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Summary This category includes work on two main questions: (1) Can morality be given an evolutionary explanation? (2) What implications for moral philosophy would such an explanation have? Work addressing (1) must clearly specify the explanatory target. An important challenge here is to distinguish morality from related notions: altruism (biological and psychological), cooperation, prosocial emotions, and the capacity to follow norms more generally. Such work must also specify the relevant evolutionary mechanism(s). Options include kin selection, reciprocity, cultural group selection, sexual selection, costly signaling, and evolutionary constraint or accident. A useful broad distinction here is between adaptationist accounts, on which morality was selected for, and non-adaptationist accounts, on which morality is a by-product of some other trait(s). Work addressing (2) can be divided into that which considers implications for normative ethics, and for metaethics. The former is widely claimed to fall foul of the is/ought gap and the naturalistic fallacy, but the latter is immune to such charges (whatever they ultimately amount to). Work of the latter sort can be roughly but usefully divided into vindicating and debunking accounts. On the former, an evolutionary explanation for morality is at least compatible with - and may even positively support - the existence of moral facts and our possession of moral knowledge. On the latter, such an explanation somehow undermines morality, by giving reason to doubt the existence of moral facts, or our reliability as moral judgment makers, or both.
Key works Ruse & Wilson 1986 made an early, flawed but still instructive attempt to link evolutionary biology with moral philosophy. More recently, Kitcher 2005 and Joyce 2006 have offered adaptationist accounts of the evolution of morality; see Prinz 2008 for a non-adaptationist account. Kahane 2011 provides a useful framework for considering the metaethical implications of an evolutionary explanation for morality. Joyce 2006 and Street 2006 are two prominent evolutionary debunkers of morality. For a vindicating account, see Copp 2008.
Introductions Encyclopedia entries include Fitzpatrick 2008 and Schroeder 2002. For article-length overviews of the empirical and metaethical issues, see Allchin 2009 and Levy 2010, respectively. For a book-length treatment, see James 2011.
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  1. Linda Abarbanell & Marc D. Hauser (2010). Mayan Morality: An Exploration of Permissible Harms. Cognition 115 (2):207-224.
    Anthropologists have provided rich field descriptions of the norms and conventions governing behavior and interactions in small-scale societies. Here, we add a further dimension to this work by presenting hypothetical moral dilemmas involving harm, to a small-scale, agrarian Mayan population, with the specific goal of exploring the hypothesis that certain moral principles apply universally. We presented Mayan participants with moral dilemmas translated into their native language, Tseltal. Paralleling several studies carried out with educated subjects living in large-scale, developed nations, the (...)
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  2. Zed Adams (2007). Frans de Waal, Primates and Philosophers: How Morality Evolved:Primates and Philosophers: How Morality Evolved. Ethics 117 (3):552-555.
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  3. Zed Adams (2007). The Evolution of Morality by Joyce, Richard. [REVIEW] Ethics 117 (2).
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  4. Zed Adams (2007). Richard Joyce, The Evolution of Morality. [REVIEW] Ethics 117 (2):363-369.
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  5. Nicholas Agar (2002). Agar's Review of Katz. [REVIEW] Biology and Philosophy 17 (1):123-139.
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  6. Max Albert & Hannes Rusch, Indirect Reciprocity, Golden Opportunities for Defection, and Inclusive Reputation. MAGKS Discussion Paper Series in Economics.
    In evolutionary models of indirect reciprocity, reputation mechanisms can stabilize cooperation even in severe cooperation problems like the prisoner’s dilemma. Under certain circumstances, conditionally cooperative strategies, which cooperate iff their partner has a good reputation, cannot be invaded by any other strategy that conditions behavior only on own and partner reputation. The first point of this paper is to show that an evolutionary version of backward induction can lead to a breakdown of this kind of indirectly reciprocal cooperation. Backward induction, (...)
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  7. J. McKenzie Alexander, Reconciling Morality with the Theory of Rational Choice Via Evolution.
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  8. J. McKenzie Alexander (2007). The Structural Evolution of Morality. Cambridge University Press.
    It is certainly the case that morality governs the interactions that take place between individuals. But what if morality exists because of these interactions? This book argues for the claim that much of the behaviour we view as 'moral' exists because acting in that way benefits each of us to the greatest extent possible, given the socially structured nature of society. Drawing upon aspects of evolutionary game theory, the theory of bounded rationality, and computational models of social networks, it shows (...)
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  9. J. McKenzie Alexander (2000). Evolutionary Explanations of Distributive Justice. Philosophy of Science 67 (3):490-516.
    Evolutionary game theoretic accounts of justice attempt to explain our willingness to follow certain principles of justice by appealing to robustness properties possessed by those principles. Skyrms (1996) offers one sketch of how such an account might go for divide-the-dollar, the simplest version of the Nash bargaining game, using the replicator dynamics of Taylor and Jonker (1978). In a recent article, D'Arms et al. (1998) criticize his account and describe a model which, they allege, undermines his theory. I sketch a (...)
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  10. Richard D. Alexander (1993). Biological Considerations in the Analysis of Morality. In Matthew Nitecki & Doris Nitecki (eds.), Evolutionary Ethics. Suny Press. 163--196.
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  11. Douglas Allchin (2009). The Evolution of Morality. Evolution 2 (4):590-601.
    Here, in textbook style, is a concise biological account of the evolution of morality. It addresses morality on three levels: moral outcomes (behavioral genetics), moral motivation or intent (psychology and neurology), and moral systems (sociality). The rationale for teaching this material is addressed in Allchin (2009). Classroom resources (including accompanying images and video links) and a discussion of teaching strategies are provided online at: http://EvolutionOfMorality.net.
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  12. Douglas Allchin (2009). Teaching the Evolution of Morality: Status and Resources. Evolution 2 (4):629-635.
    Recent studies now provide a relatively robust explanation of how moral behavior evolved, perhaps not just in humans. An analysis of current biology textbooks shows that they fail to address this critical topic fully. Here, I survey resources—books, images, and videos—that can guide educators in meeting the challenge of teaching the biology of morality.
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  13. Colin Allen & Marc Bekoff (2005). Animal Play and the Evolution of Morality: An Ethological Approach. Topoi 24 (2):125-135.
    In this paper we argue that there is much to learn about “wild justice” and the evolutionary origins of morality – behaving fairly – by studying social play behavior in group-living mammals. Because of its relatively wide distribution among the mammals, ethological investigation of play, informed by interdisciplinary cooperation, can provide a comparative perspective on the evolution of ethical behavior that is broader than is provided by the usual focus on primate sociality. Careful analysis of social play reveals rules of (...)
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  14. Fritz Allhoff (2009). The Evolution of the Moral Sentiments and the Metaphysics of Morals. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (1):97 - 114.
    So-called evolutionary error theorists, such as Michael Ruse and Richard Joyce, have argued that naturalistic accounts of the moral sentiments lead us to adopt an error theory approach to morality. Roughly, the argument is that an appreciation of the etiology of those sentiments undermines any reason to think that they track moral truth and, furthermore, undermines any reason to think that moral truth actually exists. I argue that this approach offers us a false dichotomy between error theory and some form (...)
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  15. Fritz Allhoff (2003). Evolutionary Ethics From Darwin to Moore. History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 25 (1):51 - 79.
    Evolutionary ethics has a long history, dating all the way back to Charles Darwin.1 Almost immediately after the publication of the Origin, an immense interest arose in the moral implications of Darwinism and whether the truth of Darwinism would undermine traditional ethics. Though the biological thesis was certainly exciting, nobody suspected that the impact of the Origin would be confined to the scientific arena. As one historian wrote, 'whether or not ancient populations of armadillos were transformed into the species that (...)
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  16. Keith Ansell-Pearson (2014). Morality and the Philosophy of Life in Guyau and Bergson. Continental Philosophy Review 47 (1):59-85.
    In this essay I examine the contribution a philosophy of life is able to make to our understanding of morality, including our appreciation of its evolution or development and its future. I focus on two contributions, namely, those of Jean-Marie Guyau and Henri Bergson. In the case of Guyau I show that he pioneers the naturalistic study of morality through a conception of life; for him the moral progress of humanity is bound up with an increasing sociability, involving both the (...)
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  17. Larry Arnhart (2001). Thomistic Natural Law as Darwinian Natural Right. Social Philosophy and Policy 18 (1):1-33.
    The publication in 1975 of Edward O. Wilson's Sociobiology provoked a great controversy, for in that work Wilson claimed that ethics was rooted in human biology. On the first page of the book, he asserted that our deepest intuitions of right and wrong are guided by the emotional control centers of the brain, which evolved via natural selection to help the human animal exploit opportunities and avoid threats in the natural environment. In 1998, the publication of Wilson's Consilience renewed the (...)
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  18. Larry Arnhart (1998). The New Darwinian Naturalism in Political Theory. Zygon 33 (3):369-393.
  19. Francisco Ayala (2010). What the Biological Sciences Can and Cannot Contribute to Ethics. In Francisco José Ayala & Robert Arp (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Biology. Wiley-Blackwell Pub..
    The question whether ethical behavior is biologically determined may refer either to the capacity for ethics (i.e., the proclivity to judge human actions as either right or wrong), or to the moral norms accepted by human beings for guiding their actions. I herein propose: (1) that the capacity for ethics is a necessary attribute of human nature; and (2) that moral norms are products of cultural evolution, not of biological evolution. Humans exhibit ethical behavior by nature because their biological makeup (...)
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  20. Francisco Ayala (2006). Biology to Ethics: An Evolutionist's View of Human Nature. In Giovanni Boniolo & Gabriele De Anna (eds.), Evolutionary Ethics and Contemporary Biology. Cambridge University Press. 141--158.
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  21. Francisco J. Ayala (2010). The Biological Foundations of Ethics. Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 66 (3):523 - 537.
    Erect posture and large brain are two of the most significant anatomical traits that distinguish us from nonhuman primates. But humans are also different from chimpanzees and other animals, and no less importantly, in their behavior, both as individuals and socially. Distinctive human behavioral attributes include tool-making and technology; abstract thinking, categorizing, and reasoning; symbolic (creative) language; self-awareness and death-awareness; science, literature, and art; legal codes, ethics and religion; complex social organization and political institutions. These traits may all be said (...)
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  22. Francisco J. Ayala (1987). The Biological Roots of Morality. Biology and Philosophy 2 (3):235-252.
    The question whether ethical behavior is biologically determined may refer either to thecapacity for ethics (e.i., the proclivity to judge human actions as either right or wrong), or to the moralnorms accepted by human beings for guiding their actions. My theses are: (1) that the capacity for ethics is a necessary attribute of human nature; and (2) that moral norms are products of cultural evolution, not of biological evolution.Humans exhibits ethical behavior by nature because their biological makeup determines the presence (...)
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  23. Francisco José Ayala (1967). Man in Evolution: A Scientific Statement and Some Theological and Ethical Implications. The Thomist 31:1-20.
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  24. Giovanni Felice Azzone (2003). The Dual Biological Identity of Human Beings and the Naturalization of Morality. History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 25 (2):211 - 241.
    The last two centuries have been the centuries of the discovery of the cell evolution: in the XIX century of the germinal cells and in the XX century of two groups of somatic cells, namely those of the brain-mind and of the immune systems. Since most cells do not behave in this way, the evolutionary character of the brain-mind and of the immune systems renders human beings formed by two different groups of somatic cells, one with a deterministic and another (...)
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  25. Elizabeth Baeten (2012). Another Defense of Naturalized Ethics. Metaphilosophy 43 (5):533-550.
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  26. Elizabeth Baeten (2004). Evolution and Ethics: Together Again? Studies in Practical Philosophy 4 (2):3-22.
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  27. Julian Baggini (1998). Darwin and Ethics. The Philosophers' Magazine 4:49-49.
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  28. Stephen W. Ball (1995). Gibbard's Evolutionary Theory of Rationality and its Ethical Implications. Biology and Philosophy 10 (2):129-180.
    Gibbard''s theory of rationality is evolutionary in terms of its result as well as its underpinning argument. The result is that judgments about what is rational are analyzed as being similar to judgments of morality — in view of what Darwin suggests concerning the latter. According to the Darwinian theory, moral judgments are based on sentiments which evolve to promote the survival and welfare of human societies. On Gibbard''s theory, rationality judgments should be similarly regarded as expressing emotional attachments to (...)
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  29. Stephen W. Ball (1992). Morality Among Nations: An Evolutionary View. [REVIEW] Biology and Philosophy 7 (3):361-377.
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  30. Stephen W. Ball (1988). Evolution, Explanation, and the Fact/Value Distinction. Biology and Philosophy 3 (3):317-348.
    Though modern non-cognitivists in ethics characteristically believe that values are irreducible to facts, they nevertheless believe that values are determined by facts, viz., those specified in functionalist, explanatory theories of the evolutionary origin of morality. The present paper probes the consistency of this position. The conventionalist theories of Hume and Harman are examined, and are seen not to establish a tight determinative reduction of values to facts. This result is illustrated by reference to recent theories of the sociobiological mechanisms involved (...)
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  31. Terence Ball (1981). Book Review:Darwinism and Human Affairs. Richard D. Alexander. [REVIEW] Ethics 92 (1):161-.
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  32. Albert G. A. Balz (1926). Evolution in Morals or the Evolution of Morals? Journal of Philosophy 23 (13):337-348.
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  33. Jonathan Barrett (1991). Really Taking Darwin and the Naturalistic Fallacy Seriously: An Objection to Rottschaefer and Martinsen. [REVIEW] Biology and Philosophy 6 (4):433-437.
    Out of a concern to respect the naturalistic fallacy, Ruse (1986) argues for the possibility of causal, but not justificatory, explanations of morality in terms of evolutionary processes. In a discussion of Ruse's work, Rottschaefer and Martinsen (1990) claim that he erroneously limits the explanatory scope of evolutionary concepts, because he fails to see that one can have objective moral properties without committing either of two forms of the naturalistic fallacy, if one holds that moral properties supervene on non-moral properties. (...)
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  34. L. A. Barricelli (1997). The Interaction Between Morality and Society--Its Evolutionary Mechanism. Journal of Human Values 3 (2):173-180.
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  35. Patrick Bateson (1989). Does Evolutionary Biology Contribute to Ethics? Biology and Philosophy 4 (3):287-301.
    Human propensities that are the products of Darwinian evolution may combine to generate a form of social behavior that is not itself a direct result of such pressure. This possibility may provide a satisfying explanation for the origin of socially transmitted rules such as the incest taboo. Similarly, the regulatory processes of development that generated adaptations to the environment in the circumstances in which they evolved can produce surprising and sometimes maladaptive consequences for the individual in modern conditions. These combinatorial (...)
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  36. Nicolas Baumard, Jean-Baptiste André & Dan Sperber (2013). A Mutualistic Approach to Morality: The Evolution of Fairness by Partner Choice. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 36 (1):59-122.
    What makes humans moral beings? This question can be understood either as a proximate question or as an ultimate question. The question is about the mental and social mechanisms that produce moral judgments and interactions, and has been investigated by psychologists and social scientists. The question is about the fitness consequences that explain why humans have morality, and has been discussed by evolutionary biologists in the context of the evolution of cooperation. Our goal here is to contribute to a fruitful (...)
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  37. Nicolas Baumard, Jean-Baptiste André & Dan Sperber (2013). Partner Choice, Fairness, and the Extension of Morality. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 36 (1):102-122.
    Our discussion of the commentaries begins, at the evolutionary level, with issues raised by our account of the evolution of morality in terms of partner-choice mutualism. We then turn to the cognitive level and the characterization and workings of fairness. In a final section, we discuss the degree to which our fairness-based approach to morality extends to norms that are commonly considered moral even though they are distinct from fairness.
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  38. Marc Bekoff (2004). Wild Justice and Fair Play: Cooperation, Forgiveness, and Morality in Animals. [REVIEW] Biology and Philosophy 19 (4):489-520.
    In this paper I argue that we can learn much about wild justice and the evolutionary origins of social morality – behaving fairly – by studying social play behavior in group-living animals, and that interdisciplinary cooperation will help immensely. In our efforts to learn more about the evolution of morality we need to broaden our comparative research to include animals other than non-human primates. If one is a good Darwinian, it is premature to claim that only humans can be empathic (...)
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  39. Marc Bekoff (2001). Social Play Behaviour. Cooperation, Fairness, Trust, and the Evolution of Morality. Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (2):81-90.
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  40. Marc Bekoff (2001). The Evolution of Animal Play, Emotions, and Social Morality: On Science, Theology, Spirituality, Personhood, and Love. Zygon 36 (4):615-655.
  41. Alfred W. Benn (1900). The Relation of Ethics to Evolution. International Journal of Ethics 11 (1):60-70.
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  42. Donato Bergandi (ed.) (2013). The Structural Links Between Ecology, Evolution and Ethics: The Virtuous Epistemic Circle. Springer.
    Abstract - Evolutionary, ecological and ethical studies are, at the same time, specific scientific disciplines and, from an historical point of view, structurally linked domains of research. In a context of environmental crisis, the need is increasingly emerging for a connecting epistemological framework able to express a common or convergent tendency of thought and practice aimed at building, among other things, an environmental policy management respectful of the planet’s biodiversity and its evolutionary potential. -/- Evolutionary biology, ecology and ethics: at (...)
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  43. Michael Bergmann & Patrick Kain (2014). Challenges to Moral and Religious Belief: Overview and Future Directions. In Challenges to Moral and Religious Belief: Disagreement and Evolution.
  44. Michael Bergmann & Patrick Kain (eds.) (2014). Challenges to Moral and Religious Belief: Disagreement and Evolution. Oxford University Press.
    Challenges to Moral and Religious Belief contains fourteen original essays by philosophers, theologians, and social scientists on challenges to moral and religious belief from disagreement and evolution. Three main questions are addressed: Can one reasonably maintain one's moral and religious beliefs in the face of interpersonal disagreement with intellectual peers? Does disagreement about morality between a religious belief source, such as a sacred text, and a non-religious belief source, such as a society's moral intuitions, make it irrational to continue trusting (...)
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  45. Selim Berker (forthcoming). Does Evolutionary Psychology Show That Normativity Is Mind-Dependent? In Justin D'Arms & Daniel Jacobson (eds.), Moral Psychology and Human Agency: Essays on the New Science of Ethics.
    Suppose we grant that evolutionary forces have had a profound effect on the contours of our normative judgments and intuitions. Can we conclude anything from this about the correct metaethical theory? I argue that, for the most part, we cannot. Focusing my attention on Sharon Street’s justly famous argument that the evolutionary origins of our normative judgments and intuitions cause insuperable epistemological difficulties for a metaethical view she calls "normative realism," I argue that there are two largely independent lines of (...)
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  46. K. G. Binmore (2005). Natural Justice. Oxford University Press.
    Natural Justice is a bold attempt to lay the foundations for a genuine science of morals using the theory of games. Since human morality is no less a product of evolution than any other human characteristic, the book takes the view that we need to explore its origins in the food-sharing social contracts of our prehuman ancestors. It is argued that the deep structure of our current fairness norms continues to reflect the logic of these primeval social contracts, but the (...)
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  47. Ken Binmore (2009). Justice as a Natural Phenomenon. Think 8 (22):7-23.
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  48. Jonathan Birch (2014). How Cooperation Became the Norm. [REVIEW] Biology and Philosophy 29 (3):433-444.
    Most of the contributions to Cooperation and Its Evolution grapple with the distinctive challenges presented by the project of explaining human sociality. Many of these puzzles have a ‘chicken and egg’ character: our virtually unparalleled capacity for large-scale cooperation is the product of psychological, behavioural, and demographic changes in our recent evolutionary history, and these changes are linked by complex patterns of reciprocal dependence. There is much we do not yet understand about the timing of these changes, and about the (...)
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  49. James Blachowicz (2008). The Beginning and End of Negative Morality: An Evolutionary Perspective. Philosophical Forum 39 (1):21–51.
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  50. Russell Blackford (2010). Book Review: Sam Harris' The Moral Landscape. [REVIEW] Journal of Evolution and Technology 21:53-62.
    In the end, Harris provides a compelling argument for selective intolerance toward harsh moral traditions. He argues via a kind of moral realism, linked to a form of utilitarian ethic, but I submit that these are not doing the real work. To reach a similar conclusion, we can rely on much weaker premises. It’s enough that we have a non-arbitrary conception of what morality is for, and what sorts of things we can rationally and realistically want moral traditions to do. (...)
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