt with regards to P, (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Michael J. Almeida (1998). Refuting Van Inwagen's 'Refutation': Evidentialism Again. [REVIEW] International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 44 (1):23 - 29.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Guy Axtell (2012). (More) Springs of My Discontent. Logos and Episteme (1):131-137.
    A further reply to Trent Dougherty, author of Evidentialism and its Discontents, on a range of issues regarding a proper understanding of epistemic normativity and doxastic responsibility. The relative importance of synchronic and diachronic concerns with epistemic agency is discussed, both with respect to epistemology proper, as well as in connection to broader concerns with ‘ethics of belief’ and ‘epistemology of disagreement.’.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Guy Axtell (2011). Recovering Responsibility. Logos and Episteme (3):429-454..
    This paper defends the epistemological importance of ‘diachronic’ or cross-temporal evaluation of epistemic agents against an interesting dilemma posed for this view in Trent Dougherty’s recent paper “Reducing Responsibility.” This is primarily a debate between evidentialists and character epistemologists, and key issues of contention that the paper treats include the divergent functions of synchronic and diachronic (longitudinal) evaluations of agents and their beliefs, the nature and sources of epistemic normativity, and the advantages versus the costs of the evidentialists’ reductionism about (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Guy Axtell (2011). From Internalist Evidentialism to Virtue Responsibilism. In Trent Dougherty (ed.), Evidentialism and its Discontents. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Evidentialism as its leading proponents describe it has two distinct senses, these being evidentialism as a conceptual analysis of epistemic justification, and as a prescriptive ethics of belief—an account of what one ‘ought to believe’ under different epistemic circumstances. These two senses of evidentialism are related, but in the work of leading evidentialist philosophers, in ways that I think are deeply problematic. Although focusing on Richard Feldman’s ethics of belief, this chapter is critical of evidentialism in both senses. However, I (...)
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Jason Baehr (2009). Evidentialism, Vice, and Virtue. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (3):545-567.
    Evidentialists maintain that epistemic justification is strictly a function of the evidence one has at the moment of belief. I argue here, on the basis of two kinds of cases, that the possession of good evidence is an insuflicient basis for justification. I go on to propose a modification of evidentialism according to which justification sometimes requires intellectually virtuous agency. The discussion thereby underscores an important point of contact between evidentialism and the more recent enterprise of virtue epistemology.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. L. Bonjour (2007). Review: Evidentialism. [REVIEW] Mind 116 (461):157-161.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Anthony Robert Booth (2014). Two Reasons Why Epistemic Reasons Are Not Object‐Given Reasons. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (1):1-14.
    In this paper I discuss two claims; the first is the claim that state-given reasons for belief are of a radically different kind to object-given reasons for belief. The second is that, where this last claim is true, epistemic reasons are object-given reasons for belief (EOG). I argue that EOG has two implausible consequences: (i) that suspension of judgement can never be epistemically justified, and (ii) that the reason that epistemically justifies a belief that p can never be the reason (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Anthony Robert Booth (2008). A New Argument for Pragmatism? Philosophia 36 (2):227-231.
    Shah, N. The Philosophical Quarterly, 56, 481–498 (2006) has defended evidentialism on the premise that only it (and not pragmatism) is consistent with both (a) the deliberative constraint on reasons and (b) the transparency feature of belief. I show, however, that the deliberative constraint on reasons is also problematic for evidentialism. I also suggest a way for pragmatism to be construed so as to make it consistent with both (a) and (b) and argue that a similar move is not available (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Anthony Robert Booth (2007). The Two Faces of Evidentialism. Erkenntnis 67 (3):401 - 417.
    In this paper I hope to demonstrate two different (and seemingly independent) ways of interpreting the tenets of evidentialism and show why it is important to distinguish between them. These two ways correspond to those proposed by Feldman (Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 60, 667–695, 2000, Evidentialism: Essays in epistemology, Oxford University Press, 2004) and Adler (Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 23, 267–285, 1999, Beliefs own ethics, MIT Press, 2002). Feldman’s way of interpreting evidentialism makes evidentialism a principle about epistemic justification, about (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. A. Brueckner (2012). Against an Argument Against Justification Internalism. Analysis 72 (4):745-746.
    A novel (and surprising) argument against justification internalism. Analysis 72: 239–43, Sanford Goldberg uses the New Evil Demon thought experiment in an attempt to argue as in the foregoing title. I respond by maintaining that his argument fails when aimed at a prominent version of internalism, viz. evidentialism.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (12 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Andrew Chignell, The Ethics of Belief. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    The “ethics of belief” refers to a cluster of questions at the intersection of epistemology, philosophy of mind, psychology, and ethics. The central question in the debate is whether there are norms of some sort governing our habits of belief formation, belief maintenance, and belief relinquishment. Is it ever or always morally wrong (or epistemically irrational, or imprudent) to hold a belief on insufficient evidence? Is it ever or always morally right (or epistemically rational, or prudent) to believe on the (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Juan Comesaña (2010). Evidentialist Reliabilism. Noûs 44 (4):571-600.
    I argue for a theory that combines elements of reliabilism and evidentialism.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Earl Brink Conee (2004). Evidentialism: Essays in Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
    Evidentialism is a view about the conditions under which a person is epistemically justified in having a particular doxastic attitude toward a proposition. Evidentialism holds that the justified attitudes are determined entirely by the person's evidence. This is the traditional view of justification. It is now widely opposed. The essays included in this volume develop and defend the tradition. Evidentialism has many assets. In addition to providing an intuitively plausible account of epistemic justification, it helps to resolve the problem of (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Earl Conee & Richard Feldman (2008). Evidence. In Quentin Smith (ed.), Epistemology: New Essays. Oxford University Press.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Earl Conee & Richard Feldman (2004). Evidentialism. Oxford University Press.
    Evidentialism holds that the justified attitudes are determined entirely by the person's evidence. This is the traditional view ofjustification.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Dylan Dodd (2012). Evidentialism and Skeptical Arguments. Synthese 189 (2):337-352.
    Cartesian skepticism about epistemic justification (‘skepticism’) is the view that many of our beliefs about the external world – e.g., my current belief that I have hands – aren’t justified. I examine the two most influential arguments for skepticism – the Closure Argument and the Underdetermination Argument – from an evidentialist perspective. For both arguments it is clear which premise the anti-skeptic must deny. The Closure Argument, I argue, is the better argument in that its key premise is weaker than (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. T. Dougherty (ed.) (2011). Evidentialism and its Discontents. Oxford University Press.
    Few concepts have been considered as essential to the theory of knowledge and rational belief as that of evidence. The simplest theory which accounts for this is evidentialism, the view that epistemic justification for belief--the kind of justification typically taken to be required for knowledge--is determined solely by considerations pertaining to one's evidence. In this ground-breaking book, leading epistemologists from across the spectrum challenge and refine evidentialism, sometimes suggesting that it needs to be expanded in quite surprising directions. Following this, (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Trent Dougherty (ed.) (2011). Evidentialism and its Discontents. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Few concepts have been considered as essential to the theory of knowledge and rational belief as that of evidence. The simplest theory which accounts for this is evidentialism, the view that epistemic justification for belief--the kind of justification typically taken to be required for knowledge--is determined solely by considerations pertaining to one's evidence. In this ground-breaking book, leading epistemologists from across the spectrum challenge and refine evidentialism, sometimes suggesting that it needs to be expanded in quite surprising directions. Following this, (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Horace Fairlamb (2010). Sanctifying Evidentialism. Religious Studies 46 (1):61-76.
    In contemporary epistemology of religion, evidentialism has been included in a wider critique of traditional foundationalist theories of rational belief. To show the irrelevance of evidentialism, some critics have offered alternatives to the foundationalist approach, prominent among which is Alvin Plantinga's 'warrant as proper function'. But the connection between evidentialism and foundationalism has been exaggerated, and criticisms of traditional foundationalism do not discredit evidentialism in principle. Furthermore, appeals to warranted belief imply that the heart of evidentialism — the proportioning of (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Richard Feldman (2009). Evidentialism, Higher-Order Evidence, and Disagreement. Episteme 6 (3):294-312.
    Evidentialism is the thesis that a person is justified in believing a proposition iff the person's evidence on balance supports that proposition. In discussing epistemological issues associated with disagreements among epistemic peers, some philosophers have endorsed principles that seem to run contrary to evidentialism, specifying how one should revise one's beliefs in light of disagreement. In this paper, I examine the connection between evidentialism and these principles. I argue that the puzzles about disagreement provide no reason to abandon evidentialism and (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. Richard Feldman & Earl Conee (2005). Some Virtues of Evidentialism. Veritas 50 (4).
    O evidencialismo é, primordialmente, uma tese sobre a justificação epistêmica e, secundariamente, uma tese sobre o conhecimento. Sustenta que a justificação epistêmica é superveniente da evidência. As versões do evidencialismo diferem quanto ao que conta como evidência, quanto ao que seja possuir algo como evidência e quanto ao que um dado corpo de evidência apóia. A tese secundária é a de que o apoio evidencial é necessário ao conhecimento. O evidencialismo ajuda a formular as questões epistemológicas de uma forma que (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. Richard Feldman & Earl Conee (1985). Evidentialism. Philosophical Studies 48 (1):15 - 34.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. Peter Forrest, The Epistemology of Religion. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Contemporary epistemology of religion may conveniently be treated as adebate over whether evidentialism applies to thebelief-component of religious faith, or whether we should insteadadopt a more permissive epistemology. Here evidentialism is theinitially plausible position that a belief is justified only if``it is proportioned to the evidence''. For example, supposea local weather forecaster has noticed that over the two hundred yearssince records began a wetter than average Winter is followed in 85% ofcases by a hotter than average Summer. Then, assuming for (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. Danny Frederick (2013). Doxastic Voluntarism: A Sceptical Defence. International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 3 (1):24-44.
    Doxastic voluntarism maintains that we have voluntary control over our beliefs. It is generally denied by contemporary philosophers. I argue that doxastic voluntarism is true: normally, and insofar as we are rational, we are able to suspend belief and, provided we have a natural inclination to believe, we are able to rescind that suspension, and thus to choose to believe. I show that the arguments that have been offered against doxastic voluntarism fail; and that, if the denial of doxastic voluntarism (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. Richard Fumerton (2005). Review of Earl Conee, Richard Feldman, Evidentialism: Essays in Epistemology. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2005 (2).
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. Dorit Ganson (2008). Evidentialism and Pragmatic Constraints on Outright Belief. Philosophical Studies 139 (3):441 - 458.
    Evidentialism is the view that facts about whether or not an agent is justified in having a particular belief are entirely determined by facts about the agent’s evidence; the agent’s practical needs and interests are irrelevant. I examine an array of arguments against evidentialism (by Jeremy Fantl, Matthew McGrath, David Owens, and others), and demonstrate how their force is affected when we take into account the relation between degrees of belief and outright belief. Once we are sensitive to one of (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. Alvin I. Goldman, Or: Evidentialism's Troubles, Reliabilism's Rescue Package.
    For most of their respective existences, reliabilism and evidentialism (that is, process reliabilism and mentalist evidentialism) have been rivals. They are generally viewed as incompatible, even antithetical, theories of justification.1 But a few people are beginning to re-think this notion. Perhaps an ideal theory would be a hybrid of the two, combining the best elements of each theory. Juan Comesana (forthcoming) takes this point of view and constructs a position called “Evidentialist Reliabilism.” He tries to show how each theory can (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. Alvin I. Goldman (2011). Toward a Synthesis of Reliabilism and Evidentialism? Or: Evidentialism's Troubles, Reliabilism's Rescue Package. In Trent Dougherty (ed.), Evidentialism and its Discontents. Oxford University Press.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. John Greco (2010). Achieving Knowledge: A Virtue-Theoretic Account of Epistemic Normativity. Cambridge University Press.
    Machine generated contents note: Preface; Part I. Epistemic Normativity: 1. Knowledge as success from ability; 2. Against deontology; 3. Against internalism; 4. Against evidentialism; Part II. Problems for Everyone: 5. The nature of knowledge; 6. The value of knowledge; 7. Knowledge and context; 8. The Pyrrhonian problematic; Part III. Problems for Reliabilism: 9. The problem of strange and fleeting processes; 10. The problem of defeating evidence; 11. The problem of easy knowledge; Bibliography; Index.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. John Greco (2005). Evidentialism. International Philosophical Quarterly 45 (4):556-558.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36. David Henderson, Terry Horgan & Matjaž Potrč (2007). Transglobal Evidentialism-Reliabilism. Acta Analytica 22 (4):281-300.
    We propose an approach to epistemic justification that incorporates elements of both reliabilism and evidentialism, while also transforming these elements in significant ways. After briefly describing and motivating the non-standard version of reliabilism that Henderson and Horgan call “transglobal” reliabilism, we harness some of Henderson and Horgan’s conceptual machinery to provide a non-reliabilist account of propositional justification (i.e., evidential support). We then invoke this account, together with the notion of a transglobally reliable belief-forming process, to give an account of doxastic (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. Gordon D. Kaufman (1989). “Evidentialism”. Faith and Philosophy 6 (1):35-46.
    Current discussions of “evidentialism” seem to presuppose essentially traditional theistic conceptions and formulations. For many theologians. however, these have become problematic because of (a) the rise of a new consciousness of the significance of religiouspluralism; (b) the emergence of theories about the ways in which our symbolic frames of orientation shape all our experiencing and thinking; (c) a growing awareness that significant responsibility for some of the major evils of the twentieth century must be laid to ourreligious traditions. Since recent (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. Jonathan Kvanvig (2003). ``Propositionalism and the Perspectival Character of Justification&Quot. American Philosophical Quarterly 40 (1):3-18.
    The flight from foundationalism in the earlier part of this century left several options in its wake. Distress over the possibility of foundationalist replies to the regress problem, coupled with consternation over the thought of circular reasoning mysteriously becoming acceptable as the circle gets large led to the attraction of holistic theories of a coherentist variety. Yet, such coherentisms seemed to leave the belief system cut off from the world, and perhaps a better idea was to abandon the approach to (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  39. L. Leydon-Hardy (2012). Evidentialism and its Discontents * Edited by Trent Dougherty. Analysis 72 (4):852-854.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (11 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  40. Clayton Littlejohn (forthcoming). Reasons and Theoretical Rationality. In Oxford Handbook of X and Y.
    A discussion of epistemic reasons and theoretical rationality.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41. Clayton Littlejohn (forthcoming). Skeptical Thoughts Concerning Explanationism and Skepticism. Symposion.
    According to the explanationist, we can rely on inference to best explanation to justifiably believe familiar skeptical hypotheses are false. On this view, commonsense beliefs about the existence and character of familiar, medium-sized dry goods provides the best explanation of our evidence and so justifies our belief that we're not brains-in-vats. This explanationist approach seems prima facie plausible until we press the explanationist to tell us what the data is that we're trying to explain by appeal to our beliefs about (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  42. Clayton Littlejohn (forthcoming). The Unity of Reason. In Clayton Littlejohn John Turri (ed.), Epistemic Norms: New Essays on Action, Belief, and Assertion.
    Cases of reasonable, mistaken belief figure prominently in discussions of the knowledge norm of assertion and practical reason as putative counterexamples to these norms. These cases are supposed to show that the knowledge norm is too demanding and that some weaker norm (e.g., a justification or reasonable belief norm) ought to put in its place. These cases don't show what they're intended to. When you assert something false or treat some falsehood as if it's a reason for action, you might (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43. Clayton Littlejohn (2013). A Note Concerning Justification and Access. Episteme 10 (4):369-386.
    Certain combinations of attitudes are manifestly unreasonable. It is unreasonable to believe that dogs bark, for example, if one concedes that one has no justification to believe this. Why are the irrational combinations irrational? One suggestion is that these are attitudes that a subject cannot have justification to have. If this is right, we can test claims about the structure of propositional justification by relying on our observations about which combinations of attitudes constitute Moorean absurd pairs. In a recent defense (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  44. Clayton Littlejohn (2012). Justification and the Truth-Connection. Cambridge University Press.
  45. Clayton Littlejohn (2011). Reasons and Belief's Justification. In Andrew Reisner & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Reasons for Belief. Cambridge University Press.
    There has been a considerable amount of debate about the norms of belief, but little discussion to date about what the reasons associated with these norms demand from us. By working out an account of what reasons demand, we can better understand the nature of justification.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  46. Clayton Littlejohn (2011). Evidence and Armchair Access. Synthese 179 (3):479 - 500.
    In this paper, I shall discuss a problem that arises when you try to combine an attractive account of what constitutes evidence with an independently plausible account of the kind of access we have to our evidence. According to E = K, our evidence consists of what we know. According to the principle of armchair access, we can know from the armchair what our evidence is. Combined, these claims entail that we can have armchair knowledge of the external world. Because (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  47. Todd Long (2012). Mentalist Evidentialism Vindicated (and a Super-Blooper Epistemic Design Problem for Proper Function Justification). Philosophical Studies 157 (2):251-266.
    Michael Bergmann seeks to motivate his externalist, proper function theory of epistemic justification by providing three objections to the mentalism and mentalist evidentialism characteristic of nonexternalists such as Richard Feldman and Earl Conee. Bergmann argues that (i) mentalism is committed to the false thesis that justification depends on mental states; (ii) mentalism is committed to the false thesis that the epistemic fittingness of an epistemic input to a belief-forming process must be due to an essential feature of that input, and, (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  48. Errol Lord (forthcoming). Epistemic Reasons, Evidence, and Defeaters. In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. Oxford University Press.
    The post-Gettier literature contained many views that tried to solve the Gettier problem by appealing to the notion of defeat. Unfortunately, all of these views are false. The failure of these views greatly contributed to a general distrust of reasons in epistemology. However, reasons are making a comeback in epistemology, both in general and in the context of the Gettier problem. There are two main aims of this paper. First, I will argue against a natural defeat based resolution of the (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  49. Errol Lord (2010). Having Reasons and the Factoring Account. Philosophical Studies 149 (3):283 - 296.
    It’s natural to say that when it’s rational for me to φ, I have reasons to φ. That is, there are reasons for φ-ing, and moreover, I have some of them. Mark Schroeder calls this view The Factoring Account of the having reasons relation. He thinks The Factoring Account is false. In this paper, I defend The Factoring Account. Not only do I provide intuitive support for the view, but I also defend it against Schroeder’s criticisms. Moreover, I show that (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  50. Jack Lyons (2010). Precis of Perception and Basic Beliefs. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 153 (3):443 - 446.
1 — 50 / 91