Material to categorize
- Anthony P. Atkinson & M. Wheeler (2004). The Grain of Domains: The Evolutionary-Psychological Case Against Domain-General Cognition. Mind and Language 19 (2):147-76.
- Anthony P. Atkinson & M. Wheeler (2003). Evolutionary Psychology's Grain Problem and the Cognitive Neuroscience of Reasoning. In David E. Over (ed.), Evolution and the Psychology of Thinking: The Debate. Psychology Press.
- Scott Atran (2005). Adaptationism for Human Cognition: Strong, Spurious, or Weak? Mind and Language 20 (1):39-67.
- Scott Atran (2005). Strong Versus Weak Adaptationism in Cognition and Language. In Peter Carruthers, Stephen Laurence & Stephen Stich (eds.), The Innate Mind: Structure and Contents. New York: Oxford University Press New York.
- Carl T. Bergstrom & Peter Godfrey-Smith (1998). On the Evolution of Behavioral Complexity in Individuals and Populations. Biology and Philosophy 13 (2):205-31.
- Radu J. Bogdan (2003). Minding Minds: Evolving a Reflexive Mind by Interpreting Others. MIT Press.
- William H. Calvin (2004). A Brief History of the Mind: From Apes to Intellect and Beyond. Oxford University Press.
- Angelo Cangelosi, Alberto Greco & Stevan Harnad (2002). Symbol Grounding and the Symbolic Theft Hypothesis. In A. Cangelosi & D. Parisi (eds.), Simulating the Evolution of Language. Springer-Verlag.
- Paul Coates (2003). Review of Is the Visual World a Grand Illusion?. Human Nature Review 3:176-182.
- Leda Cosmides & John Tooby (1994). Beyond Intuition and Instinct Blindness: Toward an Evolutionary Rigorous Cognitive Science. Cognition 50:41-77.
- Denise D. Cummins & Robert E. Cummins (2005). Innate Modules Vs Innate Learning Biases. Cognitive Processing.
- Denise D. Cummins & Robert E. Cummins (1999). Biological Preparedness and Evolutionary Explanation. Cognition 73 (3):B37-B53.
- Paul Sheldon Davies (1996). Preface: Evolutionary Theory in Cognitive Psychology. Minds and Machines 6 (4).
- Stephen M. Downes (2002). Some Recent Developments in Evolutionary Approaches to the Study of Human Cognition and Behavior. Biology and Philosophy 16 (5):575-94.
- Catherine Driscoll (2004). Can Behaviors Be Adaptations? Philosophy of Science 71 (1):16-35.
- Russil Durrant & Brian D. Haig (2001). How to Pursue the Adaptationist Program in Psychology. Philosophical Psychology 14 (4):357 – 380.
- Peter Godfrey-Smith (2002). Environmental Complexity and the Evolution of Cognition. In Robert J. Sternberg & J. Kaufman (eds.), The Evolution of Intelligence. Lawrence Erlbaum.
- Peter Godfrey-Smith (2002). On the Evolution of Representational and Interpretive Capacities. The Monist 85 (1):50-69.
- Peter Godfrey-Smith (1996). Complexity and the Function of Mind in Nature. Cambridge University Press.
- Mark Greenberg (2004). Goals Versus Memes: Explanation in the Theory of Cultural Evolution. In Susan L. Hurley & Nick Chater (eds.), Perspectives on Imitation. MIT Press.
- Valerie Gray Hardcastle (1999). Where Biology Meets Psychology: Philosophical Essays. MIT Press.
- Marc D. Hauser & Elizabeth Spelke (2004). Evolutionary and Developmental Foundations of Human Knowledge. In Michael S. Gazzaniga (ed.), The Cognitive Neurosciences III. MIT Press.
- J. D. Logan (1898). Psychology and the Argument From Design. Philosophical Review 7 (6):604-614.
- Edouard Machery & H. Clark Barrett (2006). Debunking Adapting Minds. Philosophy of Science 73.
- Matteo Mameli, Evolution and Psychology in Philosophical Perspective.
- Matteo Mameli (2002). Mindreading, Mindshaping, and Evolution. Biology and Philosophy 16 (5):595-626.
- Kelby Mason, Chandra Sripada & Stephen P. Stich (forthcoming). The Philosophy of Psychology. In Dermot Moran (ed.), The Routledge Companion to Twentieth-Century Philosophy. Routledge.
- Ruth G. Millikan (1997). On Cognitive Luck: Externalism in an Evolutionary Frame. In P. Machamer & M. Carrier (eds.), Mindscapes: Philosophy, Science, and the Mind. Pittsburgh University Press and Universtaetsverlag Konstanz.
- S. Okasha (2003). Fodor on Cognition, Modularity, and Adaptationism. Philosophy of Science 70 (1):68-88.
- David Papineau (2004). Kim Sterelny, Thought in a Hostile World: The Evolution of Human Cognition , Oxford: Blackwell, 2003, Pp. XI 262, £50 (Cloth), £16.95 (Paper). Friendly Thoughts on the Evolution of Cognition. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (3):491 – 502.
- Steven Pinker & Paul Bloom (1990). Natural Language and Natural Selection. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13:707-27.
- Alvin Plantinga (2004). Evolution, Epiphenomenalism, Reductionism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (3):602-619.
- Robert J. Richards (2005). Darwin's Metaphysics of Mind. In V. Hoesle & C. Illies (eds.), Darwin and Philosophy. Notre Dame University Press.
- John Sarnecki (2007). Developmental Objections to Evolutionary Modularity. Biology and Philosophy 22 (4).
- Lawrence A. Shapiro & William M. Epstein (1998). Evolutionary Theory Meets Cognitive Psychology: A More Selective Perspective. Mind and Language 13 (2):171-94.
- Dan Sperber (1996). Explaining Culture: A Naturalistic Approach. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Kim Sterelny (2006). The Evolution and Evolvability of Culture. Mind and Language 21 (2):137-165.
- Kim Sterelny (2003). Thought in a Hostile World. Blackwell.
- Stephen Stich (2004). Some Questions From the Not-so-Hostile World. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (3):503-511.
- John Tooby & Leda Cosmides (1998). Evolutionizing the Cognitive Sciences: A Reply to Shapiro and Epstein. Mind and Language 13 (2):195-204.
- Oscar Vilarroya (2001). From Functional Mess to Bounded Functionality. Minds and Machines 11 (2).
- Denis M. Walsh (2001). Naturalism, Evolution and the Mind. Cambridge University Press.
- Edward A. Wasserman (2008). Development and Evolution of Cognition: One Doth Not Fly Into Flying! Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (4):400-401.
- Bruce H. Weber & David J. Depew (eds.) (2003). Evolution and Learning: The Baldwin Effect Reconsidered. MIT Press.
- M. Wheeler & Anthony P. Atkinson (2001). Domains, Brains and Evolution. In D. Walsh (ed.), Evolution, Naturalism and Mind. Cambridge University Press.
- James F. Woodward & Fiona Cowie (2004). The Mind is Not (Just) a System of Modules Shaped (Just) by Natural Selection. In Christopher Hitchcock (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Science. Malden MA: Blackwell Publishing.
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